Re: contention: theories are incompatible
Le 18-nov.-05, à 05:26, Stephen Paul King a écrit : It seems logical. The Notion of Everything is 1st person in the sense that one, any one, can find itself within it. Nothing, on the other hand, only makes sense as seen from some external vantage point, hence it is 3rd person. I can understand why there is no notion of first person nothingness (and this is the base of the non cul-de-sac appearing with the first person notion(*). But for everything I think we can have some third person notions. Typical examples are the complete trace of the running of the UD, written UD*, or a model of PA, ZF, etc. The first person notion of everything (the 1-plenitude) is, assuming comp, so big that it is unnamable by any machine (provably so if the person is some fixed not too complex Lobian machine, like a theorem prover for PA). Bruno (*) For those who remembers the modal introduction: a no-cul-de-sac multiverse (a multiverse where all observer-moment/world/state are transitory) verifies the formula []p - p (the so-called deontic formula d). Note that d is not a theorem of G, but is a theorem of G*. d is the well known main axiom for the deontic logic of obligation /permission: indeed a world where d is false is a world where something is obligatory and not permitted. You can put anyone in jail-cul-de-sac there! General question: what do you prefer, as notation (illustrated on the formula d) : Box p - Diamond p Bp - Dp []p - p? Are there people who does not see that 1) whatever the truth value of p, Bp - Dp is true in all the worlds of a non-cul-de-sac multiverse. 2) if Bp - Dp is true in all world of multiverse, whatever the truth value of p is given in each world, then the multiverse is a non-cul-de-sac multiverse. This is easy. If you don't see this, it means you don't remember the definition of Kripke semantics, or that you don't know classical logic. Modal logic is really the general theory of Multiverses, and other multimultiverses, you know. I hardly doubt we will be able to proceed without getting more familiar with it. I am actually teaching modal logic and students ask me summary notes. I am thinking making them in English and posting them to the list. The post by uv makes me think I should soon or later explain more about Solovay theorem, which makes the link betwwen the metamathematical results of Godel, Lob and the G and G* logics discovered by Solovay, and which are pillar of the interview of the universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: contention: theories are incompatible
Hi James and Russell, Could a middle ground be found in the notion that something is a differentiated piece of Nothing, where Everything (1st person notion) and Nothing (3rd person notion) are one and the same? Violations of the notion of conservation only seem to obtain when we conflate the 1st and 3rd person viewpoints. The problem that I see with existentialism is that it tacitly assumes an unattainable 3rd person upon which to base its notion of existence. Why do we need to assume more than Existence exists (in an active and not passive sense)? Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 12:20 AM Subject: Re: contention: theories are incompatible I don't see why. Conservation of information is a fundamental property of the Multiverse, and is directly equivalent to the law of unitary evolution in quantum mechanics. If you are talking about conservation of energy, are you aware that the total energy content of the universe is zero? All of mass-energy is balanced by the negative potential energy of gravitational attraction. Multiplying zero energy universes into a multiverse still conserves energy. Ditto with momentum - the total momentum of the universe is zero. Cheers On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 08:14:20PM -0800, James N Rose wrote: An open hypothesis to list members: Conservation as a 'fundamental rule of condition' is incompatible and antithetical with any notions of many worlds. Either explicitly excludes and precludes the other; can't have both and retain a consistent existentialism. J Rose
Re: contention: theories are incompatible
Hi Russell, It seems logical. The Notion of Everything is 1st person in the sense that one, any one, can find itself within it. Nothing, on the other hand, only makes sense as seen from some external vantage point, hence it is 3rd person. This is probably naive, but it makes the whole structure hang together. For example, the idea of conservation, ala you can't get something from nothing, is a truism for the simple reason that it is not consistent to have some concept that is definite, a something, to be dependent on a Nothing. The notion of something requires an other against which it is distinguished; there is no other in Nothingness. Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 10:47 PM Subject: Re: contention: theories are incompatible On Thu, Nov 17, 2005 at 10:00:04PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi James and Russell, Could a middle ground be found in the notion that something is a differentiated piece of Nothing, where Everything (1st person notion) and Nothing (3rd person notion) are one and the same? Intriguing. Why do you say Everything is 1st person and Nothing is 3rd person? Violations of the notion of conservation only seem to obtain when we conflate the 1st and 3rd person viewpoints. This seems likely. --
