Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Helmut Raulien]

Franklin,

I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the sign belongs to, and therefore a concept outside of the sign. "externalized, objectivated" is confusing, I agree. I meant something like self-representation of the sign, like: "I am an argument", which is a proposition, and "argument" or "proposition", which are terms. I took "proposition" synonymous with "dicent", and "term" with "rheme", so the talk about sign classes. It was all about the sign identifying itself as a special kind of sign, nothing Hegelian. So- see you later, when I will have read much more by Peirce.

Best,

Helmut

 

14. November 2015 um 04:10 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
 


Helmut,
 

I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is partly rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the dynamical object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized/objectivated from itself." I don't know what it means that the sign is externalized from itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an object that is independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object is supposed to be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd almost guess that you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, but I don't know much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested in it. Moreover, I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting with what you already understand so that we can find a common ground for discussing these ideas.

 

-- Franklin

 

-


 
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 

Franklin, Gary, list,

I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized / objectivated from itself to make itself understandable. An argument transports the outside respect with its argumentative character, and the inside respect with its proposition- and term- character. I have written such a thing before about legi-, sin- and qualisign, it is a bit crude, just a guess, maybe you can do something with it, maybe Im wrong, I dont know, you tell. I do not want to confuse anybody.

Best,

Helmut


13. November 2015 um 21:01 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
 




Gary F, list,
 

Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.
 

I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. 

 


But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions.

 

In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to form such an argument" (EP2, p.308).

 

In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions. In the case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, and that when 

Units of the Universe (was) Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John, Sung:

Gentle responses inserted.   :-) 
 
On Nov 14, 2015, at 4:49 AM, John Collier wrote:

> Jerry,
>  
> Isn’t this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier analysis?

Of course, yes.  My first sentence is merely a factual statement.

> Are you implying that Fourier analysis has no scientific value (it is 
> tautological, so no additional information content – so no additional 
> empirical content),

 The mathematical content of the two forms of representation is analogous. 

But, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musica_universalis 
 for the difference in philosophical content.
[Old wine in new bottles?]  

> or do you mean to imply some other value with your use of “scientific”? I 
> would prefer to keep the term from being value laden, but I know it is used 
> that way, though usually pejoratively. I really don’t understand your usage 
> here.

My question, a second independent thought,  was: 

> How does your work relate to any form of scientific conclusion?
>  
Generally speaking, as an everyday term, "science" means well-defined objective 
knowledge, usually consistent and reproducible and independent of the observer. 
Hilbert's criteria of consistency, completeness and decidability are the first 
logical steps for evaluating scientific papers, are they not? 

The conceptual forms of mathematics do not infer any units of measure, 
scientific units being terms that are necessary to associate the scientific 
identity of a quality with number and hence quantity.  

In certain of your writings, John, such as your vigorous insistence of the 
problematic notion of "It's from bits", you choose to ignore how the units of 
"its" come into being.

I believe that this is both a metaphysical and a scientific flaw in your 
positions, in this instance and elsewhere in other of your writings.

Would your position on "It's from Bits" be consistent with:

"The union of units unites the unity of the Universe." ? 

Cheers

Jerry


BTW, the quote:
> “The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like   
>(111315-1)
> that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, 
> for a 
> long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every 
> school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in 
> history, 
> in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as 
> the filling up of its details.  The first step toward this is to find simple 
> concepts 
> applicable to every subject. “ (Heartshorne and Weiss, 1931, p. vii; emphases 
> were added).”


is directly from CP1. paragraph 1 of the "preface" which is actually from a CSP 
paper.

The deep question is: 

Can any concept meet this stringent criteria?
If so, which one or ones?
Would such a concept be a unit?

