Re: large BCP38 compliance testing

2014-10-03 Thread Andrei Robachevsky
Rich Kulawiec wrote on 03/10/14 00:47:
 We've been down this road before.  Unless there is prompt, concerted,
 collective action (as there was AGIS) then there is zero reason for those
 behind such operations to do anything but keep collecting dirty money.

There is, please join:

http://www.routingmanifesto.org/manrs/

Andrei


Equinix Sales

2014-10-03 Thread Daniel Corbe

Equinix Sales seem impossible to reach.  Should I just give up and go
through a sales agent or can someone from Equinix sales contact me
off-list?



NJ Data center equipment movers

2014-10-03 Thread Matthew Huff
I'm looking to have some equipment (2 x HP C7000 blade chassis ( each with 16 
blades), 2 x Cisco 7600, and some small misc equipment) from a datacenter in 
Mahwah, NJ to Secaucus, NJ. Anyone recommend someone?


Re: DDOS - Law enforcement

2014-10-03 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 03 Oct 2014 14:02:31 +1300, Tony Wicks said:
 effects of scumbags who send DDOS attacks towards my networks, It amazes me
 how you cannot put more effort into the blatant DDOS for hire platforms that
 are readily available to anyone. I mean how can these sites be allowed to
 continue unmolested when you can spend so much effort on P2P platforms ?

Remember that high-level resources aren't dedicated based on amount of
actual economic damage, but amount of lobbying effort/money.


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Re: DDOS - Law enforcement

2014-10-03 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 03 Oct 2014 10:59:28 -0400, Alain Hebert said:

 We where told to prouve 100k+ damage first before they even bother
 meeting us.

Remember that a single iPod full of pirated music is $8 billion of damage.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZadCj8O1-0


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Re: large BCP38 compliance testing

2014-10-03 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 08:54:32AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:
 Or it will require legislation and I will assure that whatever is
 written not be liked.  On the other hand everyone one in the country
 will be in the same boat.

I concur with you -- strongly.  Legislation is not the answer, because
(a) it only applies in limited jurisdictions and this is a global problem
and (b) it will inevitably be written by those with the deepest pockets,
see for example CAN-SPAM, crafted by and for spammers and their supporters.

But legislation isn't necessary.  Within limits (prescribed by contractual
obligations) none of us are required to offer services to arbitrary
parties.  We *choose* to do so, by default, all day every day because that's
why we have an Internet.  But we're not *obligated* to do so: those services
may be withheld in full or part at any time for any reason (or even
without a reason).

And this is where I quote the best thing I've ever read on this mailing list:

If you give people the means to hurt you, and they do it, and
you take no action except to continue giving them the means to
hurt you, and they take no action except to keep hurting you,
then one of the ways you can describe the situation is it isn't
scaling well.

--- Paul Vixie

Having observed, for example, the spam problem since its genesis, I can
unequivocally state that the *only* thing that has ever addressed the
problem (rather than merely addressing its symptoms) is SMTP blacklisting.
Everything else has been ineffective, misdirected, wishful thinking.

The same thing applies here: persistent, systemic sources of large-scale
abuse via BCP-38 noncompliance are either:

1. Being operated by clueless, negligent, incompetent people
or
2. Being operated by deliberately abusive people

There are no other possibilities.  (Note: persistent, systemic.
Transient, isolated problems happen to everyone and are not what I'm
talking about here.)

It's difficult to know which of those two are true via external
observation, but it's not *necessary* to know: the appropriate remedial
action remains the same in either case: stop giving them the means.

---rsk


re: cogent update suppression, and routing loops

2014-10-03 Thread Nick Olsen
I've had the exact same thing happen.
  
 Recently, I removed a bunch of /24's that were member of a larger /20. We 
use to advertise the /24's to certain carriers for traffic engineering. I 
saw the exact same issue you're describing.
  
 I chocked it up to Slow BGP in their core. For instance, I removed the 
route from my session with them in Orlando. It would get removed from 
Orlando, But still exist in Jacksonville. And basically route loop coming 
in from the north. It'd land in JAX, And get forwarded to MCO. Which would 
then forward it back to JAX. 20-30 seconds later, it would get removed from 
JAX, and I'd see the same behavior between JAX and ATL. It took a 4-5 
minutes in my experience for the route to finally leave the Cogent 
network.
  
 I lessened the blow by making Cogent the first peer I'd remove the /24 
from. Leaving the other /24's out there via the other carriers. So only 
those that chose cogent as the most direct route felt the unintentional 
blackhole. Other carriers removed almost instantly as expected.
  
 Nick Olsen
Network Operations  (855) FLSPEED  x106

  


 From: ryanL ryan.lan...@gmail.com
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2014 12:07 PM
To: North American Network Operators Group nanog@nanog.org
Subject: cogent update suppression, and routing loops   
hi. relatively new cogent customer. is what i've stated in my subject line
kinda standard fare with them?

i've discovered that when i advertise a /24 from inside a larger /22 to 
XO,
(who peers with cogent), and then pull the /24 some time later, that 
cogent
holds onto the /24 and then bounces packets around in their network a 
bunch
of times for upwards of 8-10 minutes until they finally yank it. this
effectively blackholes traffic to my /24 for anyone that is using a path
thru cogent.

example: http://ryry.foursquare.com/image/0e0K1K0t0W2M

it's been a bit of a frustrating experience talking to their noc to
demonstrate it, but i'm able to duplicate it on demand. even pushing 
routes
using their communities to offload the circuit takes forever to propagate
even on their own looking-glasses.

thx

ryan
 



Re: cogent update suppression, and routing loops

2014-10-03 Thread Brandon Ewing
On Thu, Oct 02, 2014 at 09:03:15AM -0700, ryanL wrote:
 (who peers with cogent), and then pull the /24 some time later, that cogent
 holds onto the /24 and then bounces packets around in their network a bunch
 of times for upwards of 8-10 minutes until they finally yank it. this
 effectively blackholes traffic to my /24 for anyone that is using a path
 thru cogent.

Maybe running into some non-standard BGP Advertisement intervals inside
Cogent's network?  Might be running a lot of sub-ASes inside the
confederation, and having to wait multiple advertisement intervals for full
propagation.

https://routingfreak.wordpress.com/tag/minimum-route-advertisement-interval/

-- 
Brandon Ewing (nicot...@warningg.com)


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Weekly Routing Table Report

2014-10-03 Thread Routing Analysis Role Account
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet
Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan.

The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, AusNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, LacNOG,
TRNOG, CaribNOG and the RIPE Routing Working Group.

Daily listings are sent to bgp-st...@lists.apnic.net

For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net.

If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith pfsi...@gmail.com.

Routing Table Report   04:00 +10GMT Sat 04 Oct, 2014

Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net
Detailed Analysis:  http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/

Analysis Summary


BGP routing table entries examined:  513366
Prefixes after maximum aggregation:  199005
Deaggregation factor:  2.58
Unique aggregates announced to Internet: 252719
Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 48192
Prefixes per ASN: 10.65
Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:   36237
Origin ASes announcing only one prefix:   16367
Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:6144
Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:171
Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table:   4.5
Max AS path length visible: 118
Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 55644) 111
Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table:  1796
Unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 436
Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs:   7552
Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table:5811
Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table:   20513
Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table:13
Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table:0
Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space:345
Number of addresses announced to Internet:   2709985028
Equivalent to 161 /8s, 135 /16s and 23 /24s
Percentage of available address space announced:   73.2
Percentage of allocated address space announced:   73.2
Percentage of available address space allocated:  100.0
Percentage of address space in use by end-sites:   96.9
Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations:  176366

APNIC Region Analysis Summary
-

Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes:   124949
Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation:   36672
APNIC Deaggregation factor:3.41
Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks:  128774
Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks:53389
APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:4979
APNIC Prefixes per ASN:   25.86
APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:   1189
APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:856
Average APNIC Region AS path length visible:4.8
Max APNIC Region AS path length visible:118
Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table:   1115
Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet:  734732608
Equivalent to 43 /8s, 203 /16s and 33 /24s
Percentage of available APNIC address space announced: 85.9

APNIC AS Blocks4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431
(pre-ERX allocations)  23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319,
   58368-59391, 63488-64098, 131072-135580
APNIC Address Blocks 1/8,  14/8,  27/8,  36/8,  39/8,  42/8,  43/8,
49/8,  58/8,  59/8,  60/8,  61/8, 101/8, 103/8,
   106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8,
   116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8,
   123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8,
   163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8,
   203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8,
   222/8, 223/8,

ARIN Region Analysis Summary


Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes:170714
Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation:85222
ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.00
Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks:   172625
Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 80799
ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:16372
ARIN 

Re: cogent update suppression, and routing loops

2014-10-03 Thread ryanL
circling back on this, i guess my case with cogent has been escalated to vp
engineering, and i've had a few people reply on and off list citing the
same problems. i encourage you to open up cases to help demonstrate further
examples (ie: it's not just me!)

thx everyone.

ryan


On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 9:03 AM, ryanL ryan.lan...@gmail.com wrote:

 hi. relatively new cogent customer. is what i've stated in my subject line
 kinda standard fare with them?

 i've discovered that when i advertise a /24 from inside a larger /22 to
 XO, (who peers with cogent), and then pull the /24 some time later, that
 cogent holds onto the /24 and then bounces packets around in their network
 a bunch of times for upwards of 8-10 minutes until they finally yank it.
 this effectively blackholes traffic to my /24 for anyone that is using a
 path thru cogent.

 example: http://ryry.foursquare.com/image/0e0K1K0t0W2M

 it's been a bit of a frustrating experience talking to their noc to
 demonstrate it, but i'm able to duplicate it on demand. even pushing routes
 using their communities to offload the circuit takes forever to propagate
 even on their own looking-glasses.

 thx

 ryan



Re: large BCP38 compliance testing

2014-10-03 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson

On Fri, 3 Oct 2014, Rich Kulawiec wrote:


The same thing applies here: persistent, systemic sources of large-scale
abuse via BCP-38 noncompliance are either:

1. Being operated by clueless, negligent, incompetent people
or
2. Being operated by deliberately abusive people

There are no other possibilities.  (Note: persistent, systemic.
Transient, isolated problems happen to everyone and are not what I'm
talking about here.)

