Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: Now I see why there was confusion before--we are talking about two different things. You are describing a modified version of Peirce's (well-established) 3-trichotomy, 10-sign taxonomy; I am asking about his (unfinished) 10-trichotomy, 66-sign taxonomy. I say that your version is modified because (1) you seem to be making the third trichotomy about the interpretant itself, rather than its relation to the sign; and (2) you are aligning the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants with rheme/dicent/argument, rather than the relation of sign to the final interpretant only. Regards, Jon On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Right. No, I don't think that all Signs have all three Interpretants. If you look at the ten classes of signs 2.254-6 in the CP collection, you'll see that only ONE sign actually operates with the Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness - which would mean that particular Sign was involved in the Final Interpretant, looking for a 'logical truth-result'. But, not all Signs in our experience function as having reached that 'truthful' final analysis. Most of our experience, as you will see from the ten classes of Signs, revolves around interpretations that are quite subjective and qualitativethe semiosic experience ends with the Immediate Interpretant. There are SIX Signs of the ten that do this (rhematic). And only three end with the Dynamic Interpretant or a mode of Secondness (Dicent). Again, most of our semiosic experience is quite personal, subjective, local, 'felt' and doesn't move to the analytic logical phase. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ?
Sung, List: My understanding is that an interpretant is *any *effect that a sign *may *have (immediate), *does *have (dynamic), or *would *have (final). It is most commonly discussed in contexts where such effects are indeed on the mind of an interpreter, but Peirce was hoping to generalize his theory in such a way that this would not be its only application. As he wrote to Lady Welby: QUOTE Peirce, 12/23/1908, EP2:478 I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of upon a person is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood. END QUOTE By the way, regarding your comments today in the other thread, note that Peirce here clearly uses Sign (capitalized) to designate one relatum among three, not the triad itself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 3:50 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: In a recent article (Semiosis stems from logical incompatibility in organic nature, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology XXX (2015) 1-6), Kalevi wrote: . . . . interpretant is enough; there can be interpretant without an interpreter. Is this true ? Can Kalevi or anyone else on these lists give me some example of this ? I always thought that Peirce defined an interpretant as the effect that a sign has on the mind of an interpreter. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding on my part ? - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ?
Jon, lists, (1) I understand Peirce's intention: He wanted to generalize anthroposemiosis to include physiosemiosis (i.e., sign processes in abiotic systems or physicochemical realms), the combination of both of which I often refer to as cosmosemiosis [1]. In other words, I believe that Peircean semiosis (or ITR, Irreversible Triadic Relation, in my discussions) applies to the whole of the Universe, including life and non-life and throughout its evolutionary history starting from the Big Bang. (2) I think it is more logical to assume that Sign is irreducibly triadic and sign represents a prescinded version of Sign, i.e., sign highlights the two arrows attached to it directly while hiding the third arrow that by-pass it. All the best. Sung Reference: [1] Ji, S. (2012). Ji, S. (2012). Complementarity. http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Excerpts_Chapters_2_complementarity_08192012.pdf In: *Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications.* Springer, New York. Section 2.3, pp. 24-50, Table 2.13. PDF at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Book Chapters . On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 7:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com wrote: Sung, List: My understanding is that an interpretant is *any *effect that a sign *may *have (immediate), *does *have (dynamic), or *would *have (final). It is most commonly discussed in contexts where such effects are indeed on the mind of an interpreter, but Peirce was hoping to generalize his theory in such a way that this would not be its only application. As he wrote to Lady Welby: QUOTE Peirce, 12/23/1908, EP2:478 I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of upon a person is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood. END QUOTE By the way, regarding your comments today in the other thread, note that Peirce here clearly uses Sign (capitalized) to designate one relatum among three, not the triad itself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 3:50 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: In a recent article (Semiosis stems from logical incompatibility in organic nature, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology XXX (2015) 1-6), Kalevi wrote: . . . . interpretant is enough; there can be interpretant without an interpreter. Is this true ? Can Kalevi or anyone else on these lists give me some example of this ? I always thought that Peirce defined an interpretant as the effect that a sign has on the mind of an interpreter. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding on my part ? -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See my comments below: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 4:24 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. Edwina: Here, I disagree; as I said before, I don't see that each Representamen must have all three Interpretants. --- JON: The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by 'distinct'. As Peirce says, the immediate object is defined 'according to the Mode of Presentation (EP2:p 482, CP 8:344). So, the Immediate Object differs from the Dynamic Object because the DO functions according to its mode of Being (it IS an external sense, while the Immediate Object is an internal sense). Jon: However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. EDWINA: Peirce's analysis in these sections, eg, the list of ten..cp 8.344, doesn't, as far as I can see, divide each, eg, Interpretant into three further divisions, which is what you seem to be saying. For example, in this list, he refers to the Sign or Representamen as defined/functional within: its mode of apprehension; then, the Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object; then, the Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant; then, the Relation of the Sign to the Normal (Final) Interpretant; and, the Triadic Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object and to its Normal (Final ) Interpretant. Then, he goes on to examine these five functions of the Sign/Representamen in more detail. With regard to the Immediate Object, he refers to its mode of Presentation. That's it. With regard to the Dynamical Object, he refers to its Mode of Being[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to that Dynamical Object). With regard to the Immediate Interpretant - he refers only to its 'mode of Presentation'. Similar to the Immediate Object'. With regard to the Dynamical Interpretant - he refers to its Mode of Being ..[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant] With regard to the normal/Final Interpretant, he refers to the Nature of this Interpretant..[and he also considers the Relation of the Sign to this Interpretant'. And finally - he considers the Relation of the Sign/Representamen to its Dyn. Object and its Normal/Final Interpretant. So- I don't see where EACH Interpretant is further, in itself, divided into three. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. Jon: My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. EDWINA: But - I'm not saying that there is ONE Interpretant. There are three - but not all are functional within a particular Sign (I refer to the Sign, capital S, to mean the Object-Representamen-Interpretant). ... What you seem to be saying, if I uderstand you correctly, is that each Interpretant is further divided into 3 - and I don't see that. The way I read Peirce - is that there are THREE very different Interpretants - but, again, not all three appear in all Signs. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: I referenced EP2:481-490, not just EP2:482. Page 483 introduces The Ten Main Trichotomies of Signs, and the first three are explained in some detail through page 489; the other seven are only given as sets of three terms on pp. 489-490, which presumably correspond to Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Here is the entire list. 1. Mode of Presentation of the Sign - Potisign, Actisign, Famisign. 2. Mode of Presentation of the (Immediate) Object - Descriptive, Designative, Copulant. 3. Nature of the Dynamic Object - Abstractive, Concretive, Collective. 4. Relation of the Sign to Its Object - Icon, Index, Symbol. 5. Nature of the Immediate Interpretant - Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. 6. Nature of the Dynamic Interpretant - Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. 7. Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant - Suggestive, Imperative, Indicative. 8. Purpose of the Eventual (Final) Interpretant - Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control. 9. Nature of the Influence of the Sign - Seme, Pheme, Delome. 10. Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance - Instinct, Experience, Form. Based on the bare list that you referenced, #7 is the relation of the sign to its dynamic interpretant, #9 is the relation of the sign to its final interpretant, and #10 is the triadic relation of the sign to its dynamic object and final interpretant. #5, #6, and #8 are the three interpretants, each of which is indeed divided into a trichotomy by Peirce. What I am seeking is the proper order of determination for these three; the order given here is categorial. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8816] Re: Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ?
