Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
On 29 May 2013, at 20:12, meekerdb wrote: On 5/29/2013 12:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see the analogy. I don't think consciousness can be negative, or even that it can be measured by one dimension. All- or-nothing would be a function that is either 1 or 0. The point is more that it is 0, or 0. If you can be conscious of red and green, then I'd say you are more conscious than someone who is red/green colorblind (albeit by a tiny amount). That is about consciousness' content. Not on being or not conscious. In order to have beliefs about arithmetic requires that you be conscious of numbers and have a language in which to express axioms and propositions. I doubt that simpler animals have this and so have different consciousness than humans. Most plausibly. But this again is about the content, and the character of consciousness, not the existence or not on some consciousness. You seem to regard consciousness as a kind of magic vessel which exists even when it is empty. I think John Mikes is right when he says it is a process. When a process isn't doing anything it doesn't exist. To be sure, I don't use this in the usual reasoning, but I have to say that I am more and more open that there is something like that, indeed. But I agree that consciousness is related to a process, in part (if not comp would be meaningless). It just appears that such a process is very basic, that it is emulated by (many) arithmetical relations, and that it is also related to arithmetical truth (which is not emulable by any machine, but machine are confronted to it). Consciousness per se is not just a process: it is a first person mental state relating some process with truth. What I say is that such process can be kept very minimal. I don't venture to say less consciousness because I think of it as multi-dimensional and an animal may have some other aspect of consciousness that we lack. Sure. Bats have plausibly some richer qualia associated to sound than humans. But what we discuss is that consciousness is either present or not. Then it can take many different shapes, and even intensity, up to the altered state of consciousness. Cotard syndrom is also interesting. People having it believe that they are dead, and some argue that they are not conscious, but in fact what happen is that they lack the ability to put any meaning on their consciousness. Put meaning on consciousness? That makes no sense to me. They are obviously conscious of some things. If they were unconscious they couldn't respond. There is a possibility that we can access a state where we are conscious only of one thing, that we are conscious. It *is* part of the unbelievable (G* minus G). It shows that consciousness seems independent of the ability to interpret the consciousness content. Many pathological states of consciousness exist, but none makes me feel like if consciousness was not something (rich and variated) or nothing. You refer to the content of consciousness, not consciousness itself. But you seem to contend that there can be consciousness without content - which I find absurd. There is always a content, but it looks like we can limit it to one thing: being conscious. This is coherent with Descartes and mechanism. Consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt, notably. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 29 May 2013, at 22:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/29/2013 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 18:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 17:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22
2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If you want to communicate why should I need to search at
all? And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then
it's ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're
talking about.
Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula
using some notation for this,
So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said
to myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me
what Bp p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it
doesn't matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still
can't find a damn thing about Bp p.
Bp = I believe in p, or 'my opinion is that it is the case that
p', or, in the context of ideally correct (and simple machine):
Beweisbar('p').
p, when produced by some system, means, in all books on logic,
that p is true (from the system pov).
So Bp p is a ay to model true opinion, in some system.
When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what
I say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but
at least I try. You're not even trying.
I have explained this more than one times on this list, to
different people, because once you get it you can't forget.
You have come perhaps too much recently, but you can always ask
question. You should not focus on the formula, but on what it
represents. It is also explained in sane04, and basically, in all
my papers on this subject. Probably with different notations.
Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to
speak more clearly than I think.
Bp is for I believe p, produced by some machinery (machine,
formal system, ...).
In particular, it is an expression in some modal logic. 'Belief'
obeys usually the axioms:
1. B(p-q) - B(p - Bq)
2. Bp - BBp
Bp p means (I believe in p) and p. P alone, in the assertative
mode of some entity means it is the case that p. (independently
of the veracity of p).
For knowledge, we use the axiom:
3. Bp - p
As Gödel saw in 1933, beweisbar, or provability, does not obey to
that third axiom, and so provability cannot model
knowledgeability. Indeed no consistent machine can prove B('0=1') -
0=1, which is equivalent with ~B('0=1'), which is self-
consistency.
I'm not sure I understand this. Are you saying we cannot take (Bp-
p) for all p as an axiom because it would entail Bf -f and then
~f-~Bf, and since ~f is true by definition it would entail that the
machine is consistent?
Yes.
