Re: A paper by Bas C. van Fraassen
HI Stephen, Just a short reply to your post to Colin, and indirectly to your last posts. On 22 Oct 2010, at 10:53, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Colin, Let me put you are ease, van Fraassen has sympathies with the frustrations that you have mentioned here and I share them as well, but let's look closely at the point that you make here as I think that it does to the heart of several problems related to the notion of an observer. OTOH, it seems to me that you are suggesting that the objective view is just a form of consensus between all of those subjective view, no? Also, the notion of a measurement is discussed in detail in the paper. I wonder if you read far enough to see it...If we buy the computationalist interpretation of the mind then there is nothing necessarily special about a human brain; the discussions about computational universality give us a good argument for that. OK. So we agree on the basic. But if you take the comp hypothesis seriously enough, then you might understand that assuming set theory or quantum mechanics is either contradictory (worst case) or redundant. Thanks for the van Fraassen paper. I have already argue that the modal interpretation of QM is a form of MWI, and that paper confirms my feeling. Not sure it is really new if you read with some attention the entire thesis by Everett. First of all we need to admit that if we are to be consistent with the mathematical prescriptions of quantum mechanics, each and every one of those scientists and table lamps, as physical objects, have a wave function of sorts associated with them and, assuming that they could interact, are entangled with each other. “Being in the universe” implies to me that that there is a sharing of context and maybe even a common basis of sorts. But is that all there is to it? Hardly! being a table lamp, when considered from the quantum perspective is not so simple. We cannot assume that there is any definiteness of properties in a sharp sense. When we consider a Table Lamp or any other physical object in isolation at best we have a superposition of possible properties, and what is the outcome of measurement is given in terms of restrictions upon those possibilities by the possible properties and modes of possible interaction of all of the tables, chairs, beds, etc. that are in the room with that table lamp and beyond. We cannot assume that what something ‘is’ is somehow invariant with respect to changes in the interactions that it has with all of the other objects. This is a very subtle point that need to be carefully considered. The notion of a Table lamp in isolation literally dissolves into nothing when we remove all those other objects upon which its definiteness of state persists. The conflation that has persistent for more than 2000 years is the idea that object in themselves are what they are. I am reminded of Einstein’s quit to Bohr that the moon would still exists if he was not looking at it. My response to Einstein is that he is not the only one interacting with the moon. We need to take the whole web of interactions into account when we consider the definiteness of properties otherwise we are only considering bare existence and that tell us nothing at all about properties. It should be obvious, if you get the UDA, that physical reality does not have a view of nowhere or an ultimate third person describable reality. Mechanism makes the physical reality a first person plural reality, with the person played by the Löbian machine or Löbian number. There is still a boolean ultimate third person view available: arithmetic (or combinators, lamda calculus, etc.). And this contradicts nothing written by Pratt, who is indeed a little less naïve than those defending the identity thesis. But Pratt scratches only the surface of the mind-body problem: he identifies the physical with the set-theoretical (which is not so much senseless actually, but far from leading to extracting QM from numbers), nor does he tackle any problem in the cognitive science (qualia, undefinability, rôle of consciousness, etc.). But his SET/SET^op duality is rather natural for a category theory minded attempt to go toward a formulation of the mind-body problem. His duality is also 100% mathematical a priori, which makes him mathematicalist like Tegmark, and like comp (with some nuances). In november I will have a bit more time, and I could add something on both van Fraassen-Rovelli and Pratt. Best, Bruno From: Colin Hales Sent: Thursday, October 21, 2010 10:35 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A paper by Bas C. van Fraassen Hi, Looks like and interesting read but the initial gloss-over I had revealed all the usual things that continue to frustrate and exasperate me Why won't people that attend to these issues do some neuroscience...where
Re: A paper by Bas C. van Fraassen
I am pretty sure that there is a profound misinterpretation and/or unrecognized presupposition deeply embedded in the kinds of discussion of which Van F and your reply and Bruno's fits. It's so embedded that there appears to be no way that respondents can type words from a perspective in which the offered view may be wrong or a sidebar in a bigger but unrecognised picture. It's very hard to write anything to combat view X when the only words which ever get written are those presuming X, and X is assuming a position of explaining everything, yet doesn't. In the long run I predict that: 1) The 'many worlds' do not exist and are a product of presuppositions about scientific description not yet understood by the proponents of MWI. 2) QM will be recognized as merely an appearance of the world, not the world as it is. 3) The universe that exists now is.the only universe that exists at the moment. Despite this, the many worlds are explorable, physically by 'virtual matter' behaving as if they existed (by an appropriate entity made of the stuff of our single universe) 4) The MWI has arisen as a result of a human need to make certain mathematics right, not the need to explain the natural world. This, in the longer term will be recognised as a form of religiosity which will be seen to imbue the physicists of this era, who are preselected by the education system for prowess in manupulating symbols. The difference between this behaviour and explaining the natural world is not understood by the physicists/mathematicians of this era. (In contrast, I regard myself as a scientist an explainer of things-natural ...which I claim as different to being a physicists/mathematician in this strange era we inhabit) 5) COMP is false a computer instantiation of rules of how a world appears to be, and a world are not the same thing. 6) COMP is false a computer instantiation of rules of how a brain appears to be is not a brain. 7) Corollary: scientific description of how the world appears and what the world is made of are not the same description _and_ computer instantiations of either set is not a world. 8) The issue that causes scientific descriptions (like QM) to be confused with actual reality is a cultural problem in science, not a technical problem with what science has/has not discovered. 