Re: FPI possible continuations
On 22 Jul 2015, at 20:59, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? FPI requires that all of them need to be taken into account to evaluate what happens next. But some explanation might correspond to very rare computations, other might be more numerous. So this is one way in which FPI differs from Many Worlds QM scenarios, because in those scenarios, the splitting is the result of divergence from a common physical reality, whereas FPI indeterminacy is the result of divergence from a common phenomenological reality. Well said. This does not change the fact that the Everett-QM indeterminacy is a particular case of the first person indeterminacy, as I think you agree, with Quentin and me and others. Eventually, if comp is true, the first one (the result of divergence from a common physical reality) must be explain through the second one (the result of phenomenological divergence, common for the guy before the split). All right? (this of course use step 7, and is not relevant at step 3) Bruno Terren In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Nothing is ruled out, but statistically, the computations which have a bigger measure will be more probable. If you see a UFO, may be there is a UFO in the normal physical reality. That means that in all normal computations an UFO is there. Then that UFO is multiplied along all things which multiply you. You will be (comp)-entangled to it. For example, there will be as much UFO than there are equivalent (from your 1p pov) position of electron possible in your body (already a continuum if we postulate classical QM (and thus that QM is the solution of the FPI). Or the UFO belongs to a normal dream, in which case you will wake up, in the normal histories. Or the UFO is based on more rare computations, and the probability that you belong to them will drop down. Naively, what you expect is determined by the mass of computations going through your state. Although the rare experience seems as much real than the normal one, they are relatively rare. Even if you find yourself in one, from there you should bet on the normal continuations starting from that non normal situation. Similarly, you should never bet on a non normal computation, unless you die or are on drugs. Basically it is like the lottery: you should not expect to win the biggest gain, despite you cannot rule out the possibility. In our case, all finite computations may be ruled out, as they have a (naive) measure null, compared to infinite computations multiplied by (dovetailing on) the real numbers. Empirically Nature used a random oracle to get that self-multiplication right, and we can expect this to be proved necessary for the comp-measure measure. Now, that reasoning is a bit naive, and it is virtually impossible to count the computations, or even to recognize them in some 3p way. It can be proved easily that most computations cannot have their semantic extracted mechanically from the code of the program doing them, and that is why I handle the math of the measure in an indirect way from the logic of self-reference. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: FPI possible continuations
Hi John, I don't mean to signify any particular ontological commitments when I refer to UFOs or any other feature of our experience. I'm comfortable with the uncertainty entailed by the skeptic's position. At the end of the day if we want to communicate, we need to use a shared language that hopefully activates in the listener the concepts we are trying to communicate. For the question I asked, it's not important whether those features of reality are really there, only that they present to our experience in identical ways; so this would allow dreams, hallucinations, and so on, as well as the features we take for granted as being real in the sense of being independently verifiable (in principle if not in practice). Terren On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 10:01 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Terren, so you think there ARE UFOs? just as you think there are those other features you mentioned (or even Telmo's Mongol invasions?) I could question TIME as well (Quentin) in my agnosticism. Our knowable(??) world/science is flexible and creative. I would not mix it up with 'reality' what we cannot know for sure. (Please, consider the English ambiguity in this last sentence: A. We cannot know for sure WHAT reality is, - or - B. I cannot mix up time and the other items with reality. ) John Mikes On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? FPI requires that all of them need to be taken into account to evaluate what happens next. But some explanation might correspond to very rare computations, other might be more numerous. So this is one way in which FPI differs from Many Worlds QM scenarios, because in those scenarios, the splitting is the result of divergence from a common physical reality, whereas FPI indeterminacy is the result of divergence from a common phenomenological reality. Terren In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Nothing is ruled out, but statistically, the computations which have a bigger measure will be more probable. If you see a UFO, may be there is a UFO in the normal physical reality. That means that in all normal computations an UFO is there. Then that UFO is multiplied along all things which multiply you. You will be (comp)-entangled to it. For example, there will be as much UFO than there are equivalent (from your 1p pov) position of electron possible in your body (already a continuum if we postulate classical QM (and thus that QM is the solution of the FPI). Or the UFO