Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

 

List,

I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal clipping from a result, which result is an event again.

A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair understandable for me.

Best,

Helmut



 "Jon Awbrey"  wrote:
 

Peircers,

What makes an object is a perennial question.

I can remember my physics professors bringing
it up in a really big way when I was still just
a freshman in college. They always cautioned us
then about extrapolating our everyday intuitions
about everyday objects beyond their native realms.

Anyone who has been graced or grazed by a modicum
of process thinking, say Whitehead or Bucky Fuller,
is aware of the trade-off between process thinking
and product thinking that rules our descriptions of
every domain of phenomena, but in a retrograde time
like the one we are currently experiencing it takes
a mighty effort to recollect the way that hidebound
objects are precipitated from more primal processes.

Here's an old post I happened on that may apply here:

Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/14/ask-meno-questions-%E2%80%A2-discussion-1/
http://web.archive.org/web/20121015213156/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8791

Regards,

Jon

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

 



 

List,

I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal clipping from a result, which result is an event again.

A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair understandable for me.

Best,

Helmut

 

Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.



 "Jon Awbrey"  wrote:
 

Peircers,

What makes an object is a perennial question.

I can remember my physics professors bringing
it up in a really big way when I was still just
a freshman in college. They always cautioned us
then about extrapolating our everyday intuitions
about everyday objects beyond their native realms.

Anyone who has been graced or grazed by a modicum
of process thinking, say Whitehead or Bucky Fuller,
is aware of the trade-off between process thinking
and product thinking that rules our descriptions of
every domain of phenomena, but in a retrograde time
like the one we are currently experiencing it takes
a mighty effort to recollect the way that hidebound
objects are precipitated from more primal processes.

Here's an old post I happened on that may apply here:

Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/14/ask-meno-questions-%E2%80%A2-discussion-1/
http://web.archive.org/web/20121015213156/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8791

Regards,

Jon

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[gnox]

Helmut,

 

Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic(al) object.

 

[[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject 
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. 
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]  —EP2:477

 

Gary f.

 

} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16  

 

  

List,

I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, 
and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its 
permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that 
is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, 
an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. 
So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not 
permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a 
representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is 
it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited 
clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following 
sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same 
entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an 
event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal 
clipping from a result, which result is an event again.

A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one 
entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that 
apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and 
place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real 
space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in 
an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair 
understandable for me.

Best,

Helmut

 

Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or 
otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been 
positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the 
case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas 
or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.






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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things

[Skagestad, Peter]

Drawing on my high-school German, I believe "power" encompasses "Macht" and 
"Kraft" - for whatever that is worth.



Peter


From: Helmut Raulien [h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2015 4:56 PM
To: cl...@lextek.com
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things

Clark, List,
Sorry, I think, I have had a misunderstanding based on the problem of 
translating "power" to German: "Macht" (mightiness) is only the power, a human 
or an institution has to achieve their particular iterests, but English "power" 
is a much more general term: In this case perhaps a universal teleology or 
telos?
Best,
Helmut


 "Clark Goble"  wrote:


On Oct 23, 2015, at 1:21 PM, Helmut Raulien 
> wrote:

I thought, that "final interpretant" had something to do with truth. But you 
wrote, that it rather has to do with power.

Our meaning of truth is the final interpretant but the final interpretant 
functions due to a type of power. For Peirce this power is wrapped up in 
Charity or agape. (Interestingly in a way similar although not identical to how 
justice functions for Derrida)

Peirce adopts the notion of sunnum bonum from Aristotle although his use is 
more a mixture of Plato, Aristotle, and the scholastics with a bit of Kant as 
well. The sunnum bonum is this idea of the universe as beautiful and good. It 
is the fundamental explanatory hypothesis. For Peirce the universe is an 
argument working itself out to this final interpretant. The final interpretant 
is this end precisely because this place of the good or reasonableness of the 
universe acting upon us. So when we say power you can’t separate it from this 
notion of the good.


