Re: One subject
On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 10:31:31 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 6/12/2012 4:40 PM, Pierz wrote: I didn't say that we would all turn into self-deniers concerned only to help others. I said we would achieve an optimal moral society. Such a society would always bear in mind the absolute equality of all subjects (not in the 'royal subject' sense!), with each person knowing their actions are received by none other than themselves. The best moral action would be the selfish action, seen from the perspective of the entire self rather than the fragmentary self. Imagine you share an island with a person for one year, and you know that the next year, you will become the other person on the island at the start of the same year again - ie, you will experience everything from their perspective. How will it change the way you behave? So does this universal person include dogs? apes? spiders? rocks? Well of course it must include all minds, which means dogs, apes and spiders. Rocks? Who knows? If rocks possess any sentience I very much doubt it has any moral bearing. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2klVzkg5gI0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have? Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition true but capable of becoming false if justified too much, like all protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, etc.). Cf hell is paved with good intentions. Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not don't do to the others what you don't want the others do to you, but don't do to the others what *the others* don't want you do to them. In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult No Thanks. (It is more complex with the children, you must add nuances like as far as possible). I don't know what G* and G are, but I get the gist, and I agree. In fact, questions like how to deal with punishment become interesting when considered through this 'one subject' lens. When 'I' am the offender, I don't want to be punished for my crimes, but 'I' as the victim and the broader community think the offender should be. We have to balance competing views. Also, there is sense in looking after oneself ahead of others to the extent that I of all people am best equipped to look after my own needs, and I have the same rights to happiness, material wellbeing etc as others. The question is, what course of action brings the greatest good if all adopt it as their moral code? It's no use everybody giving away all their worldly goods to charity - there will be no-one to receive them! Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one sense since everything happens anyway, so you
Re: One subject
On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 12:14:26 AM UTC+10, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 6/11/2012 10:19 PM, Pierz wrote: On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have? Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. Hi Pierz, A few comments. What is the process or relation that defines the I? If there is one I, as you discuss here, would not that I have experiences that are mutually contradictory? How would this not do damage to the idea that a conscious experience is an integrated whole and thus contains no contradiction? The idea of a single mind or observer does not imply that everything is happening at once in that mind - or rather, it does not imply that the I is aware of everything at once. That is patently not the case. It is hard to define in objective terms what is meant by the 'I', because the I is the process of subjectivity itself and so not amenable to objectification. But one way I have conceptualised it as follows. Our normal view posits the existence of multiple separate minds, each of which has extension in time (but, oddly, not space - we aren't talking about brains). Whereas the one mind view would see that all apparently separate minds are as it were different perspectives of and on the same single mind. An examination of the logical consequences of an extension of mind in time (the cryogenic paradox or the disassembly/reassembly thought experiment) shows that there can be no hidden identity to consciousness beyond the contents of that consciousness. No mutual contradiction occurs in the same way that the shape of the underside of an elephant does
Re: One subject
On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 4:27:29 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have? Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition true but capable of becoming false if justified too much, like all protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, etc.). Cf hell is paved with good intentions. Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not don't do to the others what you don't want the others do to you, but don't do to the others what *the others* don't want you do to them. In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult No Thanks. (It is more complex with the children, you must add nuances like as far as possible). I don't know what G* and G are, but I get the gist, and I agree. In fact, questions like how to deal with punishment become interesting when considered through this 'one subject' lens. When 'I' am the offender, I don't want to be punished for my crimes, but 'I' as the victim and the broader community think the offender should be. We have to balance competing views. Also, there is sense in looking after oneself ahead of others to the extent that I of all people am best equipped to look after my own needs, and I have the same rights to happiness, material wellbeing etc as others. The question is, what course
Re: One subject
On 6/12/2012 4:40 PM, Pierz wrote: I didn't say that we would all turn into self-deniers concerned only to help others. I said we would achieve an optimal moral society. Such a society would always bear in mind the absolute equality of all subjects (not in the 'royal subject' sense!), with each person knowing their actions are received by none other than themselves. The best moral action would be the selfish action, seen from the perspective of the entire self rather than the fragmentary self. Imagine you share an island with a person for one year, and you know that the next year, you will become the other person on the island at the start of the same year again - ie, you will experience everything from their perspective. How will it change the way you behave? So does this universal person include dogs? apes? spiders? rocks? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One subject
to the comp statement that it is the continuity of calculation that provides the cohesion of the 1p perspective. (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). Except it was the structure and implicitly the algorithms of a specific physical brain that provided the continuity. I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). Well, have you experienced them? I remember some experiences but certainly not all. Have I? I don't know! I remember being a ten year old, but only a few snapshots. Nevertheless I'm sure I lived every second of being ten. I would not expect to remember every life I have lived/will live (consciousness is out of time, so I can't really put a tense on it). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? That's pretty much the Hindu idea, but I don't think they are notably more altruistic. Do they 'grok it deep down'? People espouse beliefs with which they have been enculturated without really believing them at a deep experiential level. Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. Or, no matter what I steal it's OK because it was really mine anyway. Ha ha. That would be more like solipsism, and very short sighted. Brent Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end of all actions, both good and bad. On Monday, June 11, 2012 12:20:06 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have? Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. There's continuity of physical structure (I think that's what 'reassembled' means). I don't know what 'continuity of self-reference' means? Anyway this is not a thought experiment. The atoms in your body get replaced as you live, it is only the structure that is, approximately, conserved. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Happens to me all the time. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Are you worried that you may experience a heart attack in 20yrs? Are you eating a cheeseburger? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness That seems to me a tautology
Re: One subject
On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have? Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition true but capable of becoming false if justified too much, like all protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness, etc.). Cf hell is paved with good intentions. Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which, BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not don't do to the others what you don't want the others do to you, but don't do to the others what *the others* don't want you do to them. In fact, unless you defend your life, just respect the possible adult No Thanks. (It is more complex with the children, you must add nuances like as far as possible). I don't know what G* and G are, but I get the gist, and I agree. In fact, questions like how to deal with punishment become interesting when considered through this 'one subject' lens. When 'I' am the offender, I don't want to be punished for my crimes, but 'I' as the victim and the broader community think the offender should be. We have to balance competing views. Also, there is sense in looking after oneself ahead of others to the extent that I of all people am best equipped to look after my own needs, and I have the same rights to happiness, material wellbeing etc as others. The question is, what course of action brings the greatest good if all adopt it as their moral code? It's no use everybody giving away all their worldly
One subject
I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the question, If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have? Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner of a specific physical brain). I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact, wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can only steal from yourself. Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the receiving end of all actions, both good and bad. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ymVml8zv_kMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