It's difficult to know which of those two are true via external
observation, but it's not *necessary* to know: the appropriate remedial
action remains the same in either case: stop giving them the means.


So how do we detect these and make sure they feel pain for not doing the 
right thing. The CIDR report hasn't incurred pain as far as I know, so 
public shaming doesn't seem to work even in cases where we can detect 
people incurring hurt on others. So how do we work this? It obviously 
hasn't worked so far, what do we change to make this work?


--
Mikael Abrahamssonemail: swm...@swm.pp.se


Re: large BCP38 compliance testing

2014-10-03 Thread Alain Hebert
Well (beware it is friday),

On the 1st of January 2015:

. Refuse every routes;

. Start accepting only those passing some sort of BCP38 specs
performed by some QSA =D;

. ???

. Profit;

On 10/03/14 15:03, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
 On Fri, 3 Oct 2014, Rich Kulawiec wrote:

 The same thing applies here: persistent, systemic sources of large-scale
 abuse via BCP-38 noncompliance are either:

 1. Being operated by clueless, negligent, incompetent people
 or
 2. Being operated by deliberately abusive people

 There are no other possibilities.  (Note: persistent, systemic.
 Transient, isolated problems happen to everyone and are not what I'm
 talking about here.)

 It's difficult to know which of those two are true via external
 observation, but it's not *necessary* to know: the appropriate remedial
 action remains the same in either case: stop giving them the means.

 So how do we detect these and make sure they feel pain for not doing
 the right thing. The CIDR report hasn't incurred pain as far as I
 know, so public shaming doesn't seem to work even in cases where we
 can detect people incurring hurt on others. So how do we work this? It
 obviously hasn't worked so far, what do we change to make this work?




Re: Equinix Sales

2014-10-03 Thread Carlos Alcantar
coresite might be a good alternative if they are in the market you are
trying to get space into.


Carlos Alcantar
Race Communications / Race Team Member
1325 Howard Ave. #604, Burlingame, CA. 94010
Phone: +1 415 376 3314 / car...@race.com / http://www.race.com





On 10/3/14, 7:33 AM, Daniel Corbe co...@corbe.net wrote:


Equinix Sales seem impossible to reach.  Should I just give up and go
through a sales agent or can someone from Equinix sales contact me
off-list?





Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread David Hubbard
Saw this article:

http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/travel/marriott-fcc-wi-fi-fine/

The interesting part:

'A federal investigation of the Gaylord Opryland Resort and
Convention Center in Nashville found that Marriott employees
had used containment features of a Wi-Fi monitoring system
at the hotel to prevent people from accessing their own
personal Wi-Fi networks.'

I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's 
inaccessible?

David


re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Nick Olsen
Not sure the specific implementation. But I've heard of Rouge AP detection 
done in two ways.
  
 1. Associate to the Rouge ap. Send a packet, See if it appears on your 
network, Shut the port off it appeared from. I think this is the cisco way? 
Not sure. This is automated of course. This method wouldn't work in this 
case. Because it wasn't connected to the hotels network
  
 2. Your AP's detect the Rouge AP, They slam out a ton of Deauth's 
directed at the clients, As if they are the AP. Effectively telling the 
client to disconnect.
  
 Side question for those smarter than I. How does WPA encryption play into 
this? Would a client associated to a WPA2 AP take a non-encrypted deauth 
appearing from the same BSSID?
  
 Nick Olsen
Network Operations  (855) FLSPEED  x106

  


 From: David Hubbard dhubb...@dino.hostasaurus.com
Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 4:11 PM
To: NANOG nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Marriott wifi blocking   
Saw this article:

http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/travel/marriott-fcc-wi-fi-fine/

The interesting part:

'A federal investigation of the Gaylord Opryland Resort and
Convention Center in Nashville found that Marriott employees
had used containment features of a Wi-Fi monitoring system
at the hotel to prevent people from accessing their own
personal Wi-Fi networks.'

I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's
inaccessible?

David
 



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread telmnstr

I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's
inaccessible?


Doesn't Cisco and other vendors offer rouge AP squashing features?

- Ethan O'Toole



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Michael O Holstein
legality is questionable insofar as this device must not cause harmful 
interference of PartB
but how it works is by sending DEAUTH packets with spoofed MAC addresses
rouge AP response on Cisco/Aruba works like this.

Regards,

Michael Holstein
Cleveland State University

From: NANOG nanog-boun...@nanog.org on behalf of David Hubbard 
dhubb...@dino.hostasaurus.com
Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 4:06 PM
To: NANOG
Subject: Marriott wifi blocking

Saw this article:

http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/travel/marriott-fcc-wi-fi-fine/

The interesting part:

'A federal investigation of the Gaylord Opryland Resort and
Convention Center in Nashville found that Marriott employees
had used containment features of a Wi-Fi monitoring system
at the hotel to prevent people from accessing their own
personal Wi-Fi networks.'

I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's
inaccessible?

David


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Adrian
On Friday 03 October 2014 13:06:55 David Hubbard wrote:
...
 I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
 any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
 keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's
 inaccessible?
 


From other discussions, they were apparently continuously sending client 
deauth packets to any non-Marriott access points within range.


Adrian



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Steven Miano
There are IPS features in nearly all of the 'enterprise' level wireless
products now:

http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/adaptive-wireless-ips-software/data_sheet_c78-501388.html

http://www.aerohive.com/solutions/applications/secure.html

Doing a search for WIPs - or browsing forums about poorly configured
WIPS/Policies can show that the deauth storms can be quite turbulent.

~mianosm

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:06 PM, David Hubbard dhubb...@dino.hostasaurus.com
 wrote:

 Saw this article:

 http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/travel/marriott-fcc-wi-fi-fine/

 The interesting part:

 'A federal investigation of the Gaylord Opryland Resort and
 Convention Center in Nashville found that Marriott employees
 had used containment features of a Wi-Fi monitoring system
 at the hotel to prevent people from accessing their own
 personal Wi-Fi networks.'

 I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
 any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
 keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's
 inaccessible?

 David



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Michael O Holstein
but how it works is by sending DEAUTH packets with spoofed MAC addresses
rouge AP response on Cisco/Aruba works like this.

DIY version if you want to try it out .. just download Kali/Backtrack or 
compile aircrack-ng

http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=deauthentication

Regards,

Michael Holstein
Cleveland State University

From: NANOG nanog-boun...@nanog.org on behalf of David Hubbard 
dhubb...@dino.hostasaurus.com
Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 4:06 PM
To: NANOG
Subject: Marriott wifi blocking

Saw this article:

http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/travel/marriott-fcc-wi-fi-fine/

The interesting part:

'A federal investigation of the Gaylord Opryland Resort and
Convention Center in Nashville found that Marriott employees
had used containment features of a Wi-Fi monitoring system
at the hotel to prevent people from accessing their own
personal Wi-Fi networks.'

I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's
inaccessible?

David

Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread John Kristoff
On Fri, 3 Oct 2014 16:16:22 -0400
Nick Olsen n...@flhsi.com wrote:

 Not sure the specific implementation. But I've heard of Rouge AP
 detection done in two ways.

Relation discussion on this topic has come up from time to time.  I
believe the last time was in a thread that starts here and includes
various methods of network-based rogue AP detection if you follow all
the responses and links:

  http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2012-October/052690.html

One of my favorite ways long ago, not sure if this works reliably
anymore, was to watch who was joining well known AP IP multicast groups
commonly associated with different wireless gear, something you can
easily do on routers (e.g. show ip igmp group _group_address_).

There are also a number of well known OUIs associated with AP gear that
are easily to monitor for in arp/bridge/cam tables.

John


RE: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Godmere, Shane
-Original Message-
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of David Hubbard
Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 3:07 PM
To: NANOG
Subject: Marriott wifi blocking

Saw this article:

http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/travel/marriott-fcc-wi-fi-fine/

The interesting part:

'A federal investigation of the Gaylord Opryland Resort and Convention Center 
in Nashville found that Marriott employees had used containment features of a 
Wi-Fi monitoring system
at the hotel to prevent people from accessing their own personal Wi-Fi 
networks.'

I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but any idea what 
legal hardware they were using to effectively keep their own wifi available but 
render everyone else's inaccessible?

David
---
David,

All major WiFi players have some seek-and-destroy function to prevent rogues 
on/near their network.  It is the responsibly of the IT folks to determine how 
aggressive these settings are, and to what needs deauth sent to clients.  These 
can be very effective in dropping sessions from clients on unauthorized 
systems.  

The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to protect 
their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive customers.  


--
Opinions expressed in this email are mine and not that of my employer. 
Shane Allan Godmere  


RE: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Darin Herteen
Yes, I've tested it quite effectively using WLC 5508 and a AIR-CAP3502I-A-K9 

 Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 16:15:37 -0400
 From: telmn...@757.org
 CC: nanog@nanog.org
 Subject: Re: Marriott wifi blocking
 
  I'm aware of how the illegal wifi blocking devices work, but
  any idea what legal hardware they were using to effectively
  keep their own wifi available but render everyone else's
  inaccessible?
 
 Doesn't Cisco and other vendors offer rouge AP squashing features?
 
