Mary, list,
Those are excellent quotes from Peirce. "The Critic of Arguments: 2. The
Reader is Introduced to Relatives" was published in _The Open Court_ No.
268 (Vol. VI—41), October 13, 1892
http://books.google.com/books?id=6qzQAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA3415 and reprinted in
CP 3.415-424. The word 'facts' ought to carry connotations of
_/relations/_, with arities, transitivities, etc., connotations that
the word 'data' often carries. Information is quantified nowadays as a
logarithm. Facts as data can be quantified as if they were information,
but those properties of relations seem the real mathematicals for
treating facts (or data) as bases for drawing conclusions as bases in
turn for further conclusions and so on. Still I'm afraid that I've said
that the wrong way.
You wrote,
The previous posts about JS Mill and the definition of "event" make
me think that an event could include a use of such thinking, whether
or not it is conscious. Perhaps its becoming close to one's
awareness could be part of the process of abduction. I look forward
to hearing whether and how you may find this in relation to the topic.
[End quote]
I'd venture to say that, insofar as an inference process occurs and
constitutes a slice of the actual in its infinite detail, indeed it is
an occurrence in Peirce's sense and an event in Mill's sense; and that,
insofar as an inference process could go one way rather than another,
the way that it does go, the turn that it does take, is an event in
Peirce' sense.
Now, I don't know how to put this in terms of dicisigns in particular,
and I think that Frederik disagrees with me about it, but, for my part,
I think that, while cenoscopy has plenty to say about both inductive and
abductive modes of inference, the consideration of statistical and other
principles of inductive inference is, so to speak, more up cenoscopy's
alley, analyzing and classifying forms and norms of inductive inference,
and that abductive inference is so dependent on context, subject matter
(I remember once reading about a book _/A Field Guide to Inductive
Inference/_ which was really about abductive inference) and cultivated
instinct or 'intuition', etc., that special sciences will throw further
needed light, if less general light, on its nature, at least as
practiced by us humans, as well as by any other intelligent life that we
may be lucky or unlucky enough to find, and I guess as by higher animals.
In such study of abductive inference, the study of actual inference
_/events/_ should be pertinent, including even the coming to
consciousness, I figure. Sophisticated understandings that might help us
logically in abducing hypotheses may simply tend often not to reach
cenoscopic, philosophical generality. Peirce said, there is no point in
specifying more rules than needed for a mode of inference, and that
there just isn't much in terms of logical _/rules/_ to specify for the
act of abductive inference itself; an abductive conclusion is just a
conjecture that arises in the mind. Peirce focuses on instinct and, at
the methodeutical level, on strategic selection, separation, ordering,
etc., of hypotheses for testing so as to expedite inquiry. Deductions
can get vastly complicated and still be rigorous; but an abductive
inference that gets vastly complicated is like a plan with too many
moving parts. Well, so far I haven't taken up generalized idea of
abductive inference, abductive quasi-inference in vegetable-level
systems or the like. But for the time being that's my two cents worth.
Best, Ben
On 10/12/2014 12:01 PM, Mary Libertin wrote:
In our discussion of Stjernfelt’s /Natural Propositions/ the comments
about facts and relations, I hear an insistent echo of a quote from
Peirce -- that a “fact is a relation” (CP 3.416). I found it In
Peirce’s paper “The Critic of Arguments,” part 2, “The Reader is
Introduced to Relatives.” I find it a rich passage for consideration
in our discussion of dicisigns. Peirce does not use the term dicisign
per se; nevertheless it is fascinating to watch him think through the
connections an index and icon have between reality and various ways of
representing them in propositions. I apologize for copying the context
of the above quote that “every fact is a relation.”
3.416. “*A /relation/ is a /fact/ about a number of things*. Thus
the fact that a locomotive blows off steam constitutes a relation,
or more accurately a relationship (the /Century Dictionary,/ under
/relation,/ 3, gives the terminology. See also /relativity,/ etc.)
between the locomotive and the steam. *In reality, every fact is a
relation.* Thus, that an object is blue consists of the peculiar
regular action of that object on human eyes. This is what should
be understood by the "relativity of knowledge."