More generally p - f is equivalent with ~p, as you can verify by
doing the truth table:
p - f
100
010
That's why Löb's theorem B(Bp - p) - Bp generalizes Gödel's second
incompleteness theorem: just replace p by f. B(~Bf) - Bf, ~Bf -
~B(~Bf), Dt - ~BDt.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Particle physics according to Plato, Leibniz, and Feynman (ver 1
Particle physics according to Plato, Leibniz, and Feynman (ver 1) Comments are very welcome and this version is likely to change. I begin with an overall structure of the universe, a hierarchical government with Plato's One in command, and with leibniz's universe of colonies of monads within monads. resulting from Leibniz's localized universe as consisting of an infinity of monadic points (a dust) in mental space. Leibniz did not believe in the atomic theory and instead posited that the universe consists of a myriad of substances. Here we consider those substances to be instances of the 12 elementary particles or composites of such. First, all of the monads of the universe will be within an outer bag (only in the conceptual or monadic sense), the gravitational force monad. This being so, the gravitational monad will be the supreme monad, to use Leibniz's term. Inside of that gravitational bag will be two exclusive sets of bags or monads, a fermionic bag, iinside of which are the force-carrying fermions inside fermionic bags and a similar one for the bosons. I do not know the details, but presumaqbly fermions are held together by electroweak forces and similarly for the bosons, so that each distinct fermion bag should contain one or more electroweak bags, and similarly all the way down for the bosons. Finally, we note that the perceptions of Leibniz's monads are relational between, to verying degrees, all of the other monads of the universe and the motions of the particles occurs according to Leibniz's pre-established harmony in their appetititions. These rapidly and continuously chang pereceptions will include relative positions and relative forces between particles (the four fundamental forces). This is accomplished through the gravitational monad by Plato's One and axccording to the pre-estABLISHED HARMONY These will be, to use Leibniz's term, bare-naked monads, that is to say, bare, naked souls, each containing the identities. of the particles (their histories, perceptions, and appetite)s, And it is likely that the number and type of monad will change owing to collisions, the physics alrfeady contained in Leibniz's pre-established harmony as eg Feyman diagrams. . Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/30/2013 See my Leibniz site at http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
On 5/30/2013 2:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2013, at 20:12, meekerdb wrote: On 5/29/2013 12:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see the analogy. I don't think consciousness can be negative, or even that it can be measured by one dimension. All-or-nothing would be a function that is either 1 or 0. The point is more that it is 0, or 0. If you can be conscious of red and green, then I'd say you are more conscious than someone who is red/green colorblind (albeit by a tiny amount). That is about consciousness' content. Not on being or not conscious. In order to have beliefs about arithmetic requires that you be conscious of numbers and have a language in which to express axioms and propositions. I doubt that simpler animals have this and so have different consciousness than humans. Most plausibly. But this again is about the content, and the character of consciousness, not the existence or not on some consciousness. You seem to regard consciousness as a kind of magic vessel which exists even when it is empty. I think John Mikes is right when he says it is a process. When a process isn't doing anything it doesn't exist. To be sure, I don't use this in the usual reasoning, but I have to say that I am more and more open that there is something like that, indeed. But I agree that consciousness is related to a process, in part (if not comp would be meaningless). It just appears that such a process is very basic, that it is emulated by (many) arithmetical relations, and that it is also related to arithmetical truth (which is not emulable by any machine, but machine are confronted to it). Consciousness per se is not just a process: it is a first person mental state relating some process with truth. What I say is that such process can be kept very minimal. I don't venture to say less consciousness because I think of it as multi-dimensional and an animal may have some other aspect of consciousness that we lack. Sure. Bats have plausibly some richer qualia associated to sound than humans. But what we discuss is that consciousness is either present or not. Then it can take many different shapes, and even intensity, up to the altered state of consciousness. Cotard syndrom is also interesting. People having it believe that they are dead, and some argue that they are not conscious, but in fact what happen is that they lack the ability to put any meaning on their consciousness. Put meaning on consciousness? That makes no sense to me. They are obviously conscious of some things. If they were unconscious they couldn't respond. There is a possibility that we can access a state where we are conscious only of one thing, that we are conscious. It *is* part of the unbelievable (G* minus G). You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p But it still seems absurd to me. It invites an infinite regress: I am conscious of being conscious of being conscious of being... Brent It shows that consciousness seems independent of the ability to interpret the consciousness content. Many pathological states of consciousness exist, but none makes me feel like if consciousness was not something (rich and variated) or nothing. You refer to the content of consciousness, not consciousness itself. But you seem to contend that there can be consciousness without content - which I find absurd. There is always a content, but it looks like we can limit it to one thing: being conscious. This is coherent with Descartes and mechanism. Consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt, notably. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Belief vs Truth
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't believe it - it is merely a conjecture. In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief - whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a Christian's notion is another matter entirely. When it comes to Bp p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. And that's about where I left it - years ago. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Belief vs Truth
On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. Not really. You only believe the theorem you've proved if you believed the axioms and rules of inference. What mathematicians generally believe is that a proof is valid, i.e. that the conclusion follows from the premise. But they choose different premises, and even different rules of inference, just to see what comes out. I believe in this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't believe it - it is merely a conjecture. In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief - whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a Christian's notion is another matter entirely. I don't think scientists, doing science, *believe* anything. Of course they believe things in the common sense that they are willing to act/bet on something (at some odds). The Abrahamic religious notion of 'faith' is similar to that; the religious person must always act as if the religious dogma is true (at any odds). This precludes doubting or questioning the dogma. When it comes to Bp p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. Gettier (whom I know slightly) objected that one may believe a proposition that is true and is based on evidence but, because the evidence is not causally connected to the proposition should not count as knowledge. http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html Brent But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. And that's about where I left it - years ago. Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Belief vs Truth
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 04:19:53PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you sometimes use Bp to mean proves p and sometimes believes p To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. Not really. You only believe the theorem you've proved if you believed the axioms and rules of inference. What mathematicians generally believe is that a proof is valid, i.e. that the conclusion follows from the premise. But they choose different premises, and even different rules of inference, just to see what comes out. Fair enough, although if you're a Platonist, I guess you believe in some axioms - the PA ones, for instance. Anyway, this is rapidly departing my area of expertise :). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
