On 31 Aug 2015, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/31/2015 5:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, August 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 31 Aug 2015, at 00:42, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 12:34:18PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Aug 2015, at 03:08, Russell Standish wrote:
Well as people probably know, I don't believe C. elegans can be
conscious in any sense of the word. Hell - I have strong doubts about
ants, and they're massively more complex creatures.
I think personally that C. Elegans, and Planaria (!), even amoeba,
are conscious, although very plausibly not self-conscious.
I tend to think since 2008 that even RA is already conscious, even
maximally so, and that PA is already as much self-conscious than a
human (when in some dissociative state).
But I don't know if PA is more or less conscious than RA. That
depends of the role of the higher part of the brain consists in
filtering consciousness or enacting it.
But it probably won't be long before we simulate a mouse brain in
toto
- about 2 decades is my guess, maybe even less given enough dollars -
then we're definitely in grey philosophical territory :).
I am slightly less optimistic than you. It will take one of two
decades before we simulate the hippocampus of a rat, but probably
more time will be needed for the rest of their brain. And the result
can be a conscious creature, with a quite different consciousness
that a rat, as I find plausible that pain are related to the glial
cells and their metabolism, which are not taken into account by the
current "copies".
What is blocking us is not the computing power - already whole "rat
brain" simulations have been done is something like 1/10000 of real
time - so all we need is about a decade of performane improvement
through Moores law.
What development is needed is ways of determining the neural
circuitry. There have been leaps and bounds in the process of slicing
frozen brains, and imaging the slices with electron microscopes, but
clearly it is still far too slow.
As for the hypothesis that glial cells have something to do with it,
well that can be tested via the sort of whole rat brain simulation
I've been talking about. Run the simulation in a robotic rat, and
compare the behaviour with a real rat. Basically what the open worm
guys a doing, but scaled up to a rat. If the simulation is way
different from the real rat, then we know something else is required.
I can imagine that the rat will have a "normal behavior", but as he
cannot talk to us, we might fail to appreciate some internal change
or even some anosognosia. The rat would not be a zombie rat, but
still be in a quite different conscious state (perhaps better, as
it seems the glial cell might have some role in the chronic pain.
In general, if there is a difference in consciousness then there
should be a difference in behaviour. If the difference in
consciousness is impossible to detect then arguably it is no
difference.
I'd say more-than-arguably we don't know and can't know. Which is
why I think "the hard problem" will be dissolved by AI engineering
rather than solved by philosophers.
That is plausible, and I think that is a frightening idea.
Worst, the problem might be solved by the philosopher, or theologian,
in the context of some theory/hypothesis, and yet be dissolved in the
usual authoritarianist manner, for the usual political purpose.
Woman can vote since recently. Not a long time ago, many would have
said that most "exotic foreigners" have no soul, which is useful for
doing slavery without feeling guilty.
If an eliminativist, à-la Churchland, understand the logic of the UDA,
then he has to eliminate the physical reality too. But, having
eliminate the conscious experience, he cannot regain the "illusion" of
matter, so physics (the science) disappears too, and that is refuted
by our common experience.
This explains also why computationalism *does* solve the hard problem,
in the sense that it explains, from the law of addition and
multiplication only, how the pieces of computations logically appears
(p -> []p, for p sigma_1), and why universal numbers get entangled in
many deep computations (with "many" used in Everett sense, and "deep"
used in Bennett sense) and "linear" (hopefully enough, but we have the
quantizations to verify that)
The hard part of the hard consciousness problem, is solved by the fact
that it is shown that all universal machines with enough "inductive"
beliefs is confronted with knowable but non justifiable truth.
Actually, as all the hypostases are represented in one of them (the
[]p one, which obeys G + 1, with 1 being the name of the axiom p ->
[]p, with p atomic sentences, here, Sigma_1 sentences. The "theology"
is very rich, and for all "views", things can disappear when being
shifted, with some exception (I guess). So you can have justifiable
but not knowable, observable but not justifiable, knowable but not
observable, observable (or senseable) but not expressible, etc.
Most mode of consciousness are of the type knowable but not
justifiable, and not expressible (in some more technical sense), and
not observable.
Incompleteness does not just separate truth from believable, but it
separates (for self-referentially correct machine) between believable
and knowable, and observable and "senseable", and the separation with
truth is nuanced for each of those machine psycho-theo-logical
predicate.
I recall the 8 main "pov":
p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>t
[]p & <>t & p
8, because three of them separate between the justifiable and the truth.
At the propositional level, they are all decidable theories, and can
be represented in G.
At the first order level, those theories get most plausibly
undecidable, as that is the case for qG (Pi_2 complete) and qG* (Pi_1
complete in the oracle of "God" itself (Arithmetical Truth))
"Forever Undecided" by Smullyan, is a good introduction to the logic
of self-reference G.
Here I alluded to results proved in Boolos 1993 book, that I have
referred upon. Those were open problems in Boolos 1979 book, and they
were solved, negatively, by the Russian and Georgian logicians.
Bruno
Brent
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