Robert, lists, I agree that sinsigns need not have interpretants and qualisigns need not have objects. But the question I am raising is Can there be a sign without an interpreter ? As the following quotes indicate there cannot be signs that have no interpreter, whether human or non-human (I highlighted the interpreter or its equivalent): *Reprtoduced from: * *http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM* *5 - 1873 - C.P. 7-356 - Logic. Chapter 5 .* Let us examine some of the characters of signs in general. A sign must in the first place have some qualities in itself which serve to distinguish it, a word must have a peculiar sound different from the sound of another word; but it makes no difference what the sound is, so long as it is something distinguishable. In the next place, a sign must have a real physical connection with the thing it signifies so as to be affected by that thing. A weather-cock, which is a sign of the direction of the wind, must really turn with the wind. This word in this connection is an indirect one; but unless there be some way or other which shall connect words with the things they signify, and shall ensure their correspondance with them, they have no value as signs of those things. Whatever has these two characters is fit to become a sign. It is at least a symptom, but it is not actually a sign unless it is used as such; that is unless it is interpreted to* thought *and addresses itself to some *mind. *As thought is itself a sign we may express this by saying that the sign must be interpreted as another sign. [...] *9 - v. 1897_- C.P. 2-228 - Division of signs .* A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to *somebody *for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses *somebody, *that is, creates in the mind of *that person* an equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. [...] *38 - 1907 - MS 612. Chapter I - Common Ground (Logic) .* [...] By a Sign, I mean anything that is, on the one hand, in some way determined by an object and, on the other hand, which determines some awareness, and this in such manner that the *awareness* is thus determined by that object. [...] *40 - v.1907 - MS 318, Pragmatism.* e - [...] A sign is whatever there may be whose intent is to mediate between an *utterer* of it and an *interpreter* of it, both being repositories of thought, or quasi-minds, by conveying a meaning from the former to the latter. We may say that the sign is moulded to the meaning in the quasi-mind that utters it, where it was, virtually at least (i.e. if not in fact, yet the moulding of the sign took place as if it had been there) already an ingredient of thought. *46 - 1908 -_NEM III/2 p. 886 - Letter to P.E.B. Jourdain dated 1908 Dec 5 .* [...] My idea of a sign has been so generalized that I have at length despaired of making anybody comprehend it, so that for the sake of being understood, I now limit it, so as to define a sign as anything which is on the one hand so determined (or specialized) by an object and on the other hand so determines *the mind of an interpreter *of it that the latter is thereby determined mediately, or indirectly, by that real object that determines the sign. Even this may well be thought an excessively generalized definition. The determination of the *Interpreter's mind* I term the Interpretant of the sign. [...] *51 - 1909 - NEM III/2 p.867 - Letter to William James dated 1909 Dec 25.* [...] I start by defining what I mean by a sign. It is something determined by something else its object and itself influencing *some person* in such a way that that *person* becomes thereby mediately influenced or determined in some respect by that Object.[...] *A logical Criticism of some articles of Religious Faith .* The word sign, as it will here be used, denotes any object of *thought *which excites any kind of mental action, whether voluntary or not, concerning something otherwise recognized. [...] Every sign denotes something, and the anything it denotes is termed an object of it. [... ] I term the idea or mental action that a sign excites and which it causes the *interpreter* to attribute to the Object or Objects of it, its interpretant. [...] For a Sign cannot denote an object not otherwise known to its interpreter, for the obvious reason that if he does not already know the Object at all, he cannot possess these ideas by means of which alone his attention can be narrowed to the very object denoted. Every object of experience excites an idea of some sort; but if that idea is not associated sufficiently and in the right way so with some previous experience so as to narrow the attention, it will
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
