Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Bruce Kellett]

On 22/06/2017 10:32 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 22 Jun 2017 00:31, "Bruce Kellett" > wrote:


On 22/06/2017 1:44 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2017, at 08:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 21/06/2017 4:03 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce
Kellett wrote:

On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:

I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me,
all such irreversible
processes are related to conscious entities in
some way. Whilst
agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to
be conscious, I would
say that the output of Geiger counter is not
actually discrete until
observed by a conscious experimenter.

That sounds remarkably like the "many minds"
interpretation of
quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most
scientists because it
leaves the physics of the billions of years before
the emergence of
the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the
first consciousness
would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds
reading.

Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er
own mind
independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.


It is actually a 3p phenomenon because there is
inter-subjective agreement about the fact that
measurements give definite results.


Inter-subjectivity does not imply 3p, as it can be "only" 1p
plural. Let me illustrate this with a variant of the WM
duplication.

Imagine that Bruce and John are undergoing the WM-duplication
*together*.

By this I mean they both enter the scanning-annihilating box,
and are both reconstituted in Washington and in Moscow.

And let us assume they do it repetitively, which means they
come back to Helsinki, and do it again together.

Obviously, the line-life past that each copies describes in
its personal diaries grows like H followed by a sequence of W
and M. The number of copies grows exponentially (2^n). After
ten iterations, we have 2^10 = 1024 individuals, who share an
indeterminate experiences. With minor exceptions, they all
agree that the experience has always given each times a
precise outcome, always belonging to {W, M}. Importantly  the
duplicated couples agreed (which was the Washington or Moscow
outcome) in all duplication. They mostly all agreed they did
not found any obvious algorithm to predict the sequence (the
exception might concerned the guys in nameable stories, like:

WW

MM

Or the development of some remarkable real number in binary,
like the binary expansion of PI, sqrt(2), sqr(n), etc. In this
case, the computable is made rare (and more and more
negligible when n grows, those histories are "white rabbits
histories").

That is what I mean by first person plural. It concerns
population of machine sharing self-multiplication. it is
interesting to compare the quantum linear self-superposition
with the purely arithmetical one.


Sure, that would seem to be reasonably described as 1p-plural.
except that there is no need to have two people enter the
duplicating machine and undergo different teleportations
afterwards. Surely it is sufficient to consider one person doing a
series of polarization measurements on a sequence of photons from
an unpolarized source. That person will record some sequence of
'+' and '-' results. If the experiment is repeated N times, there
will be 2^N sequences, one in each of the generated worlds.

But that has nothing to do with inter-subjective agreement between
different observers. To see that, consider just one polarization
measurement: In order for it to be said that the measurement gave
a result, there has to be decoherence and the formation of
irreversible records. I think it is Zurek who talks about multiple
copies of the result entangled with the environment. So many
different individuals can observe the result of this single
experiment, and they will all agree that the result was what the
experimenter wrote in her lab book. That is inter-subjective
agreement. It clearly has nothing to do with 1p, or 1p-plural
pictures. 



I think there may be a terminological confusion here. IIUC, 

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Unless someone expects "consciousness" to leak in from the cosmic foam, I am 
guessing there is nothing intrinsic in the quantum (aside from wave-function) 
that possesses a 'consciousness,' possibility. Moreover the other two 
possibilities for hypercomputing, can come from two other technologies. One id 
the Stanford developed photonic computing, and the other is various work being 
done with chunks of dna. I am guessing complexity brings consciousness. Would a 
boltzmann brain be a conscious observer? Only if it was complex enough. 



-Original Message-
From: Bruce Kellett 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Wed, Jun 21, 2017 7:31 pm
Subject: Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

On 22/06/2017 1:44 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Jun 2017, at 08:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On 21/06/2017 4:03 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:
> I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me, all such irreversible
> processes are related to conscious entities in some way. Whilst
> agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to be conscious, I would
> say that the output of Geiger counter is not actually discrete until
> observed by a conscious experimenter.
 That sounds remarkably like the "many minds" interpretation of
 quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most scientists because it
 leaves the physics of the billions of years before the emergence of
 the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the first consciousness
 would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds reading.

