Re: AUDA (was David Shoemaker, Personal Identity)

2009-02-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 24 Feb 2009, at 23:44, Günther Greindl wrote:


 Hi,

 I would say the Universal Soul.  To be the ONE? The difficulty is  
 that
 Plotinus is not always clear.

 I go now from my reading of mystical texts, not from the arithmetic
 interpretation  - and here mystics often report feeling at one with  
 the
 universe, everything etc.

 I would say that this is the realization that your true nature (to be
 more precise than before) is not different than that of the ONE/dao/ 
 etc.


I am OK with this. But it is beyond word.
Lao Tse said the Dao which has a name is not the Dao. Plotinus said  
the ONE is ineffable, ...




 The universal soul hypostase *is* a first person (or a theory about
 a first person). Some would say it is just an abstract person. That
 it is just the least common part of all souls, or in the arithmetical
 toy theology, that is the common part of all first persons

 Ok, I think attaining this minimal person is also a meditative  
 state,
 but the full mystical experience reported in all cultures etc would be
 union with the ONE:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophia_perennis

 QUOTE:
 The Perennial Philosophy is expressed most succinctly in the Sanskrit
 formula, tat tvam asi ('That thou art'); the Atman, or immanent  
 eternal
 Self, is one with Brahman, the Absolute Principle of all existence;  
 and
 the last end of every human being, is to discover the fact for  
 himself,
 to find out who he really is.
 Aldous Huxley
 END QUOTE

I agree. But up to now I can really talk about this trough both comp  
and the arithmetical self-reference.
This leads to open mathematical problems.






 total amnesia (forgetting not just who you are, but that you are, +
 forgetting everything up to the idea of time and space), yet  
 remaining
 conscious, if not being even much more conscious with the feeling  
 that
 memories are making you less conscious, and that a memory-brain is a
 filter on histories. Stable memories differentiate consciousness

 Yes, I agree, I think brains/memories are filters on histories; but  
 the
 above description of pure consciousness - what introspective reason
 leads you to believe that that is still the experience of a (minimal)
 person an not already experience of the source? (I like to change
 words for the ONE so that no connotations become entrenched; after
 all, it is described as the ineffable)

OK, but the term source has many connotations too. All terms are  
wrong.
With comp truth is the less wrong, in the language of a Lobian  
machine working out the theology of a simpler machine.
No introspective reason leads me to believe the experience of the  
Universal Soul is different from the fusion with the One.
It is purely mathematical reason which leads me to make a distinction  
in the mathematical theology.
Any machine *asserting* it has fused with the ONE, is provably wrong.



 A problem for comp is that, well at least I have thought that comp
 makes the soul (the first person, the third hypostase) conscious only
 through its building or generating time. But the salvia reports and  
 my
 own experiences make me think I could be wrong there.

 Indeed, a first person, namely, what we call a person (narrative,
 history, agency, autonomy etc) requires temporality.

Yes, it is weird. I am very confused about this.





 
 AUDA in short.


 Ok, you have whetted my appetite, now I will have to read the Plotinus
 paper ;-)


Plotinus, for me, is mainly a good pedagogical path. It helps also to  
recast the machine interview in the human philosophies.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: AUDA (was David Shoemaker, Personal Identity)

2009-02-24 Thread Günther Greindl

Hi,

 I would say the Universal Soul.  To be the ONE? The difficulty is that  
 Plotinus is not always clear. 

I go now from my reading of mystical texts, not from the arithmetic 
interpretation  - and here mystics often report feeling at one with the 
universe, everything etc.

I would say that this is the realization that your true nature (to be 
more precise than before) is not different than that of the ONE/dao/etc.

 The universal soul hypostase *is* a first person (or a theory about  
 a first person). Some would say it is just an abstract person. That  
 it is just the least common part of all souls, or in the arithmetical  
 toy theology, that is the common part of all first persons  

Ok, I think attaining this minimal person is also a meditative state, 
but the full mystical experience reported in all cultures etc would be 
union with the ONE:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophia_perennis

QUOTE:
The Perennial Philosophy is expressed most succinctly in the Sanskrit 
formula, tat tvam asi ('That thou art'); the Atman, or immanent eternal 
Self, is one with Brahman, the Absolute Principle of all existence; and 
the last end of every human being, is to discover the fact for himself, 
to find out who he really is.
Aldous Huxley
END QUOTE

 total amnesia (forgetting not just who you are, but that you are, +  
 forgetting everything up to the idea of time and space), yet remaining  
 conscious, if not being even much more conscious with the feeling that  
 memories are making you less conscious, and that a memory-brain is a  
 filter on histories. Stable memories differentiate consciousness

Yes, I agree, I think brains/memories are filters on histories; but the 
above description of pure consciousness - what introspective reason 
leads you to believe that that is still the experience of a (minimal) 
person an not already experience of the source? (I like to change 
words for the ONE so that no connotations become entrenched; after 
all, it is described as the ineffable)

 A problem for comp is that, well at least I have thought that comp  
 makes the soul (the first person, the third hypostase) conscious only  
 through its building or generating time. But the salvia reports and my  
 own experiences make me think I could be wrong there.