JLRC


> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
> Sent: November 14, 2015 7:04 AM
> To: Sungchul Ji
> Cc: PEIRCE-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument 
> (USOMI)
>  
> Sung:
>  
> Every 'vibrational motion' can be approximated by a sequence of intervals.
>  
> How does your work relate to any form of scientific conclusion?
>  
> In other words, what are the premisses?  
> And what are the propositions?
> And, how are these premisses and propositions related to a scientific 
> conclusion? 
>  (such as "Life is...???)
>  
> Cheers
>  
> jerry
>  
>  
>  
> On Nov 13, 2015, at 6:33 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi,
>  
> Charles Peirce believed that there are "simple concepts applicable to every 
> subject": 
>  
>  
> “The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like   
>(111315-1)
> that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, 
> for a 
> long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every 
> school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in 
> history, 
> in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as 
> the filling up of its details.  The first step toward this is to find simple 
> concepts 
> applicable to every subject. “ (Heartshorne and Weiss, 1931, p. vii; emphases 
> were added).”
>  
> The purpose of this post is to bring to your attention some recent evidences 
> supporting the suggestion that "vibrational motions" of material systems may 
> be one of the simple concepts that applies to everything in the Universe -- 
> from bond vibrations in molecules, to concentration waves inside the cell, to 
> sound waves in human speech, to electromagnetic waves from the sun, the 
> brain, and i-phones, and to the gravitational waves yet to be confirmed (Ji, 
> 2015 a, b).   
>  
> Evidence #1:  
>  
> Petoukhov (2015) has accumulated an impressive amount of evidence during the 
> past decade that genes exhibit properties resembling 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking it
up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to
gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it
original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both?

I am not so much trying to suggest reading more before taking part (though
reading more is always good), as I am trying to get a grasp of your
interest in Peirce, and what you've taken time to familiarize yourself with
in his philosophy. I usually find each person has their own way into
Peirce, and then gradually each of us gets to understand the bigger picture
over time and we help each other along with that. I myself came by way of
interest in W James, epistemology, and logic. Please don't feel a need to
read a lot more before participating.

I'm not sure about the idea of self-representation of a sign. In EP1,
"Grounds for the Validity of Logic", p.74, Peirce concludes that a
proposition cannot imply its own truth. If a sign could represent itself,
this would seem to imply that it could imply its own truth. Besides this,
if I understand Peirce rightly, a sign, in order to be a sign (or for that
matter, for any representation to be a representation), it cannot be the
thing signified or represented. This is the importance of understanding a
sign as a medium between an object and an interpretant that constitutes a
triadic relation. If you should find an example of a sign which perfectly
represents its object in every respect so as to be indistinguishable from
the object, and so see the object as representing itself, I should say that
there is no sign at all, but simply the object. It is part of the logic of
representation that a representation must somehow be unlike what it
represents, because it cannot be the thing itself. A sign which represents
its object completely, perfectly, is no sign at all, but simply the object
itself. To put it another way, if a sign were to represent itself, it would
be its own object. But this is absurd, because it would be no sign at all
then, but simply the thing itself.

But I might be wrong about this. For instance, in EP2, "New Elements",
p.321, Peirce writes:

"It is, of course, quite possible for a symbol to represent itself, at
least in the only sense in which a thing that has no *real being* but
only *being
represented*, and which exists in *replica*, can be said to be identical
with a real and therefore individual object. A map may be a map of itself;
that is to say one replica of it may be the object mapped. But this does
not make the denotation extraordinarily direct. As an example of a symbol
of that character, we may rather take the symbol which is expressed in
words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol whatever must
denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol considered as denoting
the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes; and in denoting it, it
*is* that very thing, or a fragment of it taken for the whole. It is the
whole taken so far as it need be taken for the purpose of denotation; for
denotation essentially takes a part for its whole."

Sooo, maybe I'm wrong. But I think what he is saying here is more nuanced
than that a sign can self-represent. Every symbol has replicas, and he is
saying the object represented may itself be considered a replica of the
symbol. This doesn't make it the symbol though. I also think that in this
case the replica is not itself a sign; at least, not a sign of itself. It's
as if we took the symbol "pencil" and then instanced an actual pencil as a
replica of the symbol. I don't think this makes the symbol able to
represent itself though; after all, if the map has a replica that is the
object mapped, how does the object mapped qua replica of the map represent
in turn the map? We could say there is a likeness of the object to the map.
But that would be as an icon, not as the symbol that the map is.

In the case of "the Truth" or "Universe of Being," I take it that the
symbol in some sense represents itself, but it is not the whole of what it
represents; it is a fragment or part of the whole that is represented.

