The Seventh Step (Preamble)
Hi Kim, Still interested? I must say I was wrong. I cannot explain to you the functioning of a computer without doing math. Orally, drawing on a black board, I would have been able to explain a big part of it, and simultaneously hiding the mathematics. But I realize now that even this would have been a bad idea and would have made things more difficult in the longer run, given the ambition of the project. After all, I am supposed to explain to you how, when we assume the comp hypothesis, the ultimate realities become mathematical in nature, even arithmetical or number theoretical. But how could I explain this to you without doing a bit of mathematics. Mathematics is a curious music that only the musicians can hear. Mathematicians play with instruments that only them can hear. To listen to a mathematician, you have to be a mathematician and play the instrument. Fortunately, all universal machine like you, are a mathematician, and when a human seems to feel he is not a mathematician, it just means the mathematician living within is a bit sleepy, for a reason or another. Especially that I am realizing that some people confuse a computation with a description of a computation, which are two very different mathematical objects (albeit relative one) existing in Platonia. This plays a key role in the articulation of the step seven with the step eight. It plays a key role to understand the computationalist supervenience thesis, and thus where the laws of physics come from, and of course it is strictly needed when ultimately we interview the universal Lobian machine. So, the time has come I cure your math anxiety, if you or some others are still interested. I can awake the mathematician in you (like I can awake the mathematician living in any universal entity, btw :). I propose we begin with the numbers, and, to keep our motivation straight, I propose we meditate a little bit on the distinction between numbers and descriptions of numbers, and notations for numbers. It is a bit like the difference between a symphony and a symphony's partition Given the importance of such distinction in the whole drama, it is worth to get those conceptual nuances clear right at the beginning. I really propose to you to begin math at zero. But now I am already stuck: should I explain first the number 1, or ... the number zero? A tricky one that number zero ... :) Best, Bruno PS I now you are busy. I propose we go at the minimum of your rhythm and mine. But I tell you that the poem is long. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The arrow of time is the easiest computational direction for life in the manifold
Bruno Have you seen this: V. Walsh, A theory of magnitude:common cortical metrics of time, spce and quantity, trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 483 (2003) This was a one reference in a paper on time I just read today( Time and Causation http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0559 Ronald On Jan 25, 3:02 am, Alberto G.Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Brent: I tried to clarify my point of view in my previous response. This is my answer to these questions. On Jan 25, 5:53 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/24 Alberto G.Corona agocor...@gmail.com: But the fact is that in our univese, glasses do recompose themselves, the flame of the candles do recombines liberating oxygen and make grow the candle, objects lighter than water sink. Why? because these events exist in our space time; Just go in the reverse time dimension in our space-time manifold to see them. The laws of physics permits them. They are just reversible chemical reactions, reversible object collisions at the particle or macroscopic level. In terms of our perception of time, the outcomes we see happens just because they are cuasi-infinitely probable and the reverse counterparts, cuasi infinitely improbalbe. But, that is also an illlusion of the arrow of time, because , In terms of time-agnostic spacetime manifold reasoning, our life vector in space-time go along the increase of entrophy, not the other way around. That is: the outcomes of probability laws are a consequience of our trajectory in space time. Why our life follow this direction?. The reason is computational, as I said before. The question is often asked, why does time seem to progress in the increasing entropy direction? But if time were in fact progressing in the decreasing entropy direction, we would know no different. For example, if we were living in a simulation where 2009 is run first and 2008 is run second according to an external clock, we would not be able to tell from within the simulation. The real arrow of time question should be: why does entropy increase in the same direction in every observed part of the universe? Right. It's generally thought that the direction of increasing entropy is defined by the expansion of the universe since the expansion increases the available states for matter. But it's hard to show that this must also determine the radiation arrow of time. But at the micro-level of QM there is presumably no change in entropy, the evolution is unitary. So then the question becomes: Why the approximately classical world, in which the coarse-gained entropy does increase? Brent For only if the glass shattering occurred in a direction different to that of the mind of the observer would something unusual be noticed.- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Templeton Foundation
The Templeton Foundation gives sizeable grants to projects for reconciling science and religion, and awards a yearly prize of two million dollars to a philosopher or scientist whose work highlights the spiritual dimension of scientific progress. Go for it, Bruno! If Paul Davies can do it with a rather mediocre tome like The Mind of God - you will surely impress them with your machine theology - none of which they will understand, so it will surely command respect. Not a cynical suggestion; if the Templeton Foundation is anything beyond a perverse attempt to reward scientists who are prepared to say something nice about religion, then your setting this whole science/ religion (physical sciences/human sciences; whatever) house in order will surely be worth the two million. And then you would be obliged to write a book about it all that will show the materialist/atheists a thing or two! Hands up if you think Bruno should apply for a Templeton grant!!! With two million in his bank balance, he might even come out to Australia to visit me and Russell!!! What happened to Step 7, Doctor? warmest regards Kim Another annoying