Is there anyone from Bell Mobility to help us unblock a routing issue?
Hi, We are looking for someone from Bell mobility NOC. We are a VoIP service provider: Cloudli Communication ASN#18637. We are peering with Bell ISP and advertising the IP block 198.38.7.0/24. We have connectivity problems with our customers, when they are on the Bell LTE networks in the Lac Saint-Jean region. For information, when customers move to another region, everything works fine. This disorder started in April. Thank you Raphael Grenier
Re: Changes to ARIN Online - Routing Security Dashboard - RPKI & IRR integration (was: Fwd: [arin-announce] New Features Added to ARIN Online)
Following up on John Curran's note, we just deployed a new release of ARIN Online at approx. 16:10 UTC today (10 Aug 2023). Here are the release notes: ARIN has completed a new release to pause functionality deployed on 7 August 2023 that creates corresponding IRR Route Objects for every ROA created. We have also paused the functionality that automatically creates IRR Route Objects for all preexisting ROAs that presently lack a matching Route Object. We recognize the importance of ensuring that our services align with the needs and expectations of our community and believe that additional time for community consultation on this integration functionality is warranted. Regards, Mark From: NANOG on behalf of John Curran Date: Wednesday, August 9, 2023 at 6:20 PM To: NANOG Subject: Re: Changes to ARIN Online - Routing Security Dashboard - RPKI & IRR integration (was: Fwd: [arin-announce] New Features Added to ARIN Online) NANOGers - As alluded to by Mark Kosters in his message below, we are placing on hold the functionality for the automatic creation of corresponding new route objects for RPKI validated ROAs that lack such. This is being done out of an abundance of caution in order to allow us to conduct a community consultation in the near future to confirm with the operational community the desired functionality in this area. Thanks! /John John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Number
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
> We are seeing some weird routing from them, and the AS2 they are > attached to (University of Delaware) seems odd. classic microtik prepend syntax confusion? randy
ARIN Consultation on Automatic Creation of IRR Route Objects
NANOGers - As I noted earlier, we have opened a community consultation seeking input on the desired technical functionality for RPKI ROA / IRR route object integration in the ARIN registry - see the message attached below for details. If you have particular views on this topic, then please subscribe to the arin-consult mailing list (open to all at http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-consult) and provide your input. Thanks! /John John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers Begin forwarded message: From: ARIN Subject: [arin-announce] Consultation on Pending Functionality for Automatic Creation of IRR Route Objects for Uncovered ROAs Date: August 10, 2023 at 3:35:01 PM EDT To: "arin-annou...@arin.net" Dear ARIN Community, ARIN is seeking feedback from the community regarding a specific aspect of the recent ARIN Online functionality that was deployed on 7 August 2023. This upgrade to ARIN Online brought several new features – including tighter integration of ARIN’s Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and Internet Routing Registry (IRR) routing security services. Upon further review and out of an abundance of caution, we have decided to pause the additional functionality that creates corresponding IRR Route Objects for every Route Origin Authorization (ROA) created. We have also paused the functionality that automatically creates IRR Route Objects for all preexisting ROAs that presently lack a matching Route Object. We recognize the importance of ensuring that our services align with the needs and expectations of our community and believe that additional time for community consultation on this integration functionality is warranted. The current development plan is to provide an opt-in feature to allow for the creation of IRR Route Objects during new ROA creation in the near future. We are seeking operator input through this community consultation (https://www.arin.net/participate/community/acsp/consultations/2023/2023-4/) to gather input on the desirability of additional functionality related to integrating RPKI and IRR security services. The questions for community consideration are: - Should the automatic creation of IRR route objects for resources that have RPKI ROAs be compulsory, the default setting, or require explicit opt-in? - Should IRR Objects be managed via a direct linkage to a ROAs such that they can only be deleted through deletion of the covering ROA, or should ARIN continue to support independent management of IRR route objects? - Should ARIN automatically create managed IRR Route Objects for all validated ROAs in the Hosted RPKI repository that do not have matching IRR Route Objects today? - If so, what is the anticipated benefit of doing so? Conversely, if this functionality is not desired, why not? - If a customer agrees to link a ROA with the IRR, what is the appropriate number of route objects that should be created based on the ROA prefix and max length configuration? Would a “least specific” route object meet expectations? We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience that pausing this functionality may have caused and appreciate your understanding as we work to ensure that our services are aligned with the interests of the community. I encourage all community members to provide their comments and feedback on this matter – the feedback you provide during this consultation will be instrumental in determining how ARIN moves forward with this RPKI/IRR integration functionality. Please provide comments to arin-cons...@arin.net. You can subscribe to this mailing list at https://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-consult This consultation will remain open until 5:00 PM ET on 10 September 2023. ARIN seeks clear direction through community input, so your feedback is important. Thank you for your continued support and engagement. Regards, John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) ___ ARIN-Announce You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Announce Mailing List (arin-annou...@arin.net). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: https://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-announce Please contact i...@arin.net if you experience any issues.
