On 13 Dec 2012, at 19:39, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/13/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Dec 2012, at 14:09, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal


What I don't understand about comp is---- if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever is needed to emulate our behavior, how can comp ever be false
(except possibly by those aspects hidden by Godel ) ?

Well if there is a UTM that can calculate whatever needed to emulate our behavior, and if you still want comp, you need zombie to make comp false.

That an UTM can emulate our behavior is the BEHAVIORAL-MECHANISM hypothesis.
That such UTM is conscious, is the STRONG AI hypothesis.
That we are such UTM emulable machine is the COMP, alias CTM hypothesis.

COMP -> STRONG-AI -> BEH-MEC

And Gödel's theorem is really just the first theorem in exact machine's self-reference theory, it is really a chance for the mechanist philosophy. Judson Webb is right on that. It locally protects Church thesis, and it makes the universal machine a sort of universal dissident, allergic to authoritative arguments (at least at the start!).

Bruno
Dear Bruno,

    Comp implies virtual zombies, not physical zombies, no?


Comp implies no zombie at all. It makes the concept meaningless.

In *some* sense, there can be "apparent zombie", because there are apparent bodies, and we attribute some "real time" consciousness to some bodies that we can observe, but that is part of the illusion of bodies and time, not of of the consciousness of other person.

For someone *disbelieving* comp, you are right, this would entail the existence of an infinity of virtual zombies in arithmetic.

Bruno



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Onward!

Stephen

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