>>> Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er own mind
>>> independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.
>>
>> It is actually a 3p phenomenon because there is inter-subjective 
>> agreement about the fact that measurements give definite results.
>
> Inter-subjectivity does not imply 3p, as it can be "only" 1p plural. 
> Let me illustrate this with a variant of the WM duplication.
>
> Imagine that Bruce and John are undergoing the WM-duplication *together*.
>
> By this I mean they both enter the scanning-annihilating box, and are 
> both reconstituted in Washington and in Moscow.
>
> And let us assume they do it repetitively, which means they come back 
> to Helsinki, and do it again together.
>
> Obviously, the line-life past that each copies describes in its 
> personal diaries grows like H followed by a sequence of W and M. The 
> number of copies grows exponentially (2^n). After ten iterations, we 
> have 2^10 = 1024 individuals, who share an indeterminate experiences. 
> With minor exceptions, they all agree that the experience has always 
> given each times a precise outcome, always belonging to {W, M}. 
> Importantly  the duplicated couples agreed (which was the Washington 
> or Moscow outcome) in all duplication. They mostly all agreed they did 
> not found any obvious algorithm to predict the sequence (the exception 
> might concerned the guys in nameable stories, like:
>
> WW
>
> MM
>
> Or the development of some remarkable real number in binary, like the 
> binary expansion of PI, sqrt(2), sqr(n), etc. In this case, the 
> computable is made rare (and more and more negligible when n grows, 
> those histories are "white rabbits histories").
>
> That is what I mean by first person plural. It concerns population of 
> machine sharing self-multiplication. it is interesting to compare the 
> quantum linear self-superposition with the purely arithmetical one.

Sure, that would seem to be reasonably described as 1p-plural. except 
that there is no need to have two people enter the duplicating machine 
and undergo different teleportations afterwards. Surely it is sufficient 
to consider one person doing a series of polarization measurements on a 
sequence of photons from an unpolarized source. That person will record 
some sequence of '+' and '-' results. If the experiment is repeated N 
times, there will be 2^N sequences, one in each of the generated worlds.

But that has nothing to do with inter-subjective agreement between 
different observers. To see that, consider just one polarization 
measurement: In order for it to be said that the measurement gave a 
result, there has to be decoherence and the formation of irreversible 
records. I think it is Zurek who talks about multiple copies of the 
result entangled with the environment. So many different individuals can 
observe the result of this single experiment, and they will all agree 
that the result was what the experimenter wrote in her lab book. That is 
inter-subjective agreement. It clearly has nothing to do with 1p, or 
1p-plural pictures. But it is precisely that inter-subjective agreement 
that is essential for physics -- people have to agree that experiments 
have definite results, and they have to 

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[David Nyman]

On 22 Jun 2017 00:31, "Bruce Kellett"  wrote:

On 22/06/2017 1:44 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> On 21 Jun 2017, at 08:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>> On 21/06/2017 4:03 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
 On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:

> I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me, all such irreversible
> processes are related to conscious entities in some way. Whilst
> agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to be conscious, I would
> say that the output of Geiger counter is not actually discrete until
> observed by a conscious experimenter.
>
 That sounds remarkably like the "many minds" interpretation of
 quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most scientists because it
 leaves the physics of the billions of years before the emergence of
 the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the first consciousness
 would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds reading.

 Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er own mind
>>> independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.
>>>
>>
>> It is actually a 3p phenomenon because there is inter-subjective
>> agreement about the fact that measurements give definite results.
>>
>
> Inter-subjectivity does not imply 3p, as it can be "only" 1p plural. Let
> me illustrate this with a variant of the WM duplication.
>
> Imagine that Bruce and John are undergoing the WM-duplication *together*.
>
> By this I mean they both enter the scanning-annihilating box, and are both
> reconstituted in Washington and in Moscow.
>
> And let us assume they do it repetitively, which means they come back to
> Helsinki, and do it again together.
>
> Obviously, the line-life past that each copies describes in its personal
> diaries grows like H followed by a sequence of W and M. The number of
> copies grows exponentially (2^n). After ten iterations, we have 2^10 = 1024
> individuals, who share an indeterminate experiences. With minor exceptions,
> they all agree that the experience has always given each times a precise
> outcome, always belonging to {W, M}. Importantly  the duplicated couples
> agreed (which was the Washington or Moscow outcome) in all duplication.
> They mostly all agreed they did not found any obvious algorithm to predict
> the sequence (the exception might concerned the guys in nameable stories,
> like:
>
> WW
>
> MM
>
> Or the development of some remarkable real number in binary, like the
> binary expansion of PI, sqrt(2), sqr(n), etc. In this case, the computable
> is made rare (and more and more negligible when n grows, those histories
> are "white rabbits histories").
>
> That is what I mean by first person plural. It concerns population of
> machine sharing self-multiplication. it is interesting to compare the
> quantum linear self-superposition with the purely arithmetical one.
>

Sure, that would seem to be reasonably described as 1p-plural. except that
there is no need to have two people enter the duplicating machine and
undergo different teleportations afterwards. Surely it is sufficient to
consider one person doing a series of polarization measurements on a
sequence of photons from an unpolarized source. That person will record
some sequence of '+' and '-' results. If the experiment is repeated N
times, there will be 2^N sequences, one in each of the generated worlds.

