To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. 

Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only be 
nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield phenomenal 
existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be synechastic 
objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that are either not signs 
or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly be mystically phantural, or 
materially physical, or mentally psychical. Existent synechastic objects 
initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not yet signs nor semiotic 
tridents or terns in their formal structure, until they become semiosic objects 
by way of representation; but some existent semiosic objects also need not be 
signs, until enacted as signs by signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely 
to become phenomenal representamen that are signs by way of represented 
evolution, and whose formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is 
composed of a sole represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred 
objects in a ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject. 

The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects and 
the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or 
hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate referred 
object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and that this form of 
vehicle then determines and is embedded in the immediate interpretant subject, 
and that this immediate interpretant subject determines both the dynamic 
referred object together with the dynamic interpretant subject, and that this 
dynamic interpretant subject determines the final interpretant subject. The 
dependence of these semiosic forms would seem to be in the reverse order. 

The whole wide world is felt by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen, but not 
necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms and things and 
beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs of other objects and as 
signers of signs, is the act of representation, which is felt to permeate the 
whole phenomenal being of the world. 

(In the first grand division of informative or grammatic semiotics and 
semiosis, the common terms of sign and object and subject are often vague, and 
perhaps for contextual clarity should therein be called representants and 
referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as vehicles and 
mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal representamen and 
existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually signs of 
objects.) 


From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM
To: 'Peirce List' <[email protected]>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

Helmut,
Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic(al) object.
 [[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject 
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. 
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]  —EP2:477
Gary f.
} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16  
List,
I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, 
and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its 
permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that 
is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, 
an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. 
So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not 
permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a 
representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is 
it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited 
clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following 
sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same 
entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an 
event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal 
clipping from a result, which result is an event again.
A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one 
entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that 
apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and 
place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real 
space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in 
an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair 
understandable for me.
Best, Helmut
Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or 
otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been 
positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the 
case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas 
or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.
        
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