Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-08-28 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 2:52 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 8/27/2013 3:55 PM, Chris de Morsella wrote:


 From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2013 10:08 AM
 Subject: Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

 On Mon, Aug 26, 2013  Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote:

 you cannot prove that things in the brain happen because of some proximate
 definable and identifiable cause or otherwise they must therefore result by
 a completely random process.


Bullshit. Axioms don't need proof, and the most fundamental axiom in all
 of logic is that X is Y or X is not Y.  Everything else is built on top of
 that.  And only somebody who was absolutely desperate to prove the innate
 superiority of humans over computers would try to deny it.
 You seem confused... the brain is not an axiom... it is one of the most
 complex systems we know about in the observed universe.

 In a system as layered, massively parallel and highly noisy as the brain
 your assumptions of how it works are naïve and border on the comical. The
 brain is not a based on a simple deterministic algorithm in which the chain
 of cause and effect is always clear.


 Although reductionism has recently received a lot of bad press from
 supermarket tabloids and new age gurus the fact remains that if you want to
 study something complex you've got to break it into simpler parts and then
 see how the parts fit together. And in the final analysis things happen for
 a reason or they don't happen for a reason; and if they did then it's
 deterministic and if they didn't then it's random.

 Perhaps your final analysis is a bit too shallow and self limiting. Why you
 cling so tenaciously to this need for definitive causality chains (or else
 it must be complete randomness) is amusing, but is not misguided. You cannot
 show definitive causality for most of what goes on in most of the universe.
 You can hypothesize a causal relationship perhaps, but you cannot prove one
 for all manner of phenomenon arising out of chaotic systems. The brain is a
 noisy chaotic system and you are attempting to impose your Newtonian order
 on it.

 Your approach does not map well onto the problem domain. And what you say
 has no predictive value; it does not help unravel how the brain works... or
 how the mind arises within it.


 It does help.  There's no evidence that the brain can't be understood as a
 parallel computer plus some randomness.

Indeed, there's a huge amount of evidence that the brain can be
understood as a parallel computer + randomness. Furthermore, we can
even engineer artificial neural networks to perform tasks that were
previously only achievable by humans. Of course, Church-Turing tells
us that if this things can be done with a recurrent neural network,
they can necessarily also be done with any other Turing complete
device. The intelligence part is not so mysterious, although we are
missing some algorithms.

But then there's the hard problem, and I wonder if it's related to
randomness. I always had the feeling that it is, but I might be
falling trap to the tendency to think that two mysteries must be
related (like people also do with consciousness and QM). But they
might be.

 The problem with John's formulation
 is he insists there is either *a* reason or not *a* reason.

Yes, I think John has a blind spot around this. I think causality is
just a type of model that might approximate the truth but will never
be the whole truth. Furthermore, it's a human thought tool. It has no
reality status.

 Hardly anything
 can be thought of as having *a* reason.  In the case of human behavior, each
 instance almost certainly has many different causes, some in memory, some in
 the immediate environment, and some which are random and don't have an
 effective cause.  I think of the person, brain/body/etc, plus immediate
 environment narrow down the probable actions to a few, e.g. 1 to 20, and
 then some quantum randomness realizes one of those.  So it's not
 deterministic like Laplace's clockwork world, but it's not
 anything-is-possible either.

Or, putting it another way, the Everything has a structure. That's one
of the reasons why I like Bruno's ideas (as far as I understand them).
Comp explains why there is a structure and even give it a shape.
Meta-physically it's much better than causality, but currently worse
at making predictions about the real world. I think John only values
the latter and is not willing to listen to things that address the
first.

Telmo.

 Brent




 You can copy the symbols on a sheet of paper , but without understanding
 Hungarian you will never be impacted by the meaning or sensations that poem
 is seeking to convey.


True but irrelevant. I never claimed we would someday understand how to
 make an AI more intelligent than ourselves, I only said that someday such an
 AI would get made.

 And how are you sure it has not already been achieved. To go 

RE: The Nazi History of the Muslim Brotherhood

2013-08-28 Thread smitra

Hi Chris,

you are saying that:

No, Saibal you invoke the moral quality of the act by describing it as 
a good thing


But this is exactly why I want to avoid this whole morality thing, it 
comes with a baggage that then implies things that I don't support. I 
can think that 9/11 was a good thing to have happened while at the same 
time think that 99/11 was motivated by people with very bad motives. A 
horrible event can also later turn out to have been a very good thing 
to have happened.


It seems to me that framing things in terms of morality, arguing that I 
support consequentialism is all besides the point. I don't support 
consequentialism it only looks that way because you are considering 
what I'm saying in terms of morality when that concept doesn't apply.


Look there may well be something useful in philosophy, like what you 
write about preventing flawed reasoning. But philosophy has been pretty 
bad at preventing ill defined baggage being inntroduced and made part 
of arguments. This is why physics and not philosophy is the best way to 
describe the world.


Saibal



Citeren chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:


Hi Saibal


No I don't need to invoke morality, the price I pay for that is to have

to explain explicity what I mean by a good outcome, what measure I
choose here to determine this, etc.

Saibal, by using the terms 'good'/'bad' and 'right'/'wrong' you can 
not help but invoke morality because that is the language of 
morality. And we are able to see what standard of morality you are 
invoking by examining your justifications.


You are a consequentialist. You assess the rightness/wrongness of 
supporting Nazis by balancing outcomes. You judge 9/11 to have been 
good or bad because of the outcomes it had for x,y,z. This is 
consequentialism and it is a moral perspective. You don't escape that 
fact by also claiming you have no time for morality, all that does is 
reveal you to be inconsistent.


9/11 was a good thing to have happened, despite the perpetrators not
having good intentions, i.e. the perpetrators of 9/11 wanted to
achieve something that I would not have preferred. You are invoking the
concept of moral quality of an act, not me.

No, Saibal you invoke the moral quality of the act by describing it 
as a good thing. What else do you think your doing by describing 
something as a 'good'? Having a cup of tea? The fact that the 
intentions of the perpetrators plays no role in your judgement is 
paradigmatic of the teleological nature of consequentialism. One of 
the many reasons so many people find that kind of reasoning 
unconvincing and shallow.



Moral philosophy???. Well, I consider philosophy to be pseudoscience,
I already told you what I think about morality, so I don't have to tell
you what I think about moral philosophy.


I'm assuming that you are using 'pseudoscience' pejoratively here 
which is  silly coming from someone who believes in multiple 
realities which amount to a bunch of subjectively calculated sums.


But the truth is that philosophy isn't even close to being a 
pseudoscience. Philosophy is all very 'meta' and exists to draw out 
the flaws in reasoning we all engage in. I'm going to ignore your 
disdain for philosophy, mate, because it is too embarrassing to watch 
people who engage in little else besides pseudoscience and 
metaphysics shoot themselves in the foot. :)


Morality in previous centuries has been invoked to justify the burning
of people at the Stake for blasphemy, no one at the time argued that
this was immoral based on a reading of all those philosophers. 

Rubbish. Take slavery : for a long time justified by teleological 
claims that the suffering of the few was outweighed by the benefits 
for the many it was eventually over thrown by deontological concerns 
about the sanctity of self determination. And of course people did 
argue that slavery was immoral. Of course people did argue that 
burning people at the stake was immoral. And it was precisely because 
people did engage in moral philosophy and those ideas dissipated into 
society that we are now at a point where we can argue about the 
morality of eating a cow and can take it as given that torture is 
wrong.



John is a good example, he doesn't read past the first sentence when I
wrote hat 9/11 was a good thing to have happend,

Well I did read past the first sentence, but I needn't have. Look, if 
the gears in your brain are grinding away and delivering up moral 
statements like '9/11 was a good thing' then its time to visit the 
brain mechanic for a moral m.o.t. Maybe, if you really fancy yourself 
as a moral nihilist, then change the gaskets and abandon the use of 
moral terminology. Compare:


Supporting the Nazis was useful for the Arabs way back when

with

Supporting the Nazis was the right thing to do way back when

Do you see the difference?

I think having a go at people for taking you at your word is foolish.

All the best.


Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 03:07:46 +0200

Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-08-28 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 6:55 PM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.comwrote:

Bullshit. Axioms don't need proof, and the most fundamental axiom in all
 of logic is that X is Y or X is not Y.  Everything else is built on top of
 that.  And only somebody who was absolutely desperate to prove the
 innate superiority of humans over computers would try to deny it.



 You seem confused... the brain is not an axiom...


But the fact that X is Y OR X is not Y sure as hell IS A AXIOM, and so is
a event happens for a reason OR a event does not happen for a reason. And
first you tell me that the above is a tautology that is so obvious that I'm
foolish for repeating it so often, but now you're insisting that it isn't
true. So Chris, who is really confused around here?

 Why you cling so tenaciously to this need for definitive causality chains
 (or else it must be complete randomness) is amusing


I'm glad it brought some light to your otherwise drab existence, in fact
because you find it so amusing and the fact that X is Y or X is not Y is so
ubiquitous from now on you should find yourself in a constant state of
hilarity.

 it [the brain] is one of the most complex systems we know about in the
 observed universe.


Yes, and that is all the more reason to use reductionism if you want to
study it. If you had to understand everything about it before you could
understand anything about the brain (or anything else for that matter) you
would remain in a constant state of complete ignorance about not just the
brain but everything.


  You cannot show definitive causality for most of what goes on in most of
 the universe.


You just figured that out? Physicists have been telling us that some things
happen for no reason (are random) for nearly a century.

 You can hypothesize a causal relationship perhaps, but you cannot prove
 one for all manner of phenomenon arising out of chaotic systems. The brain
 is a noisy chaotic system and you are attempting to impose your Newtonian
 order on it.


If you're a fan of chaos computers are perfectly capable of producing it,
in fact the very first computer program I ever wrote used chaos to produce
the Mandelbrot set, a object of quite literally infinite complexity,
although of course there was a limit to how much magnification my little
computer could produce.

 Your approach does not map well onto the problem domain. And what you say
 has no predictive value; it does not help unravel how the brain works... or
 how the mind arises within it.


That approach produced Watson! No doubt you will counter by saying that
Watson has nothing to do with mind, and that is exactly why I don't believe
you when you claim to be emotionally neutral and are judging the
human-computer superiority issue strictly on the merits of the case.

 I never claimed we would someday understand how to make an AI more
 intelligent than ourselves, I only said that someday such an AI would get
 made.



 And how are you sure it has not already been achieved.


Because computers don't rule the world. Yet.

 What I said about needing to understand that which you are studying in
 order to be able to really be able to manipulate, extend, emulate, simulate
 etc. is not only true  -- as you admit


I don't admit that at all! it is sufficient but not necessary.

 With no understanding of the symbol stream you have no knowledge of what
 to do with the symbol stream passing across your view


And that is why even now we often don't understand what machines are doing
or why; we let them keep on doing it however because whatever mysterious
thing they're doing we figure it's probably important and don't dare stop
it.


   This applies to understanding the brain as well.. it is and will remain
 a mystery until we go in and figure out its fine grained workings.


It is entirely possible that we will never understand the fine grained
workings of the brain, but that won't matter because the computers will
understand it.

 John K Clark

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Re: Re: Leibniz's final causation as the Self, the active agent of change

2013-08-28 Thread Roger Clough
Hi spudboy100 

Anything that moves according to rules, a program, regulations, a control, etc. 
is not mind.

Mind has to be free and unconstrained, at least in principle. 
  
 
Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough


- Receiving the following content -  
From:  spudboy100  
Receiver:  everything-list,rclough  
Time: 2013-08-27, 13:14:57 
Subject: Re: Leibniz's final causation as the Self, the active agent of change 




My B in law posited, what moves the cursor, using a pc as an analogy of mind? 
Of course the cursor can be programmed to move and act, by a program, but then 
who made the programmer?  Leibniz and other thinkers may have asked, who made 
God? Terrific question. My sense of things is the use of an old fashioned or a 
new fashioned map. One is paper and you use your eyes and fingers, another map 
is you punch in the destination, and a women's voice speaks Turn right in 5 
miles! Both are maps. Similarly asking who created God is akin to asking your 
maps, where is the next alien intelligent civilization in the Galaxy?  Our 
little maps cannot tell us, because we're out of range. Having said this, 
where are the space aliens, or where is God, may not be detectable on our 
maps, simply because we haven't explored the universe sufficiently.  
 