But that has nothing to do with inter-subjective agreement between
different observers. To see that, consider just one polarization
measurement: In order for it to be said that the measurement gave a result,
there has to be decoherence and the formation of irreversible records. I
think it is Zurek who talks about multiple copies of the result entangled
with the environment. So many different individuals can observe the result
of this single experiment, and they will all agree that the result was what
the experimenter wrote in her lab book. That is inter-subjective agreement.
It clearly has nothing to do with 1p, or 1p-plural pictures.


I think there may be a terminological confusion here. IIUC, 1p-plural
denotes, amongst other things, just such inter-subjective agreement between
mutually entangled observers. Physics, in this usage, is considered as
1p-plural at least in terms of its phenomenology, because those phenomena
essentially reduce to the sum of all possible measurements of this sort.

David

But it is precisely that inter-subjective agreement that is essential for
physics -- people have to agree that experiments have definite results, and
they have to agree what those results are. Inter-subjective agreement
occurs in just one world -- although there may be similar agreements
between copies of those people entangled be decoherence with the other
possible experimental results.  Each world is then characterized by
inter-subjective agreement about the result obtained in that world.

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Bruce Kellett]

On 22/06/2017 1:44 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2017, at 08:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 21/06/2017 4:03 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:

I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me, all such irreversible
processes are related to conscious entities in some way. Whilst
agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to be conscious, I would
say that the output of Geiger counter is not actually discrete until
observed by a conscious experimenter.

That sounds remarkably like the "many minds" interpretation of
quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most scientists because it
leaves the physics of the billions of years before the emergence of
the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the first consciousness
would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds reading.


Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er own mind
independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.


It is actually a 3p phenomenon because there is inter-subjective 
agreement about the fact that measurements give definite results.


Inter-subjectivity does not imply 3p, as it can be "only" 1p plural. 
Let me illustrate this with a variant of the WM duplication.


Imagine that Bruce and John are undergoing the WM-duplication *together*.

By this I mean they both enter the scanning-annihilating box, and are 
both reconstituted in Washington and in Moscow.


And let us assume they do it repetitively, which means they come back 
to Helsinki, and do it again together.


Obviously, the line-life past that each copies describes in its 
personal diaries grows like H followed by a sequence of W and M. The 
number of copies grows exponentially (2^n). After ten iterations, we 
have 2^10 = 1024 individuals, who share an indeterminate experiences. 
With minor exceptions, they all agree that the experience has always 
given each times a precise outcome, always belonging to {W, M}. 
Importantly  the duplicated couples agreed (which was the Washington 
or Moscow outcome) in all duplication. They mostly all agreed they did 
not found any obvious algorithm to predict the sequence (the exception 
might concerned the guys in nameable stories, like:


WW

MM

Or the development of some remarkable real number in binary, like the 
binary expansion of PI, sqrt(2), sqr(n), etc. In this case, the 
computable is made rare (and more and more negligible when n grows, 
those histories are "white rabbits histories").


That is what I mean by first person plural. It concerns population of 
machine sharing self-multiplication. it is interesting to compare the 
quantum linear self-superposition with the purely arithmetical one.


Sure, that would seem to be reasonably described as 1p-plural. except 
that there is no need to have two people enter the duplicating machine 
and undergo different teleportations afterwards. Surely it is sufficient 
to consider one person doing a series of polarization measurements on a 
sequence of photons from an unpolarized source. That person will record 
some sequence of '+' and '-' results. If the experiment is repeated N 
times, there will be 2^N sequences, one in each of the generated worlds.


But that has nothing to do with inter-subjective agreement between 
different observers. To see that, consider just one polarization 
measurement: In order for it to be said that the measurement gave a 
result, there has to be decoherence and the formation of irreversible 
records. I think it is Zurek who talks about multiple copies of the 
result entangled with the environment. So many different individuals can 
observe the result of this single experiment, and they will all agree 
that the result was what the experimenter wrote in her lab book. That is 
inter-subjective agreement. It clearly has nothing to do with 1p, or 
1p-plural pictures. But it is precisely that inter-subjective agreement 
that is essential for physics -- people have to agree that experiments 
have definite results, and they have to agree what those results are. 
Inter-subjective agreement occurs in just one world -- although there 
may be similar agreements between copies of those people entangled be 
decoherence with the other possible experimental results.  Each world is 
then characterized by inter-subjective agreement about the result 
obtained in that world.