For a more developed account of the matter, consider an argument given by
Frederik Stjernfelt in his Natural Propositions, which book was discussed
on the list at length some months ago. I'll finish with this quote from the
text, and only offer it since it seems you are interested in this issue.
NP, p.68 (italics and brackets from the original):

"The syntax of the proposition is also the starting-point of the
investigation of its interpretant in *Syllabus*. The object of the
Dicisign, of course, is the entity referred to by the subject. The
interpretant is not merely the predicate, but the claim, made possible by
the syntax, that the predicate actually holds about an existing object:

'...the Interpretant represents a real existential relation, or genuine
Secondness, as subsisting between the Dicisign 

RE: Units of the Universe (was) Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)

[John Collier]

Jerry,

It is fairly obvious that we disagree about ontological commitment. When I talk 
of "its" I am talking about existents, not merely realities. Likewise, when I 
talk of "bits", which I take to be grounded in existent distinctions.  So I 
don't know what it would mean to in addition to explain how bits "come into 
being".  I would assume you mean come into existence, but I am already assuming 
they exist - existent distinctions; there is no other kind of distinctness 
except ones in Peirce's realm of reality, but these differences do not imply 
existent differences.

I have no idea why there are existents (something rather than nothing), and I 
have never claimed to. Quite the contrary on this and other lists, in fact. So 
I see your complaint as misguided and without basis as applied to my expressed 
positions.

Anything tautological applies to all existents, so if there is a difference in 
"philosophical content" it is going to be in the existence of the application. 
However, if we have existing harmonics, then they are analyzable into discrete 
components, even if infinite. It is also quite possible using similar 
techniques (following Shannon) to talk about information in continuous 
functions.  If the functions are realized (exist), so is the information.

You seem to see a difference where I see no existent distinction. I would say 
that any such difference can contain no information, and is at best misleading 
because expressing a concern here suggests that there is a difference that is 
somehow informative. Since it isn't, I think that thinking about it (very much) 
is a waste of time and effort.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: November 14, 2015 8:00 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Cc: Sungchul Ji; John Collier
Subject: Units of the Universe (was) Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a 
Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)

List, John, Sung:

Gentle responses inserted.   :-)

On Nov 14, 2015, at 4:49 AM, John Collier wrote:


Jerry,

Isn't this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier analysis?

Of course, yes.  My first sentence is merely a factual statement.


Are you implying that Fourier analysis has no scientific value (it is 
tautological, so no additional information content - so no additional empirical 
content),

 The mathematical content of the two forms of representation is analogous.

But, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musica_universalis
 for the difference in philosophical content.
[Old wine in new bottles?]


or do you mean to imply some other value with your use of "scientific"? I would 
prefer to keep the term from being value laden, but I know it is used that way, 
though usually pejoratively. I really don't understand your usage here.

My question, a second independent thought,  was:

How does your work relate to any form of scientific conclusion?

Generally speaking, as an everyday term, "science" means well-defined objective 
knowledge, usually consistent and reproducible and independent of the observer.
Hilbert's criteria of consistency, completeness and decidability are the first 
logical steps for evaluating scientific papers, are they not?

The conceptual forms of mathematics do not infer any units of measure, 
scientific units being terms that are necessary to associate the scientific 
identity of a quality with number and hence quantity.

In certain of your writings, John, such as your vigorous insistence of the 
problematic notion of "It's from bits", you choose to ignore how the units of 
"its" come into being.

I believe that this is both a metaphysical and a scientific flaw in your 
positions, in this instance and elsewhere in other of your writings.

Would your position on "It's from Bits" be consistent with:

"The union of units unites the unity of the Universe." ?

Cheers

Jerry


BTW, the quote:
"The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like 
 (111315-1)
that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, 
for a
long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every
school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history,
in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as
the filling up of its details.  The first step toward this is to find simple 
concepts
applicable to every subject. " (Heartshorne and Weiss, 1931, p. vii; emphases
were added)."

is directly from CP1. paragraph 1 of the "preface" which is actually from a CSP 
paper.

The deep question is:

Can any concept meet this stringent criteria?
If so, which one or ones?
Would such a concept be a unit?