   - Ethan O'Toole
 
  

Re: Equinix Sales

2014-10-03 Thread Owen DeLong
My experience with Core Site has been that their sales people are responsive, 
but their other areas not so much.

What one would expect from a Telco-owned facility.

Equinix, the sales people are less responsive, but at least when I open a 
ticket with them, it gets done pretty quickly in most cases.

Owen

On Oct 3, 2014, at 13:01 , Carlos Alcantar car...@race.com wrote:

 coresite might be a good alternative if they are in the market you are
 trying to get space into.
 
 
 Carlos Alcantar
 Race Communications / Race Team Member
 1325 Howard Ave. #604, Burlingame, CA. 94010
 Phone: +1 415 376 3314 / car...@race.com / http://www.race.com
 
 
 
 
 
 On 10/3/14, 7:33 AM, Daniel Corbe co...@corbe.net wrote:
 
 
 Equinix Sales seem impossible to reach.  Should I just give up and go
 through a sales agent or can someone from Equinix sales contact me
 off-list?
 
 



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Ricky Beam

On Fri, 03 Oct 2014 16:16:22 -0400, Nick Olsen n...@flhsi.com wrote:
Side question for those smarter than I. How does WPA encryption play  
into this? Would a client associated to a WPA2 AP take a non-encrypted

deauth appearing from the same BSSID?


It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and carries no
authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be provided.

--Ricky


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Keenan Tims
 The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to protect 
 their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive customers.  

I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
spectrum.

My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue AP
detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC regulations.

Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this 'interference',
which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally interfere.

K


The Cidr Report

2014-10-03 Thread cidr-report
This report has been generated at Fri Oct  3 21:14:05 2014 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of AS2.0 router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.

Check http://www.cidr-report.org/2.0 for a current version of this report.

Recent Table History
Date  PrefixesCIDR Agg
26-09-14517584  286968
27-09-14517645  286987
28-09-14517067  287333
29-09-14517697  287127
30-09-14517392  287790
01-10-14518035  287253
02-10-14518063  287399
03-10-14518176  287885


AS Summary
 48431  Number of ASes in routing system
 19548  Number of ASes announcing only one prefix
  3026  Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS
AS28573: NET Serviços de Comunicação S.A.,BR
  120100352  Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s)
AS4134 : CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street,CN


Aggregation Summary
The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only
when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as 
to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also
proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes').

 --- 03Oct14 ---
ASnumNetsNow NetsAggr  NetGain   % Gain   Description

Table 518309   287887   23042244.5%   All ASes

AS28573 3026  133 289395.6%   NET Serviços de Comunicação
   S.A.,BR
AS6389  2895   69 282697.6%   BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK -
   BellSouth.net Inc.,US
AS17974 2815   80 273597.2%   TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT
   Telekomunikasi Indonesia,ID
AS22773 2894  161 273394.4%   ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC -
   Cox Communications Inc.,US
AS4766  2945 1207 173859.0%   KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom,KR
AS6147  1782  166 161690.7%   Telefonica del Peru S.A.A.,PE
AS7303  1769  300 146983.0%   Telecom Argentina S.A.,AR
AS18881 1903  552 135171.0%   Global Village Telecom,BR
AS8402  1335   25 131098.1%   CORBINA-AS OJSC Vimpelcom,RU
AS4755  1912  651 126166.0%   TATACOMM-AS TATA
   Communications formerly VSNL
   is Leading ISP,IN
AS20115 1804  554 125069.3%   CHARTER-NET-HKY-NC - Charter
   Communications,US
AS9808  1292   56 123695.7%   CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile
   Communication Co.Ltd.,CN
AS4323  1644  413 123174.9%   TWTC - tw telecom holdings,
   inc.,US
AS7545  2377 1158 121951.3%   TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom
   Limited,AU
AS7552  1263   60 120395.2%   VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel
   Corporation,VN
AS9498  1306  109 119791.7%   BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd.,IN
AS10620 2992 1805 118739.7%   Telmex Colombia S.A.,CO
AS18566 2044  866 117857.6%   MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath
   Corporation,US
AS22561 1306  306 100076.6%   AS22561 - CenturyTel Internet
   Holdings, Inc.,US
AS7029  2038 1051  98748.4%   WINDSTREAM - Windstream
   Communications Inc,US
AS7738   999   83  91691.7%   Telemar Norte Leste S.A.,BR
AS6983  1492  629  86357.8%   ITCDELTA - Earthlink, Inc.,US
AS4788  1071  244  82777.2%   TMNET-AS-AP TM Net, Internet
   Service Provider,MY
AS38285  956  132  82486.2%   M2TELECOMMUNICATIONS-AU M2
   Telecommunications Group
   Ltd,AU
AS24560 1173  354  81969.8%   AIRTELBROADBAND-AS-AP Bharti
   Airtel Ltd., Telemedia
   Services,IN
AS4780  1042  266  77674.5%   SEEDNET Digital United Inc.,TW
AS26615  902  135  76785.0%   Tim Celular S.A.,BR
AS18101  957  197  76079.4%   RELIANCE-COMMUNICATIONS-IN
   Reliance Communications
   Ltd.DAKC MUMBAI,IN
AS8151  1484  737  74750.3%   Uninet S.A. de C.V.,MX
AS17908  838   92  74689.0%   TCISL Tata Communications,IN

Total  52256125913966575.9%   Top 

BGP Update Report

2014-10-03 Thread cidr-report
BGP Update Report
Interval: 25-Sep-14 -to- 02-Oct-14 (7 days)
Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072

TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS
Rank ASNUpds %  Upds/PfxAS-Name
 1 - AS9583   583990 11.3% 421.3 -- SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited,IN
 2 - AS9829   198729  3.8% 174.8 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet 
Backbone,IN
 3 - AS23752  196055  3.8%1519.8 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal 
Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP
 4 - AS24193  177229  3.4% 798.3 -- SIFY-IN Sify Limited Service 
Provider India,IN
 5 - AS3816   104096  2.0% 178.2 -- COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES 
S.A. ESP,CO
 6 - AS45816  100073  1.9%3127.3 -- ISHK-AP I-Services Network 
Solution Limited,HK
 7 - AS363398012  1.9% 276.9 -- PROVINCE-OF-BRITISH-COLUMBIA - 
Province of British Columbia,CA
 8 - AS840259612  1.1%  97.6 -- CORBINA-AS OJSC Vimpelcom,RU
 9 - AS45899   58284  1.1% 121.9 -- VNPT-AS-VN VNPT Corp,VN
10 - AS13682   52871  1.0%5874.6 -- TELEFONICA MOVILES GUATEMALA 
S.A.,GT
11 - AS13188   49032  0.9%  52.2 -- BANKINFORM-AS TOV 
Bank-Inform,UA
12 - AS755243513  0.8%  34.5 -- VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel 
Corporation,VN
13 - AS702942754  0.8%   7.1 -- WINDSTREAM - Windstream 
Communications Inc,US
14 - AS38197   41401  0.8%  67.2 -- SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network 
(Hong Kong) Limited,HK
15 - AS165938784  0.8% 153.9 -- ERX-TANET-ASN1 Tiawan Academic 
Network (TANet) Information Center,TW
16 - AS211935869  0.7% 167.6 -- TELENOR-NEXTEL Telenor Norge 
AS,NO
17 - AS28573   34162  0.7%  20.9 -- NET Serviços de Comunicação 
S.A.,BR
18 - AS17552   27921  0.5% 362.6 -- TRUE-AS-AP True Internet 
Co.,Ltd.,TH
19 - AS47331   21546  0.4%   7.3 -- TTNET TTNet A.S.,TR
20 - AS23342   21142  0.4% 528.5 -- UNITEDLAYER - Unitedlayer, 
Inc.,US


TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix)
Rank ASNUpds %  Upds/PfxAS-Name
 1 - AS25003   19569  0.4%9784.5 -- INTERNET_BINAT Internet Binat 
Ltd,IL
 2 - AS623186518  0.1%6518.0 -- BIMEH-MA-AS Bimeh Ma,IR
 3 - AS13682   52871  1.0%5874.6 -- TELEFONICA MOVILES GUATEMALA 
S.A.,GT
 4 - AS24673  0.1% 661.0 -- UDEL-DCN - University of 
Delaware,US
 5 - AS323364228  0.1%4228.0 -- IPASS-2 - iPass Incorporated,US
 6 - AS518883429  0.1%3429.0 -- PILOTSYSTEMS-AS Pilot Systems 
consulting SARL,FR
 7 - AS45816  100073  1.9%3127.3 -- ISHK-AP I-Services Network 
Solution Limited,HK
 8 - AS476802781  0.1%2781.0 -- NHCS EOBO Limited,IE
 9 - AS18135   12510  0.2%2502.0 -- BTV BTV Cable television,JP
10 - AS6629 9646  0.2%2411.5 -- NOAA-AS - NOAA,US
11 - AS417622180  0.0%2180.0 -- SEVNET PE Logvinov Vladimir 
Vladimirovich,UA
12 - AS605992003  0.0%2003.0 -- WEBKOMPAS-AS Emelyanov Valentin 
Petrovich,RU
13 - AS309441758  0.0%1758.0 -- DKD-AS Bendra Lietuvos, JAV ir 
Rusijos imone uzdaroji akcine bendrove DKD,LT
14 - AS350933325  0.1%1662.5 -- RO-HTPASSPORT High Tech 
Passport Ltd SUA California San Jose SUCURSALA BUCURESTI ROMANIA,RO
15 - AS273901655  0.0%1655.0 -- ALGAS - Fred Alger  Co Inc.,US
16 - AS621741597  0.0%1597.0 -- INTERPAN-AS INTERPAN LTD.,BG
17 - AS6468 3177  0.1%1588.5 -- EASYLINK-AS6468 - Easylink 
Services Corporation,US
18 - AS31546  0.0%5517.0 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology,US
19 - AS23752  196055  3.8%1519.8 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal 
Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP
20 - AS572011502  0.0%1502.0 -- EDF-AS Estonian Defence 
Forces,EE


TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes
Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name
 1 - 202.70.64.0/2198144  1.8%   AS23752 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal 
Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP
 2 - 202.70.88.0/2196252  1.8%   AS23752 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal 
Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP
 3 - 64.29.130.0/2421064  0.4%   AS23342 -- UNITEDLAYER - Unitedlayer, 
Inc.,US
 4 - 192.115.44.0/22   19568  0.4%   AS25003 -- INTERNET_BINAT Internet Binat 
Ltd,IL
 5 - 41.221.20.0/2413637  0.2%   AS36947 -- ALGTEL-AS,DZ
 6 - 42.83.48.0/20 12494  0.2%   AS18135 -- BTV BTV Cable television,JP
 7 - 200.34.149.0/24   10487  0.2%   AS8151  -- Uninet S.A. de C.V.,MX
 8 - 200.119.160.0/19   9888  0.2%   AS13682 -- TELEFONICA MOVILES GUATEMALA 
S.A.,GT
 9 - 190.143.240.0/20   9872  0.2%   AS13682 -- TELEFONICA MOVILES GUATEMALA 
S.A.,GT
10 - 192.58.232.0/249640  0.2%   AS6629  -- NOAA-AS - NOAA,US
11 - 190.143.224.0/20   8805  0.2%   AS13682 -- TELEFONICA MOVILES GUATEMALA 
S.A.,GT
12 - 

Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread John Schiel


On 10/03/2014 03:23 PM, Keenan Tims wrote:

The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to protect 
their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive customers.

I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
spectrum.


+1



My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue AP
detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC regulations.

Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this 'interference',
which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally interfere.


I would expect interfering for defensive purposes **only** would be 
acceptable.


--John



K




Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Hugo Slabbert

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 16:01:21 -0600, John Schiel jsch...@flowtools.net wrote:



On 10/03/2014 03:23 PM, Keenan Tims wrote:

The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to protect 
their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive customers.

I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
spectrum.


+1



My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue AP
detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC regulations.

Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this 'interference',
which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally interfere.


I would expect interfering for defensive purposes **only** would be 
acceptable.


What constitutes defensive purposes?



--John



K




--
Hugo


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Michael Van Norman

My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue AP
detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC regulations.

Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this 'interference',
which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally interfere.

I would expect interfering for defensive purposes **only** would be
acceptable.

What constitutes defensive purposes?

Since this is unlicensed spectrum, I don't think there is anything one has
a right to defend :)

/Mike




Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Lyle Giese


On 10/03/14 17:34, Michael Van Norman wrote:

My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue AP
detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC regulations.

Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this 'interference',
which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally interfere.

I would expect interfering for defensive purposes **only** would be
acceptable.

What constitutes defensive purposes?

Since this is unlicensed spectrum, I don't think there is anything one has
a right to defend :)

/Mike


If you charge for access and one person pays and sets up a rogue AP 
offering free WiFi to anyone in range.  I can see a defensive angle there.


Lyle Giese
LCR Computer Services, Inc.



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Michael Van Norman
On 10/3/14 3:44 PM, Lyle Giese l...@lcrcomputer.net wrote:


On 10/03/14 17:34, Michael Van Norman wrote:
 My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue
AP
 detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
 administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
 interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC
regulations.

 Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this
'interference',
 which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally
interfere.
 I would expect interfering for defensive purposes **only** would be
 acceptable.
 What constitutes defensive purposes?
 Since this is unlicensed spectrum, I don't think there is anything one
has
 a right to defend :)

 /Mike


If you charge for access and one person pays and sets up a rogue AP
offering free WiFi to anyone in range.  I can see a defensive angle there.

Lyle Giese
LCR Computer Services, Inc.

In that case turn off the offenders access.  No FCC violation doing that.
In any case, that was not what was happening here.

/Mike




Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Wayne E Bouchard
On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 02:23:46PM -0700, Keenan Tims wrote:
  The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to 
  protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive 
  customers.  
 
 I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
 outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
 physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
 spectrum.
 

I think that depends on the terms of your lease agreement. Could not
a hotel or conference center operate reserve the right to employ
active devices to disable any unauthorized wireless systems? Perhaps
because they want to charge to provide that service, because they
don't want errant signals leaking from their building, a rogue device
could be considered an intruder and represent a risk to the network,
or because they don't want someone setting up a system that would
interfere with their wireless gear and take down other clients who are
on premesis...

Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?

-Wayne

---
Wayne Bouchard
w...@typo.org
Network Dude
http://www.typo.org/~web/


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread joel jaeggli
On 10/3/14 6:01 PM, John Schiel wrote:
 
 On 10/03/2014 03:23 PM, Keenan Tims wrote:
 The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to
 protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive
 customers.
 I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
 outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
 physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
 spectrum.
 
 +1
 

 My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue AP
 detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
 administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
 interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC regulations.

 Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this 'interference',
 which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally interfere.
 
 I would expect interfering for defensive purposes **only** would be
 acceptable.

if you have a device licensed under fcc part 15 it may not cause harmful
interference to other users of the spectrum.

 --John
 

 K
 




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread joel jaeggli
On 10/3/14 7:12 PM, Wayne E Bouchard wrote:
 On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 02:23:46PM -0700, Keenan Tims wrote:
 The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to 
 protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive 
 customers.  

 I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
 outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
 physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
 spectrum.

 
 I think that depends on the terms of your lease agreement. Could not
 a hotel or conference center operate reserve the right to employ
 active devices to disable any unauthorized wireless systems? Perhaps
 because they want to charge to provide that service, because they
 don't want errant signals leaking from their building, a rogue device
 could be considered an intruder and represent a risk to the network,
 or because they don't want someone setting up a system that would
 interfere with their wireless gear and take down other clients who are
 on premesis...
 
 Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?

http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Documents/bulletins/oet63/oet63rev.pdf
...
The FCC rules are designed to control the marketing of low-power
transmitters and,
to a lesser extent, their use. If the operation of a non-compliant
transmitter causes
interference to authorized radio communications, the user should stop
operating the
transmitter or correct the problem causing the interference. However,
the person (or
company) that sold this non-compliant transmitter to the user has
violated the FCC
marketing rules in Part 2 as well as federal law. The act of selling or
leasing, offering
to sell or lease, or importing a low-power transmitter that has not gone
through the
appropriate FCC equipment authorization procedure is a violation of the
Commission's
rules and federal law.
...



 
 -Wayne
 
 ---
 Wayne Bouchard
 w...@typo.org
 Network Dude
 http://www.typo.org/~web/
 




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Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Re: large BCP38 compliance testing

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Ashworth
- Original Message -
 From: Alain Hebert aheb...@pubnix.net

 PS: About that uRPF Convo, we could dump all that knowledges into
 lets say... some comprehensive wiki page maybe =D That way when the
 topic arise we could just link to it.

Gee, Alain...

where would people find a wiki like that?

Cheers,
-- jra
-- 
Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink   j...@baylink.com
Designer The Things I Think   RFC 2100
Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000 Land Rover DII
St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1 727 647 1274


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Owen DeLong

On Oct 3, 2014, at 16:12 , Wayne E Bouchard w...@typo.org wrote:

 On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 02:23:46PM -0700, Keenan Tims wrote:
 The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to 
 protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive 
 customers.  
 
 I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
 outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
 physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
 spectrum.
 
 
 I think that depends on the terms of your lease agreement. Could not
 a hotel or conference center operate reserve the right to employ
 active devices to disable any unauthorized wireless systems? Perhaps
 because they want to charge to provide that service, because they
 don't want errant signals leaking from their building, a rogue device
 could be considered an intruder and represent a risk to the network,
 or because they don't want someone setting up a system that would
 interfere with their wireless gear and take down other clients who are
 on premesis...
 
 Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?

You may consider it appropriate from a financial or moral perspective, but it 
is absolutely wrong under the communications act of 1934 as amended.

The following is an oversimplification and IANAL, but generally:

You are _NOT_ allowed to intentionally cause harmful interference with a signal 
for any reason. If you are the primary user on a frequency, you are allowed to 
conduct your normal operations without undue concern for other users of the 
same spectrum, but you are not allowed to deliberately interfere with any 
secondary user just for the sake of interfering with them.

The kind of active devices being discussed and the activities of the hotel in 
question appear to have run well afoul of these regulations.

As someone else said, owning the property does not constitute ownership of the 
airwaves within the boundaries of the property, at least in the US (and I 
suspect in most if not all ITU countries).

Owen



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Ashworth
- Original Message -
 From: Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com

 It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and carries no
 authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
 provided.

What's the code for E_GREEDY?

Cheers,
-- jra
-- 
Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink   j...@baylink.com
Designer The Things I Think   RFC 2100
Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000 Land Rover DII
St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1 727 647 1274


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Donald Eastlake
IANAL but no, I think it most certainly does not, at least in the USA,
depend on the terms of your *lease* agreement. In particular, I refer
you to
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view;?id=6518608517
where in the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) specifically
voided terms restricting Wi-Fi in space leased from the Massachusetts
Port Authority at Boston airport as in violation of the OTARD (Over
The Air Reception Device) FCC rules. This probably doesn't apply if
you are a mere licensee but if you are a leaseholder, including being
a tenant-in-possession, as you are if you rent a hotel room, I think
they do apply.