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

For ease of reference, here's a copy of that previous post
that came to mind (you can thank, or maybe blame, Facebook's
new "memories of yesteryear" function for reminding me of it
at this particular time:



Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 1
Posted on October 14, 2012 by Jon Awbrey
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/14/ask-meno-questions-%E2%80%A2-discussion-1/
http://web.archive.org/web/20121015213156/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8791

Re: Victoria N. Alexander
http://web.archive.org/web/20121016233842/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8790

I think you are stating several important insights —

1.  The word ''object'' in pragmatism and pragmatic semiotics has a much wider range of meanings than the extremely 
reductive sense of a “compact physical object”. Anyone wishing to explore the richness of its meaning could hardly do 
better than to sample the senses of the Greek ''pragma'' that imbue the Latin-derived ''object''.


☞http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma

2.  There is reason to think that the sense of the word ''object'' that means objective, purpose, target, intention, 
goal, end, aim, and so on is more fundamental than the more restrictive sense of a compact physical object. That is in 
fact one of the most critical insights that comes down to us from long lines of physical theory and also from the 
traditions known as “process thinking”, suggesting that our concepts of physical objects are derivative in relation to 
our concepts of process, since they arise from our ability to discover “invariants under transformations”, that is, the 
formal constructs that are preserved by the operations or processes that transform the states of a system.


3.  As a general rule, we should avoid language that confuses signs and objects. In particular, referring to mental 
representations as “ideal objects” is just asking for trouble, and that on several counts, including the risk of 
confusing mental ideas with Platonic ideas. Language like that brings all the confusions of conceptualism, nominalism, 
and psychologism down on our heads.


4.  Given that Peirce’s critique of Cartesian philosophy is of a piece with the rest of his thought, it does not seem 
wise to backslide on this score and reinfect semiotics with the dualisms that Peirce was so persistent in rooting out. 
For example, so far as the mind/body dualism goes, Peirce regarded the body as one of the first objects that a 
developing being would naturally “construct” from the flux of experience, that is, construe or conceptualize as an 
object from the impressions available in the stream of awareness. One potential misunderstanding needs to be avoided 
here. It is not that noticing a dualism is a bad thing — where one is operative it cannot be denied. The important thing 
is this — by the time one notices a dualism, one has already become a third, a mediator, a synthetic operator, and so 
one must recognize that more than two components are already in play.




Regards,

Jon

On 10/24/2015 1:28 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Peircers,

What makes an object is a perennial question.

I can remember my physics professors bringing
it up in a really big way when I was still just
a freshman in college.  They always cautioned us
then about extrapolating our everyday intuitions
about everyday objects beyond their native realms.

Anyone who has been graced or grazed by a modicum
of process thinking, say Whitehead or Bucky Fuller,
is aware of the trade-off between process thinking
and product thinking that rules our descriptions of
every domain of phenomena, but in a retrograde time
like the one we are currently experiencing it takes
a mighty effort to recollect the way that hidebound
objects are precipitated from more primal processes.

Here's an old post I happened on that may apply here:

Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/14/ask-meno-questions-%E2%80%A2-discussion-1/
http://web.archive.org/web/20121015213156/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8791

Regards,

Jon



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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Sungchul Ji]

Helmut. lists,

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of
interaction- . . . "

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".
Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many
examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This
is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In
other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only
triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.


   f g
Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
 (Object)  (Interpretant)
 | ^
 | |
 |__|
   h

*Figure 1. * Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A
can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and
g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to
receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common
language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to
communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF
and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production;
g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e.,
communication

All the best.

