RE: computer pain
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Brent Meeker): Bruno: Because ethics and aesthetics modalities are of an higher order than arithmetic which can be considered as deeper and/or simpler. Classical arithmetical truth obeys classical logic which is the most efficient for describing platonia. Good and bad is related with the infinite self mirroring of an infinity of universal machines: it is infinitely more tricky, and in particular neither classical ethics nor aesthetics should be expected to follow classical logic. That seems unnecessarily complicated. Good and bad at the personal Whahooh! and Ouch! are easily explained as consequences of evolution and natural selection. Here is perhaps a deep disagreement (which could explain others). I can understand that the 3-personal OUCH can easily be explained as a consequences of evolution and natural selection, for example by saying that the OUCH uttered by an animal could attract the attention of its fellows on the presence of a danger, so natural selection can But, and here is the crux of the mind body problem, if such an explanation explains completely the non personal Whahooh/Ouch then it does not explain at all the first personal OUCH. Worst: it makes such a personal feeling completely useless ... And then it makes the very notion of Good and Bad pure non sense. Of course platonists, who have grasped the complete reversal (like the neoplatonist Plotinus, etc.), have no problem here given that natural evolution occur logically well after the platonis true/false, Good/bad, etc. distinction. The personal feeling related to ouch is logically prior too). Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain why good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good and bad beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would ultimately produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational inclusion of certain groups as inferior, they were right: we could breed superior humans following Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps on other worlds evolution has made such programs a natural part of life, regarded by everyone as good. Yet most of us would regard them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Brent Meeker): Bruno: Because ethics and aesthetics modalities are of an higher order than arithmetic which can be considered as deeper and/or simpler. Classical arithmetical truth obeys classical logic which is the most efficient for describing platonia. Good and bad is related with the infinite self mirroring of an infinity of universal machines: it is infinitely more tricky, and in particular neither classical ethics nor aesthetics should be expected to follow classical logic. That seems unnecessarily complicated. Good and bad at the personal Whahooh! and Ouch! are easily explained as consequences of evolution and natural selection. Here is perhaps a deep disagreement (which could explain others). I can understand that the 3-personal OUCH can easily be explained as a consequences of evolution and natural selection, for example by saying that the OUCH uttered by an animal could attract the attention of its fellows on the presence of a danger, so natural selection can But, and here is the crux of the mind body problem, if such an explanation explains completely the non personal Whahooh/Ouch then it does not explain at all the first personal OUCH. Worst: it makes such a personal feeling completely useless ... And then it makes the very notion of Good and Bad pure non sense. Of course platonists, who have grasped the complete reversal (like the neoplatonist Plotinus, etc.), have no problem here given that natural evolution occur logically well after the platonis true/false, Good/bad, etc. distinction. The personal feeling related to ouch is logically prior too). Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain why good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good and bad That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. good and bad. Good feels as it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to do that, e.g. have sex. Bad feels as it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to not do that, e.g. hold your hand in the fire. If it felt good you'd do it, because that's what feels good means, a feeling you want to have. beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would ultimately produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational inclusion of certain groups as inferior, they were right: we could breed superior humans following Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps on other worlds evolution has made such programs a natural part of life, regarded by everyone as good. Yet most of us would regard them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. Would we? Before the Nazis gave it a bad name, eugenics was a popular movement in the U.S. mostly directed at sterilizing mentally retarded people. I think it would be regarded as bad simply because we don't trust government power to be exercised prudently or to be easily limited - both practical considerations. If eugenics is practiced voluntarily, as it is being practiced in the U.S., I don't think anyone will object (well a few fundamentalist luddites will). Brent Meeker Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other ethical principles or commandments from God: With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by horrible monster ... That seems to be a reductio against comp. I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is famous for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes are illustrated in taoist and buddhist tales). So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are good? That sounds like nonsense. We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to communicate it to others *as such*, if only to prevent any normative use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward names or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can put a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the machine deserve jail. Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love buddha, kill it. (Not to take literally OC). Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine (that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am consistent and I still less know if I am correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:10, Brent Meeker a écrit : It seems to me that consciousness can exist without narrative, and without long term memory. The question if the amoeba forms memories could depends on the time scale. After all amoebas are pluri-molecular mechanism exchanging information (through viruses?) in some way. I would not bet on the unconsciousness of amoebas on large time scale. Then you have adopted some new meaning of consciousness. If you stretch consciousness to fit every exchange or storage of information then everything in the universe is conscious and we will need to invent a new word to distinguish conscious people from unconscious ones. I was using the word consciousness in the usual informal sense. I was not saying that any information exchange/storage is conscious. I was saying that I would not bet that some highly complex exchange/storage of information, in some context where self-referential correctness is at play (like evolution and self-adaptation) is not conscious. I was saying I am open to the idea that some process around us could have a consciousness about whioch we have no idea because it operates on a different scale than our own. I was not saying that amoebas are conscious, but that it would be quick to say for sure that many communicating amoebas during millenia are not. I was just doubting aloud. More formally, I think that consciousness is just the interrogative belief in a reality. But it is an *instinctive* belief. The interrogative aspect, the interrogation mark has a tendency to be burried. We are blasé, especially after childhood. Much more formally. By Godel COMPLeteness theorem, a (first order) theory is consistent iff the theory has a model, that is iff there is a mathematical structure capable of satisfying the theorems of the theory. Like (N, +, *, 0; succ) satisfies Peano Axioms and theorems. So, extensionally, to say I am consistent is equivalent (from outside) with there is a reality (respecting my beliefs/theorems). By Godel INCOMPLeteness, if such a reality exists (for me) then I cannot prove it exists (that would be a proof of my consistency), so I can only hope in such a reality. But that hope is so important for life (by accelerating relatively my decisions making ability) that nature has buried the interrogation mark of that hope, so that old animal like us take reality for granted until Plato recall us it cannot be (and create science by the same token). So consciousness is Dt?. In arithmetic it is the interrogative *inference* of Consistent(godel-number of 0 = 0). Once the machine infer Dt, she can either keep it as an inference about itself, or she can take it as a new belief, but then it is a new (and provably more efficient machine(*) for which a new B and D, still obeying G and G*, can be (re)applied. Bruno (*) See Godel's paper on the length of proofs in Martin Davis The Undecidable, or Yuri Manin's book on Mathematical Logic which gives a clear proof of Godel's result on the length of proofs (shortened when adding undecidable sentences). See the book by Torkel Franzen, which is quite a good introduction to Godel incompleteness theorem (perhaps more readable than many other book at that level). Inexhaustibility: A Non-Exhaustive Treatment, Lecture Notes in Logic 16 (Lecture Notes in Logic, 16) (Paperback) http://www.amazon.com/Inexhaustibility-Non-Exhaustive-Treatment- Lecture-Notes/dp/1568811756 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other ethical principles or commandments from God: With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by horrible monster ... That seems to be a reductio against comp. I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is famous for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one. It seems you are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act. That sounds like a reductio to me. Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes are illustrated in taoist and buddhist tales). So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are good? That sounds like nonsense. We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to communicate it to others *as such*, if only to prevent any normative use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward names or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can put a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the machine deserve jail. OK. That comports with my thought that good/bad are personal. So one can say, I did that because I think it was good to do so. And I can try to persuade you that you should think it good too. It's just wrong to assume that there is a knowable, objective good. Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love buddha, kill it. (Not to take literally OC). Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine (that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am consistent and I still less know if I am correct. Bruno Yes, I understand and agree with that. But you are using know in an absolute sense. In the everyday sense of uncertain, but probably correct belief, one can know many things - though of course not that one is consistent. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Brent meeker writes: Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain why good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good and bad That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. good and bad. Good feels as it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to do that, e.g. have sex. Bad feels as it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to not do that, e.g. hold your hand in the fire. If it felt good you'd do it, because that's what feels good means, a feeling you want to have. But it is not an absurd question to ask whether something we have evolved to think is good really is good. You are focussing on the descriptive aspect of ethics and ignoring the normative. Even if it could be shown that a certain ethical belief has been hardwired into our brains this does not make the qustion of whether the belief is one we ought to have an absurd one. We could decide that evolution sucks and we have to deliberately flout it in every way we can. It might not be a wise policy but it is not *wrong* in the way it would be wrong to claim that God made the world 6000 years ago. beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would ultimately produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational inclusion of certain groups as inferior, they were right: we could breed superior humans following Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps on other worlds evolution has made such programs a natural part of life, regarded by everyone as good. Yet most of us would regard them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. Would we? Before the Nazis gave it a bad name, eugenics was a popular movement in the U.S. mostly directed at sterilizing mentally retarded people. I think it would be regarded as bad simply because we don't trust government power to be exercised prudently or to be easily limited - both practical considerations. If eugenics is practiced voluntarily, as it is being practiced in the U.S., I don't think anyone will object (well a few fundamentalist luddites will). What about if we tested every child and allowed only the superior ones to reproduce? The point is, many people would just say this is wrong, regardless of the potential benefits to society or the species, and the response to this is not that it is absurd to hold it as wrong (leaving aside emotional rhetoric). Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain why good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good and bad That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. good and bad. Good feels as it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to do that, e.g. have sex. Bad feels as it does because it is (or was) evolutionarily advantageous to not do that, e.g. hold your hand in the fire. If it felt good you'd do it, because that's what feels good means, a feeling you want to have. But it is not an absurd question to ask whether something we have evolved to think is good really is good. You are focussing on the descriptive aspect of ethics and ignoring the normative. Right - because I don't think there is an normative aspect in the objective sense. Even if it could be shown that a certain ethical belief has been hardwired into our brains this does not make the qustion of whether the belief is one we ought to have an absurd one. We could decide that evolution sucks and we have to deliberately flout it in every way we can. But we could only decide that by showing a conflict with something else we consider good. It might not be a wise policy but it is not *wrong* in the way it would be wrong to claim that God made the world 6000 years ago. I agree, because I think there is a objective sense in which the world is more than 6000yrs old. beyond following some imperative of evolution. For example, the Nazis argued that eliminating inferior specimens from the gene pool would ultimately produce a superior species. Aside from their irrational inclusion of certain groups as inferior, they were right: we could breed superior humans following Nazi eugenic programs, and perhaps on other worlds evolution has made such programs a natural part of life, regarded by everyone as good. Yet most of us would regard them as bad, regardless of their practical benefits. Would we? Before the Nazis gave it a bad name, eugenics was a popular movement in the U.S. mostly directed at sterilizing mentally retarded people. I think it would be regarded as bad simply because we don't trust government power to be exercised prudently or to be easily limited - both practical considerations. If eugenics is practiced voluntarily, as it is being practiced in the U.S., I don't think anyone will object (well a few fundamentalist luddites will). What about if we tested every child and allowed only the superior ones to reproduce? The point is, many people would just say this is wrong, regardless of the potential benefits to society or the species, and the response to this is not that it is absurd to hold it as wrong (leaving aside emotional rhetoric). But people wouldn't *just* say this is wrong. This example is a question of societal policy. It's about what *we* will impose on *them*. It is a question of ethics, not good and bad. So in fact people would give reasons it was wrong: Who's gonna say what superior means? Who gets to decide? They might say, I just think it's bad. - but that would just be an implicit appeal to you to see whether you thought is was bad too. Social policy can only be judged in terms of what the individual members of society think is good or bad. I think I'm losing the thread of what we're discussing here. Are you holding that there are absolute norms of good/bad - as in your example of eugenics? Brent Meeker Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
