[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7218] Re: Natural meaning
Howard, Stephen, I think it would be more accurate to say that meaning is *recreated* by the interpreting agent. In other words, the interpretant is a sign, but not just any sign arbitrarily invented by the interpreter. In order to be meaningful, it has to carry forward the functioning of the very sign that it interprets, translates or transforms. gary f. -Original Message- From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: 12-Oct-14 8:19 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:7218] Re: Natural At 07:04 AM 10/12/2014, Stephen C. Rose wrote: lol. And who says what the meaning is? HP: Meaning is created by the interpreting agent. Most biosemioticians believe that interpreting agents and life are coextensive. Certainty the first self-replicating cell must interpret its coded symbolic instructions. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Interpreters and Interpretants
Re: Howard Pattee At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14669 Howard, List, Peirce's classic statement about the relationship between interpreters and interpretants is a topic I discussed somewhat playfully here: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_1#1.3.4.18._C.27est_Moi quote I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word, concept, symbol has an equivalent term — or one which has become identified with it, — in short, has an interpretant. Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a representation is something which stands for something. … A thing cannot stand for something without standing to something for that something. Now, what is this that a word stands to? Is it a person? We usually say that the word homme stands to a Frenchman for man. It would be a little more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's mind — to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular remembrance or image in that memory. And what image, what remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent of the word homme — in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or stands to, is its interpretant or identified symbol. … The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand to something, every symbol — every word and every conception — must have an interpretant — or what is the same thing, must have information or implication. /quote(Peirce, CE 1, 466–467). Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7218] Re: Natural meaning
If you have ever preached you will remember times when your statements are remembered by an enthusiast who repeats to you what you said, implying a meaning. Often not what you meant. I think meaning must be seen to be in the eye of the beholder with only scant (if that) reference to what was actually meant. This may be why advertisers surmise that seven or eight repetitions is needed to elicit the intended response.And why a good communicator is one who manages to overcome the disconnect more often than others. Maybe dicisigns are truths that transcend this problem, a realm of clarity within the welter of failed communications. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Gary F., Howard, Stephen, A long time ago in an introductory perception course I suggested to the professor that the creative filling in of missing sensory information might be better called _*restoration*_ (like that of a painting, involving skill but without assurance of perfect accuracy), and he agreed. However, I don't think that that covers all cases of interpretation. Generally one would say that the meaning or implication is not 'created' but drawn out, brought out, inferred , from something like the hidden state into which Howard said (in an older post) that symbols, as encodings, put the information that they carry. If the meaning or interpretant is arbitrarily 'created', on the other hand, then it was never 'hidden' in the signs. The most 'creative' kind of interpretation seems to be at the evolutionary scale, in the sense that the species and its special interpretive norms are 'created' by evolution. These special norms let the vegetable-level organism interpret, appraise, signs in the perspective of the species' special interests, its special questions, i.e., the norms seem to add value to the interpretants. But that value was added or created by the evolutionary process, and the kinds of interpretant that result still need to reflect the realities and actual and variable conditions faced by the organism and its species - most 'creations' or mutations are for the worse. Best, Ben On 10/12/2014 8:47 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Howard, Stephen, I think it would be more accurate to say that meaning is *recreated* by the interpreting agent. In other words, the interpretant is a sign, but not just any sign arbitrarily invented by the interpreter. In order to be meaningful, it has to carry forward the functioning of the very sign that it interprets, translates or transforms. gary f. -Original Message- From: Howard Pattee Sent: 12-Oct-14 8:19 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:7218] Re: Natural At 07:04 AM 10/12/2014, Stephen C. Rose wrote: lol. And who says what the meaning is? HP: Meaning is created by the interpreting agent. Most biosemioticians believe that interpreting agents and life are coextensive. Certainty the first self-replicating cell must interpret its coded symbolic instructions. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7218] Re: Natural meaning
