Hi Roger Clough,
### ROGER: Quanta are different from particles. They don't move
from A to B along particular paths through space (or even through
space), they move
through all possible mathematical paths - which is to say that they
are everywhere at once-
until one particular path is selected by a measurement (or selected
by passing through slits).
Do you agree with Everett that all path exists, and that the selection
might equivalent with a first person indeterminacy?
...
Note that intelligence requires the ability to select.
OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just
interaction and some memory.
Selection of a quantum path
(collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces
consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated
reduction. .
Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on
Gödel is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave
collapse, which has never make any sense to me.
Why would the physical not be infinitely divisible and extensible,
especially if not real?
ROGER: Objects can be physical and also infinitely divisible,
but L considered this infinite divisibility to disqualify an object
to be real because
there's no end to the process, one wouldn't end up with something
to refer to.
In comp we end up with what is similar above the substitution level.
What we call macro, but which is really only what we can isolate.
The picture is of course quite counter-intuitive.
Personally. I substitute Heisenberg's uncertainty principle
as the basis for this view because the fundamental particles
are supposedly divisible.
By definition an atom is not divisible, and the atoms today are the
elementary particles. Not sure you can divide an electron or a Higgs
boson.
With comp particles might get the sme explanation as the physicist, as
fixed points for some transformation in a universal group or universal
symmetrical system.
The simple groups, the exceptional groups, the Monster group can play
some role there (I speculate).
ROGER: You can split an atom because it has parts, reactors do
that all of the time.
of this particular point, Electrons and other fundamental particles
do not have parts.
You lost me with the rest of this comment, but that's OK.
Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek άτομο means not divisible).
But if string theory is correct even electron are still divisible
(conceptually).
I still don't know with comp. Normally some observable have a real
continuum spectrum. Physical reality cannot be entirely discrete.
I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit
into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue,
so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads.
OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number.
let me be explicit on this. I fixe once and for all a universal
system: I chose the programming language LISP. Actually, a subset of
it: the programs LISP computing only (partial) functions from N to N,
with some list representation of the numbers like (0), (S 0), (S S
0), ...
I enumerate in lexicographic way all the programs LISP. P_1, P_2,
P_3, ...
The ith partial computable functions phi_i is the one computed by P_i.
I can place on N a new operation, written #, with a # b = phi_a(b),
that is the result of the application of the ath program LISP, P_a, in
the enumeration of all the program LISP above, on b.
Then I define a number as being intensional when it occurs at the left
of an expression like a # b.
The choice of a universal system transforms each number into a
(partial) function from N to N.
A number u is universal if phi_u(a, b) = phi_a(b). u interprets or
understands the program a and apply it to on b to give the result
phi_a(b). a is the program, b is the data, and u is the computer. (a,
b) here abbreviates some number coding the couple (a, b), to stay
withe function having one argument (so u is a P_i, there is a
universal program P_u).
Universal is an intensional notion, it concerns the number playing the
role of a name for the function. The left number in the (partial)
operation #.
ROGER: Despisers of religion would do well to understand
this point, as follows:
Numbers, like all beings in Platonia are intensional and necessary,
so are not contingent, as monads are. Thus, arithmetical theorems
and proofs
do not change with time, are always true or always false. Perfect,
heavenly,
eternal truths, as they say. Angelic. Life itself. Free spirits.
..
Monads are intensional but are contingent, so they change (very
rapidly) with time (like other
inhabitants of Contingia). Monads are a bit corrupt like the rest of
us.
Although not perfect, they tend to strive to be so, at least those
motivated by
intellect (the principles of Platonia, so not entropic. Otherwise,
those dominated by the
lesser quality, passion,
