Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
2009/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote: I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else... which is true by supposition in the block world). Perhaps that still counts as a magical requirement for you, though. So if the boards were shuffled, or separated by arbitrary distances, the causality would go and the computation (perhaps a conscious computation) would no longer be implemented? What justification is there for adding this requirement? 2 + 2 = 4 is true 4 + 2 = 2 is false Order counts. But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the information for a particular time, the order is implicit. Arranging the frames a particular way is only important for an observer outside of the ensemble, like someone watching a film. Some argue that such a block universe would lack the special quality that gives rise to computation, consciousness and all other good things. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote: I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else... which is true by supposition in the block world). Perhaps that still counts as a magical requirement for you, though. So if the boards were shuffled, or separated by arbitrary distances, the causality would go and the computation (perhaps a conscious computation) would no longer be implemented? What justification is there for adding this requirement? 2 + 2 = 4 is true 4 + 2 = 2 is false Order counts. But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the information for a particular time, the order is implicit. What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical laws? These are things outside the frames. If you assume there is enough inside the frames to order them (as a continuum model does by implicit overlap) then that is a time order and it's meaningless to talk about shuffling or separating them (in what spacetime could such operations be carried out?). Brent Arranging the frames a particular way is only important for an observer outside of the ensemble, like someone watching a film. Some argue that such a block universe would lack the special quality that gives rise to computation, consciousness and all other good things. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Boltzmann Brains, consciousness and the arrow of time
Hi Günther,
On 07 Jan 2009, at 22:47, Günther Greindl wrote:
thanks for your comments, I interleave my response.
showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the
limit_
there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to
also
take into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into
account
and have infinite histories going through a state (do I
understand you
correctly?).
I guess you were meaning that we have to take into account an
infinity
of arbitrary long (but finite) delays. OK.
Hmm, if we have an infinity of arbitrary long but finite delays,
then I
can only see aleph_0 histories (because we never take the step to
infinity - we can enumerate all histories.
Only if we take the step to infinity (as in Cantor diagonalization,
were we presuppose the complete listing of the reals and the diagonal
does not fit at infinity) would we get 2^aleph_0 histories - or am I
missing something here?
Cantor's proof is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes there is a one
one correspondence, or bijection, between the positive integers and
the infinite sequence on {0, 1} say. Such correspondence could be
partially described by the diagram
1 1001000 ...
2 01101001100 ...
3 11000100111 ...
4 1110000 ...
5 10100110101 ...
6 00010111011 ...
7
...
and Cantor get a contradiction from that. You assume the diagram is
indeed a piece of an existing bijection in Platonia, or known by God.
But if such a bijection exist, or if God can conceive that
correspondence, then there is a special sequence that God can conceive
too, and that indeed you can bulld from that diagram, indeed the
sequence
001110...
that you get by flipping the 0 and 1 along the diagonal of the matrix
appearing on the right in the diagram. That sequence, thus, exists in
Platonia, but definitely cannot belong to the list described above. If
it was in the list, there would be a number k
k --- 001110...
But by definition of the sequence, the kth decimal of that number k
will be the flip of itself, meaning that 0 = 1. OK?
The reasoning did not depend on the choice of any one one
correspondence, so that we know that for each correspondence there is
a corresponding anti-diagonal sequence, refuting the assertion that
correspondence could exhaust the set of all infinite binary sequences.
The set of binary sequence is thus not listable, not enumerable, not
countable.
You can visualise geometrically the contradictions for any candidate
correspondence by the intersection of the line defined by the
corresponding number k and the diagonal of the matrix describing the
correspondence. Note that the diagonal makes to contradiction
appearing always in a finite time.
I insist on this diagonal because it is the main tool of the AUDA. A
very similar diagonal shows the existence of enumerable but non
recursively enumerable set of numbers, which have some role in
machine's theology (or more quotes).
But then, recall the UD dovetails on the infinite computation, and
sometimes dovetails those infinite computation with the generation of
the binary sequences.
So you have to look at it, in the third person point of view as
computations which bifurcate (or differentiate by the rule Y = II),
and bifurcate again, and again, and again, OK?
And now, what you are missing. I think. It is the distinction between
third and first person point of view. As defined in the first and
second step of UDA (not the Theatetical one used in AUDA).
Looking at the generation of the UD, or dovetailing on all
computations, you can see the many computations being generated and
you can see them differentiate or bifurcating all the time, where
here time is defined by the succession 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ... itself. If
you universal base is two dimensional (like with the Conway Game of
Life) you can see the deployment as a static three dimensional conic
structure.
Everything there, is enumerable. At each UD step, everything is even
finite!
But things changes when you adopt the first person point of view, due
to the fact that the first person point of view cannot be aware of the
dovetailing delays, nor of the extreme multiplication and redundancy
of the computations. And if you are OK with, well, mainly here the
step 4, you see that the intuitive measure will have to be made on
the union of all computations going through the current state.