Stephen, lists, People sometimes misinterpret a speaker, but this is partly because the communication system is not even structured to be purely the kind toward which Shannon's communication theory was mainly oriented - a system with rigid pre-established code and so on. Sometimes communication is merely faulty. Our ways of communicating do involve more potential for miscommunication than might seem necessary. But this is a price paid for flexibility, the opportunity to learn, e.g., to revise one's 'codes' on the run, on the wing, etc., and to learn to interpret signs from mixes of sign systems that are not one's own. People, like species, come with their own questions and interests, seeking to extract information to answer their own questions, not necessarily the questions that the speaker anticipates or imagines, even when the speaker is a preacher or teacher who wants people to revise their ways, learn new ones. A constraint that tends to keep interpretations from being too arbitrary is that, if one's interpretations do not reflect reality, then reality will exact a cost for it. To understand what interpretation is, means understanding it in terms of purpose and success, how interpretation can go right, and not only how it can go wrong, reducing it to only the cases wherein it is arbitrary, capricious, consisting _/merely/_ in the eye of the beholder. Best, Ben On 10/12/2014 10:58 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: If you have ever preached you will remember times when your statements are remembered by an enthusiast who repeats to you what you said, implying a meaning. Often not what you meant. I think meaning must be seen to be in the eye of the beholder with only scant (if that) reference to what was actually meant. This may be why advertisers surmise that seven or eight repetitions is needed to elicit the intended response.And why a good communicator is one who manages to overcome the disconnect more often than others. Maybe dicisigns are truths that transcend this problem, a realm of clarity within the welter of failed communications. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Gary F., Howard, Stephen, A long time ago in an introductory perception course I suggested to the professor that the creative filling in of missing sensory information might be better called _/restoration/_ (like that of a painting, involving skill but without assurance of perfect accuracy), and he agreed. However, I don't think that that covers all cases of interpretation. Generally one would say that the meaning or implication is not 'created' but drawn out, brought out, inferred , from something like the hidden state into which Howard said (in an older post) that symbols, as encodings, put the information that they carry. If the meaning or interpretant is arbitrarily 'created', on the other hand, then it was never 'hidden' in the signs. The most 'creative' kind of interpretation seems to be at the evolutionary scale, in the sense that the species and its special interpretive norms are 'created' by evolution. These special norms let the vegetable-level organism interpret, appraise, signs in the perspective of the species' special interests, its special questions, i.e., the norms seem to add value to the interpretants. But that value was added or created by the evolutionary process, and the kinds of interpretant that result still need to reflect the realities and actual and variable conditions faced by the organism and its species - most 'creations' or mutations are for the worse. Best, Ben On 10/12/2014 8:47 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Howard, Stephen, I think it would be more accurate to say that meaning is *recreated* by the interpreting agent. In other words, the interpretant is a sign, but not just any sign arbitrarily invented by the interpreter. In order to be meaningful, it has to carry forward the functioning of the very sign that it interprets, translates or transforms. gary f. -Original Message- From: Howard Pattee Sent: 12-Oct-14 8:19 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:7218] Re: Natural At 07:04 AM 10/12/2014, Stephen C. Rose wrote: lol. And who says what the meaning is? HP: Meaning is created by the interpreting agent. Most biosemioticians believe that interpreting agents and life are coextensive. Certainty the first self-replicating cell must interpret its coded symbolic instructions. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Pragmatism, Not Less
The origins of universalism are interesting. An unfamiliar but to me the most relevant source is English universalism propounded by an obscure cleric called James Relly. John Murray brought universalism to America and the church eventually lost all of its original meaning by merging with the Unitarians. The original meaning arrived at universalism by means of assuming the universal culpability of everyone on earth. Rather than slice and dice the occupants into lost and saved, the mechanism of most religions, Relly and his followers surmised that everyonewas and is saved.This is apposite in my view and consistent with Peirce, whose fallibilism can by extension beapplied generally to human beings and their proclivities. Sorry for running words together. I blame it on my computer! *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 12:10 PM, Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de wrote: My post was a bit polemic, because I was mad at Mumfords neglection of the value of life and that he called that universalism. And I was indeed thinking of the nazis. I think, a culture that is not based on the value of life is not universalist, but the opposite: Particularist. Universalism for me is eg. Kants categorical imperative, and Kants other imperative, that humans (so also human life) should be treated as aims, not as means. And scientists like Kohlberg and pragmatists like