Thanks,
Donald
=
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
 d3e...@gmail.com


On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 7:12 PM, Wayne E Bouchard w...@typo.org wrote:
 On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 02:23:46PM -0700, Keenan Tims wrote:
  The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to 
  protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive 
  customers.

 I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
 outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
 physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
 spectrum.


 I think that depends on the terms of your lease agreement. Could not
 a hotel or conference center operate reserve the right to employ
 active devices to disable any unauthorized wireless systems? Perhaps
 because they want to charge to provide that service, because they
 don't want errant signals leaking from their building, a rogue device
 could be considered an intruder and represent a risk to the network,
 or because they don't want someone setting up a system that would
 interfere with their wireless gear and take down other clients who are
 on premesis...

 Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?

 -Wayne

 ---
 Wayne Bouchard
 w...@typo.org
 Network Dude
 http://www.typo.org/~web/


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Ashworth
- Original Message -
 From: Owen DeLong o...@delong.com

 On Oct 3, 2014, at 16:12 , Wayne E Bouchard w...@typo.org wrote:

  Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?
 
 You may consider it appropriate from a financial or moral perspective,
 but it is absolutely wrong under the communications act of 1934 as
 amended.
 
 The following is an oversimplification and IANAL, but generally:
 
 You are _NOT_ allowed to intentionally cause harmful interference with
 a signal for any reason. If you are the primary user on a frequency,
 you are allowed to conduct your normal operations without undue
 concern for other users of the same spectrum, but you are not allowed
 to deliberately interfere with any secondary user just for the sake of
 interfering with them.
 
 The kind of active devices being discussed and the activities of the
 hotel in question appear to have run well afoul of these regulations.

Well, this will certainly have interesting implications on providing 
wireless service on business premises, won't it?

Are Cisco et alia accessories-before?

Cheers,
-- jra
-- 
Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink   j...@baylink.com
Designer The Things I Think   RFC 2100
Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000 Land Rover DII
St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1 727 647 1274


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Michael Van Norman
IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g. California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.

/Mike


On 10/3/14 5:15 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.com wrote:

So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various
vendors are illegal if used in the US?

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
 - Original Message -
 From: Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com

 It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and carries no
 authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
 provided.

 What's the code for E_GREEDY?

 Cheers,
 -- jra
 --
 Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink
j...@baylink.com
 Designer The Things I Think
RFC 2100
 Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000 Land
Rover DII
 St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1 727
647 1274



-- 
09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0




Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Larry Sheldon

On 10/3/2014 15:16, Nick Olsen wrote:

Not sure the specific implementation. But I've heard of Rouge AP detection
done in two ways.



Forgive me, I have been out of active large scale network administration 
for a number of years and have really lost touch.


What it is about red-colored APs that is offensive?  I have never seen one.


--
The unique Characteristics of System Administrators:

The fact that they are infallible; and,

The fact that they learn from their mistakes.

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Hugo Slabbert

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu wrote:


IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g. California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.


My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the 
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs 
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in 
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.




/Mike




--
Hugo


On 10/3/14 5:15 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.com wrote:


So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various
vendors are illegal if used in the US?

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:

- Original Message -

From: Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com



It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and carries no
authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
provided.


What's the code for E_GREEDY?

Cheers,
-- jra
--
Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink
j...@baylink.com
Designer The Things I Think
RFC 2100
Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000 Land
Rover DII
St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1 727
647 1274




--
09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0





signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Ashworth
Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and what 
would happen at a business that was running rogue AP detection. In the business 
the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the company 
operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the portable AP would 
be trying to create a different, separate network. And so your thesis does not 
hold. 

I think this is the distinction we need. Because it's clear that the business 
thing should be able to happen and the hotel thing should

On October 3, 2014 10:25:22 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:
On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:

IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer
services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized
user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access
to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.

My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the 
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs 
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in 
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.


/Mike



--
Hugo

On 10/3/14 5:15 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.com wrote:

So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various
vendors are illegal if used in the US?

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
 - Original Message -
 From: Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com

 It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and
carries no
 authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
 provided.

 What's the code for E_GREEDY?

 Cheers,
 -- jra
 --
 Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink
j...@baylink.com
 Designer The Things I Think
RFC 2100
 Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000
Land
Rover DII
 St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1
727
647 1274



--
09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0



-- 
Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Hugo Slabbert

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 16:49:49 -0700, Owen DeLong o...@delong.com wrote:



On Oct 3, 2014, at 16:12 , Wayne E Bouchard w...@typo.org wrote:


On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 02:23:46PM -0700, Keenan Tims wrote:

The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to protect 
their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive customers.


I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
spectrum.



I think that depends on the terms of your lease agreement. Could not
a hotel or conference center operate reserve the right to employ
active devices to disable any unauthorized wireless systems? Perhaps
because they want to charge to provide that service, because they
don't want errant signals leaking from their building, a rogue device
could be considered an intruder and represent a risk to the network,
or because they don't want someone setting up a system that would
interfere with their wireless gear and take down other clients who are
on premesis...

Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?


You may consider it appropriate from a financial or moral perspective, but it 
is absolutely wrong under the communications act of 1934 as amended.

The following is an oversimplification and IANAL, but generally:

You are _NOT_ allowed to intentionally cause harmful interference with a signal 
for any reason. If you are the primary user on a frequency, you are allowed to 
conduct your normal operations without undue concern for other users of the 
same spectrum, but you are not allowed to deliberately interfere with any 
secondary user just for the sake of interfering with them.

The kind of active devices being discussed and the activities of the hotel in 
question appear to have run well afoul of these regulations.

As someone else said, owning the property does not constitute ownership of the 
airwaves within the boundaries of the property, at least in the US (and I 
suspect in most if not all ITU countries).

Owen



Serious question:  do the FCC regulations on RF spectrum interference 
extend beyond layer 1?  I would assume that blasting a bunch of RF noise 
would be pretty obviously out of bounds, but my understanding is that 
the mechanisms described for rogue AP squashing operate at L2.  The 
*effect* is to render the wireless medium pretty much useless for its 
intended purpose, but that's accomplished by the use (abuse?) of higher 
layer control mechanisms.


I'm not condoning this, but do the FCC regulations RF interference 
apply?  Do they have authority above L1 in this case?


--
Hugo


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Michael Van Norman
On 10/3/14 7:25 PM, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:

IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.

My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.

They can say anything they want, it does not make it legal.

There's no such thing as a rogue AP in this context.  I can run an
access point almost anywhere I want (there are limits established by the
FCC in some areas) and it does not matter who owns the land underneath.
They have no authority to decide whether or not my access point is
authorized.  They can certainly refuse to connect me to their wired
network; and they can disconnect me if they decide I am making
inappropriate use of their network -- but they have no legal authority to
interfere with my wireless transmissions on my own network (be it my
personal hotspot, WiFi router, etc.).  FWIW, the same is true in almost
all corporate environments as well.

/Mike




Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Michael Van Norman
One of the reasons I pointed to the California law is that it covers above
L1 even if FCC authority does not.  The state law also provides for
criminal penalties.  I do not know if other states have similar laws.

/Mike

On 10/3/14 7:42 PM, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 16:49:49 -0700, Owen DeLong o...@delong.com wrote:


On Oct 3, 2014, at 16:12 , Wayne E Bouchard w...@typo.org wrote:

 On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 02:23:46PM -0700, Keenan Tims wrote:
 The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this
to protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive
customers.

 I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
 outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless
of
 physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
 spectrum.


 I think that depends on the terms of your lease agreement. Could not
 a hotel or conference center operate reserve the right to employ
 active devices to disable any unauthorized wireless systems? Perhaps
 because they want to charge to provide that service, because they
 don't want errant signals leaking from their building, a rogue device
 could be considered an intruder and represent a risk to the network,
 or because they don't want someone setting up a system that would
 interfere with their wireless gear and take down other clients who are
 on premesis...

 Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?

You may consider it appropriate from a financial or moral perspective,
but it is absolutely wrong under the communications act of 1934 as
amended.

The following is an oversimplification and IANAL, but generally:

You are _NOT_ allowed to intentionally cause harmful interference with a
signal for any reason. If you are the primary user on a frequency, you
are allowed to conduct your normal operations without undue concern for
other users of the same spectrum, but you are not allowed to
deliberately interfere with any secondary user just for the sake of
interfering with them.

The kind of active devices being discussed and the activities of the
hotel in question appear to have run well afoul of these regulations.

As someone else said, owning the property does not constitute ownership
of the airwaves within the boundaries of the property, at least in the
US (and I suspect in most if not all ITU countries).

Owen


Serious question:  do the FCC regulations on RF spectrum interference
extend beyond layer 1?  I would assume that blasting a bunch of RF noise
would be pretty obviously out of bounds, but my understanding is that
the mechanisms described for rogue AP squashing operate at L2.  The
*effect* is to render the wireless medium pretty much useless for its
intended purpose, but that's accomplished by the use (abuse?) of higher
layer control mechanisms.

I'm not condoning this, but do the FCC regulations RF interference
apply?  Do they have authority above L1 in this case?

-- 
Hugo




Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Hugo Slabbert

Looks like you cut off, but:

Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott 
and what would happen at a business that was running rogue AP 
detection. In the business the portable AP would be trying to look like 
the network that the company operated so as to siphon off legitimate 
users. In a hotel the portable AP would be trying to create a 
different, separate network. And so your thesis does not hold.


But it's not a completely discrete network.  It is a subset of the 
existing network in the most common example of e.g. a WLAN + NAT device 
providing access to additional clients, or at least an adjacent network 
attached to the existing one.  Okay: theoretically a guest could spin up 
a hotspot and not attach it to the hotel network at all, but I'm 
assuming that's a pretty tiny edge case.