See my comments below: - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 9:37 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: I referenced EP2:481-490, not just EP2:482. Page 483 introduces The Ten Main Trichotomies of Signs, and the first three are explained in some detail through page 489; the other seven are only given as sets of three terms on pp. 489-490, which presumably correspond to Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Here is the entire list. 1. Mode of Presentation of the Sign - Potisign, Actisign, Famisign. EDWINA: He later changes these to: Mark, Token, Type. The above refers to the Representamen alone, in itself, in, as you note, the three modal categories. 2. Mode of Presentation of the (Immediate) Object - Descriptive, Designative, Copulant. EDWINA: He later changed these to: Descriptive, Denominative and Distributive. The Immediate Object is internal. I note that Peirce did not, in his description of the above terms, refer to them as the 'Immediate Object'. He used only the term 'Objects'. Can the Immediate Object- which is internal - be a physical existentiality, akin to the external Dynamic Object? I can't agree with you that the above terms refer to the Immediate Object, seemingly in a separate existentiality for the mere fact of its being internal in 'an Other' means that it has no longer any separate existentiality. And Peirce notes, in 8.367, that the Immediate Object is in the same categorical mode as the Dynamical Object. 3. Nature of the Dynamic Object - Abstractive, Concretive, Collective. 4. Relation of the Sign to Its Object - Icon, Index, Symbol. EDWINA: Peirce refers to the above in 3, as how the Sign/Representamen 'represents' that Dynamic Object but these are directly linked to the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - see 4. An iconic Relation will present an abstract image; an indexical Relation presents a physical existentiality...Again, I don't see the functionality of such a micro-distinction between defining the 'noun' so to speak and the 'relation' within which that 'noun' exists. 5. Nature of the Immediate Interpretant - Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. EDWINA: The above is the 'physical' internal expression of the Interpretant. As internal, even though moving from a mere sensate utterance to assertion to some form of cognition..it remains bonded to the Representamen and the Immediate Object. 6. Nature of the Dynamic Interpretant - Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. 7. Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant - Suggestive, Imperative, Indicative. EDWINA: Again, the three forms that the DI can take in their expression...Both the 'Nature' and 'Manner of Appeal' are similar except that one can be called a 'noun' and the other a 'relation or verb'and I see no functionality in such a micro-analytic differentiation. 8. Purpose of the Eventual (Final) Interpretant - Gratific, To produce action, To produce self-control. 9. Nature of the Influence of the Sign - Seme, Pheme, Delome. 10. Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance - Instinct, Experience, Form. Based on the bare list that you referenced, #7 is the relation of the sign to its dynamic interpretant, #9 is the relation of the sign to its final interpretant, and #10 is the triadic relation of the sign to its dynamic object and final interpretant. #5, #6, and #8 are the three interpretants, each of which is indeed divided into a trichotomy by Peirce. What I am seeking is the proper order of determination for these three; the order given here is categorial. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon, Edwina, lists, We went over this issue several times on these lists. I think Edwina is right that Peirce used the term sign in dual meanings, which can be explained graphically thus: fg Object Representamen --- Interpretant | ^ | | |__| h Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the triadic sign of Peirce. In words, this diagram states that Object determines Representamen which in turn determines Intepretant in such a way that Interpretant is related to Object in the same way that Representamen is related to it. Now the confusion arises because Peirce often replaced Representamen with Sign, i.e., used Sign and Representamen interachangeably: f g Object - Sign Interpretant | ^ || |__| h Figure 2. A diagrammatic representation of the definition of the triadic sign of Peirce in which the term, i.e., sign, being defined appears as a part of the definition itself. The definition of the triadic sign given in Figure 2 is reminiscent of the recursive definition widely occurring in computer science and mathematics: A recursive definition of a function defines values of the functions for some inputs in terms of the values of the same function for other inputs. For example, the factorial https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factorial function *n*! is defined by the rules . . . (*n*+1)! = (*n*+1)ยท*n*! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursive_definition *Recursion* is the process of repeating items in a self-similar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-similarity way. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursion To distinguish between these two kinds of signs, it may be rational and economical (in terms of avoiding the waste of time caused by terminological confusions) to designate the former with the capital S (as suggested by Edwina) and the latter with the lower case S, i.e., Sign vs. sign. Or, in words, Sign may be referred to as the triadic sign (in that it requires three arrows to be defined; Figure 1) and the sign as the dyadic sign since its definition requires only two arrows (Figure 2). All the best. Sung On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com wrote: Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, which I always clarify by capitalizing as *S*ign. And you also use the same term, if I understand you correctly, to refer to only the mediating process in the triad, the Representamen. [Peirce did the same thing - but I think one has
[PEIRCE-L] Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ?
