Title: Re: real and virtual
Hi Lennart,
Be careful to reply-to-all, the reply mode in this list in not
the
same as in the FOR-list.
LN:
If you mean
that one has to take into consideration all virtual reconstructions
and computational stories in considering one's likely future, sure,
but each and everyone of those virtual realities has a physical
intrepetation
BM:
What is a physical interpretation? In what sense that
physical
interpretation will makes your computational continuations having
more
weight than the continua of computational continuations existing
in UD*
How could a first person perspective be different in an
arithmetical
interpretation, and a virtual? How do you relate the first
person
experience and the "physical reality"?
LN:
as the
virtual machine itself..I guess you would call that the local 3-person
view...if that is the same as the realist idea of something
objectively existing that "kicks back"..then
fine
BM:
The reality of numbers kick back enough from the point of view of
machines
embedded (in multiple ways) in arithmetical reality.
Relatively to the matter part of the mind body problem, you are
using
the idea of "physical reality" like vitalist were using
the principle
of vital force in biology.
I don't doubt the evidence that we share histories in a
relatively
stable decor. But with comp the stability must be explained
by
relatively high measure of similar computational histories.
Surely you could agree that if physics is derived by such a
measure, then
by OCCAM, that would be an evidence for "pure" comp. It
would give
a simpler theory than actual physical toes.
But you can also look for the 1989 MAUDLIN paper (or my thesis or
1988
paper) for a direct argument (without OCCAM) making difficult to
ascertain
both "materialism" and comp. I will look in the archive
for the
adress of the discussion we already have about that).
Weak form of physicalism are still possibly recoverable with
"low" mechanist
level of substitution.
Actually, I search to understand the physical without postulating
it,
like I search to understand intelligence and consciousness
without
postulating it too. Comp, like Everett partially, connects them
without
magic relations. I will think about a better eleventh step,
though.
(Without OCCAM it could be just the entire Movie-Graph/Maudlin's
Olympia
argument).
If someone can explain more simply to Lennart why we don't need
to
run the UD, please feel free ...
It is a subtler point than Tegmark or Shmidhuber seems to
realize, imo.
But invoking some "real materiality" makes both matter
and mind obscure.
The difficulty is that we anticipate such a naive model
automatically
since a very long "shared internal time". Sure.
Regards,
Bruno