Sung


On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Frances, List,
> You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and
> what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited:
> "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the
> communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is
> communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for
> you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to
> the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be
> widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by
> "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because
> everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an
> interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I
> guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or
> mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in
> a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind,
> nothing could happen?
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr
>  frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
>
>
> To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth.
>
> Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need
> only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield
> phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can
> be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that
> are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly
> be mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. 
> Existent
> synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not
> yet signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in their formal structure, until
> they become semiosic objects by way of representation; but some existent
> semiosic objects also need not be signs, until enacted as signs by
> signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely to become phenomenal
> representamen that are signs by way of represented evolution, and whose
> formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is composed of a sole
> represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred objects in a
> ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject.
>
> The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects
> and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or
> hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate
> referred object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and
> that this form of vehicle then determines and is embedded in the
> immediate interpretant subject, and that this immediate interpretant
> subject determines both the dynamic referred object together with the dynamic
> interpretant subject, and that this dynamic interpretant subject
> determines the final interpretant subject. The dependence of these
> semiosic forms would seem to be in the reverse order.
>
> The whole wide world is felt by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen,
> but not necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms
> and things and beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs of
> other objects and as signers of signs, is the act of representation, which is

Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

Correction:

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any
communication." in my previous post to
". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

Thanks.

Sung





-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji 
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary , Peirce List <
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>


Helmut. lists,

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of
interaction- . . . "

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".
Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many
examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This
is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In
other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only
triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.


   f g
Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
 (Object)  (Interpretant)
 | ^
 | |
 |__|
   h

*Figure 1. * Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A
can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and
g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to
receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common
language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to
communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF
and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production;
g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e.,
communication

All the best.

Sung


On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Frances, List,
> You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and
> what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited:
> "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the
> communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is
> communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for
> you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to
> the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be
> widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by
> "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because
> everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an
> interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I
> guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or
> mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in
> a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind,
> nothing could happen?
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr
>  frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
>
>
> To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth.
>
> Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need
> only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield
> phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can
> be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that
> are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly
> be mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. 
> Existent
> synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not
> yet signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in their formal structure, until
> they become semiosic objects by way of representation; but some existent
> semiosic objects also need not be signs, until enacted as signs by
> signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely to become phenomenal
> representamen that are signs by way of represented evolution, and whose
> formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is composed of a sole
> represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred objects in a
> ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject.
>
> The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects
> and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or
> hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate
> referred object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and
> that this form of vehicle then determines and is embedded in the
> immediate interpretant subject, and that this immediate interpretant
> subject determines both the dynamic referred object 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[gnox]

Helmut,

 

The dynamic object, according to Peirce, does not have to be a real thing; it 
can be “altogether fictive”. One example he gives is “Hamlet’s madness.” 
Although it is imaginary, it still determines the embodiment in a subject (such 
as the reader of Shakespeare or a member of a theater audience) of a form which 
is the thought-sign of that object, which in turn determines an interpretant 
(such as an actor’s performance of the role, or a reader’s impression of the 
character).

 

The unicorn is imaginary, but as an idea it already exists in the public 
domain, and that quasi-existing idea is the dynamic object of the general sign 
“unicorn.” Your personal idea of a unicorn as you read this sentence, on the 
other hand, is the immediate object of your present use of the word to 
represent the unicorn.

 

Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in two 
different subjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; even 
thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is “embodied” when 
it actually occurs to (or is initiated by) a living subject, instead of being 
just a possibility.

 

Gary f.

 

} Where the body is, there the eagles will be gathered together. [Luke 17:37, 
RSV]

Where the corpse is, there the vultures will gather. [Luke 17:37, New English 
Bible] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 12:32



 

Gary F.,

Thank you! Now I understand it like: The triad representamen / immediate object 
/ interpretant is irreducible, and the interpretant is possibly a representamen 
again, in the next sign, that relates to the same dynamical object. But this 
only accounts for cases, in which a dynamical object exists. Or is there always 
one? For example: A unicorn in a fantasy story: Does it not have a dynamical 
object, or is the dynamical object merely unknown, might be a horse and a 
narwhale skeleton, which two items a drunken sailor had combined in his mind on 
12th october 1614? I mean, when Peirce writes: "It is necessary that it should 
have been really embodied in a subject independently of the conmmunication", 
that would mean, that there cannot be a pure fantasy. Interesting, but can make 
sense, I think.