Peirce were scolars of Kant. So my conclusion was, that, when someone is attacking scientists and pragmatists, his universalism is in fact particularism. And his concept of culture too, because for him, culture is not based on the value of life, but vice versa. But I was refering to a quote out of its context, maybe. Best, Helmut Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com Ben, Helmut, Stephen, list, I certainly won't defend Brooks because I think he misuses Mumford. and even in the choice of this early material taken out of context, to support his argument *contra* Pragmatism in the article cited. I have always had a generally positive take on Mumford's ideas, although I don't believe I have ever read an entire book by him. This evening as I browsed through a selection of quotations from his books I found more which resonated positively with me than did not--which is not to say that I agree with him in each of the ideas expressed. Still, some of his ideas do not seem opposed to philosophical pragmatism, although his critical purposes aren't much attuned to it, at least as I see it at the moment. See: http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Lewis_Mumford Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 718%20482-5690* On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Helmut, list, I seldom am inclined to defend Brooks. I haven't read Mumford, although I have somewhere his book on Melville that I meant to read. For what it's worth, I'll point out that Mumford wrote the Brooks-quoted remark in 1940, when the horrors of WWII had not fully unfolded yet. Maybe he never backed down from it, I don't know. In a box somewhere I have another book that I meant to read, about how in the Nazi death camps sheer survival, fighting just to live, became a kind of heroism. The higher ideals ought to serve life, not tell it that it's full of crap, only to replace the crap with other crap, a.k.a. brainwashing and Mobilization (quick flash of Pink Floyd's marching hammers). They want politics and think it will save them. At best, it gives direction to their numbed desires. But there is no politics but the manipulation of power through language. Thus the latter's constant debasement. - Gilbert Sorrentino in _Splendide-Hôtel_. Best, Ben On 10/11/2014 5:41 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Hi! I think, that Mumford, to whom Brooks refers, is quite close to the Isis: Life is not worth fighting for: bare life is worthless. Justice is worth fighting for, order is worth fighting for, culture ... .is worth fighting for: These universal principles and values give purpose and direction to human life. That could be from an islamist hate-preaching: Your life is worthless, so be a suicide bomber and go to universalist(?) heaven. Brooks and Mumford are moral zealots and relativists who project that on the people who have deserved it the least. They intuitively know that they havent understood anything, the least the concept of universalism, and bark against those who have, because they are jealous. *Gesendet:* Samstag, 11. Oktober 2014 um 20:38 Uhr *Von:* Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com http://gary.richm...@gmail.com *An:* Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu http://peirce-l@list.iupui.edu *Betreff:* [PEIRCE-L] More Pragmatism, Not Less List, Joseph Esposito responded to David Brooks' Oct.3 New York Times column, The Problem with Pragmatism, with this letter
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Pragmatism, Not Less
Stephen - it's called The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, and states that We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stephen C. Rose To: Helmut Raulien Cc: Peirce List Sent: Sunday, October 12, 2014 12:41 PM Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Pragmatism, Not Less The origins of universalism are interesting. An unfamiliar but to me the most relevant source is English universalism propounded by an obscure cleric called James Relly. John Murray brought universalism to America and the church eventually lost all of its original meaning by merging with the Unitarians. The original meaning arrived at universalism by means of assuming the universal culpability of everyone on earth. Rather than slice and dice the occupants into lost and saved, the mechanism of most religions, Relly and his followers surmised that everyonewas and is saved.This is apposite in my view and consistent with Peirce, whose fallibilism can by extension beapplied generally to human beings and their proclivities. Sorry for running words together. I blame it on my computer! @stephencrose On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 12:10 PM, Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de wrote: My post was a bit polemic, because I was mad at Mumfords neglection of the value of life and that he called that universalism. And I was indeed thinking of the nazis. I think, a culture that is not based on the value of life is not universalist, but the opposite: Particularist. Universalism for me is eg. Kants categorical imperative, and Kants other imperative, that humans (so also human life) should be treated as aims, not as means. And scientists like Kohlberg and pragmatists like Peirce were scolars of Kant. So my conclusion was, that, when someone is attacking scientists and pragmatists, his universalism is in fact particularism. And his concept of culture too, because for him, culture is not based on the value of life, but vice versa. But I was refering to a quote out of its context, maybe. Best, Helmut Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com Ben, Helmut, Stephen, list, I certainly won't defend Brooks because