Re: Consciousness and number self-reference (was Re: A universe where everything exists?)

[Italo Aurelio]

On Sun, Dec 13, 2020, 14:11 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 10 Dec 2020, at 16:14, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>
> Mindey asked a very interesting question, and I've been thinking about it
> while following the discussion. I don't have a good answer, but I might
> have a good question. I propose another take: the discussion so far has
> been in terms of quanta, but what if we reframed it in terms of qualia?
>
> Imagine the "universe" in terms of the set of all first-person experience
> moments of all of its inhabitants. Is there a limit to novelty here? Or can
> qualia also display unbounded complexity?
>
>
>
> With Mechanism, we have to separate clearly the ontology, which is given
> by the minimal things that we have to assume because we cannot derive them
> from simpler thing, and which has to be enough rich to support a universal
> machine. There is some amount of latitude here, because we can assume any
> universal machinery(*). As everyone believe already in natural numbers and
> the laws of addition and multiplication, I use them (albeit in my course I
> prefer to use the combinators, but once we have them we have the
> numbers+laws, and vice versa.
>
> Then, everything is explained, even imposed, by the fact that we get all
> the universal numbers, and that they all discover the nuance imposed on
> provability by incompleteness, which are the nuances between, truth,
> belief, knowledge, sharable observation (quanta) and the non sharable
> observation (qualia).
>
> First incompleteness separate truth (p) from provability ([]p), and it
> makes provability into a belief predicate, forbidding it to be a knowledge
> predicate (which can be proven to NOT exist, which is coherent with the
> fact that consciousness and qualia will not be definable by the machine,
> but still deferrable too indirectly assuming mechanism and some notion of
> (arithmetical) truth (itself not definable). This entails that
> provability-and-truth will obey a knowledge logic, not definable by the
> machine about itself, but still deferrable, just by using the original idea
> of Theaetetus: knowledge is true belief, and rational knowledge is true
> provable belief ([]p & p). Sharable Observation is given by []p & <>t
> (which leads to probability logic) and private observation (qualia, and
> “unfortunately” also the quanta (which becomes first person plural, making
> physics a psychological reality) is given by applying Theatetus’ move again
> leading to []p & <>t & p.
>
> This gives 8 different mathematical theories, and the observable part
> (private and public) are testable, and can be said to fit rather well with
> physics, given that we get a many-histories interpretation of arithmetic,
> but also a quantum logic for the first person plural locally sharable
> quanta. In fact we get (up to some details I skip here) an intuitionist
> logic for the knower, a quantum logic for the observable, and an
> intuitionist quantum logic for the qualia.
>
> The logical explanation follows:
>
> NUMBER => CONSCIOUSNESS => PHYSICAL-LAWS
>
> We cannot start from consciousness, and we cannot start with matter, which
> are the notion that we have to explain from numbers, when we assume
> Mécanisme, and indeed, the universal numbers provide that explanation, and
> it is testable as it leads to number/machine physical laws, that we can
> compare with Nature.
>
> I would have preferred by far that the quanta appears at the []p & <>t
> level, but they appear only in []p & p, and []p & <>t & p, making physics a
> first person plural construct (with p’s interpretation limited to the
> partial computable formula, which are the sigma_1 (true) sentences.
>
> You can see any universal number in arithmetic as the initialisation of a
> sheave of (aleph_0, or bigger) computational histories, in the universal
> dovetailing (aka the sigma_1 truth). Those are the differentiating
> histories which, from the pov of the machine, and below their substitution
> level, select a continuum of continuations obeying to different mathematics
> (intutionist, quantum, or both) corresponding to each self-referential
> modes imposed by incompleteness.
>
> This makes also the universal “virgin” (unprogrammed) machine) already
> maximally (somehow) conscious, but it is a highly dissociative sort of
> consciousness, out of time and space. Time and space should arise from the
> subjective time (canonically related to the intuitionist logic of the
> knower. (S4Grz and S4Grz1 can be see as a logic of evolving state of
> knowledge).
>
> The notion of universal machine (Post, Kleene, Turing, Church, Markov,
> arguably Babbage) structured canonically the classical (sigma_1)
> arithmetical reality in 8 internal modes, differentiating on their first
> person histories.
>
> Like in Neoplatonism, but also many eastern school of philosophy, Nature
> is the product of the universal number self-contemplation.
>
> The bomb here are the discovery of the universal number, mainly by Turing,
> and the 

Re: Consciousness and number self-reference (was Re: A universe where everything exists?)

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/16/2020 11:29 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:



Am Do, 17. Dez 2020, um 03:08, schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 12/16/2020 9:20 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Am So, 13. Dez 2020, um 17:11, schrieb Bruno Marchal:


On 10 Dec 2020, at 16:14, Telmo Menezes > wrote:


Mindey asked a very interesting question, and I've been thinking 
about it while following the discussion. I don't have a good 
answer, but I might have a good question. I propose another take: 
the discussion so far has been in terms of quanta, but what if we 
reframed it in terms of qualia?