As the administration of the hotel/org network, I'm within bounds to say 
you're not allowed attach unauthorized devices to the network or extend 
the network and that should be fair in my network, my rules, no?  And 
so I can take action against a breach of those terms.


The hotspot is a separate network, but I don't have to allow it to 
connect to my network.  I guess that points towards killing the wired 
port as a better method, as doing deauth on the hotspot(s) WLAN(s) would 
mean that you are participating in the separate network(s) and causing 
harm there rather than at the attachment point.


But what then of the duplicate SSID of the nefarious user at the 
business?  What recourse does the business have while still staying in 
bounds?


--
Hugo

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 22:27:06 -0400, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:


Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and what 
would happen at a business that was running rogue AP detection. In the business 
the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the company 
operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the portable AP would 
be trying to create a different, separate network. And so your thesis does not 
hold.

I think this is the distinction we need. Because it's clear that the business 
thing should be able to happen and the hotel thing should

On October 3, 2014 10:25:22 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:


IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.

California

Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer

services

or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized

user

of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access

to

somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.


My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.



/Mike




--
Hugo


On 10/3/14 5:15 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.com wrote:


So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various
vendors are illegal if used in the US?

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:

- Original Message -

From: Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com



It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and

carries no

authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
provided.


What's the code for E_GREEDY?

Cheers,
-- jra
--
Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink
j...@baylink.com
Designer The Things I Think
RFC 2100
Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000

Land

Rover DII
St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1

727

647 1274




--
09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0





--
Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.


--
Hugo


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Hugo Slabbert

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 19:45:57 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu wrote:


On 10/3/14 7:25 PM, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:


On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:


IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.


My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.


They can say anything they want, it does not make it legal.

There's no such thing as a rogue AP in this context.  I can run an
access point almost anywhere I want (there are limits established by the
FCC in some areas) and it does not matter who owns the land underneath.
They have no authority to decide whether or not my access point is
authorized.  They can certainly refuse to connect me to their wired
network; and they can disconnect me if they decide I am making
inappropriate use of their network -- but they have no legal authority to
interfere with my wireless transmissions on my own network (be it my
personal hotspot, WiFi router, etc.).  FWIW, the same is true in almost
all corporate environments as well.


Thanks; I think that's the distinction I was looking for here.  By 
spoofing deauth, the org is actively/knowingly participating on *my 
network* and causing harm to it without necessarily having proof that 
*my network* is in any way attached to *their network*.  The assumption 
in the hotel case is likely that the WLANs of the rogue APs they're 
targeting are attached to their wired network and are attempts to extend 
that wireless network without authorization (and that's probably 
generally a pretty safe assumption), but that doesn't forgive causing 
harm to that WLAN.  There's no reason they can't cut off the wired port 
of the AP if it is connected to the org's network as that's their 
attachment point and their call, but spoofed deauth stuff does seem to 
be out of bounds.


I'm not clear on whether it runs afoul of FCC regs as it's not RF 
interference directly but rather an (ab)use of higher layer control 
mechanisms operating on that spectrum, but it probably does run afoul of 
most thou shalt not harm other networks legislation like the 
California example.




/Mike




--
Hugo


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Suresh Ramasubramanian
Wifi offered by a carrier citywide, or free wifi signals from a nearby
hotel / park / coffee shop..

On 04-Oct-2014 8:29 am, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

 attached to the existing one.
 Okay: theoretically a guest could
 spin up a hotspot and not attach
 it to the hotel network at all, but
 I'm assuming that's a pretty tiny
 edge case.



Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 03 Oct 2014 20:31:56 -0500, Larry Sheldon said:

 What it is about red-colored APs that is offensive?  I have never seen one.

It's a color code that indicates it's an RFC3514-compliant device.


pgpXeFC2JMDVl.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Philip Dorr
http://www.arrl.org/part-15-radio-frequency-devices#Definitions
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?node=pt47.1.15

(m) Harmful interference. Any emission, radiation or induction that
endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety
services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a
radiocommunications service operating in accordance with this chapter.
On Oct 3, 2014 6:17 PM, joel jaeggli joe...@bogus.com wrote:

 On 10/3/14 6:01 PM, John Schiel wrote:
 
  On 10/03/2014 03:23 PM, Keenan Tims wrote:
  The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to
  protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive
  customers.
  I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
  outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
  physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
  spectrum.
 
  +1
 
 
  My reading of this is that these features are illegal, period. Rogue AP
  detection is one thing, and disabling them via network or
  administrative (ie. eject the guest) means would be fine, but
  interfering with the wireless is not acceptable per the FCC regulations.
 
  Seems like common sense to me. If the FCC considers this 'interference',
  which it apparently does, then devices MUST NOT intentionally interfere.
 
  I would expect interfering for defensive purposes **only** would be
  acceptable.

 if you have a device licensed under fcc part 15 it may not cause harmful
 interference to other users of the spectrum.

  --John
 
 
  K
 





Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Hugo Slabbert

On Sat 2014-Oct-04 08:37:32 +0530, Suresh Ramasubramanian ops.li...@gmail.com 
wrote:


Wifi offered by a carrier citywide, or free wifi signals from a nearby
hotel / park / coffee shop..


Perfect example (thanks) of why cutting off network attachment points 
would be fair game while effectively attacking other WLANs has 
collateral damage.




On 04-Oct-2014 8:29 am, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:


attached to the existing one.
Okay: theoretically a guest could
spin up a hotspot and not attach
it to the hotel network at all, but
I'm assuming that's a pretty tiny
edge case.



--
Hugo


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Ashworth
Hugo, I still don't think that you have quite made it to the distinction that 
we are looking for here.

In the case of the hotel, we are talking about an access point that connects 
via 4G to a cellular carrier. An access point that attempts to create its own 
network for the subscribers devices. A network disjoint from the network 
provided by the hotel or its contractor.

This is a different case from the circumstance in a business office where 
equipment is deployed to prevent someone from walking in with an access point 
/which pretends to be part of the network which the office runs./

In the latter case, the security hardware is justified in deassociating people 
from the rogue access point, /because it is pretending to be part of a network 
it is not authorized to be part of/.

In the Marriott case, that is not the circumstance. The networks which the 
deauth probes are being aimed at are networks which are advertising themselves 
as being /separate from the network operated by the hotel/, and this is the 
distinction that makes Marriott's behavior is unacceptable. 

(In my opinion; I am NOT a lawyer. If following my advice breaks something, you 
get to keep both pieces.)

On October 3, 2014 11:04:08 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:
On Fri 2014-Oct-03 19:45:57 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:

On 10/3/14 7:25 PM, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:

IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer
services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized
user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking
access to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.

My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue
APs
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.

They can say anything they want, it does not make it legal.

There's no such thing as a rogue AP in this context.  I can run an
access point almost anywhere I want (there are limits established by
the
FCC in some areas) and it does not matter who owns the land
underneath.
They have no authority to decide whether or not my access point is
authorized.  They can certainly refuse to connect me to their wired
network; and they can disconnect me if they decide I am making
inappropriate use of their network -- but they have no legal authority
to
interfere with my wireless transmissions on my own network (be it my
personal hotspot, WiFi router, etc.).  FWIW, the same is true in
almost
all corporate environments as well.

Thanks; I think that's the distinction I was looking for here.  By 
spoofing deauth, the org is actively/knowingly participating on *my 
network* and causing harm to it without necessarily having proof that 
*my network* is in any way attached to *their network*.  The assumption

in the hotel case is likely that the WLANs of the rogue APs they're 
targeting are attached to their wired network and are attempts to
extend 
that wireless network without authorization (and that's probably 
generally a pretty safe assumption), but that doesn't forgive causing 
harm to that WLAN.  There's no reason they can't cut off the wired port

of the AP if it is connected to the org's network as that's their 
attachment point and their call, but spoofed deauth stuff does seem to 
be out of bounds.

I'm not clear on whether it runs afoul of FCC regs as it's not RF 
interference directly but rather an (ab)use of higher layer control 
mechanisms operating on that spectrum, but it probably does run afoul
of 
most thou shalt not harm other networks legislation like the 
California example.


/Mike



-- 
Hugo

-- 
Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Hugo Slabbert

Jay,

Thanks; I think I was stretching this a bit far beyond just the Marriott 
example.  Killing hotspots of completely discrete networks because $$$ 
is heinous.  I had extended this to e.g.:


1.  Hotel charges for either wired or wireless access per device and has 
network policies to that effect.
2.  Guest pays for a single device and hooks up an AP or AP/NAT combo to 
the wired port.

3.  User piggybacks multiple devices on that device's WLAN.

...to try to flesh out the scenarios.  In the attempt I went a bit far 
off the reservation.  Apologies for the noise.


--
Hugo

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 23:32:39 -0400, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:


Hugo, I still don't think that you have quite made it to the distinction that 
we are looking for here.

In the case of the hotel, we are talking about an access point that connects 
via 4G to a cellular carrier. An access point that attempts to create its own 
network for the subscribers devices. A network disjoint from the network 
provided by the hotel or its contractor.

This is a different case from the circumstance in a business office where 
equipment is deployed to prevent someone from walking in with an access point 
/which pretends to be part of the network which the office runs./

In the latter case, the security hardware is justified in deassociating people 
from the rogue access point, /because it is pretending to be part of a network 
it is not authorized to be part of/.

In the Marriott case, that is not the circumstance. The networks which the 
deauth probes are being aimed at are networks which are advertising themselves 
as being /separate from the network operated by the hotel/, and this is the 
distinction that makes Marriott's behavior is unacceptable.

(In my opinion; I am NOT a lawyer. If following my advice breaks something, you 
get to keep both pieces.)

On October 3, 2014 11:04:08 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 19:45:57 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:


On 10/3/14 7:25 PM, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:


On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:


IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer

services

or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized

user

of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking

access to

somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.