IANA AS Numbers Registry Update
Hi, The IANA AS Numbers registry has been updated to reflect the allocation of the following blocks to the RIPE NCC: 213404-214427 Assigned by RIPE NCC 2023-08-10 214428-215451 Assigned by RIPE NCC 2023-08-10 215452-216475 Assigned by RIPE NCC 2023-08-10 You can find the registry at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/ The allocation was made in accordance with the Policy for Allocation of ASN Blocks to Regional Internet Registries: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/global-policy-asn-blocks-2010-09-21-en Best regards, David Dong IANA Services Sr. Specialist
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
On 8/10/23 20:43, Randy Bush wrote: classic microtik prepend syntax confusion? Uncertain. I have a Mikrotik CPE for my home router, but I can't tell you how BGP works on it. It seems that AS2, in the path, is not genuine. We are verifying that, though. Mark.
Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire
On 8/11/23 05:17, Eric Kuhnke wrote: Recently saw an aerial video where an entire neighborhood in Laihana had burned down *except* for the concrete block structure small ILEC CO. Pictures I have seen of other ILEC sites in Hawaii closely resemble some GTE sites in the Pacific Northwest (now Ziply), which makes sense with the history of GTE in Hawaii. Does anyone have some more detailed photos or examples of a telecom site that's survived while everything else around it is burned up? I'm seeing that 80% of Laihana is burned out, but that also 80% of the fire is now contained. It's like a war zone. Mark.
Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire
Recently saw an aerial video where an entire neighborhood in Laihana had burned down *except* for the concrete block structure small ILEC CO. Pictures I have seen of other ILEC sites in Hawaii closely resemble some GTE sites in the Pacific Northwest (now Ziply), which makes sense with the history of GTE in Hawaii. Does anyone have some more detailed photos or examples of a telecom site that's survived while everything else around it is burned up? I'm looking to share this with some contacts in BC for rural telecom purposes and disaster preparedness discussions.
Dodgy AS327933 ...?
Hi all. Anyone know anything about this AS: https://bgp.he.net/AS327933 Mark.
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
Hi Mark, On 10/08/2023 11:55, Mark Tinka wrote: Anyone know anything about this AS: https://bgp.he.net/AS327933 from a 2019 DB snapshot: aut-num:AS327933 as-name:GROUPE-TELECOM-SPRL descr: GROUPE TELECOM SPRL status: ASSIGNED org:ORG-GTS2-AFRINIC admin-c:YM8-AFRINIC tech-c: YM9-AFRINIC notify: ***@gtl-rdcongo.com mnt-lower: GTS2-MNT mnt-routes: GTS2-MNT mnt-by: AFRINIC-HM-MNT changed:***@afrinic.net 20150917 source: AFRINIC I think the most common way to get out of this DB is to not pay something. I'd guess that aut-num:AS37451 as-name:CongoTelecom descr: CONGO TELECOM has a relationship with them and AS327933 wanted to prepend 2x [1] to their sole provider. (AS37451) Frank [1] https://bgp.he.net/AS327933#_graph4
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
On 8/10/23 11:38, Frank Habicht wrote: from a 2019 DB snapshot: aut-num: AS327933 as-name: GROUPE-TELECOM-SPRL descr: GROUPE TELECOM SPRL status: ASSIGNED org: ORG-GTS2-AFRINIC admin-c: YM8-AFRINIC tech-c: YM9-AFRINIC notify: ***@gtl-rdcongo.com mnt-lower: GTS2-MNT mnt-routes: GTS2-MNT mnt-by: AFRINIC-HM-MNT changed: ***@afrinic.net 20150917 source: AFRINIC I think the most common way to get out of this DB is to not pay something. I'd guess that aut-num: AS37451 as-name: CongoTelecom descr: CONGO TELECOM has a relationship with them and AS327933 wanted to prepend 2x [1] to their sole provider. (AS37451) We are seeing some weird routing from them, and the AS2 they are attached to (University of Delaware) seems odd. Not sure if any of the American folk on this list can verify AS2 is really part of the University of Delaware... Mark.