contention: theories are incompatible
An open hypothesis to list members: Conservation as a 'fundamental rule of condition' is incompatible and antithetical with any notions of many worlds. Either explicitly excludes and precludes the other; can't have both and retain a consistent existentialism. J Rose
Re: contention: theories are incompatible
I don't see why. Conservation of information is a fundamental property of the Multiverse, and is directly equivalent to the law of unitary evolution in quantum mechanics. If you are talking about conservation of energy, are you aware that the total energy content of the universe is zero? All of mass-energy is balanced by the negative potential energy of gravitational attraction. Multiplying zero energy universes into a multiverse still conserves energy. Ditto with momentum - the total momentum of the universe is zero. Cheers On Wed, Nov 16, 2005 at 08:14:20PM -0800, James N Rose wrote: An open hypothesis to list members: Conservation as a 'fundamental rule of condition' is incompatible and antithetical with any notions of many worlds. Either explicitly excludes and precludes the other; can't have both and retain a consistent existentialism. J Rose -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgp7UlrQM4YBP.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: contention: theories are incompatible
At 10:14 PM 11/16/2005, James N Rose wrote: An open hypothesis to list members: Conservation as a 'fundamental rule of condition' is incompatible and antithetical with any notions of many worlds. Either explicitly excludes and precludes the other; can't have both and retain a consistent existentialism. J Rose I haven't kept up with this thread or that idea, but there is no logical reason that a particular attribute such as conservation should be universal across a many-world manifold. First of all, conservation is ill-defined, but if precisely defined assumes a standard, which implies a teleological approach. And that is one step away from scholasticism. Before you know it, you're quoting Plato. Mathematically, conservation could be defined in terms of least-distance between points, but if the individual worlds are constructed with their own unique space-time topology (sort of by definition--otherwise each world would be the same as the next one) then the term conservation would apply only locally. So, strike two. In fact, one could describe each world as a unique slice intersecting and *forming* the surface of the many-world manifold---and each slice could be characterized by its own unique matrix. Postulating the individual world matrix as a set of elements and interactions between elements, one could arrive at an ideal (Plato again!) in which each individual world is confined to a minimum number of elements/interactions. Fine. But it would result in each world being congruent (homologous) to every other world. The result would be no difference between worlds, but there is not a shred of evidence that the configuration works that way at all levels. For example, you coffee may have cooled according to the observations setting forth the laws of thermodynamics---and thus predictable, but you sir, probably drove your automobile in a very inefficient manner today, going places that you shouldn't have gone (you didn't know the queue would be so long, or the store would be closed, etc). Now, if you had known that the store would be closed, etc, you would have been a little more efficient, but that would require a prescience that you presumably don't have. Maybe that's why, we can never precisely predict where the electron will be, because to do so would identify it's proper place---and from there we could then define it's ideal position. That we cannot (as yet) do that suggests that this inability to do so is an inherent part of a dynamic system---and is present within all intersects of the many world manifold. Short answer: Conservatism is a procedure that produces mental constructs of what we thing the world is trying to become. It allows us to fit our observations against the image in our minds, but it has its limitations. There is no perfect river. Or snowstorm. Or politician. It's all in our minds.
Re: contention: theories are incompatible
From: James N Rose Conservation as a 'fundamental rule of condition' is incompatible and antithetical with any notions of many worlds. Are conservation principles only defined in closed systems? Is a 'world' a closed system? There is, i.e., a no-deleting theorem (similar to the no-cloning theorem) saying that given 2 qubits in unknown and equal states, one cannot take one of them to a fixed state, keeping the other in the original state. In other terms |psi|psi -- |psi|0 is forbidden. But, of course, it is possible to delete a quantum state by trowing it out of that system, out of that world. s.