JLRC



John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: November 14, 2015 7:04 AM
To: Sungchul Ji
Cc: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable
to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected
Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they
stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going
around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for
under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very
unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't
portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The
commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary
literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort.

If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there
are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that
if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a link
to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself
usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance
to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of
Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is
important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain
Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"
would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be
thrown in with semiotics (except for "On a New List"), but they are
invaluable for understanding the basic perspective and understanding that
Peirce brings to his theory of semiotic.

Now with respect to your substantive remarks, I think there are a number of
things to say.

When you say "The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is
about" and then "the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as
well", it's unclear here what you mean by this. So let me give two guesses
on my part. First of all, there is the presentative aspect of the sign.
That is, we consider an object, and in what sense that object serves as a
sign. In Peirce's semiotic, this will mean that it either serves as a
medium according to a, or the, quality the object embodies (Firstness), the
brute existence of the object (Secondness), or the object as having some
kind of habit (Thirdness). This is what the trichotomy dealing with
qualisign, sinsign, and legisign is about. It deals with the sign in its
presentative aspect, what the basis is for its power of mediation. Then
besides this kind of presenting, there is the dynamical/immediate object
distinction. There is the object in itself, independent of what we think of
it, and this is the dynamic object; I believe this fits with your thought
that one aspect is "the meaning of the sign, what the sign is about". Then
there is the object as represented by the sign within the sign, and that is
the immediate object. As the quote from Frederik's book shows, the idea is
that the immediate object is not only about the dynamic object, but also
the sign itself. So you say, "the sign has to present itself, so, be about
itself as well." This seems to be exactly what the immediate obect
accomplishes. So I think you have been misunderstanding, and this
distinction between dynamical and immediate is what you are looking for. It
is simply misleading because it is referred to as immediate object rather
than, say, immediate sign, or self-representing sign. This is my guess.

Then there is what you have to say about arguments and propositions, and
here I think you have some confusion. The issue was not whether an argument
contains a proposition and a term; everyone takes that for granted, and in
fact probably more than one term, and more than one proposition. The issue
is whether the original argument itself could be regarded as a term, and
likewise whether a proposition could be regarded as a term. This is
different from the idea of containing. We haven't been discussing whether
arguments contain propositions and terms, but whether an argument can
itself, just as the argument it is, be regarded as being itself a term in
some way? That's the issue which has been discussed.

Okay, now about some remarks you made about arguments and propositions. You
said "[t]he dynamical object of this argument is the reason why it is like
this, in nature, and also the common knowledge about this reason." I'm not
so sure about this. It seems to me the reason is expressed in the final
interpretant, unless by reason you mean efficient cause, and then it would
be the dynamical object. Also, the dynamical object will not be the common
knowledge about the reason. Knowledge is of the nature of an interpretant,
not the object. As for the immediate object being an idea, the 'why it is
like this', conveyed by the sign, I don't think there is necessarily a
'why' expressed in the immediate object; in general, I'm not sure there
ever is such a case.

You also said the proposition is formed by abduction, 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, list,

I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that
any reply is made to what I have to say.

After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments.
I would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much
about this subject for awhile, and certainly am not as well acquainted with
the subject matter as Jeff. I'm just offering my two cents here.

One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object
is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is
identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong
to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose
the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it
is a little confusing that they are identified as such. After all, since we
are talking about nested signs here, and the I-relation (if I may so call
it) is shown as part of the third triad, then it does not seem like we can
have a rheme and a dicent in the other two triads, since neither of those
include the I-relation. So some explanation is required to make sense of
these bracketed identifications.

A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for the
second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual
judgment. There is the percept and then there is the perceptual judgment
which judges the percept. If we look to "Telepathy" from the seventh volume
of the CP (I googled and got a pdf from commens.org that collects the
statements about percipuum), we find such statements as the following:

"Perhaps I might be permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both
percept and perceptual judgment." (7.629)

"...I propose to consider the percept as it is immediately interpreted in
the perceptual judgment, under the name of the 'percipuum.'" (7.643)

It's not clear that the percipuum acts as medium between percept and
perceptual judgment, or exactly how the percipuum could be understood as a
medium. In the diagram, it is asserted to be a sinsign, but does this
really make sense? The percipuum, in its Secondness, serves as medium
between the percept and the perceptual judgment? I don't find this
intuitive. I'm not saying that I necessarily have a better idea of how to
think of percept and perceptual judgment. But it is true that in EP2,
"Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction," Peirce compares the perceptual
judgment to an abductive inference, so that the perceptual judgment would
be considered the interpretant of an argument sign, and thus of a legisign,
not sinsign.