9) That most of the readers of this list will stare at this list of statements and be as mystified about how I can possibly think they are right as I am about those readers' view that they can't be right. BTW I have a paper coming out in Jan 2011 in 'Journal of Machine Consciousness' in which I think I may have proved COMP false as a 'law of nature' ... here in this universe, (or any _actual_ universe, really). At the least I think the argument is very closeand I have provided the toolkit for its final demise, which someone else might use to clinch the deal. This leads to my final observation: 10) I think the realization of the difference between 'wild-type' computation (actual natural entities interacting) and 'artificial computation' (a computer made of the actual entities interacting, waving its components around in accordance with rules /symbols defined by a third party) will become mainstream in the long run. - It's quite possible that the COMP of the Bruno kind is actually right , but presented into the wrong epistemic domain and not understood as such. Time will tell. The way the Bruno-style' COMP can be right is for it to make testable predictions of the outward appearance of the mechanism for delivery of phenomenal consciousness in brain material NC (natural computation) and AC (artificial computation) is the crucial distinction. I don't think the QM/MWI proponent can conceive of that distinction. Perhaps it might be helpful if those readers try and conceive of such a situation, just as an exercise.. cheers colin hales Bruno Marchal wrote: HI Stephen, Just a short reply to your post to Colin, and indirectly to your last posts. On 22 Oct 2010, at 10:53, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Colin, Let me put you are ease, van Fraassen has sympathies with the frustrations that you have mentioned here and I share them as well, but let's look closely at the point that you make here as I think that it does to the heart of several problems related to the notion of an observer. OTOH, it seems to me that you are suggesting that the objective view is just a form of consensus between all of those subjective view, no? Also, the notion of a measurement is discussed in detail in the paper. I wonder if you read far enough to see it...If we buy the computationalist interpretation of the mind then there is nothing necessarily special about a human brain; the discussions about computational universality give us a good argument for that. OK. So we agree on the basic. But if you take the comp hypothesis seriously enough, then
RE: A paper by Bas C. van Fraassen
Good article and, as I see it, a barely-concealed challenge to actually come up with an experiment that will prove or disprove MWI. I’ve seen a few on the Los Alamos site from time to time, but nothing that wraps it up. And Young’s experiment shouldn’t count. From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Colin Hales Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2010 4:37 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A paper by Bas C. van Fraassen I am pretty sure that there is a profound misinterpretation and/or unrecognized presupposition deeply embedded in the kinds of discussion of which Van F and your reply and Bruno's fits. It's so embedded that there appears to be no way that respondents can type words from a perspective in which the offered view may be wrong or a sidebar in a bigger but unrecognised picture. It's very hard to write anything to combat view X when the only words which ever get written are those presuming X, and X is assuming a position of explaining everything, yet doesn't. In the long run I predict that: 1) The 'many worlds' do not exist and are a product of presuppositions about scientific description not yet understood by the proponents of MWI. 2) QM will be recognized as merely an appearance of the world, not the world as it is. 3) The universe that exists now is.the only universe that exists at the moment. Despite this, the many worlds are explorable, physically by 'virtual matter' behaving as if they existed (by an appropriate entity made of the stuff of our single universe) 4) The MWI has arisen as a result of a human need to make certain mathematics right, not the need to explain the natural world. This, in the longer term will be recognised as a form of religiosity which will be seen to imbue the physicists of this era, who are preselected by the education system for prowess in manupulating symbols. The difference between this behaviour and explaining the natural world is not understood by the physicists/mathematicians of this era. (In contrast, I regard myself as a scientist an explainer of things-natural ...which I claim as different to being a physicists/mathematician in this strange era we inhabit) 5) COMP is false a computer instantiation of rules of how a world appears to be, and a world are not the same thing. 6) COMP is false a computer instantiation of rules of how a brain appears to be is not a brain. 7) Corollary: scientific description of how the world appears and what the world is made of are not the same description _and_ computer instantiations of either set is not a world. 8) The issue that causes scientific descriptions (like QM) to be confused with actual reality is a cultural problem in science, not a technical problem with what science has/has not discovered. 9) That most of the readers of this list will stare at this list of statements and be as mystified about how I can possibly think they are right as I am about those readers' view that they can't be right. BTW I have a paper coming out in Jan 2011 in 'Journal of Machine Consciousness' in which I think I may have proved COMP false as a 'law of nature' ... here in this universe, (or any _actual_ universe, really). At the least I think the argument is very closeand I have provided the toolkit for its final demise, which someone else might use to clinch the deal. This leads to my final observation: 10) I think the realization of the difference between 'wild-type' computation (actual natural entities interacting) and 'artificial computation' (a computer made of the actual entities interacting, waving its components around in accordance with rules /symbols defined by a third party) will become mainstream in the long run. - It's quite possible that the COMP of the Bruno kind is actually right , but presented into the wrong epistemic domain and not understood as such. Time will tell. The way the Bruno-style' COMP can be right is for it to make testable predictions of the outward appearance of the mechanism for delivery of phenomenal consciousness in brain material NC (natural computation) and AC (artificial computation) is the crucial distinction. I don't think the QM/MWI proponent can conceive of that distinction. Perhaps it might be helpful if those readers try and conceive of such a situation, just as an exercise.. cheers colin hales Bruno Marchal wrote: HI Stephen, Just a short reply to your post to Colin, and indirectly to your last posts. On 22 Oct 2010, at 10:53, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Colin, Let me put you are ease, van Fraassen has sympathies with the frustrations that you have mentioned here and I share them as well, but let's look closely at the point that you make here as I think that it does to the heart of several problems related to the notion of an observer. OTOH, it seems to me that you are suggesting that the objective view is just a form of consensus