Best,

Helmut

 25. Oktober 2015 um 13:41 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca  
 

Helmut,

 

Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic(al) object.

 

[[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject 
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. 
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]  —EP2:477

 


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Re: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

In a separate post, it is stated:

> Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in 
> two differentsubjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; 
> even thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is 
> “embodied” when it actually occurs to (or is initiated by) a living subject, 
> instead of being just a possibility.
>  

This assertion (usage) is problematic and certainly in remote from my 
interpretation of the meaning of the EP2:477. 

The dictionary definition of "embody" is the meaning CSP is referring to, I 
presume (because of his background in logic and chemistry):

Apple dictionary states:

"embody" as defined in a dictionary is the meaning that I refer to:

embody |emˈbädē|
verb ( embodies, embodying, embodied ) [ with obj. ]
1 be an expression of or give a tangible or visible form to (an idea, quality, 
orfeeling): a team that embodies competitive spirit and skill.
• provide (a spirit) with a physical form.
2 include or contain (something) as a constituent part: the changes in law 
embodiedin the Freedom of Information Act.


Gary's usage is problematic.

CSP usage (as well as the dictionary's and mine) are consistent with usages 
such as "atoms are embodied in molecules"
Or, propositional terms are embodied in propositional logic.
Or, "DNA is embodied as a chemical fact of biological reproductions"

Cheers

Jerry


On Oct 25, 2015, at 11:32 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

> List:
> 
> On Oct 25, 2015, at 7:41 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
>> it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject 
>> independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be 
>> another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of 
>> the communication.
> 
> Are there two mysteries associated with EP2:477?
> 
> What is the philosophical meaning of embodiment in this context?
> 
> How is a sign embodied in two different objects?
> 
> What is the meaningful distinction between  "communication" in 
> 
>> should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
>> communication
> 
> and "communication" in
> 
>> same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication.
> 
> 
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[frances.kelly]

To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. 

Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only be 
nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield phenomenal 
existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be synechastic 
objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that are either not signs 
or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly be mystically phantural, or 
materially physical, or mentally psychical. Existent synechastic objects 
initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not yet signs nor semiotic 
tridents or terns in their formal structure, until they become semiosic objects 
by way of representation; but some existent semiosic objects also need not be 
signs, until enacted as signs by signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely 
to become phenomenal representamen that are signs by way of represented 
evolution, and whose formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is 
composed of a sole represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred 
objects in a ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject. 

The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects and 
the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or 
hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate referred 
object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and that this form of 
vehicle then determines and is embedded in the immediate interpretant subject, 
and that this immediate interpretant subject determines both the dynamic 
referred object together with the dynamic interpretant subject, and that this 
dynamic interpretant subject determines the final interpretant subject. The 
dependence of these semiosic forms would seem to be in the reverse order. 

The whole wide world is felt by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen, but not 
necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms and things and 
beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs of other objects and as 
signers of signs, is the act of representation, which is felt to permeate the 
whole phenomenal being of the world. 

(In the first grand division of informative or grammatic semiotics and 
semiosis, the common terms of sign and object and subject are often vague, and 
perhaps for contextual clarity should therein be called representants and 
referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as vehicles and 
mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal representamen and 
existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually signs of 
objects.) 


From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM
To: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

Helmut,
Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic(al) object.
 [[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject 
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. 
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]  —EP2:477
Gary f.
} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16  
List,
I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, 
and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its 
permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that 
is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, 
an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. 
So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not 
permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a 
representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is 
it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F.,

Thank you! Now I understand it like: The triad representamen / immediate object / interpretant is irreducible, and the interpretant is possibly a representamen again, in the next sign, that relates to the same dynamical object. But this only accounts for cases, in which a dynamical object exists. Or is there always one? For example: A unicorn in a fantasy story: Does it not have a dynamical object, or is the dynamical object merely unknown, might be a horse and a narwhale skeleton, which two items a drunken sailor had combined in his mind on 12th october 1614? I mean, when Peirce writes: "It is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a subject independently of the conmmunication", that would mean, that there cannot be a pure fantasy. Interesting, but can make sense, I think.


