Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Alex Hankey]

But Bruno, to harp on an old point,
"mathematicians (and their “dreams”)"
implies the world of 'ideas', and
as I have said, those are not in
the world of 'arithmetic', in the sense
that they are *not* described by
digital information,
but by catastrophes.


On 15 February 2018 at 15:14, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> > On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty  wrote:
> >
> > Dear Friends,
> >
> > i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
> > by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?
>
> Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of
> metamathematics, which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in
> arithmetic, a bit like Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian
> physics by default) embeds the physicists in the physical reality (but if
> we claim that the wave packet reduction is physical and not psychological,
> this is no more true, and the early QM was rather dualist).
>
> If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his
> “dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch
> of the (classical and general) information science (including computer
> science). The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety
> of meanings to finite pieces of codes.
>
> The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes
> everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed
> derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable
> constructively from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers
> on this. Physics becomes a first person statistics on some first person
> experiences. That makes Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum
> Mechanics confirms it, up to now.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> >
> > mihir
> >
> > On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
> >> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> >> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
> >> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
> >> Because ... All words are already numbered
> >> We have published large monograph named
> >> “Natural Language Addressing”
> >> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
> >> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
> >> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
> >> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the
> computer
> >> we enter not letters but their codes.
> >> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
> >> It really works!!!
> >> Friendly greetings
> >> Krassimir
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Karl Javorszky
> >> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
> >> To: Stanley N Salthe
> >> Cc: fis
> >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on
> >> the cateogry theory
> >>
> >> Using the logical language to understand Nature
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms
> “symbol”,
> >> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development,
> because
> >> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
> >> works.
> >>
> >> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> >> languages and the development of philosophy into specific
> sub-philosophies.
> >> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> >> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this,
> he
> >> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> >> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away
> on
> >> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
> >> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are
> anyway
> >> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
> >>
> >> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation
> of
> >> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> >> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing.
> It is
> >> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
> >> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
> >> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been
> true.
> >> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
> >> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
> >> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be
> surprised
> >> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the
> finding
> >> so long.
> >>
> >> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
> >> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
> >> results show, that if one uses 

[Fis] Accounting and predictions : message and meaning

[Karl Javorszky]

Accounting is not a science



There is an old joke about the mafia boss, who needs a new accountant.
Proband 1 is asked: how much is 2+2? Answer: 4. Next candidate: How much is
2+2? Answer: anything between 3 and 5. No good. Next candidate, same
question. Answer: whatever you wish, boss. He gets hired.



More traditional approaches to accounting disqualify the art from being a
science, as there is no room for error. Accounting embodies all that
Wittgenstein stood for: true statements that rely on each other and are
invariably inherently – grammatically – correct, otherwise it would not be
accounting but spaghetti.  Science, like philosophy, deals with such, what
is presently unknown, while trying to explore, understand, qualify and
quantify it. There is room for error in philosophy and science, which room
does not exist in an ideal Wittgenstein set of sentences. Among
tautologies, nothing can turn out to be otherwise.



Theoretical genetics has forced us to leave the traditional understanding
of what a number is and where it is placed. Its place has been heretofore
inseparably fused with its value, form, appearance, properties and
associations. By repeatedly sorting, one denies the connection, naively
believed to be inherent, of a value with its place. What is a king, if he
is among beggars? Can the Captain of Koepenick be represented in a numeric
tale? Are some changes more problematic than others?



One never knows, what hidden revolutionary instincts slumber deep in the
hearth of an individual. Maybe mathematicians are not so much given to
overthrowing age-old agreements, definitions, rules and conventions.
Biologists, however, should maintain the idea of sudden, *deus ex
machina*  type
improvements, as tools of evolution by mutation and variation. It could
well be, that a rupture from its place of a number does introduce a new
species of counting.



If numbers are no more married to their place, where are they then? Here,
accounting helps. We know that they cannot simply disappear; furthermore,
we add them up and expect grand totals that match. We add them up actually
twice, once according to place occupied and once as carriers of symbols.  This
one can only do, if one switches to cycles as units of counting.



Accounting in units of cycles may sound more complicated than it is in
actual practice. Classical logic degenerates into the special case of a
plane across the number line: as the ever-present moment of “now”, which is
eternal, because it is timeless. In this cross-section of time, the rules
of Wittgenstein apply. The actual content of the “now” is one of the
varieties made possible by its neighbours, the predecessor and the
successor.



The intermediate state of actual (real, existing, true) state does have
a-priori rules in it. These are given by the fact that the predecessor and
the successor states are ordered.



If we take the table we have constructed with (a,b) and watch the process
of reordering between the two sorted states  vs. , then we see that the collection is subject to very potent
sets of restrictions, on what can be where. Knowing the end state allows
building estimates about what is missing, that is: yet to come. Cycles are
of a great help here, as they are successions, ordered in specific ways. Of
that, what has happened before, human intelligence can confer, what will
happen next. That, what we deduct, is different to that, what we observe.
The former is meta-physic to the latter’s physic, meaning to the latter’s
message. Learning is basically an ability to improve the efficacy of
predictions. To be able to imagine the continuation of partly finished
cycles, periods and rhythms is to be able to respond intelligently.



One enters a territory here, which separates accounting from predicting the
future. Classical logic will not speak about the future, because the future
is not tautologic. Seen, however, as an exercise in combinatorics, one may
be able to construct – at least, theoretically – all true sentences that
can be consistently said about up to 136 objects. In this hypothetical
case, whichever state the set is in, possible predecessors and successors
of this state can be established. Taking the most probable of among the
possible next steps, the system begins a walk. It is then possible to find
such walks that are a closed loop. If the version is included, that some
facts that relate to the sequence of arguments restrict the ways
commutative assemblies can be contemporary, and that the configuration of
symbols of commutative assemblies restricts the ways arguments can be
sequenced: in this case theoretical genetics has been made accessible to a
Wittgenstein type logical discourse, reduced to tautologies and
probabilities, that is: predictions, which are again part of the art of
accounting.
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Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty  wrote:
> 
> Dear Friends,
> 
> i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
> by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?

Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of metamathematics, 
which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in arithmetic, a bit like 
Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian physics by default) embeds the 
physicists in the physical reality (but if we claim that the wave packet 
reduction is physical and not psychological, this is no more true, and the 
early QM was rather dualist).

If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his 
“dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch of 
the (classical and general) information science (including computer science). 
The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety of meanings to 
finite pieces of codes. 

The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes 
everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed 
derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable constructively 
from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers on this. Physics 
becomes a first person statistics on some first person experiences. That makes 
Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum Mechanics confirms it, up to 
now.

Bruno




> 
> mihir
> 
> On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
>> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
>> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
>> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
>> Because ... All words are already numbered
>> We have published large monograph named
>> “Natural Language Addressing”
>> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
>> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
>> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
>> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer
>> we enter not letters but their codes.
>> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
>> It really works!!!
>> Friendly greetings
>> Krassimir
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> From: Karl Javorszky
>> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
>> To: Stanley N Salthe
>> Cc: fis
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
>> the cateogry theory
>> 
>> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”,
>> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because
>> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
>> works.
>> 
>> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
>> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
>> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
>> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
>> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
>> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
>> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
>> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
>> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>> 
>> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
>> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
>> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is
>> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
>> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
>> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
>> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
>> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
>> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised
>> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding
>> so long.
>> 
>> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
>> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
>> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
>> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial
>> problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a
>> tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in
>> a semantic fashion.
>> 
>> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein
>> suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy
>> has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical