This is pretty good. Is there any online source with a complete version available?
Thanks. On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 7:32 AM, Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > Trans. Kim Jones (extract only) > > 1.1 Mechanist Philosophies > 1.1.1 Different types of Mechanism > I distinguish the following mechanist hypotheses: > BEHAVIOURIST MECHANISM > Some machines can behave as thinking beings (living, conscious etc.) > (BEH-MEC) > STRONG MECHANISM > Some machines can think (living beings, conscious beings, have a private > life etc.) (STR-MEC) > INDEXICAL MECHANISM > I am a machine (or - you are a machine, or again - human beings are > machines) (IND-MEC) > By replacing "machine" by "digital machine" one obtains the corresponding > digital theses. > The behaviourist digital mechanism BEH-DIG-MEC corresponds largely to that > of Turing in his 1950 article. In the same way, the strong digital mechanism > STR-DIG-MEC corresponds to what is called in the literature the strong > artificial intelligence thesis (strong AI). > In this work I am exclusively interested in indexical and digital mechanism > (IND-DIG-MEC or just IDM). "Digitality" necessitates Church's Thesis, which > is why the digital aspect is explained in its turn in the second part. > There, I will show how a procedure, due essentially to Goedel, permits an > indexical treatment of machines in general. > Proposition: > IND-MEC => STR-MEC => BEH-MEC, and > BEH-MEC ≠> STR-MEC ≠> IND-MEC. > (with or without the hypothesis of digitality) > > Reasoning: One admits that humans know how to think (conscious beings, > having private lives etc.) In this case IND-MEC entails STR-MEC and STR-MEC > entails BEH-MEC. That BEH-MEC does not entail STR-MEC is supported by > Weizenbaum (1976) (see also Gunderson {footnote 1} 1971). STR-MEC does not > entail IND-MEC, since the fact that machines are able to think does not > entail that they alone are able to think. It is conceivable that machines > are able to think without we ourselves being machines. Wang (1974) presents > a similar reasoning. Nevertheless, numerous philosophers make implicit use > of an opposing opinion: STR-MEC => IND-MEC, see for example Arsac 1987. > {Footnote 1: Gunderson 1971 criticises the Turing Test. The Turing Test is a > test for BEH-MEC. Simply put, a machine (hidden) passes the test if it is > able to pass itself off as a human being during a "conversation" by means of > a computer keyboard terminal.} > 1.1.2 Mechanist Philosophy: Historical Summary > Contemporary digital mechanist philosophy is due in large measure to > Descartes and Hobbes {footnote 2} (see Rogow 1986, Bernhardt 1989). > Descartes wanted to distinguish Man from the animals. He argues that the > animal, as much as Man's body (including the brain), is a machine. He > understood by this a finite assembly of of material components > that unequivocally determine the behaviour of the whole. Descartes surmises > that the soul is not mechanical. In separating the soul from the body in > this way, and thus the mind from matter, he is the originator of the dualist > position, widely encompassed by the philosophy of mind. One speaks of > Cartesian Dualism. > There follows three arguments that Descartes presented in favour of his > distinction of man from the animal-as-machine (We note that this distinction > entails the negation of IND-MEC.) > {footnote 2: One can detect some mechanist affirmations or questions > among (pre and post-Socratic, though not necessarily > materialist) philosophers, from Greek antiquity (cf Timaeus and Plato, see > also Odifreddi 1989). Among Chinese philosophers, for example Lao-Tzu, a > certain monk is admired for having passed off his "automated" servants as > flesh and blood beings. Among Hindu philosophers for example, in the > "Questions to the King Milinda", the human body is compared to the chariot, > and the human mind is compared to the different parts of the chariot, > similar to Hume's (1739) manner of tackling the problem of identity with his > boat. The temptation to set up artefacts in the image of Man is also a > component of several myths, (for ex. the Golem in Jewish culture, see for > ex. Breton 1990). It is no exaggeration to maintain that the very idea of > mechanism appears wherever and whenever machines themselves are developed.} > 1) Animals are not endowed with reason and cannot engage in linguistic > communication > This argument is losing credibility since language and reason seem more > accessible to today's machines than for example, emotion which is communally > allowed in the case of certain animals (see for ex. Lévy 1987). Here > Descartes takes Aristotle's position which asserts that Man is a "reasoning > animal". > 2) Machines are finite beings. A finite being cannot conceive of the > infinite. Now, I am able (said Descartes) to conceive of the infinite. Thus > I am not a machine. > This argument against IND-MEC brings into relief two fundamental questions: > a) Can man conceive of infinity? > b) Can a machine conceive of infinity? > Question a) differentiates Hobbes' point of view from Descartes'. Hobbes > surmises that he cannot in effect conceive of infinity. > 3) A machine can only carry out particular tasks, as it turns out, those > tasks for which it was constructed. In