Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Joe, However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. They are not so abstract that one would not be able to measure these mechanisms using information theory. The models can be expected to generate redundancy because they are entertained in the present when restructuring the system, while they indicate possible future states. Bob Ulanowicz pointed me to the mutual information in three dimensions that can indicate redundancy (= negative entropy). Last year, we had a discussion with Klaus Krippendorff about the relation between this redundancy and the probabilistic entropy which is necessarily generated when the redundancy is historically retained (because of the second law). [Redundancy in Systems which Entertain a Model of Themselves: Interaction Information and the Self-Organization of Anticipation, http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/1/63 Entropy 12(1) (2010) 63-79; pdf http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/1/63/pdf ] The retention mechanisms of anticipation operating in systems is historical and therefore measurable; the anticipatory mechanisms are not directly measurable because they are not part of the res extensa, but remain res cogitans. However, they can be simulated. The theory and computation of anticipatory systems have provided us with new instruments for doing so (Rosen, 1984; Dubois, 1998). At his time, Husserl (1929) had no instruments beyond the transcendental apperception of this domain of cogitata and therefore he has to refrain from empirical investigation; as he formulated: We must forgo a more precise investigation of the layer of meaning which provides the human world and culture, as such, with a specific meaning and therewith provides this world with specifically “mental” predicates. (Husserl, 1929, at p. 138; my translation). The progression has been made in terms of the analytical modeling (Rosen, Dubois) and the development of means to measure redundancy generation within cultural domains (McGill, Ashby, Ulanowicz, Krippendorff). See for further elaborations: http://www.leydesdorff.net/meaning.2011/index.htm Meaning as a sociological concept: A review of the modeling, mapping, and simulation of the communication of knowledge and meaning, Social Science Information (in press); pdf-version http://www.leydesdorff.net/meaning.2011/meaning.pdf The Communication of Meaning and the Structuration of Expectations: Giddens' http://www.leydesdorff.net/GiddensLuhmann/index.htm structuration theory and Luhmann's self-organization, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 61(10) (2010) 2138-2150; pdf-version http://www.leydesdorff.net/GiddensLuhmann/structuration.pdf With best wishes, Loet _ Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR) Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel. +31-20-525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ Visiting Professor, http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html ISTIC, Beijing; Honorary Fellow, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/ SPRU, University of Sussex ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear FIS colleagues, I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on the reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to give room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and informational processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) in bacteria, living cells in general, non human nervous systems, and in a number of social constructions and institutions (accounting processes, specifically the sciences), even at the level of global human society we are living now in an epoch of planetary observation and actuation (eg, climate change) --not to speak only on politics and economics. The micro-macro info flows and knowledge circulation are fascinating epistemic problems of our time, when collectively considered. I have argued in previous messages that a new info rhetorics looks necessary, so to prepare the room for a new info epistemology. The problem of the agent(s) and the world(s), the abstract observer(s) and the real one(s), the necessary disciplinary involvement (particularly of the neurosciences, the action strike...) all of this looks very difficult to be handled directly. New way of thinking needed. best wishes ---Pedro PS. NEXT WEEK THE NEW DISCUSSION SESSION BY MARK BURGING ON INFO THEORY WILL BE ANNOUNCED. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Pedro, I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me try to clarify. Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ... On p. 49, he formulated: ... so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And furthermore (at this same page): ... the second-order consensual domain that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56 onwards. My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory systems is here important. Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is, they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing models. Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers (e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be improved consciously and reflexively. Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example, is the one of autopoiesis. Best wishes, Loet Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ -Original Message- From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear FIS colleagues, I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on the reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to give room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and informational processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) in bacteria, living cells in general, non human nervous systems, and in a number of social constructions and institutions (accounting processes, specifically the sciences), even at the level of global human society we are living now in an epoch of planetary observation and actuation (eg, climate change) --not to speak only on politics and economics. The micro-macro info flows and knowledge circulation are fascinating epistemic problems of our time, when collectively considered. I have argued in previous messages that a new info rhetorics looks necessary, so to prepare the room for a new info epistemology. The problem of the agent(s) and the world(s), the abstract observer(s) and the real one(s), the necessary disciplinary involvement (particularly of the neurosciences, the action strike...) all of this looks very difficult to be handled directly. New way of thinking needed. best wishes ---Pedro PS. NEXT WEEK THE NEW DISCUSSION SESSION BY MARK BURGING ON INFO THEORY WILL BE ANNOUNCED. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Pedro, I do not quite recognize myself in the statement: Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder. However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive processes necessary for an understanding of information and meaning. The above notwithstanding, I then have a problem with your, Pedro, formulation of the capabilities of non-human observers. Here, I agree with the principle expressed by Loet that the examples of the entities you mentioned lack the necessary cognitive abilities, although I focus on aspects of them other than model-related. A theory in which NOTHING previous is taken as entirely satisfactory seems more and more necessary . . . Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: l...@leydesdorff.net Datum: 01.04.2011 12:14 An: 'Pedro C. Marijuan'pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me try to clarify. Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ... On p. 49, he formulated: ... so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And furthermore (at this same page): ... the second-order consensual domain that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56 onwards. My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory systems is here important. Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is, they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing models. Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers (e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be improved consciously and reflexively. Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example, is the one of autopoiesis. Best wishes, Loet Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ -Original Message- From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM To: fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
It seems obvious to me that any property held by a very complex entity (e.g., human being), IF it can be modeled, then that model can be used to generalize that property ANYWHERE we wish to. On these grounds I have been busy working on 'physiosemiosis' using the triadic formulation of semiosis of Charles Peirce. I have proposed that the 'sign' emerges from the context of an interaction between object and system. If context has no effect on the interaction, there is no semiosis. If, on the contrary, context affects the interaction, then we have semiosis, even in a pond. The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very unhappy when her chicks are threatened. STAN On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 3:04 PM, Pridi Siregar pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com wrote: Hi all ! Maybe the term « observer » in Pedro’s « non-human observer » term is what bugs some of you because it seems to imply some “non-human cogitum” that by habit we may want to equate to human thinking. Of course trying to understand the “psychology” of a bacteria may be a bit hard for humans so perhaps the term “observer” should be given a broader meaning and the challenge would be to define the nature/ boundaries/mechanics of this semantic extension/redefinition. The same may hold for defining “language” and “meaning”… But for lack of time I really haven’t followed all the debates and I’m no philosopher. As a business person I am much more practical and I do have one practical concern/question: are we trying to lay down a new theory of living systems or are we going (in some not too distant future) towards devising a computational framework that (even modestly) may go beyond projects such as the VHP?Sorry to be so down to earth but I suppose that in this forum everyone is allowed to express himself/herself… J Pridi *De :* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *De la part de* joe.bren...@bluewin.ch *Envoyé :* vendredi 1 avril 2011 19:38 *À :* l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Pedro C. Marijuan'; fis@listas.unizar.es *Objet :* Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I do not quite recognize myself in the statement: Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder. However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive processes necessary for an understanding of information and meaning. The above notwithstanding, I then have a problem with your, Pedro, formulation of the capabilities of non-human observers. Here, I agree with the principle expressed by Loet that the examples of the entities you mentioned lack the necessary cognitive abilities, although I focus on aspects of them other than model-related. A theory in which NOTHING previous is taken as entirely satisfactory seems more and more necessary . . . Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: l...@leydesdorff.net Datum: 01.04.2011 12:14 An: 'Pedro C. Marijuan'pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me try to clarify. Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ... On p. 49, he formulated: ... so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And furthermore (at this same page): ... the second-order consensual domain that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the information
