But Bruno, to harp on an old point, "mathematicians (and their “dreams”)" implies the world of 'ideas', and as I have said, those are not in the world of 'arithmetic', in the sense that they are *not* described by digital information, but by catastrophes.
On 15 February 2018 at 15:14, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty <mihi...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Dear Friends, > > > > i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done > > by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ? > > Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of > metamathematics, which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in > arithmetic, a bit like Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian > physics by default) embeds the physicists in the physical reality (but if > we claim that the wave packet reduction is physical and not psychological, > this is no more true, and the early QM was rather dualist). > > If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his > “dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch > of the (classical and general) information science (including computer > science). The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety > of meanings to finite pieces of codes. > > The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes > everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed > derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable > constructively from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers > on this. Physics becomes a first person statistics on some first person > experiences. That makes Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum > Mechanics confirms it, up to now. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > mihir > > > > On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com> wrote: > >> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues, > >> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis! > >> But, I think, there is no need to number every word. > >> Because ... All words are already numbered > >> We have published large monograph named > >> “Natural Language Addressing” > >> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and > >> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData). > >> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm. > >> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the > computer > >> we enter not letters but their codes. > >> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system. > >> It really works!!! > >> Friendly greetings > >> Krassimir > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> From: Karl Javorszky > >> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM > >> To: Stanley N Salthe > >> Cc: fis > >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > on > >> the cateogry theory > >> > >> Using the logical language to understand Nature > >> > >> > >> > >> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms > “symbol”, > >> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, > because > >> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great > >> works. > >> > >> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical > >> languages and the development of philosophy into specific > sub-philosophies. > >> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps. > >> > >> > >> > >> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by > >> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, > he > >> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that > >> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away > on > >> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is > >> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are > anyway > >> self-evident and cannot be otherwise. > >> > >> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation > of > >> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate > >> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. > It is > >> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a > >> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only > >> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been > true. > >> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an > >> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an > >> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be > surprised > >> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the > finding > >> so long. > >> > >> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are > >> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his > >> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical > >> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a > combinatorial > >> problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is > just a > >> tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever > noteworthy in > >> a semantic fashion. > >> > >> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that > Wittgenstein > >> suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real > philosophy > >> has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or > >> otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely > >> number theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and > valid > >> sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers are > satisfied, > >> then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out later for what > >> they stand. > >> > >> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The > only > >> noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that > old > >> dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering > >> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not > too > >> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations > that > >> one executes by routine. > >> > >> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and > flexible > >> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how > to > >> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we > could > >> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority > >> readiness One into priority readiness Two. > >> > >> There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in > the > >> field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of > >> reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at > the > >> concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together > during a > >> reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each > other. > >> Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in > the > >> corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of > being > >> associated with. > >> > >> Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place, > >> relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact, > chemical > >> valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is of > >> secondary importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is > to > >> make sure that we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same > one. > >> The next task is to make sure that we all perceive the same picture. As > the > >> kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that > one > >> can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all > observe > >> the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the > facts > >> of perception. > >> > >> The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to > >> process that what we wish to discuss. The present task is to realise > that > >> one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it > clearly. > >> The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited to > look at > >> the picture. > >> > >> Once one has answered the dilemma: “On Tuesdays, this here cup is to the > >> left of the screen, because Tuesdays I order things on their colour; on > >> Wednesdays the same cup is to the right of the screen for its size, > because > >> on Wednesdays I order things on their size: so, which is the correct > place > >> of this cup, actually?”; once on has figured this out – that namely the > cup > >> would be oscillating between its two places, or take up a position on a > >> plane with axes: colour, size -, then one has done great strides towards > >> understanding that “symbol”, “sign”, “signal” etc. are surface concepts, > >> while the underlying deep concepts have to do with sequencing and the > >> mechanics of re-sequencing, which means cycles, rhythms and > periodicities. > >> > >> > >> > >> We all know that the DNA is a sequence. Then, if one wants to > understand how > >> the DNA functions, one had better resign to the fact that one has to > deal > >> with sequences, whether one likes the topic or not. As there can be > nothing > >> philosophically new in the explanation of how the DNA works, the only > >> subject that needs investigation is, why one has such a reticence to > deal > >> with places, priorities, rankings, order, first and last becoming last > and > >> first, etc. Maybe the door to the edifice of insights on how the > interplay > >> between mixtures and sequences actually works and what this interplay > >> produces; maybe this door opens from a well-barricaded corridor within > the > >> cellar of the sub-conscious, hidden among some skeletons of {to have > sunken > >> low, defeats of self-esteem, to have been downgraded, to be among the > last, > >> to be a low-ranking individual, etc.}. One of the techniques of > influencing > >> people with low self-esteem is to encourage them to find the discipline > in > >> which they are really good. In how many ways can a person be classified > and > >> how many of these ranking results are contradictory? Is the concept of > >> cognitive dissonance linked to the similarity of two orders? Number > theory > >> should jump onto the subject of intermediate states between two > differing > >> permutations, as it is intimately connected with the subject of how DNA > >> functions. Which names fit best the patterns we observe while doing > manifold > >> re-orderings is presently of a secondary importance. Of primary > importance > >> is presently to observe, what happens if a sequence is turned into a > >> different sequence. After all, we deal with sequences, don’t we. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> 2018-02-10 16:24 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu>: > >> > >> Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights > hierarchically, > >> as: > >> > >> In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in > >> other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus > (using > >> the compositional hierarchy): > >> > >> > >> [information [language [signal]]] > >> > >> > >> Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be > >> understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs. > >> > >> > >> (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, > >> where: > >> > >> > >> [sign [information [...]]] ) > >> > >> > >> Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy): > >> > >> > >> {language {signal {information}}} > >> > >> > >> Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic > formations, > >> so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information > >> (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed > transformations. > >> > >> > >> STAN > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn> wrote: > >> > >> Dear Colleagues, > >> > >> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana > >> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination > >> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and > human > >> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone: > >> > >> In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved > >> multiple languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- > and > >> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate > various > >> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. > Such > >> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera > >> signaling. > >> > >> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the > >> concept information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or > signaling) 55 > >> times, so we have to review the history and application of > “information” and > >> “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to > understand the > >> relationship between language, signal, and information. > >> > >> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) > can > >> be traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and > >> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of > >> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" > in > >> Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. > Since > >> then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and > >> biochemistry. > >> > >> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention > to > >> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are > used to > >> employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From > the > >> tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal > transduction > >> study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications > before > >> 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the > >> central issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than > "information". > >> After that, the central issue of telecommunications is "information" > rather > >> than "signal". > >> > >> According to the application history of information concept, nearly > all > >> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, > >> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language > problem > >> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the > >> information. > >> > >> > >> > >> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers: > >> > >> 1. Do Plants Think? (June 5, 2012, Scientific American) > >> > >> > >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think- > daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931 > e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b） > >> > >> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn (December 3, 2014, New > Scientist) > >> > >> > >> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root- > intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn) > >> > >> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can > exists. > >> > >> > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> > >> Xueshan > >> > >> > >> > >> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-bounces@listas. > unizar.es] > >> On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji > >> Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM > >> To: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. > DEACON > >> <dea...@berkeley.edu> > >> Cc: Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es> > >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information > based > >> on the cateogry theory > >> > >> > >> > >> Hi Terry, and FISers, > >> > >> > >> > >> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife > >> that, in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, > can > >> kill? > >> > >> > >> > >> All the best. > >> > >> > >> > >> Sung > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > ---------------- > >> > >> From: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com> > >> Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM > >> To: Terrence W. DEACON > >> Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji > >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information > based > >> on the cateogry theory > >> > >> > >> > >> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, > >> > >> è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of > >> information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e > >> seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che > quando si > >> ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non > >> significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un > >> Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra > >> macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In > tal > >> caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio > di > >> informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è > necessario > >> che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un > processo > >> di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione > semiotica > >> autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che > >> l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- > o > >> tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che > >> biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o > >> specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica > della > >> significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è > >> impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da > una > >> semiotica della significazione. > >> > >> Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. > >> Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della > >> scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza > >> dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). > >> Nello mio stesso libro si trovano: > >> > >> - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si > >> colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di > >> significazione e i processi di comunicazione; > >> > >> - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la > >> neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova > >> epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130). > >> > >> Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio > >> scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono > che > >> mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più > grande del > >> (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie. > >> > >> Un saluto affettuoso. > >> > >> Francecso > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>: > >> > >> Dear FISers, > >> > >> > >> > >> In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base > model > >> for building a general theory of information. > >> > >> Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a > >> claim that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that > it > >> can be causally misleading. > >> > >> I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology > and > >> evolution of the human language capacity. > >> > >> And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic > >> Species. > >> > >> Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary > >> biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in > evolutionary > >> thinking. > >> > >> Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing > >> tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information > theoretic > >> thinking as well. > >> > >> So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I > >> append the following excerpt from the book. > >> > >> > >> > >> "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model > for > >> analyzing other > >> > >> species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every > other > >> form of communication as > >> > >> exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and > divergent > >> case. No analytic method > >> > >> could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as > >> long as animals have > >> > >> interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been > >> around at least as long as frogs > >> > >> have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic > >> communication was an afterthought, > >> > >> so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an > >> ancient and well-established > >> > >> mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate > model > >> against which to assess > >> > >> other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the > rule, > >> and a quite anomalous > >> > >> exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with > >> respect to the extent they possess or > >> > >> lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the > >> types of hair on different mammals > >> > >> with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. > It is > >> an understandable > >> > >> anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we > >> might see more typical wings > >> > >> and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced > >> adaptations—but it does more to > >> > >> obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so > >> should be analyzed as an > >> > >> exception to a more general rule, not vice versa." > >> > >> > >> > >> Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms. > >> > >> This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported > by a > >> vast nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure. > >> > >> So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more > >> fundamental precursors. > >> > >> And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw > >> insight from this more familiar realm. > >> > >> I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that > >> assumes what it endeavors to explain. > >> > >> > >> > >> Regards to all, Terry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero > >> <javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > >> In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, > >> though I am still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. > Still I > >> am afraid that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief > formulation of > >> it I will lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, > here it > >> comes: > >> > >> I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the > contexts > >> in which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many > >> contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use > of the > >> distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. > Baecker > >> and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group that > what > >> information is depends on the system we are talking about. But the > concept > >> of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has many > sources > >> and types of information. > >> So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined > as a > >> set of loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form > is a > >> temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements. > >> Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected > by RNA > >> to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate > cell. > >> We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a specific > kind > >> of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or a set of > >> linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or > discourse. > >> > >> The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as > >> information. Or even better, each type of medium produces information > of its > >> own kind. > >> According to this point of view, information cannot be > transmitted. > >> It can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference > >> that a medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from > it. A > >> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can > >> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a > synergetic > >> manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity > reductions. > >> And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into > information. > >> For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing > to > >> print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let > us > >> say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking > >> cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social > >> practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the > introduction > >> of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message > >> orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not > the > >> same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face > to > >> face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if > the > >> other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and > what > >> that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is > being > >> sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special place, > so he > >> planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable > >> configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You > >> shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone > in her > >> room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And imagination > >> makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral > >> communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk > and > >> send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by > >> adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see > what > >> he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social > >> sciences because that is my research field, although I have the > intuition > >> that it could also work for natural sciences. > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> JJ > >> > >> El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu > > > >> escribió: > >> > >> Hi FISers, > >> > >> > >> > >> On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our > >> discussions and recognize that the term information applies in diverse > ways > >> to many different contexts. And because of this it is important to > indicate > >> the framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, > >> linguistic, etc. > >> > >> . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction > >> introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, > though it > >> too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be > >> misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less > >> linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the > >> division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative > >> analyses/properties of information." > >> > >> > >> > >> I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused > linguistic > >> metaphor in defining "information". Although the linguistic metaphor > has > >> its limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique > >> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of > functions > >> (see the last column in Table 1.) > >> > >> > >> > >> The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied > >> theories of information discussed on this list may be viewed as > belonging to > >> the same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically > >> represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of Table 1. > >> > >> > >> > >> Table 1. The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible > >> Triadic Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell > >> language theory, and linguistics. > >> > >> Category Theory > >> > >> > >> f g > >> A -----> B ------> C > >> | ^ > >> | | > >> |______________| > >> h > >> > >> > >> > >> ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) > >> Deacon’s theory of information > >> Shannon’s > >> > >> Theory of > >> > >> information > >> Peirce’s theory of signs > >> Cell language theory > >> Human language > >> (Function) > >> > >> A > >> Intrinsic information > >> Source > >> Object > >> Nucleotides*/ > >> Amion acids > >> Letters > >> (Building blocks) > >> > >> B > >> Referential information > >> Message > >> Sign > >> Proteins > >> Words > >> (Denotation) > >> > >> C > >> Normative information > >> Receiver > >> Interpretant > >> Metabolomes > >> (Totality of cell metabolism) > >> Systems of words > >> (Decision making & Reasoning) > >> > >> f > >> ? > >> Encoding > >> Sign production > >> Physical laws > >> Second articulation > >> > >> g > >> ? > >> Decoding > >> Sign interpretation > >> Evoutionary selection > >> First and Third articulation > >> > >> h > >> ? > >> Information flow > >> Information flow > >> Inheritance > >> Grounding/ > >> > >> Habit > >> > >> Scale > >> Micro-Macro? > >> Macro > >> Macro > >> Micro > >> Macro > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides. > >> According to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n > genetic > >> alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn > consisting > >> of n nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just > one > >> example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1. When n = 3, for > >> example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet with 4^3 = 64 > >> letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the familiar > codon > >> table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely thought > >> (including myself until recently) but letters! It then follows that > >> proteins are words and metabolic pathways are sentences. Finally, the > >> transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as > "hyperstructures" by > >> V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by me more recently) > >> correspond to texts essential to represent > arguement/reasoning/computing. > >> What is most exciting is the recent discovery in my lab at Rutgers that > the > >> so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels in living cells can > identify > >> function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways" underlying breast cancer > before > >> and after drug treatment (manuscript under review). > >> > >> > >> > >> Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome. > >> > >> > >> > >> Sung > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Professor Terrence W. Deacon > >> University of California, Berkeley > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Fis mailing list > > Fis@listas.unizar.es > > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > -- Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.) Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science, SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789 ____________________________________________________________ 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
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