feature of the term metaphysics is that it has made it quasi-impossible for physicians to do metaphysics, since meta here has a sense corresponding to meta in metamathematics (the old name for Recursion Theory). Now, most physicians would argue (at least before the rise of the quantum) that such a meta-physics is simply physics. Which means: physicians, together with their laboratories and their libraries simply obey the laws of physics. OK, but when you say the same thing of quantum mechanics, you are now heading toward Everett and the Many-Worlds interpretation. Everett was the first serious meta-physician in that sense. Well, Galileo and Einstein (among others) also helped to prepare the terrain for this 'desanthropomorphisation' process. Embedding the subject into the object of study. Embedding the spectator in the spectacles, as the Hindu says. - Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au Web: http://web.mac.com/kmjcommp/Plenitude_Music Phone: (612) 9389 4239 or 0431 723 001 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Seventh Step (Preamble)
Bruno, our posts just crossed each other. I'm still here and listening and thinking hard. We are busy, as you say, but listening and thinking about the realities has to be part of that, so I ensure that I set aside time to follow your reasoning. I may translate part of the Brussels thesis soon and release on the list, just to prove that the act of translating is also the act of arriving at a compatible understanding of what i translate. You will tell me if I am any good at it and please be frank. Start with ZERO - it's more mysterious than 1 K On 05/02/2009, at 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Kim, Still interested? I must say I was wrong. I cannot explain to you the functioning of a computer without doing math. Orally, drawing on a black board, I would have been able to explain a big part of it, and simultaneously hiding the mathematics. But I realize now that even this would have been a bad idea and would have made things more difficult in the longer run, given the ambition of the project. After all, I am supposed to explain to you how, when we assume the comp hypothesis, the ultimate realities become mathematical in nature, even arithmetical or number theoretical. But how could I explain this to you without doing a bit of mathematics. Mathematics is a curious music that only the musicians can hear. Mathematicians play with instruments that only them can hear. To listen to a mathematician, you have to be a mathematician and play the instrument. Fortunately, all universal machine like you, are a mathematician, and when a human seems to feel he is not a mathematician, it just means the mathematician living within is a bit sleepy, for a reason or another. Especially that I am realizing that some people confuse a computation with a description of a computation, which are two very different mathematical objects (albeit relative one) existing in Platonia. This plays a key role in the articulation of the step seven with the step eight. It plays a key role to understand the computationalist supervenience thesis, and thus where the laws of physics come from, and of course it is strictly needed when ultimately we interview the universal Lobian machine. So, the time has come I cure your math anxiety, if you or some others are still interested. I can awake the mathematician in you (like I can awake the mathematician living in any universal entity, btw :). I propose we begin with the numbers, and, to keep our motivation straight, I propose we meditate a little bit on the distinction between numbers and descriptions of numbers, and notations for numbers. It is a bit like the difference between a symphony and a symphony's partition Given the importance of such distinction in the whole drama, it is worth to get those conceptual nuances clear right at the beginning. I really propose to you to begin math at zero. But now I am already stuck: should I explain first the number 1, or ... the number zero? A tricky one that number zero ... :) Best, Bruno PS I now you are busy. I propose we go at the minimum of your rhythm and mine. But I tell you that the poem is long. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Templeton Foundation
Kim Jones wrote: The Templeton Foundation gives sizeable grants to projects for reconciling science and religion, and awards a yearly prize of two million dollars to a philosopher or scientist whose work highlights the spiritual dimension of scientific progress. Go for it, Bruno! If Paul Davies can do it with a rather mediocre tome like The Mind of God - you will surely impress them with your machine theology - none of which they will understand, so it will surely command respect. Not a cynical suggestion; if the Templeton Foundation is anything beyond a perverse attempt to reward scientists who are prepared to say something nice about religion, then your setting this whole science/ religion (physical sciences/human sciences; whatever) house in order will surely be worth the two million. And then you would be obliged to write a book about it all that will show the materialist/atheists a thing or two! Hands up if you think Bruno should apply for a Templeton grant!!! With two million in his bank balance, he might even come out to Australia to visit me and Russell!!! Sure. Go for it, Bruno! What happened to Step 7, Doctor? warmest regards Kim Another annoying feature of the term metaphysics is that it has made it quasi-impossible for physicians to do metaphysics, since meta here has a sense corresponding to meta in metamathematics (the old name for Recursion Theory). Now, most physicians would argue (at least before the rise of the quantum) that such a meta-physics is simply physics. Which means: physicians, together with their laboratories and their libraries simply obey the laws of physics. OK, but when you say the same thing of quantum mechanics, you are now heading toward Everett and the Many-Worlds interpretation. Everett was the first serious meta-physician in that sense. Well, Galileo and Einstein And your namesake, Giordano Bruno. Brent (among others) also helped to prepare the terrain for this 'desanthropomorphisation' process. Embedding the subject into the object of study. Embedding the spectator in the spectacles, as the Hindu says. - Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
Trans. Kim Jones (extract only)
1.1 Mechanist Philosophies
1.1.1 Different types of Mechanism
I distinguish the following mechanist hypotheses:
BEHAVIOURIST MECHANISM
Some machines can behave as thinking beings (living, conscious etc.)