Again, this bears no relation to Tegmark's 'bird' view. You might well 
call the bird view the 0p view, because there is no person or 
consciousness that can ever experience that view.




There is no collapse at all at the 3p level, nor even decoherence as 
such.


Decoherence is a well-understood physical phenomenon that has been 
widely observed.


I can't agree more. It might be, and should be when assuming digital 
mechanism, a first person plurality phenomenon. In the (quantum) MW, 
is the fission/differentiation of histories brought by measurement, 
and the 

Re: AI and social destabilization

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

according to many nerds, humans won't be at the forefront of anything, due to 
AI, and machine learning. being "leader of the free world," and other such 
statements, are merely, sales pitches from lawyers who get elected into office, 
and so called journalists. Stumbling after people in the EU like Juncker, for 
example is not in our interest. Plus, to be honest, I wouldn't trade Cincinnati 
for Malmo, Fika notwithstanding. Call it cultural programming. 



-Original Message-
From: Telmo Menezes 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Wed, Jun 21, 2017 6:03 am
Subject: Re: AI and social destabilization

I completely agree with you for a change.

The job-centered society is already looking silly, and will soon look
like medieval superstition. I am waiting for a wave of politicians
that talk about "destroying jobs" instead of "creating jobs", but I
won't hold my breath. I think that the current state of affairs rests
on two things, that are very hard to break:

- A global financial system that only knows how to redistribute wealth
through employment -- but is becoming worse and worse even at doing
that;
- A set of social norms that makes self-worth dependent on employment.

There are no jobs for everyone anymore, not by a long shot. This is
already happening, and the jobs are nor coming back. We have now
entered a silly situation where bullshit jobs are created to prevent
social collapse. This is not only silly but also tragic. We create
prisons for each other for no good reason at all. This is extra silly
in corporate environments, where people are pressured to "work" more
and more hours. It's all mindless virtue signalling.

Of course (for now), someone has to do the unpleasant work that keeps
civilisation running. I don't think that UBI is the only solution. For
example, why can't we work for one decade and live off that money for
the rest of our life spans? The only reason I can see is that the game
is rigged against this being possible. It is most definitely possible
at the higher leves of income, so why not for the common person? Money
is an abstraction, and this abstraction can be redefined -- as it was
already in the past.

If you guys in the US don't manage to get rid of idiots like Trump, I
don't think it is possible that you will be on the forefront of
western civilisation for the next round.

Telmo.


On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 10:10 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> Jobs are already being lost because of the improvements in AI and it's not
> just unskilled workers that are in trouble. Don't think that because you're
> so smart a AI could never do your job better than you can so the AI
> revolution can't effect you personally
> ;
> in March of this year Blackrock, the world's biggest money manager with
> stock funds worth over $275 billion, announced they would fire over 40
> employees including some portfolio managers with astronomical paychecks. The
> reason is they decided to let computers running AI software pick stocks and
> manage 11% of their funds instead of humans.  89% of Blackston's fund
> managers still have a job, but if I was one of them I might decide I don't
> need to buy a new Rolls Royce every month and it would be wise for me to
> start saving my money for a rainy day. Improving technology has created a
> huge gap between the rich and the poor and the gap isn't just increasing
> it's accelerating.
>
> In 2010 the richest 388 people had as much wealth as half of the entire
> human race, that's 3.6 Billion people. In 2014 the richest 85 people did. In
> 2015 the richest 62 people did. This year the richest 8 people did. Think of
> it, the 8 richest Human beings have as much wealth as the poorest 3.6
> BILLION Human beings! History has pretty decisively shown that huge
> inequality just ain't healthy for any society, although history has no
> examples of inequality of
> the
>  magnitude
> we have now.
>
> The improvements in AI that are certain to come
>
> in the next few years
>
> will only accelerate the acceleration of this socially destabilizing trend
> unless something pushes back, something like government action. Health
> insurance for all might be a good place to start. However Donald Trump wants
> to push for lowering taxes on the rich, getting rid of the inheritance tax,
> and eliminating health care for
>
> the
>
> 24 million
>
> poorest people in the country;
>
>  but that's pushing in the wrong direction and will only accelerate the
> acceleration of
> the acceleration
> of the wealth gap.
>
> Anybody who is not terrified by this doesn't understand the situation.
>
> One way or another this trend will NOT continue, if government action
> doesn't slow down the widening of the gap something far far more unpleasant
> will.
> If
> I were one of those 8 hyper rich people I'd be calling for change louder
> than anyone because I like the fact that there is a connection between my
> head and my shoulders and 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Pierz,

On 21 Jun 2017, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:

Bruno, do you believe there is a different world for every possible  
basis in which a spin (or other observable) might be measured? That  
seems pretty strange.





