Re: Animal consciousness and self-consciousness (was Re: Self-aware = Consciousness?)
On 09 May 2011, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote: On 5/9/2011 11:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 May 2011, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote: On 5/9/2011 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 May 2011, at 19:36, meekerdb wrote: On 5/7/2011 8:19 AM, John Mikes wrote: Thanks, Russell, I am gladly standing corrected about our fellow smart animals. HOWEVER: We speak about a self-awareness as we, humans identify it in our human terms and views. Maybe other animals have different mental capabilities we cannot pursue or understand, as adjusted to their level of complexity usable in their 'menatality'. It may - or may not - be only according to their number of neurons as our conventional sciences teach. Or some may use senses we are deficient in, maybe totally ignorant about. (We have a deficient smelling sense as compared to a dog and missing orientation's senses of some birds, fish, turtle) In our anthropocentric boasting we believe that only our human observations are 'real'. Thanks for setting me straight John. Not only do other species have different perceptual modalities; even within the self-awareness there are different kinds. Referring to my favorite example of the AI Mars rover, such a rover has awareness of it's position on the planet. It has awareness of it's battery charge and the functionality of various subsystems. It has awareness of its immediate goal (climb over that hill) and of some longer mission (proceed to the gully and take a soil sample). It's not aware of where these goals arise (as humans are not aware of why they fall in love). It's not aware of it's origins or construction. It's not a social creature, so it's not aware of it's position in a society or of what others may think of it. I expect that when we have understood consciousness we will see that it is a complex of many things, just as when we came to understand life we found that it is a complex of many different processes. Life and consciousness are different notion with respect to the notion of explanation we can find from them. In case of life, we can reduce a third person describable phenomenon to another one (for example we can argue that biology is in principle reduced to chemistry, which is reduced to physics). For consciousness there is an hard problem, which is the mind-body problem, and most people working on the subject agree that it needs another sort of explanation. Then comp shows that indeed, part of that problem, is that if we use the traditional mechanistic rationale, we inherit the need of reducing physics to number theory and intensional number theory, with a need to explicitly distinguish first person and third person distinction. In a sense, the hard problem of consciousness leads to an hard problem of matter (the first person measure problem). Of course, I do think that mathematical logic put much light on all of this, especially the self-reference logics. Indeed, it makes the problem a purely mathematical problem, and it shows quanta to be a particular case of qualia. So we can say that comp has already solved the conceptual problem of the origin of the coupling consciousness/ matter, unless someone can shows that too much white rabbits remains predictible and that normalization of them is impossible, in which case comp is refuted. Bruno I don't see that reducing consciousness to mathematics is any different than reducing it to physics. It is more easy to explain the illusion of matter to an immaterial consciousness, than to explain the non-illusion of consciousness to something material. Consciousness can be explained by fixed point property of number transformation, in relation to truth, and this explains 99% of consciousness (belief in a reality) and 100% of the illusion of matter, which is really the illusion that some particular universal number plays a particular role. Each time I demand a physicist to explain what is matter, he can only give to me an equation relating numbers. With math, it is different, we have all relation between numbers, and we can understand, by listening to them, why some relation will take the form of particular universal number, having very long and deep computations, and why they will be taken statistically as describing a universe or a multiverses. Aren't you are still left with the hard problem which now becomes Why do these number relations produce consciousness?. Not true. The math explains why some number relatively to other numbers develop a belief in a reality, and it explains why such a belief separates into a communicable part and a non communicable part. This is entirely explained by the G/G* splitting and their modal variant (based on the classical theory of knowledge). I don't think this hard problem is soluble. An explanation gap remains, but then those number can understand why an explanation gap has to
Re: Animal consciousness and self-consciousness (was Re: Self-aware = Consciousness?)