Indeed, a first person, namely, what we call a person (narrative, 
history, agency, autonomy etc) requires temporality.


 
 AUDA in short.
 

Ok, you have whetted my appetite, now I will have to read the Plotinus 
paper ;-)

Cheers,
Günther

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AUDA (was David Shoemaker, Personal Identity)

2009-02-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 23 Feb 2009, at 02:21, Günther Greindl wrote:


 Hi Stathis, Bruno, List,

 the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
 to the unspeakable you = ONE).
 I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and  
 unnameable.
 Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much
 more precise.

 I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having  
 all
 my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
 magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
 nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.

 You must take into account Bruno's Plotinian interpretation: the One,
 the Intellect, and the Universal Soul. In this sense, you can become
 more you in that you penetrate false knowledge Maya and realize  
 your
 true nature (the Dao, if you like, roughly the ONE in Plotinus).


I would say the Universal Soul.  To be the ONE? The difficulty is that  
Plotinus is not always clear. Obvioulsy he did not dispose of an  
arithmetical interpretation. Formidably enough he is aware that  
numbers can play a big role there, like most neoplatonists.
The universal soul hypostase *is* a first person (or a theory about  
a first person). Some would say it is just an abstract person. That  
it is just the least common part of all souls, or in the arithmetical  
toy theology, that is the common part of all first persons  
corresponding to the ideally correct machines. But (with comp) we can  
make the point that such a person *is* conscious.
A sort of confirmation is given by the thought of some mystic  
(Plotinus, Ibn Arabi, ...), but also from experience reports of those  
who experiments with Salvia Divinorum, which makes possible to have a  
total amnesia (forgetting not just who you are, but that you are, +  
forgetting everything up to the idea of time and space), yet remaining  
conscious, if not being even much more conscious with the feeling that  
memories are making you less conscious, and that a memory-brain is a  
filter on histories. Stable memories differentiate consciousness.

A problem for comp is that, well at least I have thought that comp  
makes the soul (the first person, the third hypostase) conscious only  
through its building or generating time. But the salvia reports and my  
own experiences make me think I could be wrong there.






 @Bruno:
 What I have come to wonder: you take the Löbian Machine to be the  
 model
 of a person - say, a human. But what if the Löbian Machine is actually
 (and only) the ultimate person - the universal soul, in Plotinus'
 terminology.


OK. It is the ultimate person, but also the initial person.It is a  
baby god. The one who has to fall from truth to be able to go back to  
truth, but then the impossible marriage between just addition and  
multiplication explains (assuming we are digital) why we can lost our  
selves in an infinitely complex labyrinth of realities.







 This would account for the infinite (continuum!) histories (lived
 through the lives of all beings in the multiverse), the universal  
 soul
 forgetting itself in a cosmic play, sort of -  but also for COMP
 immortality - immortal would be the _universal soul_, but not
 necessarily concrete persons (as we conceive them, which requires at
 least some continuity of memory etc)


I think you are quite correct. Except I would say all first persons  
feel themselves always as being concrete (in all situations, OMs,  
worlds, ...). Even an amnesic person can feel herself concrete, even  
if she forgets the meaning of the word concrete. And see what I said  
to Stathis, the point where I don't follow Parfit: we are never 100%  
concrete. Concreteness is always relative to a probable history. We  
are always abstract, immaterial types relatively embedded in  
infinitely many types of histories (computations seen from inside).  
So, like in Hinduism it seems comp gives the two main form of  
immortality: the one when you remember you are the universal soul, and  
the one which makes you live again, and again, and again, from  
mornings to mornings, from lives to lives, exploring the many  
realities. I think this happens when you don't remember you are the  
universal soul. That remembering is somewhat paradoxical, and, to be  
sure hard to extract from the interview of the universal machine.
It is really an amnesia of an amnesia. Perhaps a forgetful functor in  
the category of the models of Lobian machines. I don't *know*!
The incompleteness prevents the consistent machines to ever come back  
on earth with the last step of that remembering. It does not prevent  
the machine to commit that last step, only to come back with the  
memory of that step.

Hmmm ... This could look a bit mystical, so I should recall AUDA, for  
the benefit of some others.


AUDA in short.

For the correct machine, the incompleteness makes obligatory to have a  
theology, in the sense that she