I think he misuses Mumford. and even in the choice of this early material taken out of context, to support his argument contra Pragmatism in the article cited. I have always had a generally positive take on Mumford's ideas, although I don't believe I have ever read an entire book by him. This evening as I browsed through a selection of quotations from his books I found more which resonated positively with me than did not--which is not to say that I agree with him in each of the ideas expressed. Still, some of his ideas do not seem opposed to philosophical pragmatism, although his critical purposes aren't much attuned to it, at least as I see it at the moment. See: http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Lewis_Mumford Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Helmut, list, I seldom am inclined to defend Brooks. I haven't read Mumford, although I have somewhere his book on Melville that I meant to read. For what it's worth, I'll point out that Mumford wrote the Brooks-quoted remark in 1940, when the horrors of WWII had not fully unfolded yet. Maybe he never backed down from it, I don't know. In a box somewhere I have another book that I meant to read, about how in the Nazi death camps sheer survival, fighting just to live, became a kind of heroism. The higher ideals ought to serve life, not tell it that it's full of crap, only to replace the crap with other crap, a.k.a. brainwashing and Mobilization (quick flash of Pink Floyd's marching hammers). They want politics and think it will save them. At best, it gives direction to their numbed desires. But there is no politics but the manipulation of power through language. Thus the latter's constant debasement. - Gilbert Sorrentino in _Splendide-Hôtel_. Best, Ben On 10/11/2014 5:41 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Hi! I think, that Mumford, to whom Brooks refers, is quite close to the Isis: Life is not worth fighting for: bare life is worthless. Justice is worth fighting for, order is worth fighting for, culture ... .is worth fighting for: These universal principles and values give purpose and direction to human life. That could be from an islamist hate-preaching: Your life is worthless, so be a suicide bomber and go to universalist(?) heaven. Brooks and Mumford are moral zealots and relativists who project that on the people who have deserved it
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Event, WAS Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8
Mary, list, Those are excellent quotes from Peirce. The Critic of Arguments: 2. The Reader is Introduced to Relatives was published in _The Open Court_ No. 268 (Vol. VI—41), October 13, 1892 http://books.google.com/books?id=6qzQMAAJpg=PA3415 and reprinted in CP 3.415-424. The word 'facts' ought to carry connotations of _/relations/_, with arities, transitivities, etc., connotations that the word 'data' often carries. Information is quantified nowadays as a logarithm. Facts as data can be quantified as if they were information, but those properties of relations seem the real mathematicals for treating facts (or data) as bases for drawing conclusions as bases in turn for further conclusions and so on. Still I'm afraid that I've said that the wrong way. You wrote, The previous posts about JS Mill and the definition of event make me think that an event could include a use of such thinking, whether or not it is conscious. Perhaps its becoming close to one's awareness could be part of the process of abduction. I look forward to hearing whether and how you may find this in relation to the topic. [End quote] I'd venture to say that, insofar as an inference process occurs and constitutes a slice of the actual in its infinite detail, indeed it is an occurrence in Peirce's sense and an event in Mill's sense; and that, insofar as an inference process could go one way rather than another, the way that it does go, the turn that it does take, is an event in Peirce' sense. Now, I don't know how to put this in terms of dicisigns in particular, and I think that Frederik disagrees with me about it, but, for my part, I think that, while cenoscopy has plenty to say about both inductive and abductive modes of inference, the consideration of statistical and other principles of inductive inference is, so to speak, more up cenoscopy's alley, analyzing and classifying forms and norms of inductive inference, and that abductive inference is so dependent on context, subject matter (I remember once reading about a book _/A Field Guide to Inductive Inference/_ which was really about abductive inference) and cultivated instinct or 'intuition', etc., that special sciences will throw further needed light, if less general light, on its nature, at least as practiced by us humans, as well as by any other intelligent life that we may be lucky or unlucky enough to find, and I guess as by higher animals. In such study of abductive inference, the study of actual inference _/events/_ should be pertinent, including even the coming to consciousness, I figure. Sophisticated understandings that might help us logically in abducing hypotheses may simply tend often not to reach cenoscopic, philosophical generality. Peirce said, there is no point in specifying more rules than needed for a mode of inference, and that there just isn't much in terms of logical _/rules/_ to specify for the act of abductive inference itself; an abductive conclusion is just a conjecture that arises in the mind. Peirce focuses on instinct and, at the methodeutical level, on strategic selection, separation, ordering, etc., of hypotheses for testing so as to expedite inquiry. Deductions can get vastly complicated and still be rigorous; but an abductive inference