I believe in 0 worlds, but in many relative computational histories,  
in arithmetic. Linearity at the bottom ensures that the experiences  
will not depend on the basis chosen for the "universe", but the  
stories guides the consciousness flux, say, toward  stable sharable  
and hopefully sustainable realilties.
Do those dreams cohere enough to define well determined physical  
world? That is just a complex question which would need some progress  
in the definition of what could be a physical world.


For QM, I use a multi-multiverse, choosing a base, is choosing a  
multiverse, (I have called that a partition of the multiverse, also).  
Wallace things similar, I think, but I would say it literally follow  
from how Everett explains it it seems to me; notably where he explains  
the base independence of the many realities.
The global system has no "well defined " subsystems, but the sub- 
systems themsemselve beg to disagree on this, and can locally see  
themselves as part of some subsystem of a larger system.


Keep in mind I do not assume QM in physics, but digital mechanism in  
the "mind science".


The wave seems to work, and the question is where do that wave come  
from? I suspect already the prime numbers, but there is is only one  
way that I know to get both the quanta and the qualia, which is the  
"interview of the (Löbian-Gödelian) machine (using Solovay G/G*  
theorem).


If the prime numbers are "guilty", then I guess RH is undecidable in  
PA (and thus true, as even RA can refute RH if RH is false!). Maybe  
the metamathematics could recover the qualia from this, I don't know.


Bruno







On Wednesday, June 21, 2017 at 10:27:14 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

On 20 Jun 2017, at 19:44, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/19/2017 11:47 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Why would you say that if I fly from Bermuda to London it
demonstrates that flights from Bermuda to Algiers and Algiers to
London exist?


Why should I not when I can find interference pattern involving
Algiers and some other city? It is the interference which forces us
to take "the two slit" into account, even with only one photon used
in the process?


It's fine to use some other basis.  We use the "two slit" basis
because that makes the calculations easy.


Yes, but it can be misleading for those who have a naive reading of
the MW. The relevant (for the experience and their relative weigh)
part of the multiverse is base independent (eventually it is even
"theory" independent).





But that's not a reason to say each path is in a different world;
PARTICULARY since they interfere with one another.


That is why I usually avoid the term "world".  "Many-dreams" is less
wrong, and it makes physics looking already closer to the digital
mechanist (non computable) physics.

Bruno






Brent


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Jun 2017, at 08:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 21/06/2017 4:03 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:
I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me, all such  
irreversible

processes are related to conscious entities in some way. Whilst
agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to be conscious, I would
say that the output of Geiger counter is not actually discrete  
until

observed by a conscious experimenter.

That sounds remarkably like the "many minds" interpretation of
quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most scientists because it
leaves the physics of the billions of years before the emergence of
the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the first consciousness
would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds reading.


Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er own mind
independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.


It is actually a 3p phenomenon because there is inter-subjective  
agreement about the fact that measurements give definite results.


Inter-subjectivity does not imply 3p, as it can be "only" 1p plural.  
Let me illustrate this with a variant of the WM duplication.


Imagine that Bruce and John are undergoing the WM-duplication  
*together*.


By this I mean they both enter the scanning-annihilating box, and are  
both reconstituted in Washington and in Moscow.


And let us assume they do it repetitively, which means they come back  
to Helsinki, and do it again together.


Obviously, the line-life past that each copies describes in its  
personal diaries grows like H followed by a sequence of W and M. The  
number of copies grows exponentially (2^n). After ten iterations, we  
have 2^10 = 1024 individuals, who share an indeterminate experiences.  
With minor exceptions, they all agree that the experience has always  
given each times a precise outcome, always belonging to {W, M}.  
Importantly  the duplicated couples agreed (which was the Washington  
or Moscow outcome) in all duplication. They mostly all agreed they did  
not found any obvious algorithm to predict the sequence (the exception  
might concerned the guys in nameable stories, like:


WW

MM

Or the development of some remarkable real number in binary, like the  
binary expansion of PI, sqrt(2), sqr(n), etc. In this case, the  
computable is made rare (and more and more negligible when n grows,  
those histories are "white rabbits histories").