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
On 8/10/23 12:01, d...@darwincosta.com wrote: I know someone you might know them. Happy to introduce off-list. Yes, Darwin. That would be most appreciated. Thanks. Mark.
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
> On 10 Aug 2023, at 10:57, Mark Tinka wrote: > > Hi all. Hi Mark, > > Anyone know anything about this AS: > > https://bgp.he.net/AS327933 I know someone you might know them. Happy to introduce off-list. > > Mark. Cheers. Darwin-.
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
On 10/08/2023 16:02, Mark Tinka wrote: We are seeing some weird routing from them, and the AS2 they are attached to (University of Delaware) seems odd. Not sure if any of the American folk on this list can verify AS2 is really part of the University of Delaware... Mark. ouch! I see in your LG that this AS 2 is originating 197.157.254.0/24 . which seems to mean that it's not just a plain "we want to prepend 2 times, put the number 2 into config and the NOS takes this as the ASN to insert" putting someone from AS37451 into BCC. ouch again! looking for "show ip bgp regexp _37451 2_" in Mark's LG, i see there are many originated and downstream's prefixes of AS37451 affected. So i'd now thing it's a AS37451 issue, not AS327933 alone. Frank
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
On 8/10/23 15:22, Frank Habicht wrote: ouch! I see in your LG that this AS 2 is originating 197.157.254.0/24 . which seems to mean that it's not just a plain "we want to prepend 2 times, put the number 2 into config and the NOS takes this as the ASN to insert" putting someone from AS37451 into BCC. ouch again! looking for "show ip bgp regexp _37451 2_" in Mark's LG, i see there are many originated and downstream's prefixes of AS37451 affected. Right, these are the "odd" issues I am referring to that we are looking into. So i'd now thing it's a AS37451 issue, not AS327933 alone. Needless to say that the grapevine seems to claim that AS327933 is announcing bogons. We are reaching out to our customer (China Telecom) who is their provider to investigate. Thanks, Frank. Mark.
Re: Dodgy AS327933 ...?
AS2 is the most hijacked prefix in the world. Yes UD still owns it, but since different router vendors use different methods of prepending AS numbers, many folks try to prepend twice and end up announcing on AS2.. thanks mike On 8/10/23 9:02 AM, Mark Tinka wrote: On 8/10/23 11:38, Frank Habicht wrote: from a 2019 DB snapshot: aut-num: AS327933 as-name: GROUPE-TELECOM-SPRL descr: GROUPE TELECOM SPRL status: ASSIGNED org: ORG-GTS2-AFRINIC admin-c: YM8-AFRINIC tech-c: YM9-AFRINIC notify: ***@gtl-rdcongo.com mnt-lower: GTS2-MNT mnt-routes: GTS2-MNT mnt-by: AFRINIC-HM-MNT changed: ***@afrinic.net 20150917 source: AFRINIC I think the most common way to get out of this DB is to not pay something. I'd guess that aut-num: AS37451 as-name: CongoTelecom descr: CONGO TELECOM has a relationship with them and AS327933 wanted to prepend 2x [1] to their sole provider. (AS37451) We are seeing some weird routing from them, and the AS2 they are attached to (University of Delaware) seems odd. Not sure if any of the American folk on this list can verify AS2 is really part of the University of Delaware... Mark. -- Mike Davis Lead Network Architect University of Delaware - 302.831.8756 Newark, DE 19716Email da...@udel.edu