3.417. “Not only is every fact really a relation but your thought
of the fact /implicitly/ represents it as such. Thus, when you
think "this is blue," the demonstrative "this" shows you are
thinking of something just brought up to your notice; while the
adjective shows that you recognise a familiar idea as applicable
to it. Thus, your thought, when explicated, develops into the
thought of a fact concerning this thing and concerning the
character of blueness. Still, it must be admitted that,
antecedently to the unwrapping of your thought, you were not
actually thinking of blueness as a distinct object, and therefore
were not thinking of the relation as a relation. There is an
aspect of every relation under which it does not appear as a
relation. Thus, the blowing off of steam by a locomotive may be
regarded as merely an action of the locomotive, the steam not
being conceived to be a thing distinct from the engine. This
aspect we enphrase in saying, "the engine blows."
3.418. “Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as
referring to a single thing or to more is a question of the form
of proposition under which it suits our purpose to state the fact.
Consider any argument concerning the validity of which a person
might conceivably entertain for a moment some doubt. For instance,
let the premiss be that from either of two provinces of a certain
kingdom it is possible to proceed to any province by floating down
the only river the kingdom contains, combined with a land-journey
within the boundaries of one province; and let the conclusion be
that the river, after touching every province in the kingdom, must
again meet the one which it first left. Now, in order to show that
this inference is (or that it is not) absolutely necessary, it is
requisite to have something analogous to a diagram with different
series of parts, the parts of each series being evidently related
as those provinces are said to be, while in the different series
something corresponding to the course of the river has all the
essential variations possible; and this diagram must be so
contrived that it is easy to examine it and find out whether the
course of the river is in truth in every case such as is here
proposed to be inferred. Such a diagram has got to be either
auditory or visual, the parts being separated in the one case in
time, in the other in space. But in order completely to exhibit
the analogue of the conditions of the argument under examination,
it will be necessary to use signs or symbols repeated in different
places and in different juxtapositions, these signs being subject
to certain "rules," that is, certain general relations associated
with them by the mind. Such a method of forming a diagram is
called /algebra./ All speech is but such an algebra, the repeated
signs being the words, which have relations by virtue of the
meanings associated with them. What is commonly called /logical
algebra/ differs from other formal logic only in using the same
formal method with greater freedom. I may mention that unpublished
studies^†1 have shown me that a far more powerful method of
diagrammatisation than algebra is possible, being an extension at
once of algebra and of Clifford's method of graphs; but I am not
in a situation to draw up a statement of my researches.
3.419. “Diagrams and diagrammatoidal figures are intended to be
applied to the better understanding of states of things, whether
experienced, or read of, or imagined. Such a figure cannot,
however, show what it is to which it is intended to be applied;
nor can any other diagram avail for that purpose. The where and
the when of the particular experience, or the occasion or other
identifying circumstance of the particular fiction to which the
diagram is to be applied, are things not capable of being
diagrammatically exhibited. Describe and describe and describe,
and you never can describe a date, a position, or any homaloidal
quantity. You may object that a map is a diagram showing
localities; undoubtedly, but not until the law of the projection
is understood, nor even then unless at least two points on the map
are somehow previously identified with points in nature. Now, how
is any diagram ever to perform that identification? If a diagram
cannot do it, algebra cannot: for algebra is but a sort of
diagram; and if algebra cannot do it, language cannot: for
language is but a kind of algebra. such as /that/ and /this,/
pronouns — a literally preposterous designation, for nouns may
more truly be called pro-demonstratives. ”
The previous posts about JS Mill and the definition of "event" make me
think that an event could include a use of such thinking, whether or
not it is conscious. Perhaps its becoming close to one's awareness
could be part of the process of abduction. I look forward to hearing
whether and how you may find this in relation to the topic.
Best, Mary Libertin
On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 4:05 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
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