(BEH-MEC)
STRONG MECHANISM
Some machines can think (living beings, conscious beings, have a
private life etc.) (STR-MEC)
INDEXICAL MECHANISM
I am a machine (or - you are a machine, or again - human beings are
machines) (IND-MEC)
By replacing machine by digital machine one obtains the
corresponding digital theses.
The behaviourist digital mechanism BEH-DIG-MEC corresponds largely to
that of Turing in his 1950 article. In the same way, the strong
digital mechanism STR-DIG-MEC corresponds to what is called in the
literature the strong artificial intelligence thesis (strong AI).
In this work I am exclusively interested in indexical and digital
mechanism (IND-DIG-MEC or just IDM). Digitality necessitates
Church's Thesis, which is why the digital aspect is explained in its
turn in the second part. There, I will show how a procedure, due
essentially to Goedel, permits an indexical treatment of machines in
general.
Proposition:
IND-MEC = STR-MEC = BEH-MEC, and
BEH-MEC ≠ STR-MEC ≠ IND-MEC.
(with or without the hypothesis of digitality)
Reasoning: One admits that humans know how to think (conscious
beings, having private lives etc.) In this case IND-MEC entails STR-
MEC and STR-MEC entails BEH-MEC. That BEH-MEC does not entail STR-MEC
is supported by Weizenbaum (1976) (see also Gunderson {footnote 1}
1971). STR-MEC does not entail IND-MEC, since the fact that machines
are able to think does not entail that they alone are able to think.
It is conceivable that machines are able to think without we ourselves
being machines. Wang (1974) presents a similar reasoning.
Nevertheless, numerous philosophers make implicit use of an opposing
opinion: STR-MEC = IND-MEC, see for example Arsac 1987.
{Footnote 1: Gunderson 1971 criticises the Turing Test. The Turing
Test is a test for BEH-MEC. Simply put, a machine (hidden) passes the
test if it is able to pass itself off as a human being during a
conversation by means of a computer keyboard terminal.}
1.1.2 Mechanist Philosophy: Historical Summary
Contemporary digital mechanist philosophy is due in large measure to
Descartes and Hobbes {footnote 2} (see Rogow 1986, Bernhardt 1989).
Descartes wanted to distinguish Man from the animals. He argues that
the animal, as much as Man's body (including the brain), is a machine.
He understood by this a finite assembly of of material components that
unequivocally determine the behaviour of the whole. Descartes surmises
that the soul is not mechanical. In separating the soul from the body
in this way, and thus the mind from matter, he is the originator of
the dualist position, widely encompassed by the philosophy of mind.
One speaks of Cartesian Dualism.
There follows three arguments that Descartes presented in favour of
his distinction of man from the animal-as-machine (We note that this
distinction entails the negation of IND-MEC.)
{footnote 2: One can detect some mechanist affirmations or questions
among (pre and post-Socratic, though not necessarily materialist)
philosophers, from Greek antiquity (cf Timaeus and Plato, see also
Odifreddi 1989). Among Chinese philosophers, for example Lao-Tzu, a
certain monk is admired for having passed off his automated servants
as flesh and blood beings. Among Hindu philosophers for example, in
the Questions to the King Milinda, the human body is compared to the
chariot, and the human mind is compared to the different parts of the
chariot, similar to Hume's (1739) manner of tackling the problem of
identity with his boat. The temptation to set up artefacts in the
image of Man is also a component of several myths, (for ex. the Golem
in Jewish culture, see for ex. Breton 1990). It is no exaggeration to
maintain that the very idea of mechanism appears wherever and whenever
machines themselves are developed.}
1) Animals are not endowed with reason and cannot engage in linguistic
communication
This argument is losing credibility since language and reason seem
more accessible to today's machines than for example, emotion which is
communally allowed in the case of certain animals (see for ex. Lévy
1987). Here Descartes takes Aristotle's position which asserts that
Man is a reasoning animal.
2) Machines are finite beings. A finite being cannot conceive of the
infinite. Now, I am able (said Descartes) to conceive of the infinite.