Imagine the "universe" in terms of the set of all first-person 
experience moments of all of its inhabitants. Is there a limit to 
novelty here? Or can qualia also display unbounded complexity?



With Mechanism, we have to separate clearly the ontology, which is 
given by the minimal things that we have to assume because we 
cannot derive them from simpler thing, and which has to be enough 
rich to support a universal machine. There is some amount of 
latitude here, because we can assume any universal machinery(*). As 
everyone believe already in natural numbers and the laws of 
addition and multiplication, I use them (albeit in my course I 
prefer to use the combinators, but once we have them we have the 
numbers+laws, and vice versa.


Still, don't you find it incredibly strange that such a thing exists 
to being with?


You wouldn't if you thought about the evolution of mind and how it 
serves in natural selection.  Counting is very useful. Even animals 
do it.




I am aware. What I mean is that it is incredibly strange that anything 
exists at all.


If nothing existed that would be a contradiction in terms. :-)

Brent

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Irreducible randomness in QM

[Alan Grayson]

Can it be directly inferred from Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle? TIA, AG

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Re: Hossenfelder on Superdeterminism

[Alan Grayson]

Or is her idea tantamount to the claim that the universe is NOT irreducibly 
random, and there exists a sort-of non local hidden variable that implies a 
deterministic interpretation of QM? AG

On Thursday, December 17, 2020 at 2:29:11 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

> She might mean to assume the detector settings were set when the universe 
> began, and not determined by the experimenters. But why would that solve 
> the enigma of non-locality? AG
>
> On Thursday, December 17, 2020 at 2:09:57 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>> Hossenfelder wants to delete the free will hypothesis from Bell 
>> experiments. Assuming one could do that, although I don't see how that 
>> could be done, but assuming it can be deleted, would that change the 
>> probabilities measured by Bell experiments? AG
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 15, 2020 at 3:34:09 AM UTC-7 Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 15, 2020 at 12:32:33 AM UTC-6 agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 If gravity isn't a force, why is there an ongoing effort to unity it 
 with the other three known forces?  It seems like an impossible task, 
 doomed to failure. AG


>>> Maybe the other gauge forces are not entirely forces as well.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>  
>>>
 On Monday, December 14, 2020 at 11:15:51 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

> Is the free will assumption she refers to, the belief that Bell 
> experimenters are free to set the observing angles of their detectors? If 
> that's the case, how would or could one delete this hypothesis in a Bell 
> experiment?  AG
>
> On Monday, December 14, 2020 at 10:56:37 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>> Is she for or against it? AG
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwTkBkb94Rc
>>
>

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Re: Hossenfelder on Superdeterminism

[Alan Grayson]

She might mean to assume the detector settings were set when the universe 
began, and not determined by the experimenters. But why would that solve 
the enigma of non-locality? AG

On Thursday, December 17, 2020 at 2:09:57 AM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

> Hossenfelder wants to delete the free will hypothesis from Bell 
> experiments. Assuming one could do that, although I don't see how that 
> could be done, but assuming it can be deleted, would that change the 
> probabilities measured by Bell experiments? AG
>
> On Tuesday, December 15, 2020 at 3:34:09 AM UTC-7 Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>> On Tuesday, December 15, 2020 at 12:32:33 AM UTC-6 agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> If gravity isn't a force, why is there an ongoing effort to unity it 
>>> with the other three known forces?  It seems like an impossible task, 
>>> doomed to failure. AG
>>>
>>>
>> Maybe the other gauge forces are not entirely forces as well.
>>
>> LC
>>  
>>
>>> On Monday, December 14, 2020 at 11:15:51 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
 Is the free will assumption she refers to, the belief that Bell 
 experimenters are free to set the observing angles of their detectors? If 
 that's the case, how would or could one delete this hypothesis in a Bell 
 experiment?  AG

 On Monday, December 14, 2020 at 10:56:37 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:

> Is she for or against it? AG
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwTkBkb94Rc
>


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Re: Hossenfelder on Superdeterminism

[Alan Grayson]

Hossenfelder wants to delete the free will hypothesis from Bell 
experiments. Assuming one could do that, although I don't see how that 
could be done, but assuming it can be deleted, would that change the 
probabilities measured by Bell experiments? AG

On Tuesday, December 15, 2020 at 3:34:09 AM UTC-7 Lawrence Crowell wrote:

> On Tuesday, December 15, 2020 at 12:32:33 AM UTC-6 agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>
>> If gravity isn't a force, why is there an ongoing effort to unity it with 
>> the other three known forces?  It seems like an impossible task, doomed to 
>> failure. AG
>>
>>
> Maybe the other gauge forces are not entirely forces as well.
>
> LC
>  
>
>> On Monday, December 14, 2020 at 11:15:51 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>> Is the free will assumption she refers to, the belief that Bell 
>>> experimenters are free to set the observing angles of their detectors? If 
>>> that's the case, how would or could one delete this hypothesis in a Bell 
>>> experiment?  AG
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 14, 2020 at 10:56:37 PM UTC-7 Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
 Is she for or against it? AG

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwTkBkb94Rc

>>>

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