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Stan, Ø The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very unhappy when her chicks are threatened. Being a computer scientist I don't really know enough about qualia, so I checked Wiki and read: Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the experience of taking a recreational drug, or the redness of an evening sky. I believe that hen and other animals have some sort of qualia, of course not human qualia, but their own, animal qualia. Am I wrong in my believe that animals can feel pain, have headache, feel taste of drink and food, can see colors and can even get drunk (Animals Are Beautiful People, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDknJ6KPLxc ) and that pain, headache etc. that they experience represent their qualia? With best regards, Gordana http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/ From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe Sent: den 1 april 2011 21:39 To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles It seems obvious to me that any property held by a very complex entity (e.g., human being), IF it can be modeled, then that model can be used to generalize that property ANYWHERE we wish to. On these grounds I have been busy working on 'physiosemiosis' using the triadic formulation of semiosis of Charles Peirce. I have proposed that the 'sign' emerges from the context of an interaction between object and system. If context has no effect on the interaction, there is no semiosis. If, on the contrary, context affects the interaction, then we have semiosis, even in a pond. The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very unhappy when her chicks are threatened. STAN On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 3:04 PM, Pridi Siregar pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.commailto:pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com wrote: Hi all ! Maybe the term « observer » in Pedro's « non-human observer » term is what bugs some of you because it seems to imply some non-human cogitum that by habit we may want to equate to human thinking. Of course trying to understand the psychology of a bacteria may be a bit hard for humans so perhaps the term observer should be given a broader meaning and the challenge would be to define the nature/ boundaries/mechanics of this semantic extension/redefinition. The same may hold for defining language and meaning... But for lack of time I really haven't followed all the debates and I'm no philosopher. As a business person I am much more practical and I do have one practical concern/question: are we trying to lay down a new theory of living systems or are we going (in some not too distant future) towards devising a computational framework that (even modestly) may go beyond projects such as the VHP?Sorry to be so down to earth but I suppose that in this forum everyone is allowed to express himself/herself...:) Pridi De : fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] De la part de joe.bren...@bluewin.chmailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch Envoyé : vendredi 1 avril 2011 19:38 À : l...@leydesdorff.netmailto:l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Pedro C. Marijuan'; fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es Objet : Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I do not quite recognize myself in the statement: Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder. However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive processes necessary for an understanding
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Karl, Dear Loet, Thank you both for your postings and the perspectives they provide. They leave me with just two questions, and I am glad Karl does not want to close the discussion so that I may ask for your and other views on them. 1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are completely mutually exclusive? 2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary are: By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an ontological content? Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly, since he writes: The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility of a new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being discovered, that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with Loet, that the paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?! I look forward to hearing from you. Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41 An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam Dear James, thank you for the widening of this discussion. Order and Information Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the relation between information and order bring us back to some deep problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages. The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs. the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of the world as the descriptions of the things themselves? In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs. the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus). The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each deviate from the ideal-typical case. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder creates different ties, therefore a different information content. The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down. We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such exists. Karl 2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es: Dear all, Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for the list and to everyone else for indulging me. As a historian, I have learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned out to be very complicated indeed. The
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Joe and colleagues, 1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are completely mutually exclusive? Of course, not: the expectations are informed by previous observations and further observations can change our expectations. More precisely: observational reports are needed to make the discourse (entertaining expectations) progressive. 2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary are: By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. I would prefer to use a plural for “ideas of order”: paradigms, theoretical frameworks, etc. As argued before, the “sunt” is problematic because this order does not “exist” (in the res extensa), but can be entertained (as cogitate in the res cogitans). The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. The information content is always expected information content of a distribution. Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an ontological content? It seems to me that my perspective leads to a chaology instead of a cosmology. “Out there” is only noise; order emerges from our reflections and exchanges as cogitantes. Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly, since he writes: The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. These ordering principles are not “given” by God in his Creation (albeit in the substance of Natura naturans or natura naturata), but are constructed by us in scholarly discourses. This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility of a new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being discovered, that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with Loet, that the paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?! “Reality” can be considered as broken in res extensa and res cogitans. Alternative expectations are also possible, but have to assume a “veracitas Dei” or harmonia prestabilita. When one gives this perspective up, chaology can be expected to prevail. Best wishes, Loet I look forward to hearing from you. Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41 An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam Dear James, thank you for the widening of this discussion. Order and Information Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the relation between information and order bring us back to some deep problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages. The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs. the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of the world as the descriptions of the things themselves? In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs. the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus). The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each deviate from the ideal-typical case. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear All, the contrasting views between Loet’s understanding of order as an implication of information and of the alternative which deducts information from order are in no real opposition. Rather they reflect differing perspectives, like the tradition of e.g. measuring a room from a middle point outwards or from the corners inwards: this is an opportunity for taxonomy and codification. The numbers are fountains of possible compromises, as a closed system, of which all alternatives are known, can easily be modelled by a collection of logical statements. Let me digress a bit about numbers: these are logical signs that can represent anything. In the sentence-logic or order-logic that we try to read out of them, they could be represented by ☺, ☼, ◊, ♣, etc. As long as they obey the rule e.g. of ☼ + ◊ = ♣, and there is a sufficient number of them, an order evolves. Now, what an order specifically is, that is the deepest question of philosophy. This is why it is so helpful to use the index finger and say: “this is a deictic definition of order” while one points the finger to a sorted table. (Augustinus: Confessiones) If the symbols are ordered and re-ordered, specific migration patterns evolve. Some construct two spaces of three rectangular axes each. Loet said the same in different words, by pointing out that some attributes give a sort of fixation to a concept. Usually, one uses the numbers for counting, that is, in their capacity as natural numbers. Here, we can use them in their denominative capacity, because even their ordinal capacity gets lost as they cease to impose the “natural” order of natural numbers, namely 1,2,3,4,… In its denominative capacity a+b=c can mean the same as ☼ + ◊ = ♣ or “horses and tables have four feet”. Here comes the individuality within the group (today’s slang for re and universalia), because on ☼ + ◊ = ♣ we recognise that each ☼ of many ☼ is indistinguishable to the others and that we do not know what the natural order between ☺, ☼, ◊, ♣ might be. So we do not know the deviation of the members of a tie to the ideal-typical member of the tie, and this means that information can and can not be present, in dependence of the actual individuation of the members of the group. This is what Loet and me agree on so far. Loet and me have not yet compiled our concepts about fragments, fragmentation and distinction, but I am very confident that he widens our understanding on one hand and will be presenting an important – probably, the most important – side of the coin. What this person can contribute to the philosophical debate, is not much. The accountant has produced a Table and uses it as a demonstrative tool for concepts of order and reorder. A table of symbols has absolutely no meaning at all, neither epistemological, nor transcendental, nor does it pretend any exclusivity to order concepts. One will certainly have difficulties explaining that the secret of the cosmic (ultra, mega, meta, ultimate, basic, etc.) order lies in the combinatorial intricacies of how to express 67 by means of extents 32 or otherwise. This appears to govern the metamorphoses in the Table between “how many”, “what kind” and “where”. Whether one gains or loses faith on recognising that another mystery is gone is an individual matter. As a culture, we have forgiven the meteorologists for ruining our concepts of Thor rolling his hammer and substituting it with audible fragments of discharges, which is much less juicy. So the metamorphosing tricks of Nature may also be explained away with boring technicalities. The numbers themselves make no revolutions, their interpretation does. Karl 2011/3/28 Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net Dear Joe and colleagues, 1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are completely mutually exclusive? Of course, not: the expectations are informed by previous observations and further observations can change our expectations. More precisely: observational reports are needed to make the discourse (entertaining expectations) progressive. 2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary are: By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. I would prefer to use a plural for “ideas of order”: paradigms, theoretical frameworks, etc. As argued before, the “sunt” is problematic because this order does not “exist” (in the res extensa), but can be entertained (as cogitate in the res cogitans). The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. The information content