belongs to a normal dream, in which case you will wake up, in the normal histories. Or the UFO is based on more rare computations, and the probability that you belong to them will drop down. Naively, what you expect is determined by the mass of computations going through your state. Although the rare experience seems as much real than the normal one, they are relatively rare. Even if you find yourself in one, from there you should bet on the normal continuations starting from that non normal situation. Similarly, you should never bet on a non normal computation, unless you die or are on drugs. Basically it is like the lottery: you should not expect to win the biggest gain, despite you cannot rule out the possibility. In our case, all finite computations may be ruled out, as they have a (naive) measure null, compared to infinite computations multiplied by (dovetailing on) the real numbers. Empirically Nature used a random oracle to get that self-multiplication right, and we can expect this to be proved necessary for the comp-measure measure. Now, that reasoning is a bit naive, and it is virtually impossible to count the computations, or even to recognize them in some 3p way. It can be proved easily that most computations cannot have their semantic extracted mechanically from the code of the program doing them, and that is why I handle the math of the measure in an indirect way from the logic of self-reference. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? FPI requires that all of them need to be taken into account to evaluate what happens next. But some explanation might correspond to very rare computations, other might be more numerous. In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Nothing is ruled out, but statistically, the computations which have a bigger measure will be more probable. If you see a UFO, may be there is a UFO in the normal physical reality. That means that in all normal computations an UFO is there. Then that UFO is multiplied along all things which multiply you. You will be (comp)-entangled to it. For example, there will be as much UFO than there are equivalent (from your 1p pov) position of electron possible in your body (already a continuum if we postulate classical QM (and thus that QM is the solution of the FPI). Or the UFO belongs to a normal dream, in which case you will wake up, in the normal histories. Or the UFO is based on more rare computations, and the probability that you belong to them will drop down. Naively, what you expect is determined by the mass of computations going through your state. Although the rare experience seems as much real than the normal one, they are relatively rare. Even if you find yourself in one, from there you should bet on the normal continuations starting from that non normal situation. Similarly, you should never bet on a non normal computation, unless you die or are on drugs. Basically it is like the lottery: you should not expect to win the biggest gain, despite you cannot rule out the possibility. In our case, all finite computations may be ruled out, as they have a (naive) measure null, compared to infinite computations multiplied by (dovetailing on) the real numbers. Empirically Nature used a random oracle to get that self-multiplication right, and we can expect this to be proved necessary for the comp-measure measure. Now, that reasoning is a bit naive, and it is virtually impossible to count the computations, or even to recognize them in some 3p way. It can be proved easily that most computations cannot have their semantic extracted mechanically from the code of the program doing them, and that is why I handle the math of the measure in an indirect way from the logic of self-reference. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
Le 20 juil. 2015 23:14, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com a écrit : Hi Terren, I won't try to answer but instead increase the scope of the question. Could it also apply to the past? Could there be many (infinite?) possible histories that lead to the current state of affairs, but until you learn about, say, the Mongol invasions then the Mongol invasions are just a possibility? I think it is, as measure is a relative thing, it echoes also the memory erasure experiment that Saibal Mitra I think once told. So yes any moment has multiple past as well as multiple futures. Whatever the relative measure of each, each moment is as real as any other. Quentin Cheers, Telmo. On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
Hi Terren, I won't try to answer but instead increase the scope of the question. Could it also apply to the past? Could there be many (infinite?) possible histories that lead to the current state of affairs, but until you learn about, say, the Mongol invasions then the Mongol invasions are just a possibility? Cheers, Telmo. On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
FPI possible continuations
Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI possible continuations
Hi Terren, so you think there ARE UFOs? just as you think there are those other features you mentioned (or even Telmo's Mongol invasions?) I could question TIME as well (Quentin) in my agnosticism. Our knowable(??) world/science is flexible and creative. I would not mix it up with 'reality' what we cannot know for sure. (Please, consider the English ambiguity in this last sentence: A. We cannot know for sure WHAT reality is, - or - B. I cannot mix up time and the other items with reality. ) John Mikes On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of the infinite computations going through my state? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