that gets vastly complicated is like a plan with too many moving parts. Well, so far I haven't taken up generalized idea of abductive inference, abductive quasi-inference in vegetable-level systems or the like. But for the time being that's my two cents worth. Best, Ben On 10/12/2014 12:01 PM, Mary Libertin wrote: In our discussion of Stjernfelt’s /Natural Propositions/ the comments about facts and relations, I hear an insistent echo of a quote from Peirce -- that a “fact is a relation” (CP 3.416). I found it In Peirce’s paper “The Critic of Arguments,” part 2, “The Reader is Introduced to Relatives.” I find it a rich passage for consideration in our discussion of dicisigns. Peirce does not use the term dicisign per se; nevertheless it is fascinating to watch him think through the connections an index and icon have between reality and various ways of representing them in propositions. I apologize for copying the context of the above quote that “every fact is a relation.” 3.416. “*A /relation/ is a /fact/ about a number of things*. Thus the fact that a locomotive blows off steam constitutes a relation, or more accurately a relationship (the /Century Dictionary,/ under /relation,/ 3, gives the terminology. See also /relativity,/ etc.) between the locomotive and the steam. *In reality, every fact is a relation.* Thus, that an object is blue consists of the peculiar regular action of that object on human eyes. This is what should be understood by the relativity of knowledge. 3.417. “Not only is every fact really a relation but your thought of the fact /implicitly/ represents it as such. Thus,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Pragmatism, Not Less
I read David Brooks’ piece in the New York Times, and have had a long term interest in pragmatism and in the work of Lewis Mumford. I actually discuss Mumford’s essay described by Brooks in my book,* Bereft of Reason*, on page 147 forward. I find the both the letter to the New York Times from Joseph Esposito and Gary R’s claim that Brooks misused Mumford uninformed and misguided, and Helmut’s claim that Mumford’s position is close to ISIS to be amazingly thoughtless, 180 degrees from the truth, missing Mumford’s point in this context being described that living for immediate pleasure gratification regardless of purpose is wrong. In my opinion Mumford’s position regarding intervention against Nazi Germany was correct and Dewey’s at the time before World War II was incorrect. Mumford’s allowance of the emotions was closer to Peirce's outlook, and in that sense Brooks’s understanding of “pragmatism,” whatever he meant by using the term, was shallow. And the term Mumford was using was pragmatic liberalism. Ironically, by the very same logic, Mumford came to condemn the United States' use of the atomic bomb at the end of World War II, and became a critic of the US military megamachine and political megamachine, and turned against the Vietnam War by 1965-6, one year after he had received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Lyndon Johnson. I would like to see what conservative David Brooks would do with that. I have quoted some excerpts from my chapter in *Bereft of Reason*, on “Lewis Mumford’s Organic World-View” below. Gene excerpt from *Bereft of Reason*: “The second confrontation with Dewey and pragmatism occurred on the eve of World War Two, and concerned what Mumford termed “The Corruption of Liberalism.” Mumford believed that fascism would not listen to reasonable talk and could not be appeased, and urged strong measures as early as 1935 against Hitler and in support of European nations which might be attacked by Hitler. By 1938 he urged in *The New Republic* that the United States “Strike first against fascism; and strike hard, but strike.” His militant position was widely attacked by the left, and he lost a number of friends in the process, including Frank Lloyd Wright, Van Wyck Brooks, Charles Beard, and Malcolm Cowley among others. To give an idea of the opinions and climate of the prewar debate, just consider the titles of commentaries published in the March, 1939 issue of *Common Sense* on the question “If War Comes--Shall We Participate or be Neutral?”: Bertrand Russell, “The Case for U.S. Neutrality;” Max Lerner, “`Economic Force’ May Be Enough;” Charles A. Beard, “America Cannot ‘Save’ Europe;” John T. Flynn, “Nothing Less Than a Crime;” and Harry Elmer Barnes, “A War for ‘Tory Finance’?”. Dewey’s contribution was titled, “No Matter What Happens--Stay Out,” and it could not have been more opposed to Mumford’s piece, “Fascism is Worse than War.” Mumford believed that the inability of the left to see that rational persuasion and appeasement were inadequate to stem Hitler’s Hell-bound ambition indicated a corruption in the tradition of what Mumford called “pragmatic liberalism.” The fatal error of pragmatic liberalism was its gutless intellectualism, its endorsement of emotional neutrality as a basis for objectivity, which he characterized as “the dread of the emotions.” He illustrated why the emotions ought to play a significant part in rational decisions with an example of encountering a poisonous snake: “If one meets a poisonous snake on one’s path, two things are important for a *rational* reaction. One is to identify it, and not make the error of assuming that a copperhead is a harmless adder. The other is to have a prompt emotion of fear, if the snake *is* poisonous; for fear starts the flow of adren[al]in into the blood-stream, and that will not merely put the organism as a whole on the alert, but it will give it the extra strength needed either to run away or to attack. Merely to look at the snake abstractedly, without identifying it and without sensing danger and experiencing fear, may lead to the highly irrational step of permitting the snake to draw near without being on one’s guard against his bite.” Emotions, as this example makes clear, are not the opposite of the rational in the conduct of life, and therefore should not be neutralized in order for rational judgments to be made. The emotion of fear in this example is a non-rational inference which provides a means for feeling one’s way in a problematic situation to a rational reaction before the rationale becomes conscious… … In my opinion Dewey’s concept that the “context of situation” should provide the ground for social inquiries remains an important antidote to empty formalism and blind empiricism. Yet the clearest evidence of its shortcomings in the practice of life was Dewey’s belief on the eve of World War II that the United States should stay out of the impending war against Nazi Germany,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Pragmatism, Not Less
Gene Halton wrote: I find the both the letter to the New York Times from Joseph Esposito and Gary R's claim that Brooks misused Mumford uninformed and misguided and yet you continue, Gene, that Mumford's allowance of the emotions was closer to Peirce's outlook, and in that sense Brooks's understanding of pragmatism, whatever he meant by using the term, was shallow. So which is it Gene? Did Joseph and I perhaps get a sense of Brooks' shallowness as you termed it? Our take was certainly more about Brooks than Mumford. I thought I made it quite clear that I have been generally quite sympathetic to Mumford's arguments (one of the reasons why I posted the group of quotations of his which I did), but, again, I found, as did you, Brooks's understanding of 'pragmatism' . . . .shallow. So Joseph and I agree with you at least in that. It is possible that when I read your book *Bereft of Reason* a few years ago I may have concentrated too heavily on such lines as the one you just quoted regarding the USA's involved in the WW2 that Perhaps American involvement did lead to the military-industrial-academic complex and McCarthyism after the war. . . Now, am I so uniformed and misguided if indeed our involvement in WW2 perhaps led, as you wrote, to the military-industrial-academic complex (Truman was strongly advised to leave out the third term of that diabolical triad, btw, which was NOT academic but Congressional)? And what have we now in American and, indeed, global 'culture' but precisely the military-industrial-congressional complex writ large: the *military-global corporate--governments-corrupted-by-power-and-money complex*? And the women and children still suffer, as Camus wrote. Thanks for all those good wars, those wars to end all wars, etc., etc., etc., etc. Your modifying the last passage from your book which I quoted above with perhaps suggests to me that even you too may have some reservations about how throwing millions of American military lives into the WW2 fodder (and the Korean War fodder, and the Vietnam War fodder, and the Iraq wars fodder, and the Afghanistan fodder, and, and, and--who knows what the future may bring in the way of human fodder offered to the war machine?), that these wars may have proved historically, at least, *problematic,* especially given the fact that those resolved nothing, and that we have been and are still slaughtering children and young men and women and old men and women in battle, soldiers and civilians send to there deaths for. . .. what values?--to what end? (certainly in this sense at least, I completely agree with Dewey and Tori Alexander, most recently, that there is a case to be made for pacifism). So to my way of thinking--after all the Brooks' nonsense is cleared away--it's not just a black and white issue that Mumford was completely correct and Dewey completely wrong, say. And, btw, I consider myself considerably less uniformed and misguided than you present me, and Joseph Esposito, whom I greatly respect, as being. I doubt that you or anyone has all the answers to the question of war and peace. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu wrote: I read David Brooks' piece in the New York Times, and have had a long term interest in pragmatism and in the work of Lewis Mumford. I actually discuss Mumford's essay described by Brooks in my book,* Bereft of Reason*, on page 147 forward. I find the both the letter to the New York Times from Joseph Esposito and Gary R's claim that Brooks misused Mumford uninformed and misguided, and Helmut's claim that Mumford's position is close to ISIS to be amazingly thoughtless, 180 degrees from the truth, missing Mumford's point in this context being described that living for immediate pleasure gratification regardless of purpose is wrong. In my opinion Mumford's position regarding intervention against Nazi Germany was correct and Dewey's at the time before World War II was incorrect. Mumford's allowance of the emotions was closer to Peirce's outlook, and in that sense Brooks's understanding of pragmatism, whatever he meant by using the term, was shallow. And the term Mumford was using was pragmatic liberalism. Ironically, by the very same logic, Mumford came to condemn the United States' use of the atomic bomb at the end of World War II, and became a critic of the US military megamachine and political megamachine, and turned against the Vietnam War by 1965-6, one year after he had received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Lyndon Johnson. I would like to see what conservative David Brooks would do with that. I have quoted some excerpts from my chapter in *Bereft of Reason*, on Lewis Mumford's Organic World-View below. Gene excerpt from *Bereft of Reason*: The
