Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jul 2017, at 04:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 12/07/2017 12:42 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:00:40PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Well, if that is what it is supposed to imply, then John might well
be right to have problems with it! As I have said before, there is
no analogy between step 3 and quantum many worlds -- the differences
far outweigh any superficial similarities.
I don't think you have properly elucidated what those differences  
are,

other than in passing, maybe. How about concentrating on those
differences in detail - if you can show that the many worlds of FPI
are phenomenally different from the many worlds of quantum mechanics,


I don't know how many differences you need, but in step 3, a person  
is duplicated, not a world. And in that scenario, I could, after  
duplication and finding myself in Moscow, get on a plane and fly to  
Washington and meet up with my duplicate. That sort of interaction  
between duplicates is not possible in MWI (at least in its  
decoherent form).


In that step 3 scenario you are right.

But the step 3 is used only to explain and define the notion of thirs  
and fist person view, and to explain the first person indeterminacy.


Step 4 to 7 is needed to understand that in arithmetic too, nobody can  
talk with its (infinitely many) doppelgangers in "parallel"  
computational history, and why matter is not clonable, and other  
qualitaitive quantum facts.


Then, to get the quantitative aspect, you need to compare quantum  
logic(s) with the arithmetical quantum logics.



Also, in quantum MWI, there is no external observer who can see the  
splitting as there can be external observers of person duplication  
-- the copies do not have to be transported, after all, they might  
both be in the same room.


You get the step 3 point, OK. But you seem to miss the steps 4, 5, 6,  
7 (and 8, which is not necessary, unless you believe in magic and that  
the physical universe is small).


The reversal relies on the fact that with computationalism, we *are*  
at each nano-second (say) multiplied/differentiated into an infinity  
of computations emulated in a (tiny) part of the arithmetical reality.  
I called that the global indeterminacy, where the reconstitution  
domain is simply the structure (N, 0, +, *) (not to confuse with any  
theory on that structure, which plays the role of the observers and  
are seen as numbers *in* that reality).


And the math confirms that we got a quantum logic. Even three of them,  
and the only question is if that quantum logic define, or not, a  
unique measure on the computations "seen from the 1p view, and for  
this we need a mathematical theory of the 1p view. It happens that the  
incompleteness phenomenon rehabilitates the theory of knowledge of  
Theaetetus. Incompleteness makes provability into a rational-belief  
notion, and we can define knowledge by the conjunction of rational- 
belief and truth. On the proposition corresponding to the existence of  
a computational continuations just that give already a quantum logic,  
but we get two other one with adding constraints of consistency.


I was hoping hat such a theory would be quickly refuted, so that we  
could learnj something, but that is not the case. Digital Mechanism is  
the only theory which explains qulaia and quanta and their relations,  
and which does not commit an ontological commitment (in a PRIMARY  
MATTER, or in GOD, or something).


It is the second time that you talk like if step 3 was the last step,  
or like I would have been defending the (ridiculous) idea that the  
quantum superposition was literally a duplication of person's bodies  
or of of worlds. It is more like a notion of infinitely many  
"preparation" in the arithmetical reality (the standard model of  
arithmetic). That is apparent at step 7.


Bruno





Bruce


then you are well on the way to showing a fundamental incompatibility
between computationalism and quantum theory. Then presumably, we can
perform an experiment to show which one is incorrect.  
Computationalism

or QM. Worthy of a Nobel prize, I'd think.

Somehow, I don't know that the task is going to be quite so easy...


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: QM Automata

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jul 2017, at 06:45, Brent Meeker wrote:

Here are a couple of papers that may be of interest.  Albert  
considers what a QM automata may know about itself and arrives at  
some unexpected result.  Peres throws some cold water on the result  
- but Peres doesn't believe in a multiverse.


That paper by Albert use the FPI, or a quantum FPI-like notion, and is  
close to Everett's view. Yet, if I remember correctly, Albert, who  
criticized the Many-World a lot in his book "QM and experiences" has  
restated his self-theory in a Bohmian frame (with still sort of  
parallel universe (as Deutsch argues correctly (I think), and lacking  
particles and full of p-zombies). I found that development very weird,  
and it cannot be used with digital mechanism (even with a quantum  
automata). So Albert was close, but then drifted away ...


I will look at Peres paper, but usually I am not very convinced by its  
metaphysical assumption, even without assuming computationalism.  I  
will comment if I find that I missed something.


