Re: UDA query
On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can actually prepare them (in the quantum sense of preparation) in many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal dovetailer generate those preparations infinitely often. The universal dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate all rational possible quantum states. Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum preparable, but in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine either). Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not ( priori) digitally emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: paper on view of reality
On 20 Dec 2009, at 05:55, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Ronald, The theory is pure unadulterated Idealism. Matter/energy are, at best, considered as epiphenomena. My efferts to discuss alternatives have lead nowhere... You may try again, or refer to links to your theories. The UD reasoning will then entail that such materialist theories have to be non computationalist. Not that they are irremediably false. But this list seems very open to comp. You may try to find an error in UDA. Without any (fatal) error in UDA, you have to accept that when we assume comp, alternatives to objective idealism are logically/epistemologically ruled out. Note that, unlike the theory mentioned above, comp does not make matter or energy (nor consciousness) epiphenomena. They are relative concrete phenomena which make it possible for us to interact with our (most probable) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Thank you quentin and Bruno... Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many times) by the UD. Hence by it generating all possible emulations of me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can actually prepare them (in the quantum sense of preparation) in many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal dovetailer generate those preparations infinitely often. The universal dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate all rational possible quantum states. Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum preparable, but in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine either). Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not ( priori) digitally emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
Sorry I should have added that I was assuming that the UD was operating at some future time as in step 7 (fig 7) of Bruno's paper. Is my reasoning correct in what I have said in the last post? On Dec 21, 9:33 pm, Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk wrote: Thank you quentin and Bruno... Right I think I see what Quentin is saying in that we take the copying procedure as given for the purpose of the experiment however technically problematic. I think I get part of what you say Bruno. What I had thought myself was that even if it was not possible to extract sufficient information down to the correct level by a copying process, there could still be an identical me generated (perhaps many times) by the UD. Hence by it generating all possible emulations of me implies that their would be a consistent extension of me (at any stage of my life) that I could just as easily experience for my next OM as opposed to the one i would expect to experience on the current wetware (or whateverware I'm running on if we are in fact already software constructs in a simulation). On Dec 21, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Dec 2009, at 08:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/12/21 Nick P m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk Bruno states in his paper “The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations” that “The description encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the description of a state of some Turing machine, given that we assume comp. So its description can be duplicated, and the experiencer can be reconstituted simultaneously at two different places, for example Washington and Moscow”. However to get this Turing state from the human, I suspect that this might result in the destruction of the original – I am not sure just a passive reading is possible. Bruno gives the footnote below. “For an example, it could be the state of a Turing machine emulating some unitary transformation in case the brain, whatever it is, is correctly described by quantum mechanics. This recall that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and comp, in its all classical and Platonist form, is not incompatible with the thesis that the brain is a quantum computer (which I doubt). Giving that machine Turing state, it can be recopied, without violating the non cloning theorem of quantum information science”. The unitary transformation alluded to above would need an initial state to operate on in order to enable evolution. This initial state must be obtained from a possibly destructive “read” to obtain configurational data at below the substitution level, I’m not sure that the no clone theorem can be overcome here? You're anticipating how this could be done on humans. But the argument is done by taking for granted that we/consciousness can be captured by a computational process (is turing emulable). So let's take as a start a conscious being already running on something else as wetware with input/output system that permits easy access to the current computational state. The fact that we would be turing emulable does not entails that it is actually possible to copy our current state without destructing the wetware or that it is feasible at all... but if it is possible (even at the expense of destructing the original) then after that data gathering, unlimited duplication can be done... so the fact that the original would have been destroyed in the copying process doesn't matter. That's right. Another way to see this consists in reminding one that a quantum computer can be emulated by a classical digital computer. So, despite we cannot clone arbitrary (unknown) quantum states, we can actually prepare them (in the quantum sense of preparation) in many exemplars, and, (and this is the point), the universal dovetailer generate those preparations infinitely often. The universal dovetailer, although typically classical and digital, does generate all rational possible quantum states. Now, if you attach your consciousness a real (or complex, with all decimals) quantum state, then we may be non quantum preparable, but in that case we are no more Turing emulable, and it means that we are working in another theory than comp. (But you don't need quantum mechanics here, if we are analog classical machine using all the decimals of the reals involved, we are no more digitalizable machine either). Actually comp predicts already a non cloning phenomenon for any piece of observable matter, given that observation (of matter) emerges from an infinity of infinite computations (a priori), and that is not ( priori) digitally emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the