My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue

APs

are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.


They can say anything they want, it does not make it legal.

There's no such thing as a rogue AP in this context.  I can run an
access point almost anywhere I want (there are limits established by

the

FCC in some areas) and it does not matter who owns the land

underneath.

They have no authority to decide whether or not my access point is
authorized.  They can certainly refuse to connect me to their wired
network; and they can disconnect me if they decide I am making
inappropriate use of their network -- but they have no legal authority

to

interfere with my wireless transmissions on my own network (be it my
personal hotspot, WiFi router, etc.).  FWIW, the same is true in

almost

all corporate environments as well.


Thanks; I think that's the distinction I was looking for here.  By
spoofing deauth, the org is actively/knowingly participating on *my
network* and causing harm to it without necessarily having proof that
*my network* is in any way attached to *their network*.  The assumption

in the hotel case is likely that the WLANs of the rogue APs they're
targeting are attached to their wired network and are attempts to
extend
that wireless network without authorization (and that's probably
generally a pretty safe assumption), but that doesn't forgive causing
harm to that WLAN.  There's no reason they can't cut off the wired port

of the AP if it is connected to the org's network as that's their
attachment point and their call, but spoofed deauth stuff does seem to
be out of bounds.

I'm not clear on whether it runs afoul of FCC regs as it's not RF
interference directly but rather an (ab)use of higher layer control
mechanisms operating on that spectrum, but it probably does run afoul
of
most thou shalt not harm other networks legislation like the
California example.



/Mike




--
Hugo


--
Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.


--
Hugo


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Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Ashworth
No problem, Hugo. 

In fact, if you paid for Wired service and plugged your own router in, you 
would still be creating your own network, and not pretending to be the hotel's 
network. At the RF layer. 

So it would not be legal for them to zap that either. Doing so might /violate 
your agreement for the wired internet/, but that's a problem up in layer 10...

(People, money, lawyers)

On October 3, 2014 11:45:48 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:
Jay,

Thanks; I think I was stretching this a bit far beyond just the
Marriott 
example.  Killing hotspots of completely discrete networks because
$$$ 
is heinous.  I had extended this to e.g.:

1.  Hotel charges for either wired or wireless access per device and
has 
network policies to that effect.
2.  Guest pays for a single device and hooks up an AP or AP/NAT combo
to 
the wired port.
3.  User piggybacks multiple devices on that device's WLAN.

...to try to flesh out the scenarios.  In the attempt I went a bit far 
off the reservation.  Apologies for the noise.

--
Hugo

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 23:32:39 -0400, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com
wrote:

Hugo, I still don't think that you have quite made it to the
distinction that we are looking for here.

In the case of the hotel, we are talking about an access point that
connects via 4G to a cellular carrier. An access point that attempts to
create its own network for the subscribers devices. A network disjoint
from the network provided by the hotel or its contractor.

This is a different case from the circumstance in a business office
where equipment is deployed to prevent someone from walking in with an
access point /which pretends to be part of the network which the office
runs./

In the latter case, the security hardware is justified in
deassociating people from the rogue access point, /because it is
pretending to be part of a network it is not authorized to be part of/.

In the Marriott case, that is not the circumstance. The networks which
the deauth probes are being aimed at are networks which are advertising
themselves as being /separate from the network operated by the hotel/,
and this is the distinction that makes Marriott's behavior is
unacceptable.

(In my opinion; I am NOT a lawyer. If following my advice breaks
something, you get to keep both pieces.)

On October 3, 2014 11:04:08 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com
wrote:
On Fri 2014-Oct-03 19:45:57 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
wrote:

On 10/3/14 7:25 PM, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman
m...@ucla.edu
wrote:

IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly
and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer
services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an
authorized
user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking
access to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.

My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue
APs
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.

They can say anything they want, it does not make it legal.

There's no such thing as a rogue AP in this context.  I can run an
access point almost anywhere I want (there are limits established by
the
FCC in some areas) and it does not matter who owns the land
underneath.
They have no authority to decide whether or not my access point is
authorized.  They can certainly refuse to connect me to their
wired
network; and they can disconnect me if they decide I am making
inappropriate use of their network -- but they have no legal
authority
to
interfere with my wireless transmissions on my own network (be it my
personal hotspot, WiFi router, etc.).  FWIW, the same is true in
almost
all corporate environments as well.

Thanks; I think that's the distinction I was looking for here.  By
spoofing deauth, the org is actively/knowingly participating on *my
network* and causing harm to it without necessarily having proof that
*my network* is in any way attached to *their network*.  The
assumption

in the hotel case is likely that the WLANs of the rogue APs they're
targeting are attached to their wired network and are attempts to
extend
that wireless network without authorization (and that's probably
generally a pretty safe assumption), but that doesn't forgive causing
harm to that WLAN.  There's no reason they can't cut off the wired
port

of the AP if it is connected to the org's network as that's their
attachment point and their call, but spoofed deauth stuff does seem
to
be out of bounds.

I'm not clear on whether it runs afoul of FCC regs as it's not RF
interference directly but rather an (ab)use of higher layer control
mechanisms operating on that spectrum, but it probably does run afoul
of
most thou shalt not 

Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Daniel Seagraves

On Oct 3, 2014, at 10:45 PM, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:

 Jay,
 
 Killing hotspots of completely discrete networks because $$$ is heinous.  I 
 had extended this to e.g.:
 

It’s not just Marriott doing this; A friend of mine went to a convention near 
DC and found the venue was doing something like this. I don’t know if the 
method was the same, but he reported that any time he connected to his phone he 
would be disconnected “nearly immediately. He mentioned this to a con staffer 
and was told you had to rent internet access from the venue, it cost several 
hundred dollars per day. Same for electricity, about which he was told “If you 
have to ask how much it costs, you cannot afford it.”




Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Hennigan
On 10/3/14, 7:57 PM, Hugo Slabbert wrote:

 But it's not a completely discrete network.  It is a subset of the
 existing network in the most common example of e.g. a WLAN + NAT device
 providing access to additional clients, or at least an adjacent network
 attached to the existing one.  Okay: theoretically a guest could spin up
 a hotspot and not attach it to the hotel network at all, but I'm
 assuming that's a pretty tiny edge case.

The appropriate remedy would be to deny access to the WLAN+NAT device
from your host network, not to interfere with its communication to its
clients. Or ask the guest operating it to leave the premises.

A guest spinning up a hotspot not connected to the hotel network is far
from an edge case. Cellular 3G/4G/LTE-to-hotspot devices are quite
common and widely deployed. Tethering one's laptop to one's smartphone
is also very common. Jamming such communications does nothing to protect
one's own wi-fi, only to protect one's profits.

 As the administration of the hotel/org network, I'm within bounds to say
 you're not allowed attach unauthorized devices to the network or extend
 the network and that should be fair in my network, my rules, no?  And
 so I can take action against a breach of those terms.

As long as it's a legal action, such as denying the MAC of the
unauthorized device to your network, absolutely. In this case it's
someone else's network, hence not your rules.

 The hotspot is a separate network, but I don't have to allow it to
 connect to my network.  I guess that points towards killing the wired
 port as a better method, as doing deauth on the hotspot(s) WLAN(s) would
 mean that you are participating in the separate network(s) and causing
 harm there rather than at the attachment point.

Precisely.

 But what then of the duplicate SSID of the nefarious user at the
 business?  What recourse does the business have while still staying in
 bounds?

As long as the nefarious user isn't connecting to the business's
network, none. There are likely hundreds of thousands if not millions of
networks whose SSID is 'Linksys', duplicated willy-nilly worldwide.

--
Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - j...@impulse.net
Impulse Internet Service  -  http://www.impulse.net/
Your local telephone and internet company - 805 884-6323 - WB6RDV


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Majdi S. Abbas
On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 10:57:29PM -0500, Daniel Seagraves wrote:
 It?s not just Marriott doing this; A friend of mine went to a convention 
 near DC and found the venue was doing something like this. I don?t know if 
 the method was the same, but he reported that any time he connected to his 
 phone he would be disconnected ?nearly immediately. He mentioned this to a 
 con staffer and was told you had to rent internet access from the venue, it 
 cost several hundred dollars per day. Same for electricity, about which he 

I've seen this in a few places, but if anyone encounters similar
behavior, I suggest the following:

- Document the incident.
- Identify the make and model of the access point, or
  controller, and be sure to pass along this information to 
  the FCC's OET: http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/

Vendors really need to start losing their US device certification 
for devices that include advertised features that violate US law.  It
would put a stop to this sort of thing pretty quickly.

--msa


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Hennigan
On 10/3/14, 8:04 PM, Hugo Slabbert wrote:

 I'm not clear on whether it runs afoul of FCC regs as it's not RF
 interference directly but rather an (ab)use of higher layer control
 mechanisms operating on that spectrum, but it probably does run afoul of
 most thou shalt not harm other networks legislation like the
 California example.

You can't get to layer 2 or layer 3 without layer 1.  The abuse of
higher layer control protocols requires an RF transmitter within the
radio spectrum, hence it is interference.  It is a much more selectively
targeted type of interference than broadband noise, but it's very
obviously interference over radio frequencies by any definition.


-- 
--
Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - j...@impulse.net
Impulse Internet Service  -  http://www.impulse.net/
Your local telephone and internet company - 805 884-6323 - WB6RDV


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Owen DeLong
The hotel is being fined for blocking/jamming users setting up wifi via mobile 
technologies and such, not using the hotel's network. Hard for me to imagine 
how the hotel gets to insert itself into any applicable AUP in that scenario.  

