Re: MGA 3
This distinction between physicalism and materialism, with materialism allowing for features to emerge, it sounds to me like a join-the-dots puzzle - the physical substrate provides the dots, but the supervening system also contains lines - abstract structures implied by but not contained within the system implementing it. But does that not mean that this also implies further possible layers to the underlying reality? That no matter how many turtles you go down, there's always more turtles to come? -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/12/7 Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Sat, Dec 06, 2008 at 03:32:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I would be pleased if you can give me a version of MAT or MEC to which the argument does not apply. For example, the argument applies to most transfinite variant of MEC. It does not apply when some magic is introduced in MAT, and MAT is hard to define in a way to exclude that magic. If you can help, I thank you in advance. Bruno Michael Lockwood distinguishes between materialism (consciousness supervenes on the physical world) and physicalism (the physical world suffices to explain everything). The difference between the two is that in physicalism, consciousness (indeed any emergent phenomenon) is mere epiphenomena, a computational convenience, but not necessary for explanation, whereas in non-physicalist materialism, there are emergent phenomena that are not explainable in terms of the underlying physics, even though supervenience holds. This has been argued in the famous paper by Philip Anderson. One very obvious distinction between the two positions is that strong emergence is possible in materialism, but strictly forbidden by physicalism. An example I give of strong emergence in my book is the strong anthropic principle. So - I'm convinced your argument works to show the contradiction between COMP and physicalism, but not so the more general materialism. I think you have confirmed this in some of your previous responses to me in this thread. Which is just as well. AFAICT, supervenience is the only thing preventing the Occam catastrophe. We don't live in a magical world, because such a world (assuming COMP) would have so many contradictory statements that we'd disappear in a puff of destructive logic! (reference to my previous posting about destructive phenomena). -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
Thanks for the references.
You are welcome.
ps- it is final exam crunch time, so I haven't been checking email so
much as usual... I may get around to more detailed replies et cetera
this weekend or next week.
With pleasure.
Best,
Bruno
On Sun, Dec 7, 2008 at 1:12 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
On 07 Dec 2008, at 06:19, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument
more
detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or
be
opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might
not be good at all pedagogically...
I would be pleased if you can give me a version of MAT or MEC to
which
the argument does not apply. For example, the argument applies to
most
transfinite variant of MEC. It does not apply when some magic is
introduced in MAT, and MAT is hard to define in a way to exclude that
magic. If you can help, I thank you in advance.
My particular brand of magic appears to be a requirement of
counterfactual/causal structure that reflects the
counterfactual/causal structure of (abstract) computation.
Sometimes I think I should first explain what a computation is. I
take it
in the sense of theoretical computer science, a computation is
always define
relatively to a universal computation from outside, and an infinity
of
universal computations from inside. This asks for a bit of computer
science.
But there is not really abstract computation, there are always
relative
computation (both with comp and Everett QM). They are always concrete
relatively to the universal machine which execute them. The
starting point
in no important (for our fundamental concerns), you can take number
with
addition and multiplication, or lambda terms with abstraction and
application.
Stathis has
pointed out some possible ways to show such ideas incoherent (which I
am not completely skeptical of, despite my arguments).
I appreciate.
Since this type
of theory is the type that matches my personal intuition, MGA will
feel empty to me until such alternatives are explicitly dealt a
killing blow (after which the rest is obvious, since I intuitively
feel the contradiction in versions of COMP+MAT that don't require
counterfactuals).
Understanding UD(1...7) could perhaps help you to figure out what
happens
when we abandon the physical supervenience thesis, and embrace what
remains,
if keeping comp, that is the comp supervenience. It will explain
how the
physical laws have to emerge and why we believe (quasi-correctly)
in brains.
Of course, as you say, you'd be in a hard spot if you were required
to
deal with every various intuition that anybody had... but, for what
it's worth, that is mine.
I respect your intuition and appreciate the kind attitude. My
feeling is
that if front of very hard problems we have to be open to the fact
that we
could be surprised and that truth could be counterintuitive. The
incompleteness phenomena, from Godel and Lob, are surprising and
counterintuitive, and in the empirical world the SWE, whatever
interpretation we find more plausible, is always rather
counterintuitive
too.
I interpret the self-referentially correct scientist M by the
logic of
Godel's provability predicates beweisbar_M. But the intuitive
knower, the
first person, is modelled (or defined) by the Theatetus trick: the
machine M
knows p in case beweisbar_M('p') and p. Although extensionally
equivalent,
their are intensionally different. They prove the same arithmetical
propositions, but they obey different logics. This is enough for
showing
that the first person associated with the self-referentially correct
scientist will already disbelieve the comp hypothesis or find it very
doubtful. We are near a paradox: the correct machine cannot know or
believe
their are machine. No doubt comp will appear counterintuitive for
them. I
know it is a sort of trap/ the solution consists in admitting that
comp
needs a strong act of faith, and I try to put light on the
consequences for
a machine, when she makes the bet.
The best reference on the self-reference logics are
Boolos, G. (1979). The unprovability of consistency. Cambridge
University
Press, London.Boolos, G. (1993). The Logic of Provability. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.Smoryński, P. (1985). Self-Reference
and Modal
Logic. Springer Verlag, New York.Smullyan, R. (1987). Forever
Undecided.
Knopf, New York.
The last one is a recreative book, not so simple, and rather quick
in the
heart of the matter chapter. Smullyan wrote many lovely books,
recreative
and technical on that theme.