Hi John, On 09 May 2011, at 21:35, John Mikes wrote: A stimulating discussion, indeed. I side with Brent in most of his remarks and question SOME of Bruno's in my 'unfounded' agnostic worldview of 'some' complexity of unrestricted everything - beyond our capabilities to grasp. Which IMO does not agree with Bruno's I don't think this hard problem is soluble. It is not Bruno's, but Brent's. Looking at the inductive 'evolution' in our epistemology my agnosticism seems more optimistic than this. Indeed, comp does solve the 'hard problem', up to a reduction of physics to a modality of universal machine's self-reference (making the theory testable). Within our present capabilities is missing from the statement, but our capabilities increased constantly - not only by the introduction of 'zero' in math or the Solar system (1st grade cosmology) of Copernicus. I do not restrict the grand kids of the grand kids of our grand kids. I lived through an epoch from right after candlelight with horses into MIR, the e-mail and DNA. I would not guess 'what's next'. To retort Brent's AI-robot I mention a trivial example: I have a light-switch on my wall that is conscious about lighting up the bulbs whenever it gets flipped its button to 'up'. ? It does not know that 'I am' doing that, but does what it 'knows'. ? (I guess you are trivializing the notion of consciousness). You might be right, but with comp the light switch is a non well defined object, like any piece of matter. So what you say is not false, but senseless. The rest is similar, at different levels of complexity - the Mars robot still not coming close to 'my' idea-churning or Bruno's math. And IMO biology is not 'reduced to chemistry (which is reduced to physics)' - only the PART we consider has a (partial?) explanation in those reduced sciences, with neglected other phenomena outside such explanatory restrictions. Just as 'life' is not within biology, which may be closer to it than chemistry. or physics, but genetics is further on and still not 'life'. What is life? I think that here it is just a question of vocabulary, unless you think about a precise biological phenomenon which would escape the actual theories? In science we bever pretend to know the truth, but we have to take the theories seriously enough if only to find the discrepancy with the facts. Of course, since theology has been taking out of science, many scientist (more than I thought when young) have a theological interpretation of science (and some without knowing it). They are doubly wrong of course. Yes, consciousness - the historic word applied by many who did not know what they are talking about and applied it in the sense needed to 'apply' to THEIR OWN theoretical needs - is an artifact not identifiable, unless we reach an agreement WHAT IT IS (if it IS indeed). Here I totally disagree. We cannot define in 3p terms what is consciousness, but we know pretty well what it is. We dispose of many, many, many, personal examples, and that is enough for knowing what it is, even if we cannot define it. The comp theory explains entirely what it is, and why we cannot define it. It explains also why it has to be, and what role it has in the origin of the physical realm. In my wording the complexity that defines many of the applicable tenets form some PROCESS(es), not a mathematically identifiable expression - nor 'awareness' as in another domain. The 'hard problem' is still open. I don't think so. I am not sure you have study the posts, or the paper, where the solution is explained. If you do, I will ask you to tell us what is missing. We need a new insight. We are hindered by too much mental blockage due to accepted (believed? calculated?) hearsay assumptions and their consequences. We 'guess' what we do not know. We always guess what we do not know. Always. The rest is authoritative argument, or argument by authority. Bruno You see, I should keep my mouse shut... John On Mon, May 9, 2011 at 2:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/9/2011 11:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 May 2011, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote: On 5/9/2011 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 May 2011, at 19:36, meekerdb wrote: On 5/7/2011 8:19 AM, John Mikes wrote: Thanks, Russell, I am gladly standing corrected about our fellow smart animals. HOWEVER: We speak about a self-awareness as we, humans identify it in our human terms and views. Maybe other animals have different mental capabilities we cannot pursue or understand, as adjusted to their level of complexity usable in their 'menatality'. It may - or may not - be only according to their number of neurons as our conventional sciences teach. Or some may use senses we are deficient in, maybe totally ignorant about. (We have a deficient smelling sense as compared to a dog and missing orientation's
Re: Animal consciousness and self-consciousness (was Re: Self-aware = Consciousness?)