That is what I mean by first person plural. It concerns population of  
machine sharing self-multiplication. it is interesting to compare the  
quantum linear self-superposition with the purely arithmetical one.









There is no collapse at all at the 3p level, nor even decoherence  
as such.


Decoherence is a well-understood physical phenomenon that has been  
widely observed.


I can't agree more. It might be, and should be when assuming digital  
mechanism, a first person plurality phenomenon. In the (quantum) MW,  
is the fission/differentiation of histories brought by measurement,  
and the measurement itself is part of the histories.







I do not know what you mean by saying "nor even decoherence as such."


Maybe Russell meant in the (3-1) view of the (assumed by Everett)  
Universal wave. Plausible. The universal wave describes a change of  
base. It is God's vision (in this still physicalist view).


Everett, that is QM without the collapse axiom, looks already like a  
solution of the computationalist mind-body problem. But it works only  
if Everett QM is itself derivable from (intensional) arithmetic.




Also, you seem to be confusing the inter-subjective 3p view with  
Tegmark's bird view. There is no person, body, or consciousness that  
ever has the bird view -- the bird is a purely formal construct and  
has nothing to do with mind or consciousness.



That is an interesting remark, but it is a highly debatable question.  
See my conversation with David Nyman, about the "the nature" of the 0p  
view: is it more 1p or 3p? Is it more like a thing or a person? Well,  
I don't know. Is the arithmetical reality conceivable as a person? You  
can see it has an infinite (and highly non mechanical) body of  
(arithmetical) knowledge, but this would be a poetical acknowledgment  
of our ignorance.




Even though everything might remain unitary at that level, no one  
can ever experience the consequences of that unitary evolution.


Hmm... You speculate that there is no global 1p for the global unitary  
evolution, which is an open problem to me. Hard to know.


Nevertheless, assuming QM, you do *experience* the *consequences* of  
the unitary evolution, right here and right now, directly, and  
indirectly, as you are using a machine whose miniaturization has been  
made possible by the QM laws + human inference of the QM laws.


With mechanism, the QM laws have to be derived from the first person  
views 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Pierz]

Bruno, do you believe there is a different world for every possible basis in 
which a spin (or other observable) might be measured? That seems pretty 
strange. 

On Wednesday, June 21, 2017 at 10:27:14 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 20 Jun 2017, at 19:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
> >
> >
> > On 6/19/2017 11:47 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> Why would you say that if I fly from Bermuda to London it  
> >>> demonstrates that flights from Bermuda to Algiers and Algiers to  
> >>> London exist?
> >>
> >> Why should I not when I can find interference pattern involving  
> >> Algiers and some other city? It is the interference which forces us  
> >> to take "the two slit" into account, even with only one photon used  
> >> in the process?
> >
> > It's fine to use some other basis.  We use the "two slit" basis  
> > because that makes the calculations easy.
> 
> Yes, but it can be misleading for those who have a naive reading of  
> the MW. The relevant (for the experience and their relative weigh)  
> part of the multiverse is base independent (eventually it is even  
> "theory" independent).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >  But that's not a reason to say each path is in a different world;  
> > PARTICULARY since they interfere with one another.
> 
> That is why I usually avoid the term "world".  "Many-dreams" is less  
> wrong, and it makes physics looking already closer to the digital  
> mechanist (non computable) physics.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >
> > Brent
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: substitution level

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jun 2017, at 01:46, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 10:34:44AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:



KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and
Control, 57, pp. 40-47.



And I raise you with

@Article{Chang-etal94,
 author = 	 {Richard Chang and Benny Chor and Oded Goldreich and  
Juris Hartmanis and Johan H\aa{}stad and Desh Ranjan and Pankaj  
Rohatgi},

 title = {The Random Oracle Hypothesis is False},
 journal =   {Journal of Computer and System Sciences},
 year =  1994,
 volume =49,
 pages = {24-39}
}



I am still searching my Kurtz paper. Hartmanis is usually good, but my  
memory of this is that this paper shows only that the random  
hypothesis is false *FAPP*. It makes Kurtz result less interesting,  
but still relevant for the FPI and physics extraction (as the UD  
contains by construction a random oracle, and all oracles, but only  
the random one has a clear role, and a promising one finding some  
equivalent in arithmetic for a phase randomization similar to Feynman.  
Note that if Riemann hypothesis is true, we should be able to extract  
a random oracle from the distribution of prime. The same would occur  
if we could prove that the decimal sequence of some constructive  
(transcendental) number is random.





