Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
On Sun, Dec 10, 2006 at 01:57:40AM -0800, William wrote: It takes precisely the same amount of information to simulate something as the thing has in the first place. This is the definition of information as used in algorithmic information theory. So I don't think this latter argument works at all. I am referring to a perfect simulation by higher hand. The universe where this simulation is taking place would both have all the information of our universe (same amount of information) + the information to describe the simulators (higher hand); which would be more than the information in our universe (and describing these higher hands probably isn't going to work without adding an infinite amount of information). If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal Turing machine will do for a higher hand. In which case, the information needed is simply the shortest possible program for simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the information content of the universe. If, on the other hand, the universe is not simulable by a Turing machine, then I really don't know what you mean by simulating it by a higher hand. You would need to give more details. Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Cosmological Theodicea - JOINING post
Hello everybody I am a 39-year-old male with a Master in Engineering, a scientific background and an enduring passion for Cosmology I have been elaborating something along lines similar to Tegmark's myself for a few years, albeit starting from a more philosophical point of view My original question was something like this: Given that I am physical being, can a tree in my thoughts be any less physical than a tree in my garden? Here's my current stance on the topic (I presume the titles are giveaways...): Gods Many Dices (I) - The Science of Parallel Universes (an extended commentary of Tegmark's): http://omnologos.wordpress.com/2006/10/23/god%e2%80%99s-many-dices-i-the-science-of-parallel-universes/ http://tinyurl.com/y565d2 Gods Many Dices (II) - The Philosophy of Parallel Universes (introductory remarks on the philosophical consequences of parallel universes) http://omnologos.wordpress.com/2006/10/24/god%e2%80%99s-many-dices-ii-the-philosophy-of-parallel-universes/ http://tinyurl.com/y4udnp In the second article I propose an answer to the Theodicea question (namely, God doesn't just allow evil to happen: God allows everything to happen). I haven't come across that before (is anybody else here interested in the topic?) Anyway, having just joined I'll now lurk for a while regards maurizio Blog (English): http://omnologos.wordpress.com Blog (Italiano): http://mauriziomorabito.wordpress.com --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 10-déc.-06, à 00:33, Tom Caylor a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 04-déc.-06, à 08:34, Tom Caylor wrote : The existence of a personal God who is not silent answers the questions in a way that an impersonal god or reality does not... I certainly have a methodological problem with such an idea. This is due to my motivation in the subject. I am searching an explanation of what is a person, so assuming the existence of a person (any person, godlike or not) seems to me to beg the question... In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of evil is solved or even really addressed with comp. This is because comp cannot define evil correctly. I will try to explain this more. I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. Note also that the major critics by the neoplatonists on Aristotle, besides their diverging opinions on the nature of matter, is the non-person character of the big unnameable, but then for Plotinus the second God (the second primary hypostase is personal), and indeed G* has a personal aspect from the point of view of the machine. I agree (comp agree) with Plotinus that the big first cannot be a person. The second one can. To be sure Plotinus is not always completely clear on that point (especially on his chapter on free-will). None of Plotinus' hypostases are both personal and free from evil (as well as infinite, which we agree is needed (but not sufficient, I maintain!) for the problem of meaning). It is a key point. I agree. None of Plotinus hypostases are both personal and free from evil/good. Finding an arithmetical interpretation of the hypostases could then give a hope toward an explanation of goodness and evil. Please note that 7/8 of the hypostases are personal-views. ... An impersonal origin results in everything finally being equal. Why? This reminds me Smullyan describing two possible reactions of a human in front of the comp hyp: 1) The human does not trust himself and believes that machine are stupid at the start. His reaction about comp is: I am machine thus I am as stupid as a machine. 2) The human trust himself: his reaction with the comp hyp is Cute, it means machine can be as nice as me. Where you can really see that numbers are impersonal is in the fact that they don't solve the problem of evil. Why do you say that numbers are impersonal? The scientific discourse, be it on numbers, machines, humans or Gods has to be impersonal, but it would be an error to infer from that numbers or machines or humans or gods are impersonal. Yes, Man is finite and cf Sartre, Plato etc. is not a sufficient integration point within himself for meaning. Why? Recall that although comp makes the body finite, the 1-person cannot be conceived as such, at least by the 1-person eself. But man, as a person, is also noble and cruel in his relationship with himself and other persons. With an impersonal core, the universe/multiverse is totally silent in this area. As it should be. But with comp there is no universe/multiverse in that sense. Comp generates truly, for logical and arithmetical reasons, a conception of a highly interconnected whole where the difference between appearances (psychological, physical, sensible, ...) comes from the many person-point of view. Only the arithmetical truth is 0-personal, the seven other main hypostases are based on the notion of person, which, thanks to the incompleteness theorem can be defined through the modal nuances: p, Bp, Bp p, Bp Dp, Bp Dp p (viewed from G (3-communicable) and G* (3-inferable but non 1-communicable). With an impersonal core, Man's alienation with himself and other persons is only because of chance. With an impersonal core, man is simply statistically out of line with the rest of the universe. With an impersonal core, the only possible definition of right vs. wrong is statistical (e.g. the average), and ultimately there is no difference between cruelty and non-cruelty. Yes I can agree, but then you should be glad with comp, it explains that the impersonal arithmetical core can generate the many personal point of views. As Marquis de Sade said, What is, is right. This is because Sade makes the utterly devastating confusion between mechanism and materialism. With comp Sade is probably the most inconsistent philosopher we can imagine. I think Sade was not completely unaware of that. If we were all tied to a computer which takes the average and
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
In a message dated 12/11/2006 3:35:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
In a message dated 12/11/2006 3:17:42 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal Turing machine will do for a higher hand. In which case, the information needed is simply the shortest possible program for simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the information content of the universe. What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the simulations for now although i do not think it is required): 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours. Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual difference). Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist but is less probable than 1. information in 1 = inf(A) information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) inf(A) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. !! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
1Z wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. !! To expand a bit, both of these easily answer the problem Of Evil if you treat them as Theories of Everything (and not just Everything Physical). The Problem of Evil is the Problem of reconciling a good God with a suffering world. Since there is no God in either theory, the problem does not arise. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