Best,

Helmut


 25. Oktober 2015 um 13:41 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut,

 

Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and dynamic(al) object.

 

[[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. ]]  —EP2:477

 

Gary f.

 


} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway


 




From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16  



 





  



List,



I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal clipping from a result, which result is an event again.



A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair understandable for me.



Best,



Helmut



 



Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.





 











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Embodiment Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

On Oct 25, 2015, at 7:41 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject 
> independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be 
> another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the 
> communication.

Are there two mysteries associated with EP2:477?

What is the philosophical meaning of embodiment in this context?

How is a sign embodied in two different objects?

What is the meaningful distinction between  "communication" in 

> should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
> communication

and "communication" in

> same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication.



Cheers

Jerry






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RE: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

[gnox]

Jerry, EP2:477 is from a 1906 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby, and the EP2 
editors chose to omit part of it, including the paragraph preceding the one 
that I quoted. Restoring this context may help to clear up your confusion about 
Peirce’s usage of “embodied,” which is compatible with the first meaning you 
quote from the Apple dictionary. Here are the two paragraphs together:

 

[[ I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will 
try. A thought is not per se in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in the same 
sense as I might say that Right or Truth would remain what they are though they 
were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But a thought, to gain 
any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special 
variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from 
the momentary self to the better considered self of the immediate and of the 
general future. Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if 
external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind 
is itself a sign, a determinable sign. Consider for example a blank-book. It is 
meant to be written in. Words written in that in due order will have quite 
another force from the same words scattered accidentally on the ground, even 
should these happen to have fallen into collections which would have a meaning 
if written in the blank-book. The language employed in discoursing to the 
reader, and the language employed to express the thought to which the discourse 
relates should be kept distinct and each should be selected for its peculiar 
fitness for the purpose it was to serve. For the discoursing language I would 
use English, which has special merits for the treatment of logic. For the 
language discoursed about, I would use the system of Existential Graphs 
throughout which has no equal for this purpose. 

I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication 
or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by 
something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant 
or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order 
rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In 
order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it 
should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in 
which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The 
Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]

 

The one sentence that you quoted from this in your earlier post says that the 
Form (which is communicated or extended by the Sign) is embodied in two 
subjects, in one of them independently of the communication, and in the other 
as a consequence of the communication.  Your original question, “How is a sign 
embodied in two different objects?”, does not make sense in that context.

 

Gary f.

 

} Wipe your glosses with what you know. [Finnegans Wake 304] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 13:57
To: Peirce List 



 

List:

 

In a separate post, it is stated:

 

Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in two 
differentsubjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; even 
thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is “embodied” when 
it actually occurs to (or is initiated by) a living subject, instead of being 
just a possibility.

 

 

This assertion (usage) is problematic and certainly in remote from my 
interpretation of the meaning of the EP2:477. 

 

The dictionary definition of "embody" is the meaning CSP is referring to, I 
presume (because of his background in logic and chemistry):

 

Apple dictionary states:

 

"embody" as defined in a dictionary is the meaning that I refer to:

 

embody |emˈbädē|verb ( embodies, embodying, embodied ) [ with obj. ]1 be an 
expression of or give a tangible or visible form to (an idea, quality, 
orfeeling): a team that embodies competitive spirit and skill.• provide (a 
spirit) with a physical form.2 include or contain (something) as a constituent 
part: the changes in law embodiedin the Freedom of Information Act.

Gary's usage is problematic.
CSP usage (as well as the dictionary's and mine) are consistent with usages 
such as "atoms are embodied in molecules"

Or, propositional terms