Owen




 On Oct 3, 2014, at 19:25, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:
 
 On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu wrote:
 
 IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g. California
 Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
 without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services
 or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user
 of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access to
 somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.
 
 My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the blocking 
 tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs are not 
 authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in contravention of 
 the AUP of the hotel/org network.
 
 
 /Mike
 
 
 
 --
 Hugo
 
 On 10/3/14 5:15 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various
 vendors are illegal if used in the US?
 
 On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
 - Original Message -
 From: Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com
 
 It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and carries no
 authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
 provided.
 
 What's the code for E_GREEDY?
 
 Cheers,
 -- jra
 --
 Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink
 j...@baylink.com
 Designer The Things I Think
 RFC 2100
 Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000 Land
 Rover DII
 St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1 727
 647 1274
 
 
 
 --
 09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0
 
 


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Owen DeLong
If the signal that is causing the harmful interference is a radio transmission, 
then the FCC doesn't differentiate between noise and intelligent harmful 
interference. If you interfere elsewhere on the wire or without transmitting, 
you might avoid the part 15 rules about causing harmful interference. If you 
transmit a signal over the air, then the FCC has authority and requires that 
you not cause harmful interference. 

Owen




 On Oct 3, 2014, at 19:42, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:
 
 On Fri 2014-Oct-03 16:49:49 -0700, Owen DeLong o...@delong.com wrote:
 
 
 On Oct 3, 2014, at 16:12 , Wayne E Bouchard w...@typo.org wrote:
 
 On Fri, Oct 03, 2014 at 02:23:46PM -0700, Keenan Tims wrote:
 The question here is what is authorized and what is not.  Was this to 
 protect their network from rogues, or protect revenue from captive 
 customers.
 
 I can't imagine that any 'AP-squashing' packets are ever authorized,
 outside of a lab. The wireless spectrum is shared by all, regardless of
 physical locality. Because it's your building doesn't mean you own the
 spectrum.
 
 I think that depends on the terms of your lease agreement. Could not
 a hotel or conference center operate reserve the right to employ
 active devices to disable any unauthorized wireless systems? Perhaps
 because they want to charge to provide that service, because they
 don't want errant signals leaking from their building, a rogue device
 could be considered an intruder and represent a risk to the network,
 or because they don't want someone setting up a system that would
 interfere with their wireless gear and take down other clients who are
 on premesis...
 
 Would not such an active device be quite appropriate there?
 
 You may consider it appropriate from a financial or moral perspective, but 
 it is absolutely wrong under the communications act of 1934 as amended.
 
 The following is an oversimplification and IANAL, but generally:
 
 You are _NOT_ allowed to intentionally cause harmful interference with a 
 signal for any reason. If you are the primary user on a frequency, you are 
 allowed to conduct your normal operations without undue concern for other 
 users of the same spectrum, but you are not allowed to deliberately 
 interfere with any secondary user just for the sake of interfering with them.
 
 The kind of active devices being discussed and the activities of the hotel 
 in question appear to have run well afoul of these regulations.
 
 As someone else said, owning the property does not constitute ownership of 
 the airwaves within the boundaries of the property, at least in the US (and 
 I suspect in most if not all ITU countries).
 
 Owen
 
 Serious question:  do the FCC regulations on RF spectrum interference extend 
 beyond layer 1?  I would assume that blasting a bunch of RF noise would be 
 pretty obviously out of bounds, but my understanding is that the mechanisms 
 described for rogue AP squashing operate at L2.  The *effect* is to render 
 the wireless medium pretty much useless for its intended purpose, but that's 
 accomplished by the use (abuse?) of higher layer control mechanisms.
 
 I'm not condoning this, but do the FCC regulations RF interference apply?  Do 
 they have authority above L1 in this case?
 
 -- 
 Hugo


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Owen DeLong
If there were a duplicate SSID, the. The nefarious user is the one causing 
illegal harmful interference. 

However, as I understand the case in question, Marriott was blocking stand-up 
mobile hotspots not attached to their wired network or bridged/routed through 
their wifi. 

As you pointed out, even if this were unauthorized extension of the Marriott 
network, Marriott's legitimate response would have been disconnecting the 
extension from their network, not causing harmful interference to the other 
network. 

Owen




 On Oct 3, 2014, at 19:57, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:
 
 Looks like you cut off, but:
 
 Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and 
 what would happen at a business that was running rogue AP detection. In the 
 business the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the 
 company operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the 
 portable AP would be trying to create a different, separate network. And so 
 your thesis does not hold.
 
 But it's not a completely discrete network.  It is a subset of the existing 
 network in the most common example of e.g. a WLAN + NAT device providing 
 access to additional clients, or at least an adjacent network attached to the 
 existing one.  Okay: theoretically a guest could spin up a hotspot and not 
 attach it to the hotel network at all, but I'm assuming that's a pretty tiny 
 edge case.
 
 As the administration of the hotel/org network, I'm within bounds to say 
 you're not allowed attach unauthorized devices to the network or extend the 
 network and that should be fair in my network, my rules, no?  And so I can 
 take action against a breach of those terms.
 
 The hotspot is a separate network, but I don't have to allow it to connect to 
 my network.  I guess that points towards killing the wired port as a better 
 method, as doing deauth on the hotspot(s) WLAN(s) would mean that you are 
 participating in the separate network(s) and causing harm there rather than 
 at the attachment point.
 
 But what then of the duplicate SSID of the nefarious user at the business?  
 What recourse does the business have while still staying in bounds?
 
 --
 Hugo
 
 On Fri 2014-Oct-03 22:27:06 -0400, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
 
 Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and 
 what would happen at a business that was running rogue AP detection. In the 
 business the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the 
 company operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the 
 portable AP would be trying to create a different, separate network. And so 
 your thesis does not hold.
 
 I think this is the distinction we need. Because it's clear that the 
 business thing should be able to happen and the hotel thing should
 
 On October 3, 2014 10:25:22 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert h...@slabnet.com wrote:
 On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman m...@ucla.edu
 wrote:
 
 IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
 California
 Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to knowingly and
 without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer
 services
 or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized
 user
 of a computer, computer system, or computer network.  Blocking access
 to
 somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.
 
 My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
 blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs
 are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
 contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.
 
 
 /Mike
 
 --
 Hugo
 
 On 10/3/14 5:15 PM, Mike Hale eyeronic.des...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various
 vendors are illegal if used in the US?
 
 On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
 - Original Message -
 From: Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com
 
 It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and
 carries no
 authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
 provided.
 
 What's the code for E_GREEDY?
 
 Cheers,
 -- jra
 --
 Jay R. Ashworth  Baylink
 j...@baylink.com
 Designer The Things I Think
 RFC 2100
 Ashworth  Associates   http://www.bcp38.info  2000
 Land
 Rover DII
 St Petersburg FL USA  BCP38: Ask For It By Name!   +1
 727
 647 1274
 
 
 
 --
 09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0
 
 -- 
 Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
 
 -- 
 Hugo


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Jay Hennigan
On 10/3/14, 8:45 PM, Hugo Slabbert wrote:
 Jay,
 
 Thanks; I think I was stretching this a bit far beyond just the Marriott
 example.  Killing hotspots of completely discrete networks because $$$
 is heinous.  I had extended this to e.g.:
 
 1.  Hotel charges for either wired or wireless access per device and has
 network policies to that effect.

OK.

 2.  Guest pays for a single device and hooks up an AP or AP/NAT combo to
 the wired port.

Guest has only a single device connected to hotel's network, which he is
paying for. OK.

 3.  User piggybacks multiple devices on that device's WLAN.

His network, his rules. Hotel has no right to interfere. He only has one
device connected to them. Same scenario as that of a residential ISP
where a user pays for one dynamic IP address, installs a NAT box and
connects several devices to it.

If hotel has an AUP that specifically prohibits this, then they are
within their rights to disconnect the user from their network, but not
to interfere with his network. If they do so he now has his own little
private WLAN going nowhere but it works just fine.

--
Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - j...@impulse.net
Impulse Internet Service  -  http://www.impulse.net/
Your local telephone and internet company - 805 884-6323 - WB6RDV


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Larry Sheldon

On 10/3/2014 22:09, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:

On Fri, 03 Oct 2014 20:31:56 -0500, Larry Sheldon said:


What it is about red-colored APs that is offensive?  I have never seen one.


It's a color code that indicates it's an RFC3514-compliant device.


%^)

--
The unique Characteristics of System Administrators:

The fact that they are infallible; and,

The fact that they learn from their mistakes.


Quis custodiet ipsos custodes


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Larry Sheldon

On 10/3/2014 22:26, Hugo Slabbert wrote:

On Sat 2014-Oct-04 08:37:32 +0530, Suresh Ramasubramanian
ops.li...@gmail.com wrote:


Wifi offered by a carrier citywide, or free wifi signals from a nearby
hotel / park / coffee shop..


Perfect example (thanks) of why cutting off network attachment points
would be fair game while effectively attacking other WLANs has
collateral damage.


Most crimes not committed by government entities have to go through an 
indictment-trial-conviction sequence before punisihment is administered.


Except in Chicago.

--
The unique Characteristics of System Administrators:

The fact that they are infallible; and,

The fact that they learn from their mistakes.


Quis custodiet ipsos custodes


Re: Marriott wifi blocking

2014-10-03 Thread Larry Sheldon

On 10/3/2014 23:31, Owen DeLong wrote:

The hotel is being fined for blocking/jamming users setting up wifi
via mobile technologies and such, not using the hotel's network. Hard
for me to imagine how the hotel gets to insert itself into any
applicable AUP in that scenario.


+1

What happens if the AP happens to be stopped at a traffic light outside?

--
The unique Characteristics of System Administrators:

The fact that they are infallible; and,

The fact that they learn from their mistakes.

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes