Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Aug 2015, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/31/2015 5:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Monday, August 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 31 Aug 2015, at 00:42, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 12:34:18PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Aug 2015, at 03:08, Russell Standish wrote:

Well as people probably know, I don't believe C. elegans can be
conscious in any sense of the word. Hell - I have strong doubts about
ants, and they're massively more complex creatures.

I think personally that C. Elegans, and Planaria (!), even amoeba,
are conscious, although very plausibly not self-conscious.

I tend to think since 2008 that even RA is already conscious, even
maximally so, and that PA is already as much self-conscious than a
human (when in some dissociative state).

But I don't know if PA is more or less conscious than RA. That
depends of the role of the higher part of the brain consists in
filtering consciousness or enacting it.


But it probably won't be long before we simulate a mouse brain in  
toto

- about 2 decades is my guess, maybe even less given enough dollars -
then we're definitely in grey philosophical territory :).

I am slightly less optimistic than you. It will take one of two
decades before we simulate the hippocampus of a rat, but probably
more time will be needed for the rest of their brain. And the result
can be a conscious creature, with a quite different consciousness
that a rat, as I find plausible that pain are related to the glial
cells and their metabolism, which are not  taken into account by the
current "copies".

What is blocking us is not the computing power - already whole "rat
brain" simulations have been done is something like 1/1 of real
time - so all we need is about a decade of performane improvement
through Moores law.

What development is needed is ways of determining the neural
circuitry. There have been leaps and bounds in the process of slicing
frozen brains, and imaging the slices with electron microscopes, but
clearly it is still far too slow.

As for the hypothesis that glial cells have something to do with it,
well that can be tested via the sort of whole rat brain simulation
I've been talking about. Run the simulation in a robotic rat, and
compare the behaviour with a real rat. Basically what the open worm
guys a doing, but scaled up to a rat. If the simulation is way
different from the real rat, then we know something else is required.


I can imagine that the rat will have a "normal behavior", but as he  
cannot talk to us, we might fail to appreciate some internal change  
or even some anosognosia. The rat would not be a zombie rat, but  
still be in a quite different conscious state (perhaps better, as  
it seems the glial cell might have some role in the chronic pain.


In general, if there is a difference in consciousness then there  
should be a difference in behaviour. If the difference in  
consciousness is impossible to detect then arguably it is no  
difference.


I'd say more-than-arguably we don't know and can't know.  Which is  
why I think "the hard problem" will be dissolved by AI engineering  
rather than solved by philosophers.



That is plausible, and I think that is a frightening idea.

Worst, the problem might be solved by the philosopher, or theologian,  
in the context of some theory/hypothesis, and yet be dissolved in the  
usual authoritarianist manner, for the usual political purpose.


Woman can vote since recently. Not a long time ago, many would have  
said that most "exotic foreigners" have no soul, which is useful for  
doing slavery without feeling guilty.


If an eliminativist, à-la Churchland, understand the logic of the UDA,  
then he has to eliminate the physical reality too. But, having  
eliminate the conscious experience, he cannot regain the "illusion" of  
matter, so physics (the science) disappears too, and that is refuted  
by our common experience.


This explains also why computationalism *does* solve the hard problem,  
in the sense that it explains, from the law of addition and  
multiplication only, how the pieces of computations logically appears  
(p -> []p, for p sigma_1), and why universal numbers get entangled in  
many deep computations (with "many" used in Everett sense, and "deep"  
used in Bennett sense) and "linear" (hopefully enough, but we have the  
quantizations to verify that)


The hard part of the hard consciousness problem, is solved by the fact  
that it is shown that all universal machines with enough "inductive"  
beliefs is confronted with knowable but non justifiable truth.  
Actually, as all the hypostases are represented in one of them (the  
[]p one, which obeys G + 1, with 1 being the name of the axiom p ->  
[]p, with p atomic sentences, here, Sigma_1 sentences. The "theology"  
is very rich, and for all "views", things can disappear when being  
shifted, with some exception (I guess). So you can have justifiable  
but not knowable, 

Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Aug 2015, at 19:40, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/31/2015 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 30 Aug 2015, at 20:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/30/2015 3:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 30 Aug 2015, at 03:08, Russell Standish wrote:


Well as people probably know, I don't believe C. elegans can be
conscious in any sense of the word. Hell - I have strong doubts  
about

ants, and they're massively more complex creatures.


I think personally that C. Elegans, and Planaria (!), even  
amoeba, are conscious, although very plausibly not self-conscious.


I tend to think since 2008 that even RA is already conscious,  
even maximally so, and that PA is already as much self-conscious  
than a human (when in some dissociative state).


But I don't know if PA is more or less conscious than RA. That  
depends of the role of the higher part of the brain consists in  
filtering consciousness or enacting it.




But it probably won't be long before we simulate a mouse brain  
in toto
- about 2 decades is my guess, maybe even less given enough  
dollars -

then we're definitely in grey philosophical territory :).


I am slightly less optimistic than you. It will take one of two  
decades before we simulate the hippocampus of a rat, but probably  
more time will be needed for the rest of their brain. And the  
result can be a conscious creature, with a quite different  
consciousness that a rat, as I find plausible that pain are  
related to the glial cells and their metabolism, which are not  
taken into account by the current "copies".


So now you agree with me that there are different kinds and  
degrees of consciousness; that it is not just a binary attribute  
of an axiom + inference system.


?

Either you are conscious, or you are not.


But is a roundworm either conscious or not?  an amoeba?


I don't know, but i think they are. Even bacteria, and perhaps even  
some viruses, but on a different time scale than us.




If they can be conscious, but not self-conscious then there are two  
kinds of "being conscious".


Yes, at least two kinds, but each arithmetical hypostases having  
either "<>t" or "& p" describes a type of consciousness, I would say.
And they all differentiate on the infinitely many version of "[]A", be  
it the "[]" predicate of PA, ZF, an amoeba or you and me ...





And being self-conscious can have different modes.  A Mars Rover is  
conscious of itself having a certain location, battery charge,  
temperature,...but it's not conscious of its purpose or the effect  
it's success has on engineers at JPL.


OK. I mean plausible, but I am not sure that Mars Rover is self- 
conscious. He might have correct belief about its own location, but he  
might not (yet) have a "enough" rich notion of itself.






Then there are many type of consciousness states, and some can have  
some notion of degrees assigned to them. In the case I was talking,  
I might be obliged to accept the idea that RA is maximally  
conscious, and PA might be less conscious or more delusional about  
its consciousness. (but that is counter-intuitive, and depends on  
the validity of the "Galois connection" account of consciousness. I  
have no certainty here (even in the comp frame).


For another example,  I have strong evidences that we are conscious  
at *all* moment of the nocturnal sleep. It is a question of  
training to be able to memorize the episodes enough well to realize  
this, but apparently we are programmed to forget those experiences.


Sure, if your wife whispers your name at night while you're asleep  
you wake up instantly.


It depends of the man, and perhaps of the wife. I took holiday with a  
guy who was incredibly hard to wake up in the morning. Even shouting  
his name quite aloud did not woke up. We had too shake him for some  
time. Note that he warned us before. He never use an alarm clock, as  
he does not work for him. To wake in time, he has to just sleep his  
right number of hours.





But you don't if you're anesthetized.


Which proves nothing, as I am sure you agree.






Obviously "to be unconscious" cannot be a first person experience.


But it can be a first body experience.


Perhaps in some metaphorical sense.

But a body has no experience at all, and actually don't even exist.  
They are only sharable pattern of information computed in "special  
sheaf of computations", whose initial segments are dovetailed in the  
arithmetical reality.








To believe that *we have been unconscious* is consistent, but  
plausibly false, and probably false with computationalism, where,  
to put it with Otto Rossler's phrasing: consciousness is a prison.


I'd say it's more than plausibly true.  If there are time intervals  
during which we are inert and unresponsive and which we have no  
memory of, that's pretty good evidence we were unconscious - in fact  
it's the operational defintion.


Once I made a nap. I was very tired and fall asleep, rather deeply, as  
like the guy above people around me 

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>>​Bruno Marcha​l  was alluding on how you predict your  
subjective experience when you do an experience in physics​ ​ 
where "you" has been duplicated and thus making that personal  
pronoun ambiguous.


​>​I have repeated many times that the question is always asked  
before the duplication.


​And the question is about what one and only one thing will happen  
to YOU after YOU ​has been duplicated and becomes TWO. In other  
words the question was about gibberish.


​I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I  
can't prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has  
been able to do any better. ​


​> ​If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the  
matter.


​If we're dealing in philosophy and not everyday conversation and  
it my body is a machine then I don't know what "choice" ​ ​means.  
And if my body is not a machine I still don't know what "choice"  
means.​


​> ​You beg the question with respect to step 3.

​There may be a question mark but there is no question. And I have  
no answer because gibberish has no answer.  ​

​>> ​​When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know. ​
​> ​Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument that  
there is no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument  
that a simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you  
don't believe in.


​A computer can make a simulated hurricane but because it uses only  
numbers to build the ​storm​ and numbers (probably) have no  
physical properties the simulated hurricane would always lack  
something the real hurricane had, the physical ability to get the  
computer wet.


However if it turned out that you're right and math is more  
fundamental than physics and numbers have everything physics has and  
more then a clever enough programmer could write a program that  
would cause the computer to actually get wet. I'm very skeptical  
that such a program is possible but I can't prove it's impossible so  
maybe you're right.


​>> ​​No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody​  
has ever made one single calculation without the use of physical  
hardware


​> ​How do you know that?​

​Because every time a calculation ​is made something physical  
in ​a ​computer changes and if I change something physical in a  
computer the calculation changes.


​​> How do you know that there is physical hardware?

​Because I can touch the hardware with my physical hand​.
​
​> ​If you don't know if math is or not the fundamental science,

​Observations can be made regardless of it math or physics is the  
fundamental science. ​


​> ​But we know as a fact that elementary arithmetic (Robinson  
Arithmetic) contains all terminating computations, and all pieces on  
the non terminating computations.


Then computer chips would be unnecessary and Raphael M Robinson  
should be the principle stockholder of the Robinson computer  
corporation and be a trillionare​, but I don't believe that is the  
case.


​A physical brain or a physical computer can perform calculations  
that produce​ Robinson​ arithmetic​, it can describe how a  
calculation was done​,​ but Robinson

arithmetic​ can't actuality calculate a damn thing. .

​>> ​why hasn't at least one of those numerous scientists started  
their own computer hardware company with zero manufacturing costs  
and become a trillionaire? This is not a rhetorical question, I'd  
really like an answer.


​> ​For the same reason that nobody would drink simulated water,  
unless they are simulated themselves.


​That is a very bad analogy because there is such a thing as  
simulated water but there is no such thing as simulated arithmetic;  
simulated water is different from physical water but arithmetic is  
always just arithmetic. I think we would both agree that when a  
simulated computer calculates 2+2 the 4 it produces is exactly the  
same as the 4 a ​ ​non-​simulated computer would make when  
doing the same calculation, and the same would be true if the  
simulated computer itself simulate​d​ a computer. But we also  
agree that simulated water would not quench your thirst the way that  
physical water would, so if physical water has attributes that  
numbers can not produce​, so​ you tell me if physics or  
mathematics is ​the ​more fundamental.



​>>​>​> ​Convince the National Academy of Science or the  
Royal Society that you're not talking nonsense and have them make  
you a member; and then convince the International Congress of  
Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields Metal and announce  
it all here.


​>​>>​ ​You are basically making an argument by authority  
here,


​​>>> ​And your multiple statements that I have not convinced  
anybody else on this list is not an argument from authority??


​>​No, it is not. It is a simple observation that anybody can  

Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[meekerdb]

On 9/2/2015 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So now you agree with me that there are different kinds and degrees of consciousness; 
that it is not just a binary attribute of an axiom + inference system.


?

Either you are conscious, or you are not.


But is a roundworm either conscious or not?  an amoeba?


I don't know, but i think they are. Even bacteria, and perhaps even some viruses, but on 
a different time scale than us.




If they can be conscious, but not self-conscious then there are two kinds of "being 
conscious".


Yes, at least two kinds, but each arithmetical hypostases having either "<>t" or "& p" 
describes a type of consciousness, I would say.
And they all differentiate on the infinitely many version of "[]A", be it the "[]" 
predicate of PA, ZF, an amoeba or you and me ...


So if there are different kinds of consciousness then a being with more kinds is more 
conscious.  It seems that your dictum, "Your either conscious or not." is being diluted 
away to mere slogan.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[chris peck]

Bruno

>> And someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect to live. JC 
>> remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed that you will survive, 
>> so you expect to live some experience, no? Let me ask you this how to you 
>> evaluate the chance to see 0 on the paper after opening the drawer.

'You' is ambiguous *because* we agree that 'you' will survive. If we agreed 
'you' wouldn't survive then its meaning is clear. 'You' denotes just JC at 
Helsinki.

>> Surely, you can't be serious, as this is not a first experience. It is a 
>> list of first person experiences. "

Don't call me Shirley, and 'I will see 0 or I will see 1' is a list just as 
really as 'I will see 0 and I will see 1'. Whats your point?

>> After pushing the button, you will live only one realization of the 
>> experience just listed above.

This explicitly violates the agreement that 'you' survives in both rooms when 
duplicated. Also, its when you phrase things this way that it becomes clear 
that you are violating 'comp' because it is equivolent to saying that 'you' 
survives in only one branch, that despite the copy being made at the right 
substitution level in both rooms, something else is carrying over to one or the 
other room that is not contained in the description. You're language makes it 
clear that you believe, implicitly if not explicitly, that the description is 
incomplete.

>> you really maintain that the result of JC opening the drawer will be "0 and 
>> 1"?

yes in the following sense. I survive in both rooms. In both rooms I open the 
drawer. So I will 'live' the experience of 0 and I will 'live' the experience 
of 1.

>> So JC predicts "0 and 1". Then I interview JC-0. Did you observe "0 and 1". 
>> Yes, JC told me. 
How come? JC -1 has not yet been reconstituted, may be ... 

Perhaps the question that needs to be asked of JC-H is whether he can expect to 
see 0 and 1 at precisely the same moment? Is that the question you are trying 
to formulate? 

Also, you have to be clear about how 'you' operates. It can track 'you' 
backwards in time from JC-0 to JC-H and from JC-1 to JC-H, but it doesn't work 
well tracking duplicates across space at a particular time. So JC-0 can't track 
to JC-1. So, for example whilst it is true that JC-0-'you' is not JC-1-'you', 
both are JC-H-'you'. In otherwords, because JC-0 and JC-1's experiences are 
exclusive relative to one another, they are not exclusive relative to JC-H. 
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 19:40:16 +0200


On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, 
Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>>​Bruno Marcha​l  was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience 
when you do an experience in physics​ ​where "you" has been duplicated and thus 
making that personal pronoun ambiguous.
​>​I have repeated many times that the question is always asked before the 
duplication.
​And the question is about what one and only one thing will happen to YOU after 
YOU ​has been duplicated and becomes TWO. In other words the question was about 
gibberish.  
​I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I can't prove 
it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has been able to do any 
better. ​
​> ​If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the matter.
​If we're dealing in philosophy and not everyday conversation and it my body is 
a machine then I don't know what "choice" ​ ​means. And if my body is not a 
machine I still don't know what "choice" means.​ ​> ​You beg the question with 
respect to step 3.
​There may be a question mark but there is no question. And I have no answer 
because gibberish has no answer.  ​​>> ​​When I don't know I'm not afraid to 
say I don't know. ​​> ​Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument 
that there is no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument that a 
simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you don't believe in.