Hi, In a recent article (Semiosis stems from logical incompatibility in organic nature, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology XXX (2015) 1-6), Kalevi wrote: . . . . interpretant is enough; there can be interpretant without an interpreter. Is this true ? Can Kalevi or anyone else on these lists give me some example of this ? I always thought that Peirce defined an interpretant as the effect that a sign has on the mind of an interpreter. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding on my part ? All the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, which I always clarify by capitalizing as *S*ign. And you also use the same term, if I understand you correctly, to refer to only the mediating process in the triad, the Representamen. [Peirce did the same thing - but I think one has to mull through his writings to see what he exactly meant]. 2) You yourself brought up the three-phase actions of the Interpretant, so, I'm confused now..for after all, the Interpretant, in all its phases, is in a Relation with the Representamen (which you term as 'sign']. 3) You write: you are aligning the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants with rheme/dicent/argument, rather than the relation of sign to the final interpretant only. Now, if I understand you in the above, you are focusing on the relation of the *Representamen* to the final interpretant'. I don't see that it is possible for the semiosic triad to exclude, in its semiosic process, the two less complex Interpretants; namely, the immediate and dynamic. All three are, in my view, in a Relation with the Representamen. So - what am I misunderstanding in your questions? 4) I don't see that the Peircean sign moves away from the basic triad; there's no 'ten-trichotomy'. There are microphases of the triad: dynamic object-immediate object - Representamen - and the Immediate, Dynamic and Final Interpretants ..which brings us to only six microparts. And you can then add in the modes which increases the complexity - where the Dynamic Object can be in any one of the three modes; and the Representamen can be in any one of the three modes. BUT - although this increases the *internal* complexity of the Sign, as you point out, I'm not sure how it moves away from the basic format of the triad. I would say that this internal complexity increases the ability of matter to adapt to environmental stimuli. So- I am obviously missing something in your argument! Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
Jon, Lists I believe that, at one level of the semiotic process, we can treat the sign as one of the three relata in the triad. Of course, at the next stage of interpretation, the interpretant may itself function as a sign. Are there any restrictions on having some combination of interpretant, sign and object serving as a sign at the next stage of interpretation? Once the three are combined into a triad, I would think that all three could then serve as sign in relation to some further interpretant. Let's consider some an example drawn from Peirce's discussion of perception. Starting with the basic kind of case, we have an iconic rhematice qualisign (say, an abstraction of a feeling of a color of yellow) that serves as a sign, and that is brought into relation to an immediate object (e.g., a percept of a yellow chair with a green cushion) and an immediate interpretant (e.g., a skeleton set of the relations between the color and the object). It is clear that, at the next level, the immediate interpretant can serve as a sign that is brought into relation to a dynamical object (e.g. the really efficient chair that I bump against when walking around the room) and the dynamical interpretant (e.g., the action of sitting down on the chair). Is there any reason to think that the immediate interpretant doesn't bring along with it, as it were, the qualisign and the immediate object--which also serve as part of the sign along with the immediate interpretant? For my part, I don't see how a coherent explanation can be given of the process of how the percepts and skeleton sets form the parts of our conceptions, and how concepts form the parts of propositions, and how propositions form the parts of our arguments unless all of these parts are combined together and are treated as richer kinds of signs that are then interpreted further in relation to richer objects and interpretants. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, August 16, 2015 1:24 PM To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes Edwina, List: 1. I am following Short in using sign to refer to what some call the representamen or sign-vehicle. The triad is not the sign; rather, the sign is one of three relata in the triad, along with the object and interpretant. 2,3,4. My understanding is that every sign has three different (but not independent) interpretants--immediate, dynamic, and final--each with its own trichotomy. The immediate interpretant has no distinct relation with the sign, which is why it is called immediate; the same is true of the immediate object. However, the dynamic object, dynamic interpretant, and final interpretant do have distinct relations with the sign, each with its own trichotomy; and the triadic relation among the sign, dynamic object, and final interpretant provides yet another trichotomy. Hence there are ten trichotomies and 66 classes of signs once the rule of determination is applied--It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. See EP2:481-490 for all of this, which I thought was pretty basic stuff in Peirce. My original question pertains to the proper ordering of the three interpretant trichotomies in accordance with the rule of determination. Since Peirce gave this order as destinate, then effective, then explicit (EP2:481), it is not clear whether he meant IiIdIf (as commonly assumed) or IfIdIi (as argued by Mueller, Morand, and Udell). The whole issue is meaningless if the 10-trichotomy, 66-class taxonomy is rejected in favor of a modified 3-trichotomy, 10-class taxonomy in which immediate/dynamic/final is the trichotomy for the (one) interpretant--something that I have not come across in any of Peirce's own writings or the secondary literature so far. Regards, Jon On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 9:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Jon: I think that there has to be some clarification of terms. 1) You use the term 'sign' to mean both the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, which I always clarify by capitalizing as Sign. And you also use the same term, if I understand you correctly, to refer to only the mediating process in the triad, the Representamen. [Peirce did the same thing - but I think one has to mull through his writings to see what he exactly meant]. 2) You yourself brought up the three-phase actions of the Interpretant, so, I'm confused now..for after all, the Interpretant, in all its phases, is in a Relation with the Representamen (which you term as 'sign']. 3) You write: you are aligning the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants with rheme/dicent/argument, rather than