A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the
first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema
in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and
something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I
thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than
it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through
a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation. I could be wrong here, but
I thought I should mention it.

In general, I'm not sure the diagrams are a fair depiction of the idea in
question. I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes
are incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into
arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent
by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested
in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.
But I'm not convinced that the diagrams really show how this might work. I
don't think rhemes typically deal with the immediate object and immediate
interpretant while a dicent typically deals with the dynamic object and
dynamic interpretant, and so on. Rather each one will have to account for
each of the ten trichotomies. I guess that the idea in, for instance,
making a rheme nest in a dicent that way, is to suggest that the dynamic
object and/or the dynamic interpretant fulfill the role of filling in the
blanks (or new bonding sites), while when a proposition or group of
propositions is nested into an argument, the (new?) dynamic object and/or
the final interpretant fulfills that role of filling in or new bonding. It
seems to me that this is probably wrong. But, if something else was meant
to be shown, it would be helpful if some further explanation were offered.
Otherwise, I'm missing it.

Having said all this, I still very much approve of the original idea. It is
simply its explication through the proposed diagrams that I find
problematic.

-- Franklin

-



On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 5:14 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Jeff, Gary F, Ben,
>
> I like Jeff's suggestion very much. It seems to me a a more developed
> interpretation of the point that Ben had suggested, 

Re: Units of the Universe (was) Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:


On Nov 14, 2015, at 12:54 PM, John Collier wrote:

> Jerry,
>  
> It is fairly obvious that we disagree about ontological commitment.

Yes.

JLRC


> When I talk of “its” I am talking about existents, not merely realities. 
> Likewise, when I talk of “bits”, which I take to be grounded in existent 
> distinctions.  So I don’t know what it would mean to in addition to explain 
> how bits “come into being”.  I would assume you mean come into existence, but 
> I am already assuming they exist – existent distinctions; there is no other 
> kind of distinctness except ones in Peirce’s realm of reality, but these 
> differences do not imply existent differences.
>  
> I have no idea why there are existents (something rather than nothing), and I 
> have never claimed to. Quite the contrary on this and other lists, in fact. 
> So I see your complaint as misguided and without basis as applied to my 
> expressed positions.
>  
> Anything tautological applies to all existents, so if there is a difference 
> in “philosophical content” it is going to be in the existence of the 
> application. However, if we have existing harmonics, then they are analyzable 
> into discrete components, even if infinite. It is also quite possible using 
> similar techniques (following Shannon) to talk about information in 
> continuous functions.  If the functions are realized (exist), so is the 
> information.
>  
> You seem to see a difference where I see no existent distinction. I would say 
> that any such difference can contain no information, and is at best 
> misleading because expressing a concern here suggests that there is a 
> difference that is somehow informative. Since it isn’t, I think that thinking 
> about it (very much) is a waste of time and effort.
>  
> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
> Sent: November 14, 2015 8:00 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L
> Cc: Sungchul Ji; John Collier
> Subject: Units of the Universe (was) Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a 
> Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)
>  
> List, John, Sung:
>  
> Gentle responses inserted.   :-) 
>  
> On Nov 14, 2015, at 4:49 AM, John Collier wrote:
> 
> 
> Jerry,
>  
> Isn’t this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier analysis?
>  
> Of course, yes.  My first sentence is merely a factual statement.
> 
> 
> Are you implying that Fourier analysis has no scientific value (it is 
> tautological, so no additional information content – so no additional 
> empirical content),
>  
>  The mathematical content of the two forms of representation is analogous. 
>  
> But, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musica_universalis 
>  for the difference in philosophical content.
> [Old wine in new bottles?]  
> 
> 
> or do you mean to imply some other value with your use of “scientific”? I 
> would prefer to keep the term from being value laden, but I know it is used 
> that way, though usually pejoratively. I really don’t understand your usage 
> here.
>  
> My question, a second independent thought,  was: 
>  
> How does your work relate to any form of scientific conclusion?
>  
> Generally speaking, as an everyday term, "science" means well-defined 
> objective knowledge, usually consistent and reproducible and independent of 
> the observer. 
> Hilbert's criteria of consistency, completeness and decidability are the 
> first logical steps for evaluating scientific papers, are they not? 
>  
> The conceptual forms of mathematics do not infer any units of measure, 
> scientific units being terms that are necessary to associate the scientific 
> identity of a quality with number and hence quantity.  
>  
> In certain of your writings, John, such as your vigorous insistence of the 
> problematic notion of "It's from bits", you choose to ignore how the units of 
> "its" come into being.
>  
> I believe that this is both a metaphysical and a scientific flaw in your 
> positions, in this instance and elsewhere in other of your writings.
>  
> Would your position on "It's from Bits" be consistent with:
>  
> "The union of units unites the unity of the Universe." ? 
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry
>  
>  
> BTW, the quote:
> “The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like   
>(111315-1)
> that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, 
> for a 
> long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every 
> school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in 
> history, 
> in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as 
> the filling up of its details.  The first step toward this is to find simple 
> concepts 
> applicable to every subject. “ (Heartshorne and Weiss, 1931, p. vii; emphases 
> were added).”
> 
> is directly from CP1. paragraph 1 of the "preface" which is actually from a 
> CSP paper.
>  
> The deep question is: 
>  
> Can any 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff,