​A computer can make a simulated hurricane but because it uses only numbers to 
build the ​storm​ and numbers (probably) have no physical properties the 
simulated hurricane would always lack something the real hurricane had, the 
physical ability to get the computer wet.

However if it turned out that you're right and math is more fundamental than 
physics and numbers have everything physics has and more then a clever enough 
programmer could write a program that would cause the computer to actually get 
wet. I'm very skeptical that such a program is possible but I can't prove it's 
impossible so maybe you're right.  

​>> ​​No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody​ has ever made one 
single calculation without the use of physical hardware
​> ​How do you know that?​ 
​Because every time a calculation ​is made something physical in ​a ​computer 
changes and if I change something physical in a 

Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le 2 sept. 2015 22:48, "meekerdb"  a écrit :
>
> On 9/2/2015 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> So now you agree with me that there are different kinds and degrees
of consciousness; that it is not just a binary attribute of an axiom +
inference system.


 ?

 Either you are conscious, or you are not.
>>>
>>>
>>> But is a roundworm either conscious or not?  an amoeba?
>>
>>
>> I don't know, but i think they are. Even bacteria, and perhaps even some
viruses, but on a different time scale than us.
>>
>>
>>
>>> If they can be conscious, but not self-conscious then there are two
kinds of "being conscious".
>>
>>
>> Yes, at least two kinds, but each arithmetical hypostases having either
"<>t" or "& p" describes a type of consciousness, I would say.
>> And they all differentiate on the infinitely many version of "[]A", be
it the "[]" predicate of PA, ZF, an amoeba or you and me ...
>
>
> So if there are different kinds of consciousness then a being with more
kinds is more conscious.  It seems that your dictum, "Your either conscious
or not." is being diluted away to mere slogan.

There is only one way of not being conscious, so you're either not
conscious or you're conscious whatever level it is.

>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

[meekerdb]

On 9/2/2015 2:23 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


> So if there are different kinds of consciousness then a being with more kinds is more 
conscious.  It seems that your dictum, "Your either conscious or not." is being diluted 
away to mere slogan.


There is only one way of not being conscious, so you're either not conscious or you're 
conscious whatever level it is.




Question begging.  If there's more than one kind of consciousness, then there is more than 
one kind of being unconscious.  Per Bruno's example one could be unconscious of your self.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: If the universe is computational, what is the computing platform? What are the options?

[Peter Sas]

Hi Mike,

That film looks like a lot of fun... How can I see it? Can I order a copy 
online?

Here by the way is my latest blog post on the platform problem in digital 
physics and the relation to consciousness: 
http://critique-of-pure-interest.blogspot.nl/2015/09/is-universe-self-computing-consciousness.html

Peter

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: If the universe is computational, what is the computing platform? What are the options?

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Excellent website you have there, Peter. Let me present Eric Steinhart, if you 
don't already know him? He is also a big fan of Josiah Royce.



 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfDB35y-5Z0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HTcQp1bTKHA

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Peter Sas 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Wed, Sep 2, 2015 8:02 am
Subject: Re: If the universe is computational, what is the computing platform? 
What are the options?


 
Hi Mike,  
  
That film looks like a lot of fun... How can I see it? Can I order a copy 
online?  
  
Here by the way is my latest blog post on the platform problem in digital 
physics and the relation to consciousness: 
http://critique-of-pure-interest.blogspot.nl/2015/09/is-universe-self-computing-consciousness.html
  
  
Peter  
  
 
  
 --  
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group. 
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to  everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 
 To post to this group, send email to  everything-list@googlegroups.com. 
 Visit this group at  http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 
 For more options, visit  https://groups.google.com/d/optout. 
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.