On 13 Dec 2012, at 19:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/13/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
What I don't understand about comp is---- if there is a UTM that
can calculate
whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be
false
(except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ?
Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to
emulate our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie
to make comp false.
That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM
hypothesis.
That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis.
That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM
hypothesis.
COMP -> STRONG-AI -> BEH-MEC
And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact
machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the
mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally
protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort
of universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at
least at the start!).
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
Comp implies virtual zombies, not physical zombies, no?
Comp implies no zombie at all. It makes the concept meaningless.
In *some* sense, there can be "apparent zombie", because there are
apparent bodies, and we attribute some "real time" consciousness to
some bodies that we can observe, but that is part of the illusion of
bodies and time, not of of the consciousness of other person.
For someone *disbelieving* comp, you are right, this would entail the
existence of an infinity of virtual zombies in arithmetic.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
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