Seriously, there is an easy proof that probabilistic Turing machines
are incapable of implementing any algorithm a Turing machine can't:

@InCollection{Leeuw-etal56,
 author = 	 {Karel de Leeuw and Edward F. Moore and Claude E.  
Shannon and N. Shapiro},

 title = {Computation by Probabilistic Machines},
 booktitle = {Automata Studies},
 pages = {183--212},
 publisher = {Princeton UP},
 year =  1956,
 editor ={Shannon and McCarthy},
 address =   {Princeton}
}


This is well known. The point I made was not on "computation", but on  
the ability of proving or solving some problem. Probabilistic and  
quantum machines do not violate the Church-Turing thesis, and all  
known universal formalism compute the same functions than a combinator  
or Turing machine, but of course such combinators or Turing machine  
can prove or believe quite different set of (arithmetical)  
propositions, and solve different class of problems.


Bruno





However, it appears that NP-complete problems become P when a random
oracle is added to the mix, so there is a difference from a
computational complexity point of view. I confess to not understanding
that proof, but it is in Chang et al op. cit.

Cheers

--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Jun 2017, at 19:44, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 6/19/2017 11:47 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why would you say that if I fly from Bermuda to London it  
demonstrates that flights from Bermuda to Algiers and Algiers to  
London exist?


Why should I not when I can find interference pattern involving  
Algiers and some other city? It is the interference which forces us  
to take "the two slit" into account, even with only one photon used  
in the process?


It's fine to use some other basis.  We use the "two slit" basis  
because that makes the calculations easy.


Yes, but it can be misleading for those who have a naive reading of  
the MW. The relevant (for the experience and their relative weigh)  
part of the multiverse is base independent (eventually it is even  
"theory" independent).





 But that's not a reason to say each path is in a different world;  
PARTICULARY since they interfere with one another.


That is why I usually avoid the term "world".  "Many-dreams" is less  
wrong, and it makes physics looking already closer to the digital  
mechanist (non computable) physics.


Bruno






Brent


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: AI and social destabilization

[Telmo Menezes]

I completely agree with you for a change.

The job-centered society is already looking silly, and will soon look
like medieval superstition. I am waiting for a wave of politicians
that talk about "destroying jobs" instead of "creating jobs", but I
won't hold my breath. I think that the current state of affairs rests
on two things, that are very hard to break:

- A global financial system that only knows how to redistribute wealth
through employment -- but is becoming worse and worse even at doing
that;
- A set of social norms that makes self-worth dependent on employment.

There are no jobs for everyone anymore, not by a long shot. This is
already happening, and the jobs are nor coming back. We have now
entered a silly situation where bullshit jobs are created to prevent
social collapse. This is not only silly but also tragic. We create
prisons for each other for no good reason at all. This is extra silly
in corporate environments, where people are pressured to "work" more
and more hours. It's all mindless virtue signalling.

Of course (for now), someone has to do the unpleasant work that keeps
civilisation running. I don't think that UBI is the only solution. For
example, why can't we work for one decade and live off that money for
the rest of our life spans? The only reason I can see is that the game
is rigged against this being possible. It is most definitely possible
at the higher leves of income, so why not for the common person? Money
is an abstraction, and this abstraction can be redefined -- as it was
already in the past.

If you guys in the US don't manage to get rid of idiots like Trump, I
don't think it is possible that you will be on the forefront of
western civilisation for the next round.

Telmo.


