Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Kory Heath wrote: > On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then >> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not >> the null state? >> I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be one-to-one (which is possible since a stone or other physical object has many microscopic states). If the mapping is something like: computation-state1---map1>physical-state0 computation-state2---map2>physical-state0 computation-state3---map3>physical-state0 ... then the inverse mapping, physical-state0---1map--->computation-state1 physical-state0---2map--->computation-state2 physical-state0---3map--->computation-state3 ... has to implicitly provide it's own order. So for the physical-state0 to implement the computation there would have to be another index variable, like time, to order the inverse mapping. Then it would really be physical-state0@ t=1---1map--->computation-state1 physical-state0@ t=2---2map--->computation-state2 physical-state0@ t=3---3map--->computation-state3 ... Right? Brent. > > I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any > computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the > belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm > not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all > computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are > functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of > the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play > for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation, > because that's the one I actually understand. > > -- Kory > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
If you look at the structure and relationships of maths, it's all rather an incestuous family tree anyway. You can get from any one point to another if you try hard enough. It's like 6 degrees of Kevin Bacon. Now think of any physical system embedded in the maths. It's easy enough to get to other physical systems, or to other mathematical objects, and eventually to any physicality you want. Just consider that it's completely irrelevant whether you start off with the platonic maths world or the physical world. If this seems unclear or silly, well, I am very drunk -- - Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/16 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then > > every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not > > the null state? > > I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any > computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the > belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm > not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all > computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are > functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of > the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play > for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation, > because that's the one I actually understand. > > -- Kory > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then > every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not > the null state? I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation, because that's the one I actually understand. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
*Is it wrong to ask what the lattice is made of? Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical existence? m.a. * Kory Heath wrote > Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary > digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an > outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's > Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, "At > time T, is this cell on or off?" For any cell at any time T, there's a > mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on > or off. > > My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter > play the role that "physical existence" is supposed to play for > materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's > Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits > (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons, > I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so), > because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're > "all you need" for consciousness, and they're "all you need" for what > materialists call "physical reality". We can perform acts of > computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical > facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness. > > > > -- Kory > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon
Dear Gordon Tsai, you wrote: "...How do we gain 'the outside view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system?..." I am the 'heretic' who denies that we 'can'. Whatever "we" think as 'outside', is within our own thinking, no matter how we imagine to transcend our limitations. Bruno writes very smart things, I enjoy reading them, but 'with a grain of salt' that it is Brunoism, not binding in the limits to my imagination. Sometimes I get startled by his strong arguments, sometimes I have the "OK, but..." response. I started on the list more than 10 years ago. Welcome to the place of free spirits John Mikes On 11/13/08, Gordon Tsai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno: > >I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to > find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still > sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I > think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, > dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled > subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain 'the outside > view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It's like > chess pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath > rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as 'self-observing 'ideal' > machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon my poetic > distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's home? > > Gordon > > > > --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon) > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM > > > On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: > >> >> >> On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the >>> argument >>> with people interested in the matter. >> >> True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) >> >>> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to >>> tell us what he means by a physical universe. >> >> I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, >> "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. > What's >> problematic about that?" > > > I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian > brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building. > Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from > that, and by this move created modern science including theology as > the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature > enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic, > both scientist and theologian get back to it. > Of course poets and mystics know better > > > >> And then the burden is back on us to explain >> why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than > it >> seems. Burden Tennis. > > > This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument > (hereafter MGA). > > > > >> >> >>> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use >>> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or >>> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). >> >> I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to >> some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by >> anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that >> computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. > > > Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will > have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember > that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be > it soft or hard wired). > > > >> I >> believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian >> machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- >> experiments. > > > MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like > UDA, but it is deeply different. > > >> >> >> I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. > > > Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does > not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA > was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that > computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me > too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit > frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they > already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me > that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses > it with other type of criticism of comp. > > > >> It's easy for me to >> sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of >> actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that >> computations don't need to be implem
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/15 Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > 2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything' > > Just what I was saying! > I was about to say that... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or > just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the > character's part. > > For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible > computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing whether > you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it - you start off > with physicalism and end up with some kind of neoplatonism. Of course, you > could still argue that you need some kind of physical seed, but again what I > take from this is that since you can perform as much abstraction on the > substrate as you like, it doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be > completely nothing. My simplistic version works like this: > > 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything' Just what I was saying! -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/15 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory > outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that > reality in PC is still "materialist", in the sense that at the root > there still is material stuff which is different than bare > mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a > physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as > there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that > stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the > computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust > throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to > say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of > my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough > like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally > disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through > space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist. > > One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my > opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One > can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in > order for the "dust" to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to > suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the > role that "physical existence" is supposed to play. But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? The computation is "realised" in the mapping, a Platonic object, with the nature or even existence of the physical state being irrelevant. > Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard > to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For > instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt > the need to "jump start" the universe he wanted by performing the > initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be > jump-started. Yes, I guess he just added that part because it fit better with the story. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the character's part. For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing whether you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it - you start off with physicalism and end up with some kind of neoplatonism. Of course, you could still argue that you need some kind of physical seed, but again what I take from this is that since you can perform as much abstraction on the substrate as you like, it doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be completely nothing. My simplistic version works like this: 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything' 2008/11/15 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote: > > Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have > > essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. > > Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory > outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that > reality in PC is still "materialist", in the sense that at the root > there still is material stuff which is different than bare > mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a > physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as > there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that > stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the > computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust > throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to > say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of > my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough > like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally > disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through > space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist. > > One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my > opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One > can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in > order for the "dust" to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to > suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the > role that "physical existence" is supposed to play. > > Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard > to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For > instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt > the need to "jump start" the universe he wanted by performing the > initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be > jump-started. > > -- Kory > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