effect, Descartes is saying: > "Since, in the case that reason is a universal instrument that participates > in every sort of encounter, these organs need a certain particular > disposition for each and every action; from this comes the idea that it is > morally impossible that a machine might possess sufficient diversity such > that it might act in every living occurrence in the same way that our reason > assists our actions (Descartes, "1953", page 165). > The idea of a universal machine had nevertheless crossed the mind of Raymond > Lulle (1302) whom Descartes had studied. This same idea will reappear with > Leibnitz, culminating in the work of Turing, and this will be explained in > the second part. > La Mettrie will rehash Descartes' animal-as-machine for the purpose of > extending it to Man (La Mettrie 1748, see also Gunderson 1971). > In parallel with Descartes, Hobbes himself develops the mechanist hypothesis > (Rogow 1986). On can date Hobbes' motivation toward mechanism from the time > of his discovery of geometry. Having been particularly impressed by the fact > that he might have been convinced by a *finite communication* based on > logical geometrical reasoning, Hobbes conceives of the mechanistic character > of thinking. He then thinks that it should be possible to reduce thinking to > addition and subtraction. (see Webb 1980). He is thus very close to the > *functionalist* position in the philosophy of mind: that the additions and > multiplications might be realisable by a *telegraphic network* , a > *hydraulic system*, an *electromagnetic device* , or even *a windmill*, a > *catapult* or a *calculating device* (ordinateur), citing Searle's > enumeration (Searle 1984). Thought is thereby reduced to operations not > necessarily equipment-dependent, and to the constituent matter employed to > realise these operations. La Mettrie, after his own fashion, argues in > something like the same sense: > "Thus a Soul of mud, discovering in the twinkling of an eye, the relations > and the consequences of an infinity of ideas difficult to conceive, would be > preferable evidently to an ignorant and stupid Soul, which might be made of > all the more precious Elements" (La Mettrie 1748). > Similarly, Lafitte engages us on the subject of Babbage, precursor of 19th > century information processing, to which we will return in the second part: > "For Babbage, all machines being a composition of different organs linked > together in a complex manner, the important thing to fix is less the very > form of the organs than the sequencing of their functions, which relates to > organic linkages that cause the ensemble to function." (Lafitte 1930). > Differing with Descartes, Hobbes concludes that it is not possible that Man > - whom he considers to be a finite being - might conceive of the infinite. > Hobbes' motivation, being finitist and indexical (human thought is > mechanisable) is therefore opposed to Descartes' animal-as-machine and is, > in this sense, much closer to the contemporary motivation in the direction > of artificial intelligence. Soon I will return to the relation existing > between mechanism and functionalism. > 1.1.3 What is a machine? > Given the familiar connotations of the word "machine" - locomotives, > electric kettles, automobiles, computers, microscopes, dish-washers, sewing > machines, rice-cookers, time-pieces, mechanism may well seem grotesque. > Even if machines are considered to be artefacts of exclusively human > construction, in other words artificial, the concept of the machine is > difficult to define. Lafitte, in 1911 argues that just such a definition can > only be made in vain: > "To claim to be able to define the concept of a machine is to suppose that > the science of machines has come about, or that it might one day come about > in all it's perfection. Other than what is chimerically-speaking, to assign > limits to the development of mechanical forms, is to suppose in the first > place an entire and complete knowledge of the character of every individual > present and future mechanism, followed by the perfection of a measuring > instrument capable of situating each into a definitive category according to > their ensemble of characteristics. But, this again implicitly admits to a > massive division of sorts, conforming to those contours we can cleanly > envisage and having no link whatsoever with other bodies." (see also further > on 2.3) > Similarly, La Mettrie, in "Man as Machine" writes: > "Man is a Machine so composed that it is frankly impossible to initially get > a clear idea of it and consequently to arrive at a definition" > What Hobbes and Descartes have in common is that a machine is a locally > finite being. Its global behaviour is determined by the behaviour of its > elementary constituents, these being finite in number at each instant (call > this the "digital aspect"). The number of components can nonetheless grow > according to the work performed by the machine. > (to be cont.) > > K > > Email: > [email protected] > Web: > http://web.mac.com/kmjcommp/Plenitude_Music > Phone: > (612) 9389 4239 or 0431 723 001 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Hector Zenil http://www.mathrix.org --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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