The bible, imo, is Martin Davis book The undecidable which
contains some
of the original papers by Gödel, Church, Kleene, Post and indeed
the most
key starting points of the parts of
Re: Lost and not lost 1 (Plan)
Kim (and Bruno, if you allow me to intrude): Bruno's IF depends IMO on how one is defining machine. Evidently NOT a mechanical contraption driven by 'energy'(?) input and built-in controls that are operated by a 'machinist' of higher consciousness. Then again Descartes? I would call his point a 'machine WITH a ghost' what he calls 'soul'. I would name it a complexity of machine and function' calling a machine anything that DOES something (even that is questionable). In many minds 'machine' may imply a design. (Just haphazardously, or as the ominous ID?) So, to reflect to Kim's question, what else? - could mean: different from what? (Complexity is my word for 'ensemble', because the latter does not postulate any interrrelations - interactive(?) functions(?). ) A machine is not a mere 'ensemble'. Nor is a universe. Maybe my poor French is inadequate. John On Wed, Dec 10, 2008 at 12:29 AM, Kim Jones [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Ok - Bruno, I will take this very slowly. You have a habit of saying 10,000 fascinating things in one post and staggering me, so one at a time: On 10/12/2008, at 4:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Here, below, is the plan of my heroic attempt (indeed) to explain why I think that: IF we assume that we are machine, Never understood what people meant by a machine. I've always thought I was a machine. C'est evident. Consequently it surprises me when people question it. I'm surprised even that it took until Descartes to achieve this enlightenment although you will probably say that Plotinus was already onto it. Presumably anything that isn't some phantasm that defies the laws of physics - and therefore probably cannot exist - is going to be a machine of some sort. Have I got anywhere near it or am I not even wrong on that? Why should it be news to anyone that we are machines - I've been assuming it all along. Now you will tell me how I should be - what?? Experiencing reality? Interpreting reality? Both? Everything (appears to my conscious mind to be) an ensemble of something else(s) including moi et toi, and it all works somehow in co- operation and the universe exists - ergo we are machines - we can extrapolate from this that the universe is a gigantic Machine since we appear to be a part of an ensemble as a machine element. Ergo the Multiverse exists because it's all a fractal What's the other option - that never made it into my brain? Genial!! - allons-y K --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Lost and not lost 1 (Plan)
Hi Kim, On 10 Dec 2008, at 06:29, Kim Jones wrote: Ok - Bruno, I will take this very slowly. It is the idea. I will be very slow myself. You have a habit of saying 10,000 fascinating things in one post and staggering me, so one at a time: I did it on purpose, so as to give you different angle of attack. On 10/12/2008, at 4:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Here, below, is the plan of my heroic attempt (indeed) to explain why I think that: IF we assume that we are machine, Never understood what people meant by a machine. Actually I was thinking digital machine or digitalizable machine. Like Mechanism will always mean digital mechanism. I will explain this later. To define the notion of machine in general is not easy. With the usual physical theories most things are machine and are even digital or analog but still digitalizable machine. I prefer not working with precise definitions, and instead illustrate the concept through the reasoning. The main idea is that a machine or a mechanism is something which is a finite combination of a finite number of elementary parts (or locally finite, it could grow) and which behavior in all circumstances can be explained or reduced to the predictible local behavior of the elementary parts). When the occurence of the elementary parts are many, this leads to differential equation, when not so many, it gives rise to difference equation or recursive processes. The very idea of explanation is often implicitly or explicitly rely on mechanism, or on a mechanism. I've always thought I was a machine. This is not obvious. Is the system Earth-Moon really a machine? Already with the rough definition given above, we could doubt it, if only because the Moon-Earth system is usually described byinfinite real variable functions. The real functions operate on the real numbers, the points of the line, which are infinite objects. With quantum mechanics the apparent real things get digital, but if you keep the collapse of the wave, it is hard to even describe you as either a physical thing still less a machine. With the many world, the usual mechanist explanation of the observer is preserved, except for the classical mechanics behind. (Albeit only logicians, to be sure, have provided, computable or mechanist function on the reals with non computable derivatives). And what about the believers? Jacques Arsac, a french computer scientist wrote a book beginning by I am a Catholic so I cannot believe in Artificial Intelligence, and its point is that we are not machine. Renault, the car firm, made an advertising based on the idea that you are not a machine. But the real trouble with the mechanist idea is its apparent elimination of the subject, it explains consciousness away. Not only mechanism does not solve the mind body problem, but when mechanism and materialism are combined, as it is usually still done, you get nihilism. This is really my point. I was just anticipating. No need to ask question here. You will soon understand this by yourself with the point 1) and 2). Well, we will see. C'est evident. Consequently it surprises me when people question it. It would already be a success for me if you begin to doubt mechanism. Eventually you will perhaps (if you are patient enough) understand why no machine can really believe in Mechanism. The logic of mechanism will take us near inconsistency. It is impossible to take it for granted. And things are worst than that: if we are machines, we cannot know which machine we are, but we can bet (and argue that nature has already bet on mechanism, etc.). I'm surprised even that it took until Descartes to achieve this enlightenment although you will probably say that Plotinus was already onto it. Plotinus and Descartes are aware that, by deciding to preserve the soul, or the person, or consciousness (etc.), matter become doubtful. malin génies appears (Descartes), indeterminateness appears (Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus). Descartes has understood that it has to introduce a God, to preserve the consistency of mechanism. It is a sort of superconsistency axiom, which could easily lead to inconsistency. Descartes gived rise to the modern mind body problem. Descartes used soul instead of mind. Presumably anything that isn't some phantasm that defies the laws of physics - and therefore probably cannot exist - is going to be a machine of some sort. Have I got anywhere near it or am I not even wrong on that? You are wrong, but don't worry, almost everybody is wrong on this, and this by assuming comp, and assuming, for now, that my own reasoning is correct, which I hope you will understand by yourself if patient enough. I am probably also, wrong, at some level. All machine could be wrong on that, but we can be less and less wrong. The problem with mechanism is that it predicts that the laws of physics defy