There is a continuum of such infinite computations, if only due to
that entangling of computation on the dovetailing on the reals and the
Y = II rule.
The third person probabilities for the *first* person point of views
have to bear on the fact that although the reals or the binary
sequence are not enumerable it is easy to write a simple program which
generates them all. This is not always well understood, but the trick
is very simple; just don't name them. In
Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5
Dear Bruno, I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences. Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and probabilistics. * Bruno quotes in -- lines, like the starting proposition: It is because an event can be random or probabilistic... * ...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random experience with a probability measure HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2 Wrong. A PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL. It is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in the outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP. To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you identify 'probability'. (I don't). To your evaluating paragraph Fair Enough: fair enough. That makes my point. * The experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey are above my head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even a big genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming AFTER his time. (Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!) ...Einstein missed comp by its conventionalist math blindness perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested in computer science. ... I admire Kim's scientific tenacity to absorb your 'explanations' to the level of asking resonable questions. I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am further away from your domain to do so. Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far. One word of how I feel about probability: In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains for our observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the item in question (that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences beyond the boundaries of that domain. The next occurrence in the future history is undecided from a knowledge of the domain's past history in our best effort: we can consider only the 'stuff' limited into our model, cannot include effects from 'the rest of the world', so we cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next' occurrence at all. Ominscient is different. I am not. Thanks for an interesting reading. John M On Mon, Jan 5, 2009 at 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Jan 2009, at 12:59, Kim Jones wrote: Bruno, In this step, one of me experiences (or actually does not experience) the delay prior to reconstitution. In Step 2, it was proven to me that I cannot know that any extra time (other than the 4 minutes necessary transmission interval) has elapsed between my annihilation and reconstitution on Mars. The same thing will now happen to one of me in the duplication-plus-delay in Step 4. Essentially, Step 4 is identical to Step 2 with duplication as the only added feature. We cannot attribute a measure to my 1-pov in either step because the outcome is truly random. It is because an event can be random or probabilistic that we have to put a measure on it (like a distribution of probabilities, or of credibilities). Example: the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random experience with a probability measure HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2. I will ask you questions, if you don't mind. I prefer to ask question and illustrate the use of the word in place of teaching you the probability theory. - Do you agree that if you throw a coin, you have a probability of 1/2 to get HEAD? - Do you agree that if you throw a dice, you have a probability of 1/6 to get six? - Do you agree that if you play lottery, you will win the biggest price with a probability like 1/big number In most discrete case, we can infer equivalence of the elementary events on the base of symmetry (like in the old Pascal probability calculus). Here I would merely like to ask, random to whom? *Fair enough.* In all situation which will interest us: it means random for the subject who performs the (first person) experience. You are the one throwing the dice? Then it will be random for you (despite it will be random for your friend too, but perhaps not for God). Doesn't random mean that no conscious mind (mine or yours) can see the determinism behind it? I could agree, although it is not necessary to dig on such detailed analysis, imo. We are tempted to say probability 1/2 but that is only a comp-style bet. I am not sure I understand. There is just one comp bet: the yes doctor, which we can be paraphrased in step 1by I survive (or I go to Mars) with probability 1. (and idem in step 2) But in step 3, ASSUMING comp, it is hard for me to see any difference with the throwing of a coin, *for the subject of the experience*. Suppose I propose the following two type of experiences/experiments. The ROOM ZERO and the ROOM ONE are NOT distinguishable from inside (but are of
Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5
John Mikes wrote: Dear Bruno, I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences. Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and probabilistics. * Bruno quotes in -- lines, like the starting proposition: It is because an event can be random or probabilistic... * ...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random experience with a probability measure HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2 Wrong. A PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL. It is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in the outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP. Interestingly, the statistician Persis Diaconis can flip a coin so that it lands heads or tails as he chooses. Many professional magicians can do it to. To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you identify 'probability'. (I don't). To your evaluating paragraph Fair Enough: fair enough. That makes my point. * The experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey are above my head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even a big genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming AFTER his time. (Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!) ...Einstein missed comp by its conventionalist math blindness perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested in computer science. ... I admire Kim's scientific tenacity to absorb your 'explanations' to the level of asking resonable questions. I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am further away from your domain to do so. Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far. One word of how I feel about probability: In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains for our observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the item in question (that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences beyond the boundaries of that domain. The next occurrence in the future history is undecided from a knowledge of the domain's past history in our best effort: we can consider only the 'stuff' limited into our model, cannot include effects from 'the rest of the world', so we cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next' occurrence at all. Ominscient is different. I am not. I think it is an open question whether there is inherent randomness in quantum mechanics. In Bohmian QM the randomness comes from ignorance of the rest of the world. But the EPR experiments show that this can only hold if the influence of the rest of the world is non-local (i.e. faster than light) and hence inconsistent with relativity. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