Bruno






Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Lawrence Krauss Should Have Paid Attention to Vic

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Noson,


On 12 Jul 2017, at 01:26, Noson Yanofsky wrote:


Hi,

I agree that without axioms, there would be no theorems. But I am  
not sure that means there would be no physics.


There would still be a physical universe (just to be clear), but the  
science physics use many assumptions/axioms/theories. In particular  
all theories in physics uses the natral numbers, and this means that  
they are using (most of the time implicitly) axioms defining or  
characterizing natural number (or Church-Turing equivalent).


Keep in mind that we cannot prove in pure logic that x+0 = x. That  
kind of thing is so obvious that many before Dedekind and Gödel, have  
thought that we can prove that in logic alone. Note also that logic  
itself relies on assumptions, that we can make explicit or not.








The universe works perfectly whether we look at it or not.


In which theory? (and that concerns the theory of "we" as much as the  
theory of the "universe").


Here, what I can justify is only that IF the brain/body works like a  
digital machine (or, more weakly, is emulable by a digital machine)  
THEN The physical universe "does not exist" when we don't look at,  
with "we" meaning us, the universal digital machine (which exists only  
in the arithmetical reality).


I refer you the fact that Digital Mechanism is not epistemologically  
compatible with the existence of a logically primary physical  
universe. If we are digital machine, the physical reality must be  
recovered from a statistics on all computation "seen from inside".
"Seen from inside" has to be made precise through the mathematical  
logic of machine self-reference (and this works up to now, but I would  
be please when we get a physical theorem refuted by Nature).


In fact, with mechanism, the universe does not exist even when we look  
at it, a bit like a rainbow which is not an object there, but an  
optical illusion, yet sharable by many observers.





There could be chaos or order without mathematics.


Let us not confuse a mathematical theory and a mathematical reality.  
If we are digital machine, which is a mathematical, even an  
arithmetical, notion, it can be shown that the fundamental reality is  
"pure" arithmetic. Pure arithmetic contains all execution of all  
computers, and the physical realm emerges from a first person plural  
view.


Chaos and order are mathematical notion, so I am not sure there could  
be chaos and order without a mathematical reality (although I agree  
that there could be chaos and order without a mathematical theory of  
chaos and order).




Ants do not have mathematics, but the physical world around them  
works nicely.


That is why if we assume digital mechanism, we must explain the  
appearances of ants (and humans) and physical reality from the  
mathematical properties of relative computational states. That gives  
also an advantage to distinguish qualia and quanta.


Now, even without going that far, I am not sure Ants do not have some  
implicit mathematical theories. The case is probably even clearer with  
cicada whose life span are prime numbers, so as to minimize some  
conflict of interest. (Google on "cicada prime number"). This does not  
mean that the Cicada have some knowledge of prime numbers, but it  
means that "evolution" has used the prime number reality (not theory)  
to help the cicada on its path, and so, without prime number they  
might disappeared, or be less developed.






I have to look into your mechanism.


OK.  Ask any question. What is sometimes not obvious for the  
physicists is that the arithmetical reality emulates in a static way  
the whole set of all possible dreams/experiences. It does it in the  
manner a block-universe (of general relativity, for example)  
instantiates all observer-lines in a static way, and time is treated  
like an indexical.


You can consult my paper here:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

(A better version, corrected by Kim, is also available, but I have not  
yet put it on my webpage). If you or your institution is on research  
gate, or academia, you can read:


Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body  
problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40


Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in  
Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.


Best regards,

Bruno






Noson

From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be]
Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2017 4:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Cc: Noson Yanofsky 
Subject: Re: Lawrence Krauss Should Have Paid Attention to Vic


On 11 Jul 2017, at 05:22, Brent Meeker wrote:


Interesting essay.  When I was helping edit Vic's books I made a  
similar argument too him - that the reason his Point-of-View- 
Invariance seemed so powerful in rederiving physics is that  
physicist were only interested in things that obeyed POVI.


You 

Re: QM Automata

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

The physics relies on is acknowledged, on not, D. Deutsch @Oxford). Quantum 
computers branching calculations to other universes was Deutsches' bailiwick.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOPPJ_Ju3xw

I don't know multiple universes, or just one frick'in big one? This one is 
looking dead as a doornail round these parts. 



-Original Message-
From: Brent Meeker 
To: EveryThing 
Sent: Wed, Jul 12, 2017 12:46 am
Subject: QM Automata

Here are a couple of papers that may be of interest.  Albert considers 
what a QM automata may know about itself and arrives at some unexpected 
result.  Peres throws some cold water on the result - but Peres doesn't 
believe in a multiverse.

Brent

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