Re: Why I am I?
On 19 Dec 2009, at 16:13, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Honestly I think you are a bit dishonest to yourself here, since you already presume the appearance of matter, I assume nowhere primitive matter. I do assume consensual reality. If not, I would not post message on a list. Well, that was my point. So indeed numbers don't make sense independent of that, because Bruno Marchal wrote: unless you can make theories about numbers without perceiving anything, which I doubt. Humans cannot do that, but this is independent which are simùpler concept. All scientists agrees on numbers, and to day we can explain in a precise sense why numbers is the least we have to assume. Bruno Marchal wrote: When you do abstract math you nevertheless work with matter, that is, word written on paper or on a computer screen. So either you can indeed make sense of a circular theory Indeed. That is the case. Circularity is fundamental. I will soon explain this through the second recursion theorem of Kleene. The whole AUDA things is based almost exclusively based on that handling of circularity, which makes the self-reference possible, for machine, and relatively to universal machine(s). So we seem to agree actually. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Of course, the human conception of the numbers depends on the human conception of his neighborhood and life, but when searching a TOE we have to agree on the simplest objects (ontology) from which we derive the others (phenomenology). For me this is not meaningful. What kind of phenomology could be derived from the fundamental numbers? You may read Plotinus, for having an informal idea. The phenomenologies corresponds to the hypostases, + intelligible and sensible matter. from the numbers (+ comp) we can explain the non communicability of consciousness, its local undoubtability, how primitive matter emerges and leads to first plural quantum-like indeterminacies, etc. What I find difficult to grasp: If conciousness is non communicable how could we explai Bruno Marchal wrote: Basically just that they need to be phenomena and that they are not expressible in terms of something else. But this for me has little to do with what the phenomena *are*. I don't understand this. Well every strictly formal theory will just explain you phenomena formally. But since phenomena are something that trascends formalities, they fail to explain that which is fundamental to phenomena. Not at all. In a theory (perhaps formal) you can still attribute meaning to your terms, and accept that some rule of deduction preserves that meaning, then you can learn something new by deduction. You argument here is close to the error of saying that if neurons (artificial, or not) manipulates only other neurones, the meaning will escape them. This does not follow. Anything can be formalise, at some level of description, and indeed three of the arithmetical hypostases concern non formalizable by the machine form of knowledge by the machine. Only formalist philosopher copuld decide to not attribute meaning on the primitive terms, although he will attributes the usual meaning of the inference rules (which are at another level). Bruno Marchal wrote: It's like a theory saying: There is something, but don't aks me what it is. You should study the theory, and makes specific remark. That would lead nowhere, since I don't have anything specific against the theory. It's just that I think claiming it to explain something fundamental is missleading; it makes one search fundamental truth where there is none. Because what is fundamental to everyone is his own experience. I agree. But then study the theory which explains why machine can already understand this, but that we have to explain physics from the number if we want to take the theory seriously. I have never claim it explains something fundamental, it explains a new problem, the problem of justifying how machine dreams glue enough to stabilize first person plural sharable observation. I just formulate a problem (and show a solution, which is just to better illustrate the problem, and also that it would be premature to used UDA to abandon mechanism. And then there is that new pal: the universal machine, which is also a root of many problems. To understand UDA is really equal to underst(and that we don't and cannot really understand what numbers and machines are. But that we can learn think making us doubting some quasi dogma in the fundamental sciences. Bruno Marchal wrote: The theory explains what exists, and how the rest emerges from it. But then doesn't the rest exist, too? I just see a problem with claiming to explain what exists, when it is really not clear what existance could mean apart from the relatively meaningful, but vague, every day use. In that context
UDA query
Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. Regards, Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