On 10 May 2011 13:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What does it mean for numbers to understand? Suppose I can answer this in a way that you understand. Then it means the same things for the numbers. This seems to me to be a very central point. Chalmers gives very convincing arguments why an Aristotelian machine's expressed behaviour (including its thoughts and beliefs) are indistinguishable from a conscious person's - excepting only that it is not IN FACT conscious (!). This alone should be enough (as indeed he argues) to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a metaphysics of matter, unless consciousness itself is to be denied (which, as Deutsch argues in his most recent book, is just bad explanation). It seems as if, starting from an Aristotelian perspective, there is no way this puzzle can be resolved even with the addition of various ad hoc assumptions (such as Chalmers himself attempts, unsuccessfully IMO); the assumed primacy of material processes inevitably ends in the vitiation of mental explanation, in this view of the matter. To resolve the puzzle it seems that material processes and mental processes (or, one might say, material and mental explanations) must emerge as deeply correlated aspects of a single narrative. Hence, if computationalism is to be the explanation for the mental, it must likewise suffice as that of the material. From this perspective, as you say, it is then of the essence that any explanation must mean the same things for the numbers as it does for me. David On 09 May 2011, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote: On 5/9/2011 11:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 May 2011, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote: On 5/9/2011 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 May 2011, at 19:36, meekerdb wrote: On 5/7/2011 8:19 AM, John Mikes wrote: Thanks, Russell, I am gladly standing corrected about our fellow smart animals. HOWEVER: We speak about a self-awareness as we, humans identify it in our human terms and views. Maybe other animals have different mental capabilities we cannot pursue or understand, as adjusted to their level of complexity usable in their 'menatality'. It may - or may not - be only according to their number of neurons as our conventional sciences teach. Or some may use senses we are deficient in, maybe totally ignorant about. (We have a deficient smelling sense as compared to a dog and missing orientation's senses of some birds, fish, turtle) In our anthropocentric boasting we believe that only our human observations are 'real'. Thanks for setting me straight John. Not only do other species have different perceptual modalities; even within the self-awareness there are different kinds. Referring to my favorite example of the AI Mars rover, such a rover has awareness of it's position on the planet. It has awareness of it's battery charge and the functionality of various subsystems. It has awareness of its immediate goal (climb over that hill) and of some longer mission (proceed to the gully and take a soil sample). It's not aware of where these goals arise (as humans are not aware of why they fall in love). It's not aware of it's origins or construction. It's not a social creature, so it's not aware of it's position in a society or of what others may think of it. I expect that when we have understood consciousness we will see that it is a complex of many things, just as when we came to understand life we found that it is a complex of many different processes. Life and consciousness are different notion with respect to the notion of explanation we can find from them. In case of life, we can reduce a third person describable phenomenon to another one (for example we can argue that biology is in principle reduced to chemistry, which is reduced to physics). For consciousness there is an hard problem, which is the mind-body problem, and most people working on the subject agree that it needs another sort of explanation. Then comp shows that indeed, part of that problem, is that if we use the traditional mechanistic rationale, we inherit the need of reducing physics to number theory and intensional number theory, with a need to explicitly distinguish first person and third person distinction. In a sense, the hard problem of consciousness leads to an hard problem of matter (the first person measure problem). Of course, I do think that mathematical logic put much light on all of this, especially the self-reference logics. Indeed, it makes the problem a purely mathematical problem, and it shows quanta to be a particular case of qualia. So we can say that comp has already solved the conceptual problem of the origin of the coupling consciousness/matter, unless someone can shows that too much white rabbits remains predictible and that normalization of them is impossible, in which case comp is refuted. Bruno I don't see that reducing consciousness to mathematics is any different than
Re: Animal consciousness and self-consciousness (was Re: Self-aware = Consciousness?)
On 5/10/2011 9:01 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 10 May 2011 13:21, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What does it mean for numbers to understand? Suppose I can answer this in a way that you understand. Then it means the same things for the numbers. This seems to me to be a very central point. Chalmers gives very convincing arguments why an Aristotelian machine's expressed behaviour (including its thoughts and beliefs) are indistinguishable from a conscious person's - excepting only that it is not IN FACT conscious (!). How does he establish that it is not conscious? This alone should be enough (as indeed he argues) to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a metaphysics of matter, unless consciousness itself is to be denied (which, as Deutsch argues in his most recent book, is just bad explanation). It seems as if, starting from an Aristotelian perspective, there is no way this puzzle can be resolved even with the addition of various ad hoc assumptions (such as Chalmers himself attempts, unsuccessfully IMO); the assumed primacy of material processes inevitably ends in the vitiation of mental explanation, in this view of the matter. To resolve the puzzle it seems that material processes and mental processes (or, one might say, material and mental explanations) must emerge as deeply correlated aspects of a single narrative. Hence, if computationalism is to be the explanation for the mental, it must likewise suffice as that of the material. The problem with computationalism is that exists = is computed does not entail computed = exists and if you hypothesize the latter it explains too much. Brent From this perspective, as you say, it is then of the essence that any explanation must mean the same things for the numbers as it does for me. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Animal consciousness and self-consciousness (was Re: Self-aware = Consciousness?)
