Re: Doesn't the UTM insure that comp is true ?

2012-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Dec 2012, at 19:39, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/13/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal


What I don't understand about comp is if there is a UTM that  
can calculate
whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be  
false

(except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ?


Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to  
emulate our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie  
to make comp false.


That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM  
hypothesis.

That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis.
That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM  
hypothesis.


COMP - STRONG-AI - BEH-MEC

And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact  
machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the  
mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally  
protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort  
of universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at  
least at the start!).


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

Comp implies virtual zombies, not physical zombies, no?



Comp implies no zombie at all. It makes the concept meaningless.

In *some* sense, there can be apparent zombie, because there are  
apparent bodies, and we attribute some real time consciousness to  
some bodies that we can observe, but that is part of the illusion of  
bodies and time, not of of the consciousness of other person.


For someone *disbelieving* comp, you are right, this would entail the  
existence of an infinity of virtual zombies in arithmetic.


Bruno




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Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Doesn't the UTM insure that comp is true ?

2012-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal


What I don't understand about comp is if there is a UTM that can  
calculate

whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false
(except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ?


Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to emulate  
our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie to make comp  
false.


That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM  
hypothesis.

That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis.
That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM hypothesis.

COMP - STRONG-AI - BEH-MEC

And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact  
machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the  
mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally  
protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort of  
universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at least at  
the start!).


Bruno






[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/13/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-13, 05:22:45
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism

On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:

 On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 
 
  On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
 
  On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 
  
  
   On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
  
  
   Your servitor:
  
   1) Arithmetic (comp)
  
   :)
  
   Bruno
  
   To which I add:
  
   0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives  
rise

   to comp.
 
 
  OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding  
comp.

 
  No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for
  granted.

 Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running  
existence,

 are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.

 Tiny compared to what though?

Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described.



 As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from
 nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory-
 motor primitive, which has no possible explanation.

First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or
Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, if only to make sense
of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor.
Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation.



 Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of  
experiences


Keep in mind that experiences is what I want explain.




 which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in
 arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of
 frustration.

In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness.




 It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all
 it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete
 sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the
 Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure
 capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers?





  Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't
  necessary in the first place.

 By postulating what we want to explain.

 There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain
 arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of
 arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense
 which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value.

If you say so ...






 
  You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.
 
  It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If
  you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non-
  ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other
  beings in public space.

 You take the problem, and then say it is the solution.

 The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and
 solutions.

Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp
interesting.




 That's the god-
 of-the-gap mistake.

 No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos -
 beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is
 sense itself.

We don't even know if there is one.





 We have of course already discuss this. You are
 just saying don't search.

 You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the
 only answer that can ever be universally true.

Hmm...





 It looks *you* are talking everything for
 granted at the start, in the theory.

 I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down
 into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down
 to sense.

The CTM + classical theory of knowledge can explain 

Re: Doesn't the UTM insure that comp is true ?

2012-12-13 Thread Stephen P. King

On 12/13/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal
What I don't understand about comp is if there is a UTM that can 
calculate

whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false
(except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ?


Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to emulate 
our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie to make comp 
false.


That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM 
hypothesis.

That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis.
That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM hypothesis.

COMP - STRONG-AI - BEH-MEC

And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact 
machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the 
mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally 
protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort of 
universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at least at 
the start!).


Bruno

Dear Bruno,

Comp implies virtual zombies, not physical zombies, no?

--
Onward!

Stephen

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