Physicist, Freeman Dyson, has written that to know more things we have to have 
increasingly better observation, and to do this, we have to have improved 
tools for better experimentation and observation. The Self may be detectable 
or comprehendible through better tools, and one of these tools is assuredly 
mathematics. 
 
Mitch 
 
 
-Original Message- 
From: Roger Clough  
To: - Roger Clough  
Sent: Mon, Aug 26, 2013 3:31 am 
Subject: Leibniz's final causation as the Self, the active agent of change 
 
 
 
Leibniz's final causation as the Self, the active agent of change   
 
So far, materialistic models of the mind, such as Dennett's,  
are essentially passive.  There is no internal active agent of change, 
which one might call the Self.  
  
The internal active agent of change is desire, which we might 
define as a mismatch between the current state and a goal. 
In other words, the internal active agent of change is final 
causation, which has been discussed by Leibniz as typical of 
life, and also by Aristotle in his four basic causes of change. 
  
This desire to achieve a personal goal appears mentally as 
an intention, which is the active agent of change.  This is what 
we call the Self, and is the missing element of AI as well as  
current models of the mind. 
  
 
Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]  
See my Leibniz site at  
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough 
 
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Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-08-28 Thread Chris de Morsella

  


 From: meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

[snip]

 Although reductionism  has recently received a lot 
 of bad press from  supermarket tabloids and new age 
 gurus the  fact remains that if you want to study
   something complex you've got to break it into  
 simpler parts and then see how the parts fit 
  together. And in the final analysis things  
 happen for a reason or they don't happen for a  
 reason; and if they did then it's  deterministic and 
 if they didn't then it's  random.   

Perhaps your final analysis is a bit too shallowand 
self limiting. Why you cling sotenaciously to this need 
for definitivecausality chains (or else it must be 
completerandomness) is amusing, but is not misguided.   
 You cannot show definitive causality for most of   
 what goes on in most of the universe. You can  
  hypothesize a causal relationship perhaps, butyou 
cannot prove one for all manner ofphenomenon arising 
out of chaotic systems. Thebrain is a noisy chaotic 
system and you areattempting to impose your Newtonian 
order on it. 

Your approach does not map well onto theproblem domain. 
And what you say has nopredictive value; it does not 
help unravel howthe brain works... or how the mind 
arises within it.

 It does help.  There's no evidence that the brain can't beunderstood as 
 a parallel computer plus some randomness.  The problemwith John's 
 formulation is he insists there is either *a* reason ornot *a* reason.  
 Hardly anything can be thought of as having *a*reason.  In the case of 
 human behavior, each instance almostcertainly has many different causes, 
 some in memory, some in theimmediate environment, and some which are 
 random and don't have aneffective cause.  I think of the person, 
 brain/body/etc, plusimmediate environment narrow down the probable 
 actions to a few,e.g. 1 to 20, and then some quantum randomness realizes 
 one ofthose.  So it's not deterministic like Laplace's clockwork world,  
   but it's not anything-is-possible either.
Sure reductionist approach can gain you a partial understanding; you can slice 
the brain up; analyze processes and try to classify and drill down to smaller 
and down into increasingly tightly focused problem domains within the larger 
problem domain of how the brain works. But this approach fails to capture the 
holistic dynamic processes and subtle interplays between rapidly forming and 
also rapidly subsiding synchronized firing networks that pull together 
coalitions of neurons from many different brain regions. The brain is not only 
massively parallel -- it is a superbly tight packed one hundred trillion 
connection machine with 86 billion operating nodes in the network -- it is also 
incredibly noisy and seemingly chaotic.

The simple deterministic causality approach cannot model a vastly parallel and 
very noisy chaotic system such as the brain. The brain is not operating on 
deterministic principles -- or at least not completely so. Without modeling the 
chaos -- and chaos is modeled all the time and predictive statements can be 
made about chaotic systems (say the chaotic airflow over an air foil for 
example). But these models and the equations that comprise them account for 
chaos and often rely on probabilistic and consensus based algorithms. 
 
I am not arguing that the brain is beyond study or cannot be understood, 
analyzed or modeled. What I am arguing is that it is not a simple deterministic 
system in which state X will always lead to outcome Y; nor can it always be 
determined based on knowing an outcome Y in the brain what the causational 
state was that ultimately lead to that outcome. Even if there may be causation 
the processes by which the brain operates are so distributed and 
inter-dependent and the system is so incredibly noisy (and it really is a very 
high noise to signal ratio)  that any attempt to work backwards from some 
outcome down the causal chain of neural activity that resulted in it rapidly 
breaks down and grows geometrically more difficult with each remove from the 
final result and back into the densely nested forest of potential network 
branches.

John keeps insisting that X is Y or X is not Y. True, but so what? It does not 
provide any great insight into how the brain works as a dynamic entity. 
Basically based on reading his posts on the subject what 

Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-08-28 Thread Chris de Morsella

 


 From: Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2013 11:17 PM
Subject: Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?
  
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 2:52 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 8/27/2013 3:55 PM, Chris de Morsella wrote:


 From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2013 10:08 AM
 Subject: Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

 On Mon, Aug 26, 2013  Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote:

 you cannot prove that things in the brain happen because of some proximate
 definable and identifiable cause or otherwise they must therefore result by
 a completely random process.


Bullshit. Axioms don't need proof, and the most fundamental axiom in all
 of logic is that X is Y or X is not Y.  Everything else is built on top of
 that.  And only somebody who was absolutely desperate to prove the innate
 superiority of humans over computers would try to deny it.
 You seem confused... the brain is not an axiom... it is one of the most
 complex systems we know about in the observed universe.

 In a system as layered, massively parallel and highly noisy as the brain
 your assumptions of how it works are naïve and border on the comical. The
 brain is not a based on a simple deterministic algorithm in which the chain
 of cause and effect is always clear.


 Although reductionism has recently received a lot of bad press from
 supermarket tabloids and new age gurus the fact remains that if you want to
 study something complex you've got to break it into simpler parts and then
 see how the parts fit together. And in the final analysis things happen for
 a reason or they don't happen for a reason; and if they did then it's
 deterministic and if they didn't then it's random.

 Perhaps your final analysis is a bit too shallow and self limiting. Why you
 cling so tenaciously to this need for definitive causality chains (or else
 it must be complete randomness) is amusing, but is not misguided. You cannot
 show definitive causality for most of what goes on in most of the universe.
 You can hypothesize a causal relationship perhaps, but you cannot prove one
 for all manner of phenomenon arising out of chaotic systems. The brain is a
 noisy chaotic system and you are attempting to impose your Newtonian order
 on it.

 Your approach does not map well onto the problem domain. And what you say
 has no predictive value; it does not help unravel how the brain works... or
 how the mind arises within it.


 It does help.  There's no evidence that the brain can't be understood as a
 parallel computer plus some randomness.

Indeed, there's a huge amount of evidence that the brain can be
understood as a parallel computer + randomness. Furthermore, we can
even engineer artificial neural networks to perform tasks that were
previously only achievable by humans. Of course, Church-Turing tells
us that if this things can be done with a recurrent neural network,
they can necessarily also be done with any other Turing complete
device. The intelligence part is not so mysterious, although we are
missing some algorithms.

But then there's the hard problem, and I wonder if it's related to
randomness. I always had the feeling that it is, but I might be
falling trap to the tendency to think that two mysteries must be
related (like people also do with consciousness and QM). But they
might be.

I feel it should be added that the brain is also a very noisy and seemingly 
chaotic system. It is not just massively parallel, but it is also very noisy 
and we are discovering -- in fact, just now discovering (and DARPA by the way 
is very interested in finding out more) -- the algorithms the neocortex seems 
to use to arrive at  -- or focus in and amplify a signal. In order to 
understand and be able to begin to model the dynamic brain (I prefer at this 
point to call this the mind -- i.e. the dynamic sensations, experiences, 
feelings, thoughts and perceptions arising within the physical brain as a 
result of the dynamic interactions of the many billions -- even many trillions 
when we examine potential pathways of connection -- of individual neuronal 
actors and the coalitions of such actors acting in concert with other possibly 
distant neurons.