On 10 May 2011 19:11, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This seems to me to be a very central point. Chalmers gives very convincing arguments why an Aristotelian machine's expressed behaviour (including its thoughts and beliefs) are indistinguishable from a conscious person's - excepting only that it is not IN FACT conscious (!). How does he establish that it is not conscious? Sorry if this wasn't clear. In this context, by Aristotelian machine I simply meant Chalmers' zombie. It's unconscious by stipulation, i.e. he points out that the ascription of first-person consciousness is inessential to a complete (in principle) account of its (or indeed our) behaviour in third-person terms. The problem with computationalism is that exists = is computed does not entail computed = exists and if you hypothesize the latter it explains too much. The critical issue would indeed seem to be whether when you hypothesize the latter it explains too much. If so, then I guess by Bruno's lights comp would be refuted (i.e the conjunction of CTM and a primitive material TOE). David On 5/10/2011 9:01 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 10 May 2011 13:21, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What does it mean for numbers to understand? Suppose I can answer this in a way that you understand. Then it means the same things for the numbers. This seems to me to be a very central point. Chalmers gives very convincing arguments why an Aristotelian machine's expressed behaviour (including its thoughts and beliefs) are indistinguishable from a conscious person's - excepting only that it is not IN FACT conscious (!). How does he establish that it is not conscious? This alone should be enough (as indeed he argues) to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a metaphysics of matter, unless consciousness itself is to be denied (which, as Deutsch argues in his most recent book, is just bad explanation). It seems as if, starting from an Aristotelian perspective, there is no way this puzzle can be resolved even with the addition of various ad hoc assumptions (such as Chalmers himself attempts, unsuccessfully IMO); the assumed primacy of material processes inevitably ends in the vitiation of mental explanation, in this view of the matter. To resolve the puzzle it seems that material processes and mental processes (or, one might say, material and mental explanations) must emerge as deeply correlated aspects of a single narrative. Hence, if computationalism is to be the explanation for the mental, it must likewise suffice as that of the material. The problem with computationalism is that exists = is computed does not entail computed = exists and if you hypothesize the latter it explains too much. Brent From this perspective, as you say, it is then of the essence that any explanation must mean the same things for the numbers as it does for me. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Animal consciousness and self-consciousness (was Re: Self-aware = Consciousness?)
Hi, Bruno, excuse me for getting lost between you and Brent. You are absolutely right: I did not follow, study and understand those many thousand pages of discussions over the more than a decade on this list, together with the many tenthousand pages (not) learned to understand them. Indeed I am out of the vocabulary. Here are some little nitpicks I feel I can respond to: you wrote: *? (I guess you are trivializing the notion of consciousness). You might be right, but with comp the light switch is a non well defined object, like any piece of matter. So what you say is not false, but senseless*. \ I was trying to trivialize Brent's robot, as you identified: 'any piece of matter'. And my example was trivial, in such respect. About my inquiry for consciousness: I questioned *WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?* your reply: *...Indeed, comp does solve the 'hard problem', up to a reduction of physics to a modality of universal machine's self-reference (making the theory testable).* does not enlighten me: a modality of universal machine's self reference draws my question: *WHAT *modality? *HOW* does that self reference work? *Testability* is not an argument, it may be a way *TO* an argument. Did the hard problem change from its original content which was the topical identification of physical data measurable in our neuronal system? (Mind-Body?) (Plus: as I recall you were not too concrete about our knowledge of the universal Machine either). *LIFE* in my views is not biological, biology (and other life sciences) try to get a handle on CERTAIN aspects we select in the generality we may call 'life'. I think we agreed that there is no such thing as *The TRUTH -* there are tenets you or me may accept as 'true' in some sense. I think I already sent you my 'draft' about Science-Religion about belief systems. Have a good time John M On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi John, On 09 May 2011, at 21:35, John Mikes wrote: A stimulating discussion, indeed. I side with Brent in most of his remarks and question SOME of Bruno's in my 'unfounded' agnostic worldview of 'some' complexity of unrestricted everything - beyond our capabilities to grasp. Which IMO does not agree with Bruno's * I don't think this hard problem is soluble. * It is not Bruno's, but Brent's. Looking at the inductive 'evolution' in our epistemology my agnosticism seems more optimistic than this. Indeed, comp does solve the 'hard problem', up to a reduction of physics to a modality of universal machine's self-reference (making the theory testable). Within our present capabilities is missing from the statement, but our capabilities increased constantly - not only by the introduction of 'zero' in math or the Solar system (1st grade cosmology) of Copernicus. I do not restrict the grand kids of the grand kids of our grand kids. I lived through an epoch from right after candlelight with horses into MIR, the e-mail and DNA. I would not guess 'what's next'. To retort Brent's AI-robot I mention a trivial example: I have a light-switch on my wall that is *conscious* about lighting up the bulbs whenever it gets flipped its button to 'up'. ? It does not know that 'I am' doing that, but does what it 'knows'. ? (I guess you are trivializing the notion of consciousness). You might be right, but with