Again, just to note in case you didn't see my other post, I thought it
better to move discussion to a more appropriately titled thread, in case
you are interested in responding.

On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> List,
>
> I think it would be best to move any further discussion to a separate
> thread, since no one is in any way discussing "Vol. 2 of CP, on Induction"
> anymore in this thread. I'm starting a new thread titled "Terms,
> Propositions, Arguments", which I hope is sufficiently vague as a
> description of any further discussion of our issues.
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> -
>
> On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 6:30 PM, Franklin Ransom <
> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary F, list,
>>
>> I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I
>> think I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am
>> in part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about
>> the informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and
>> because in KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions
>> information and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to
>> terms, and not propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further
>> in KS how these ideas apply to propositions specifically.
>>
>> -- Franklin
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>>>
>>> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions
>>> and not signs?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
>>> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
>>> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the
>>> Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311),
>>> and in part III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the
>>> proposition by first defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e.
>>> predicate and subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term
>>> which is still undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and
>>> depth, he can only be referring to the breadth and depth of the
>>> proposition, not of its parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can
>>> *be* a predicate (or “essential part”) of a sign (namely a
>>> proposition), but it can’t *have* a predicate.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
>>> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
>>> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
>>> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
>>> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
>>> Bateson] {
>>>
>>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
>>> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary F, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
>>> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
>>> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
>>> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
>>> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
>>> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
>>> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
>>> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
>>> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
>>> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
>>> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to
>>> which it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in
>>> which it is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what
>>> is being explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
>>> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
>>> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a
>>> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose,
>>> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a
>>> part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's,
>>> characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is
>>> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Franklin:



On Nov 14, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:

> I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are 
> incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into 
> arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent by 
> the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested in 
> an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.

The concept of a diagram is far wider than what you allude to.

See: 
Greaves, M., 2002, The Philosophical Status of Diagrams, Stanford: CSLI 
Publications.

This is an extraordinary book. Places CSP's diagrams is a modern and wider a 
logical framework.

Cheers

Jerry
-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jerry,

I am referencing the diagrams that Jeff attached to his last post, under
the subject thread "Vol. 2 of CP, On Induction" and never meant to be
saying anything theoretical about diagrams in general..

-- Franklin



On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 4:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:

> Franklin:
>
>
>
> On Nov 14, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are
> incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into
> arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent
> by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested
> in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.
>
>
> The concept of a diagram is far wider than what you allude to.
>
> See:
>
>- Greaves, M., 2002, *The Philosophical Status of Diagrams*, Stanford:
>CSLI Publications.
>
>
> This is an extraordinary book. Places CSP's diagrams is a modern and wider
> a logical framework.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)

[Sungchul Ji]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji 
Date: Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 6:47 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical
Instrument (USOMI)
To: John Collier 


John, Jerry, lists,

(1)  John asked, "Isn’t this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier
analysis?"