 The problem with John's formulation
 is he insists there is either *a* reason or not *a* reason.

 Yes, I think John has a blind spot around this. I think causality is
just a type of model that might approximate the truth but will never
be the whole truth. Furthermore, it's a human thought tool. It has no
reality status.

And my argument is that it is not the right tool for the job - -or more 
precisely cannot be the only tool you bring to this particular job site. Other 
mental/logic tools are needed including methodologies for dealing with chaotic 
noisy systems. In a chaotic system -- such as say our planetary atmosphere to 

Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-08-28 Thread Chris de Morsella

 


 From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 

On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 6:55 PM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com 
wrote:



Bullshit. Axioms don't need proof, and the most fundamental axiom in all of 
logic is that X is Y or X is not Y.  Everything else is built on top of that. 
 And only somebody who was absolutely desperate to prove the innate 
superiority of humans over computers would try to deny it.



 You seem confused... the brain is not an axiom... 

But the fact that X is Y OR X is not Y sure as hell IS A AXIOM, and so is a 
event happens for a reason OR a event does not happen for a reason. And first 
you tell me that the above is a tautology that is so obvious that I'm foolish 
for repeating it so often, but now you're insisting that it isn't true. So 
Chris, who is really confused around here?
 
X is Y OR X is not Y -- except when that which is being considered exists in a 
state of superposition :)
But sure its true in classic logic. And again I raise your bet with a big SO 
WHAT?
 
If X = Y AND Y = Z then X = Z  This is also logically true, but also has no 
substantial bearing on how the dynamic processes by which the mind arises from 
the 86 billion neuron and 100 trillion connection two phase (electro-chemical) 
network that comprises our brain
 

 Why you cling so tenaciously to this need for definitive causality chains (or 
 else it must be complete randomness) is amusing


I'm glad it brought some light to your otherwise drab existence, in fact 
because you find it so amusing and the fact that X is Y or X is not Y is so 
ubiquitous from now on you should find yourself in a constant state of 
hilarity.  

How totally pompous of you. What do you know of my existence, whether it be 
drab or dangerously on the edge? You have no knowledge of my existence and for 
you to characterize it -- from your position of gross ignorance reveals a 
gaping deficiency in your reasoning abilities or else a really bad character 
flaw. Could you please refrain from this engaging in these kinds of childish 
attributions and characterizations of someone whom you do not know at all but 
happen to be arguing with. Since I do not think you are stupid I must conclude 
you are pompous, which is not something I would be especially proud of if I 
were you.

 
 it [the brain] is one of the most complex systems we know about in the 
 observed universe.  
 

Yes, and that is all the more reason to use reductionism if you want to study 
it. If you had to understand everything about it before you could understand 
anything about the brain (or anything else for that matter) you would remain in 
a constant state of complete ignorance about not just the brain but everything.


 You cannot show definitive causality for most of what goes on in most of the 
 universe.  

 You just figured that out? Physicists have been telling us that some things 
 happen for no reason (are random) for nearly a century.

AND when did I say random? I deal with randomness -- or more accurately pseudo 
randomness and how to account for it and use it -- all the time in my work 
life. But I am not referring to random events, I was describing the difficulty 
in tracing causality back from an outcome state Y to an originating (within the 
frame of reference) state Y. I was making the statement that because of the 
chaotic and highly parallelized nature of the brain that very often the attempt 
to work back and determine the causes is in practice impossible.
 
Now hopefully you will finally figure out what I have being trying to 
communicate to you and realize that my stating that it is impossible to work 
back from result X to initial state Y by trying to rewind events and work back 
step by step is not the same thing as saying that the outcome X is the result 
of some random process. The brain is not a random state machine, it has a 
definite direction of flow and we experience a clear and consistent outcome. 
Clearly there is cause and effect -- as well as a fair degree of randomness 
that works its way into outcomes along the complex chains of consensus building 
neuralcortex algorithms that seem to be operating in us -- and which by the way 
DARPA is highly interested in learning more about.