comp the light switch is a non well defined object, like any piece of matter. So what you say is not false, but senseless. The rest is similar, at different levels of complexity - the Mars robot still not coming close to 'my' idea-churning or Bruno's math. And IMO biology is not 'reduced to chemistry (which is reduced to physics)' - only the *PART we consider* has a (partial?) explanation in those reduced sciences, with neglected other phenomena outside such explanatory restrictions. Just as 'life' is not *within* biology, which may be closer to it than chemistry. or physics, but genetics is further on and still not 'life'. What is life? I think that here it is just a question of vocabulary, unless you think about a precise biological phenomenon which would escape the actual theories? In science we bever pretend to know the truth, but we have to take the theories seriously enough if only to find the discrepancy with the facts. Of course, since theology has been taking out of science, many scientist (more than I thought when young) have a theological interpretation of science (and some without knowing it). They are doubly wrong of course. Yes, consciousness - the historic word applied by many who did not know what they are talking about and applied it in the sense needed to 'apply' to *THEIR OWN* theoretical needs - is an artifact not identifiable, unless we reach an agreement *WHAT IT IS* (if it IS indeed). Here I totally disagree. We cannot define in 3p terms what is consciousness, but we know pretty well what it is. We dispose of many,
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent and Everything List Members, Let me start over and focus on the sequencing of OMs. I argue that the Schrodinger Equation does not work to generate a sequencing of Observer moments for multiple interacting observers because it assumes a physically unreal notion of time, the Newtonian Absolute time which is disallowed by the experimentally verified theory of general relativity. I will concede that I might be mistaken in my claim that the complex valuation of the observables (or, in the state vector formalism, the amplitudes) nor the hermiticity will generate a natural or well ordering that can be used to induced an a priori sequencing of the OMs, but I would like to see an argument that it does. Is there one? The paper by Ischam argues that there is not... I see this problem of OM sequencing as separate from the ideas about clocks since clocks are a classical concept that depends, in a QM universe, on decoherence or something similar to overcome the effects of the HUP on its hands. Onward! Stephen From: meekerdb Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 8:04 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis On 5/9/2011 3:22 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, From: meekerdb Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 12:17 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis On 5/8/2011 10:22 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bent, From: meekerdb Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 12:31 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis On 5/8/2011 9:19 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, No, the Newtonian case would be such that the logical non-contradiction requirement would be trivial as the number of physical alternatives that could occur next per state is one, this generates a one to one to one to one to one ... type of sequencing. There is no “choice” in the Newtonian case. And hence no measure problem. [SPK] I agree. But the universe we experience is not Newtonian... On the other hand, in QM we have a clear example of irreducible and non-trivial alternatives that could occur next per state. IN QM, observables are defined in terms of complex valued amplitudes which do not have a well ordering as Real numbered valuations do. No, observables are defined by Hermitean operators which have real eigenvalues. The Hamiltonian generates time evolution. [SPK] I am sorry but you are wrong. The Hamiltonian generation of time evolution is only known for the non-relativistic version of QM, simple cases of relativistic particle dynamics and quantum field theory as currently defined. These use the absolute time of Newton. It is well known that the Newtonian version of time is disallowed by General Relativity. Chris Isham discuses this here: http://arxiv.org/abs/grqc/9210011 “The problem of time in quantum gravity is deeply connected with the special role as- signed to temporal concepts in standard theories of physics. In particular, in Newtonian physics, time—the parameter with respect to which change is manifest—is external to the system itself. This is reflected in the special status of time in conventional quantum theory:” I'm well aware of the problem of time in quantum gravity. But I don't think you need to consider relativistic QFT and solve the problem of quantum gravity just to have examples of non-trivial alternatives that could occur. I don't see the relevance to ordering OMs. [SPKnew] But it is the same problem! If our notion of OMs is not related to the content of observations involved in such things as “inertial reference frames” and the general covariance of physical laws, what is the point of OMs? The Hermitean operators only requires that the observed “pointer bases” are Real numbers. In other words, the Hermiticity requirement only applies to the outcomes of measurements, it does not pre-order the measurements. No, but they are not unordered because the wave-function is complex valued as you implied. The observables, which are presumably the content of OMs are real valued and would be ordered by, for example, reading a clock. [SPK] Did you actually read what I wrote? I was explicit. There was no implication that “they are not unordered because the wave-function is complex valued“, maybe I need to be even more clear and explicit. The Hermiticity requirement of observables DOES NOT GENERATE A WELL ORDER. Can you read that? The fact that each measurement is required to manifest as some Real number does not sequentially map the measurements into the Real line. I welcome you to show otherwise. What you wrote was. On the other hand, in QM we have a clear example of irreducible and non-trivial alternatives that could occur next per state .IN QM, observables are