Thus I am not a machine.
This argument against IND-MEC brings into relief two fundamental
questions:
a) Can man conceive of infinity?
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
This is pretty good. Is there any online source with a complete
version available?
Thanks.
On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 7:32 AM, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
Trans. Kim Jones (extract only)
1.1 Mechanist Philosophies
1.1.1 Different types of Mechanism
I distinguish the following mechanist hypotheses:
BEHAVIOURIST MECHANISM
Some machines can behave as thinking beings (living, conscious etc.)
(BEH-MEC)
STRONG MECHANISM
Some machines can think (living beings, conscious beings, have a private
life etc.) (STR-MEC)
INDEXICAL MECHANISM
I am a machine (or - you are a machine, or again - human beings are
machines) (IND-MEC)
By replacing machine by digital machine one obtains the corresponding
digital theses.
The behaviourist digital mechanism BEH-DIG-MEC corresponds largely to that
of Turing in his 1950 article. In the same way, the strong digital mechanism
STR-DIG-MEC corresponds to what is called in the literature the strong
artificial intelligence thesis (strong AI).
In this work I am exclusively interested in indexical and digital mechanism
(IND-DIG-MEC or just IDM). Digitality necessitates Church's Thesis, which
is why the digital aspect is explained in its turn in the second part.
There, I will show how a procedure, due essentially to Goedel, permits an
indexical treatment of machines in general.
Proposition:
IND-MEC = STR-MEC = BEH-MEC, and
BEH-MEC ≠ STR-MEC ≠ IND-MEC.
(with or without the hypothesis of digitality)
Reasoning: One admits that humans know how to think (conscious beings,
having private lives etc.) In this case IND-MEC entails STR-MEC and STR-MEC
entails BEH-MEC. That BEH-MEC does not entail STR-MEC is supported by
Weizenbaum (1976) (see also Gunderson {footnote 1} 1971). STR-MEC does not
entail IND-MEC, since the fact that machines are able to think does not
entail that they alone are able to think. It is conceivable that machines
are able to think without we ourselves being machines. Wang (1974) presents
a similar reasoning. Nevertheless, numerous philosophers make implicit use
of an opposing opinion: STR-MEC = IND-MEC, see for example Arsac 1987.
{Footnote 1: Gunderson 1971 criticises the Turing Test. The Turing Test is a
test for BEH-MEC. Simply put, a machine (hidden) passes the test if it is
able to pass itself off as a human being during a conversation by means of
a computer keyboard terminal.}
1.1.2 Mechanist Philosophy: Historical Summary
Contemporary digital mechanist philosophy is due in large measure to
Descartes and Hobbes {footnote 2} (see Rogow 1986, Bernhardt 1989).
Descartes wanted to distinguish Man from the animals. He argues that the
animal, as much as Man's body (including the brain), is a machine. He
understood by this a finite assembly of of material components
that unequivocally determine the behaviour of the whole. Descartes surmises
that the soul is not mechanical. In separating the soul from the body in
this way, and thus the mind from matter, he is the originator of the dualist
position, widely encompassed by the philosophy of mind. One speaks of
Cartesian Dualism.
There follows three arguments that Descartes presented in favour of his
distinction of man from the animal-as-machine (We note that this distinction
entails the negation of IND-MEC.)
{footnote 2: One can detect some mechanist affirmations or questions
among (pre and post-Socratic, though not necessarily
materialist) philosophers, from Greek antiquity (cf Timaeus and Plato, see
also Odifreddi 1989). Among Chinese philosophers, for example Lao-Tzu, a
certain monk is admired for having passed off his automated servants as
flesh and blood beings. Among Hindu philosophers for example, in the
Questions to the King Milinda, the human body is compared to the chariot,
and the human mind is compared to the different parts of the chariot,
similar to Hume's (1739) manner of tackling the problem of identity with his
boat. The temptation to set up artefacts in the image of Man is also a
component of several myths, (for ex. the Golem in Jewish culture, see for
ex. Breton 1990). It is no exaggeration to maintain that the very idea of
mechanism appears wherever and whenever machines themselves are developed.}
1) Animals are not endowed with reason and cannot engage in linguistic
communication
This argument is losing credibility since language and reason seem more
accessible to today's machines than for example, emotion which is communally
allowed in the case of certain animals (see for ex. Lévy 1987). Here
Descartes takes Aristotle's position which asserts that Man is a reasoning
animal.
2) Machines are finite beings. A finite being cannot conceive of the
infinite. Now, I am able (said Descartes) to conceive of the infinite. Thus
I am not a machine.
This argument against IND-MEC brings into relief two fundamental questions:
a) Can man conceive of infinity?
b) Can a machine conceive of infinity?
Question a) differentiates Hobbes'