 You can hypothesize a causal relationship perhaps, but you cannot prove one 
 for all manner of phenomenon arising out of chaotic systems. The brain is a 
 noisy chaotic system and you are attempting to impose your Newtonian order on 
 it.  

 If you're a fan of chaos computers are perfectly capable of producing it, in 
 fact the very first computer program I ever wrote used chaos to produce the 
 Mandelbrot set, a object of quite literally infinite complexity, although of 
 course there was a limit to how much magnification my little computer could 
 produce. 
 
I work with large systems for well known software companies and the spend my 
work days in computer code that operates them -- when I am not dragged into 

Re: When will a computer pass the Turing Test?

2013-08-28 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:05:27PM -0700, Chris de Morsella wrote:
 
 John keeps insisting that X is Y or X is not Y. True, but so what? It does 
 not provide any great insight into how the brain works as a dynamic entity. 
 Basically based on reading his posts on the subject what I am stating is that 
 he would not be hired to help work out the problem based on his views of how 
 the brain can be understood. In fact he would not make it past the initial 
 screening interview -- IMO. I am not calling him stupid -- though he does 
 question my intelligence -- but for some reason (which I know not of) he 
 clings to this simplistic view of what is in fact a highly dynamic, noisy, 
 chaotic and vastly parallelized system.
 

I think John is flogging the dead horse idea that free will involves
both causation and not causation (my will causes something to happen,
that something cannot be caused by something, as my will is
free). Maybe he needs to save that for the theologs who seem to hold
the bizarre idea that an omnsicient being could actually exist. (How
can our will be free if an omnisicient being already knows what choice
we will make?).

It is, as always, a confusion of emergence levels. My will is an
emergent concept, that has no relevance to the microscopic realm of
atoms, molecules and forces, but as an explanation for why I chose to
drink a cup of coffee is presumably a good one. The recent discussion
initiated by Bill Taylor of FOAR reminds us of David Deutsch's
argument along those lines, such as the explanation for why an atom of
copper occupies a certain position in a statue of Nelson on Picadilly
circus, which really puts the point more forcefully than I have done.

Obviously, that the particular arrangement of molecules in my brain
this morning may have no precise causation is sufficient to guarantee
my will to be free. It is a debatable point whether it is necessary
though, and we've been through interminable debates about that on this
list an elsewhere without getting anywhere :).


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Proof of Impossibility Sketch For a Consistent Theory of Everything and a Consistent Metasystem of a Theory of Everything

2013-08-28 Thread Ian Mclean
Details on my blog, Radical 
Computinghttp://radicomp.blogspot.com/2013/08/proof-of-impossibility-sketch-for.html
.

The summary is this, we can argue that a Theory of Everything is 
characterized by either syntactic, negation, or deductive completeness or 
universal closure. A *theory of everything* (*ToE*) or *final theory* is 
atheory of theoretical physics that 
fully explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and 
predicts the outcome of *any* experiment that could be carried out *in 
principle*. (Wikipedia: Theory of 
Everythinghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_everything
) Either definition excludes strictly consistent theories from 
consideration. Universal closure is achieved almost exclusively by the 
axiom of unrestricted comprehension and universal sets which in general 
entail Russell's paradox. Completeness is a more tractable property, but as 
I've sketched, necessitates that a neither a Theory of Everything nor its 
metasystem is strictly consistent.

This sketch is for the first part of a two part thesis on proof by 
contradiction methods examining proofs by contradiction intolerance and 
proofs by contradiction tolerance towards the development of paraconsistent 
metasystems and methods in metamathematics and the scientific method. 
Rather than argue for the impossibility of a theory of everything 
whatsoever, I argue that this necessitates that a Theory of Everything and 
its metasystem will be paraconsistent in a stronger sense than Zizzi's Lq 
and Lnq qubit languages. The second part of the paper will re-examine 
Gödel's proofs, Russell's paradox, and diagonalization proofs with 
contradiction tolerant methods.

I appreciate any feedback--especially constructive criticism,
-Ian D.L.N. Mclean

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