Indeed John is right.  Any curve, including long tailed histograms, can be
fit into a series of sine waves, as the Fourier theorem predicts (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourier_series).  In fact we have found that
not all long tailed histograms fit PDE (Planckian Distribution Equation),
although more than 90% of them that we have examined so far do.  As an
example, see how a series of 8 sine waves (green curve) in Figure 1 can fit
the long tailed histogram (blue curve) much better than PDE (red curve).


[image: Inline image 5]

Figure 1.  The superiority of the Fourier series over PDE in fitting long
tailed histograms. (I thank one of my students, Seungkee Kim, for producing
this graph.)



Several conclusions and definitions can be formulated from these
observations:

(i) All long tailed histograms fit Fourier series, i.e., a series of simple
sine waves, confirming the Fourier theorem.

(ii) Only a subset of the histograms fitting the Fourier series also fits
PDE.

(iii) Just as the Planckian information (I_P) is defined as the binary
logarithm of the ratio of the area under the curve (AUC) of PDE over the
AUC of Gaussian-like equation (GLE), i.e.,

I_P = log_2[AUC(PDE)/AUC(GLE)], so
(111415-1)

it would be logical to define as the Fourier information (I_F) the binary
logarithm of the ratio of the AUC of the N-term Fourier series (FSN)
fitting a histogram over the AUC of GLE, i.e.,

I_F = log_2[AUC(FSN)/AUC(GLE)]
   (111415-2)

GLE is defined as the Gaussian equation wherein the pre-exponential factor,
sigma x (2 x pi)^0.5,  is replaced by a free parameter, A.

(iv)  M. Burgin, in his book, "Theory of Information: Fundamentality,
Diversity and Unification" (World Scientific, New Jersey, 2010, pp.
131-133) lists no less than 35 ways of defining information.  I_P and I_F
are but two more such definitions.


(v)  Since all experimental records (some of which may be no more than half
waves), including long tailed histograms, are expected to fit functions
consisting of a series of N sine waves (where N could be 5-20 ?), it seems
logical to conclude that all these records result from some mechanisms
implicating wave phenomena, whether electromagnetic, mechanical, chemical,
acoustic, or gravitational.

(2)  In response to Jerry's comments about what is new in my and
Petoukhov's findings that the Universe may behave as a self-organizing
system of oscillators, or as a musical instrument (since ancients have
already thought about it), I just want to remind him that it took more than
two millennia for the concept of the atom, first invoked by Democritus, to
be proven scientifically. Similarly, with all due humility, I am tempted to
suggest that the Pythagoras' and Plato's idea of musica universalis (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourier_series) may have taken more than two
millennia to be proven empirically through the Fourier theorem, the
universality of PDE, and the isomorphism between molecular genetics and
waving phenomena discovered by Petoukhov through the application of matrix
mathematics (http://sciforum.net/conference/70/paper/2812).

All the best.

Sung


On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 5:49 AM, John Collier  wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
>
> Isn’t this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier analysis? Are you
> implying that Fourier analysis has no scientific value (it is tautological,
> so no additional information content – so no additional empirical content),
> or do you mean to imply some other value with your use of “scientific”? I
> would prefer to keep the term from being value laden, but I know it is used
> that way, though usually pejoratively. I really don’t understand your usage
> here.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
> *Sent:* November 14, 2015 7:04 AM
> *To:* Sungchul Ji
> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical
> Instrument (USOMI)
>
>
>
> Sung:
>
>
>
> Every 'vibrational motion' can be approximated by a sequence of intervals.
>
>
>
> How does your work relate to any form of scientific conclusion?
>
>
>
> In other words, what are the premisses?
>
> And what are the propositions?
>
> And, how are these premisses and propositions related to a scientific
> conclusion?
>
>  (such as "Life is...???)
>
>
>
> Cheers
>
>
>
> jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 13, 2015, at 6:33 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
>
>
> Hi,
>
>
>
> Charles Peirce believed that there are "simple