Re: On morphic telepathy
On 1/4/2013 1:54 AM, Roger Clough wrote: On morphic telepathy Note that Leibniz for good reasons (similar to Kant) did not consider time and space to be substances, so the monads all exist as a dust of points in an inextended domain (to use Descartes' concepts) which is by definition outside of spacetime (is in mental domain). Space and time do not exist ion the mental domain, so it is like a nonlocal field. Dear Roger, Is it necessary that monads are a substance? Could we think of them as pure process the product of which is the content of experience of the monad? Is this formulation antithetical to the definition that Leibniz gives monads? So had the monads windows, they would be in continual direct instant communcation with each other, which L disallows by not permitting them to have windows. Or they could be in a continuous state of simulating the effects of said communications on themselves an behaving 'as if' they where observing each other. What the 'no windows' postulate provides is a denial of 'exchange of substances' - which makes sense if there are no substances at all anyway! The supreme monad however can see everything with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and instantly updates the perceptions of each monad. Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad' in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure... I use the since the actual perceptions are indirect as described above. Sure. It is as if they have continual direct communication with each other. But they do not have perfect or equal undistorted clarity of vision, so telepathy is individual and can be sketchy. Sure. QM allows for this kind of telepathy! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On morphic telepathy
STEPHAN: Is it necessary that monads are a substance? Could we think of them as pure process the product of which is the content of experience of the monad? Is this formulation antithetical to the definition that Leibniz gives monads? ROGER: Keep in mind that Leibniz formulated his ideas in the 17th century, when aside from Spinoza, there had been little new done since Aristotle. Leibniz was trying to establish something fundamental to base his metaphysics on. Something specific that you could essentially point to. He had done away with two-substance cartesian dualism by considering both mind and body from a mental or logical aspect. Of course the phenomenol world still existed, so he still needed some appropriate way of mentally designating material objects. These were all substances, but L only considered as real or permanent only indivisible substances (substances of only one part-- without internal boundaries.) These indivisible real objects he called monads. These have the same or at least very similar characteristics as morphic fields. Time is not a feature in monadic space, which essentially rules out experiemnces except as snapshots. Only the supreme monad can have experiences, IMHO. The monads below only have fixed sets of perceptions, which are like snapshots in an album of memories. ROGER (previously) So had the monads windows, they would be in continual direct instant communcation with each other, which L disallows by not permitting them to have windows. STEPHAN: Or they could be in a continuous state of simulating the effects of said communications on themselves an behaving 'as if' they where observing each other. What the 'no windows' postulate provides is a denial of 'exchange of substances' - which makes sense if there are no substances at all anyway! ROGER: OK. Except the time continuity would only be as if. Personally I believe that the denial of windows is deliberately to disempower the monads so that only the omniscient supreme monad is aware, as we ordinarily think of the term. In essence the physical universe is simply the body of one great soul or person. (ROGER previously) The supreme monad however can see everything with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and instantly updates the perceptions of each monad. STEPHAN: Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad' in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure... ROGER: A single monad reflects all of the other monads, but only from his perspective. Only the Supreme Monad sees things as they really are (from all perspectives at once (incomprehensible to us) instead of the single perspective we call the phenomenol world). I use the since the actual perceptions are indirect as described above. STEPHEN:Sure. ROGER: It is as if they have continual direct communication with each other. But they do not have perfect or equal undistorted clarity of vision, so telepathy is individual and can be sketchy. Sure. QM allows for this kind of telepathy! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On morphic telepathy
On 1/4/2013 10:41 AM, Roger Clough wrote: STEPHEN: Is it necessary that monads are a substance? Could we think of them as pure process the product of which is the content of experience of the monad? Is this formulation antithetical to the definition that Leibniz gives monads? ROGER: Keep in mind that Leibniz formulated his ideas in the 17th century, when aside from Spinoza, there had been little new done since Aristotle. Dear Roger, I am trying to bring Leibniz' ideas in line with current understanding of the universe. ;-) Leibniz was trying to establish something fundamental to base his metaphysics on. Yes, an alternative, even, to Descartes ideas. I see both of these men as valiantly attacking the hardest problems in philosophy and partly succeeding. Something specific that you could essentially point to. OK. He had done away with two-substance cartesian dualism by considering both mind and body from a mental or logical aspect. Yes, but at a price. I am, you could say, trying to make the price reasonable. His PEH is, IMHO, too costly ontologically speaking. I am seeking to replace it with a ongoing computation idea. Of course the phenomenal world still existed, so he still needed some appropriate way of mentally designating material objects. Sure, and we can capture the materialness of physical reality with appropriate concepts while not having to conjure utopian fantasies of perfection. The way that computers can simulate each other perfectly captures the interaction model what L proposed for interaction between monads, but to use it we need a different way of thinking. IMHO, the pseudo-telepathy of quantum games theory is perfect but still too theoretical as it exists today. These were all substances, but L only considered as real or permanent only indivisible substances (substances of only one part-- without internal boundaries.) These indivisible real objects he called monads. My claim is that we can dispense completely with substances and use relative invariances instead. These have the same or at least very similar characteristics as morphic fields. I agree. Time is not a feature in monadic space, which essentially rules out experiemnces except as snapshots. Only the supreme monad can have experiences, IMHO. The monads below only have fixed sets of perceptions, which are like snapshots in an album of memories. I agree but I argue that this is a feature of the PEH idea, which I am trying to show to be flawed. ROGER (previously) So had the monads windows, they would be in continual direct instant communcation with each other, which L disallows by not permitting them to have windows. STEPHEN: Or they could be in a continuous state of simulating the effects of said communications on themselves an behaving 'as if' they where observing each other. What the 'no windows' postulate provides is a denial of 'exchange of substances' - which makes sense if there are no substances at all anyway! ROGER: OK. Except the time continuity would only be as if. yes, but as if for each and every monad thus setting up a 'multisolipsistic' regime as Andrew Soltau discusses in his work. Personally I believe that the denial of windows is deliberately to disempower the monads so that only the omniscient supreme monad is aware, as we ordinarily think of the term. In essence the physical universe is simply the body of one great soul or person. Yes, but to do so makes the role of free will degenerate. This is too high a price, IMHO. It is like thehyper-Calvinist doctrine http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyper-Calvinism. (ROGER previously) The supreme monad however can see everything with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and instantly updates the perceptions of each monad. STEPHEN: Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad' in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure... ROGER: A single monad reflects all of the other monads, but only from his perspective. Only the Supreme Monad sees things as they really are (from all perspectives at once (incomprehensible to us) instead of the single perspective we call the phenomenol world). My vision of L's idea was that all monads reflected all others. The relation between them is that of a network, not a hierarchical tree. It is interesting to note that if the network is large enough, there will almost always be tree graphs definable in it as subsets. This leads to a predominance of the appearance of a hierarchy for individual monads within the network. I use the since the actual perceptions are indirect as described above. STEPHEN:Sure. ROGER: It is as if they have continual direct communication Yes. with each other. But they do not have perfect or equal undistorted clarity of vision, so telepathy is individual and can be