On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 10:10 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> Jobs are already being lost because of the improvements in AI and it's not
> just unskilled workers that are in trouble. Don't think that because you're
> so smart a AI could never do your job better than you can so the AI
> revolution can't effect you personally
> ;
> in March of this year Blackrock, the world's biggest money manager with
> stock funds worth over $275 billion, announced they would fire over 40
> employees including some portfolio managers with astronomical paychecks. The
> reason is they decided to let computers running AI software pick stocks and
> manage 11% of their funds instead of humans.  89% of Blackston's fund
> managers still have a job, but if I was one of them I might decide I don't
> need to buy a new Rolls Royce every month and it would be wise for me to
> start saving my money for a rainy day. Improving technology has created a
> huge gap between the rich and the poor and the gap isn't just increasing
> it's accelerating.
>
> In 2010 the richest 388 people had as much wealth as half of the entire
> human race, that's 3.6 Billion people. In 2014 the richest 85 people did. In
> 2015 the richest 62 people did. This year the richest 8 people did. Think of
> it, the 8 richest Human beings have as much wealth as the poorest 3.6
> BILLION Human beings! History has pretty decisively shown that huge
> inequality just ain't healthy for any society, although history has no
> examples of inequality of
> the
>  magnitude
> we have now.
>
> The improvements in AI that are certain to come
>
> in the next few years
>
> will only accelerate the acceleration of this socially destabilizing trend
> unless something pushes back, something like government action. Health
> insurance for all might be a good place to start. However Donald Trump wants
> to push for lowering taxes on the rich, getting rid of the inheritance tax,
> and eliminating health care for
>
> the
>
> 24 million
>
> poorest people in the country;
>
>  but that's pushing in the wrong direction and will only accelerate the
> acceleration of
> the acceleration
> of the wealth gap.
>
> Anybody who is not terrified by this doesn't understand the situation.
>
> One way or another this trend will NOT continue, if government action
> doesn't slow down the widening of the gap something far far more unpleasant
> will.
> If
> I were one of those 8 hyper rich people I'd be calling for change louder
> than anyone because I like the fact that there is a connection between my
> head and my shoulders and would prefer to keep it that way.
> Let me be clear,
> I'm not talking about "should", I'm not talking about morality, I'm just
> saying
> that
> when the gap between the rich and the poor gets
> too
> large social instability occurs
> and that can be very unhealthy for those at the very top.
>
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at 

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Telmo Menezes]

On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 8:21 AM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:
> On 21/06/2017 4:03 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:

 I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me, all such irreversible
 processes are related to conscious entities in some way. Whilst
 agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to be conscious, I would
 say that the output of Geiger counter is not actually discrete until
 observed by a conscious experimenter.
>>>
>>> That sounds remarkably like the "many minds" interpretation of
>>> quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most scientists because it
>>> leaves the physics of the billions of years before the emergence of
>>> the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the first consciousness
>>> would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds reading.
>>>
>> Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er own mind
>> independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.
>
>
> It is actually a 3p phenomenon because there is inter-subjective agreement
> about the fact that measurements give definite results.

It is actually not, if many minds is true.

>> There is no collapse at all at the 3p level, nor even decoherence as such.
>
>
> Decoherence is a well-understood physical phenomenon that has been widely
> observed. I do not know what you mean by saying "nor even decoherence as
> such." Also, you seem to be confusing the inter-subjective 3p view with
> Tegmark's bird view.

Are you capable of arguing your position without talking down to people?

Telmo.

> There is no person, body, or consciousness that ever
> has the bird view -- the bird is a purely formal construct and has nothing
> to do with mind or consciousness. Even though everything might remain
> unitary at that level, no one can ever experience the consequences of that
> unitary evolution.
>
> Bruce
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/06/2017 4:03 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:

I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me, all such irreversible
processes are related to conscious entities in some way. Whilst
agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to be conscious, I would
say that the output of Geiger counter is not actually discrete until
observed by a conscious experimenter.

That sounds remarkably like the "many minds" interpretation of
quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most scientists because it
leaves the physics of the billions of years before the emergence of
the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the first consciousness
would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds reading.


Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er own mind
independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.


It is actually a 3p phenomenon because there is inter-subjective 
agreement about the fact that measurements give definite results.



There is no collapse at all at the 3p level, nor even decoherence as such.


Decoherence is a well-understood physical phenomenon that has been 
widely observed. I do not know what you mean by saying "nor even 
decoherence as such." Also, you seem to be confusing the 
inter-subjective 3p view with Tegmark's bird view. There is no person, 
body, or consciousness that ever has the bird view -- the bird is a 
purely formal construct and has nothing to do with mind or 
consciousness. Even though everything might remain unitary at that 
level, no one can ever experience the consequences of that unitary 
evolution.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:15:31PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 19/06/2017 10:23 am, Russell Standish wrote:
> >I know Scott wouldn't go as far as me. For me, all such irreversible
> >processes are related to conscious entities in some way. Whilst
> >agreeing that Geiger counters are unlikely to be conscious, I would
> >say that the output of Geiger counter is not actually discrete until
> >observed by a conscious experimenter.
> 
> That sounds remarkably like the "many minds" interpretation of
> quantum mechanics. This is disfavoured by most scientists because it
> leaves the physics of the billions of years before the emergence of
> the first "conscious" creature unresolved -- the first consciousness
> would cause an almighty collapse on the many minds reading.
> 

Each consciousness causes "an almighty collapse" in er own mind
independently of any other. It's a pure 1p phenomena.

There is no collapse at all at the 3p level, nor even decoherence as such.

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.