RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jon S., Jeff et al.,

 

Jon, thanks for jumping in here while I was occupied elsewhere. I’m essentially 
in agreement with what you say, but i’m responding here before reading 
subsequent posts in the thread, so for now I’ll just point to some Peirce texts 
relevant to these issues.

 

The 1904 letter to Welby in CP 8.327ff. and SS 23-36 (but not in EP2) is the 
most extensive discussion of the NDTR trichotomies that I know of outside the 
NDTR itself, and situates them firmly in the phenomenological categories. 
Here’s the context of Jeff’s quote:

__

335. In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs 
into Icons, Indices, and Symbols (a division I gave in 1867). I define an Icon 
as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object by virtue of its own 
internal nature. Such is any qualisign, like a vision, — or the sentiment 
excited by a piece of music considered as representing what the composer 
intended. Such may be a sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a curve of the 
distribution of errors. I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic 
object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a 
legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease. (The symptom 
itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in 
a particular case is a sinsign.) I define a Symbol as a sign which is 
determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be so 
interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural 
disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant (that of 
which the interpretant is a determination). Every symbol is necessarily a 
legisign; for it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign a symbol. 

336. In respect to its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of a 
quality, of an existent, or of a law. 

 

As for the internal/external distinction, Peirce’s application of it to 
“worlds” is pervasive, so naturally he also speaks of external or internal 
signs (e.g. EP2:388). But when it comes to what is internal to the sign, the 
quotes are a bit harder to find. Here’s one from the 1908 letter to Welby, 
which says that “It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, 
the Mediate without, and the Immediate within the Sign” (EP2:480). See also 
EP2:485:

 

354. The inquiry ought, one would expect, to be an easy one, since both 
trichotomies depend on there being three Modes of Presence to the mind, which 
we may term 

The Immediate,—The Direct,—The Familiar 

Mode of Presence. 

The difference between the two trichotomies is that the one refers to the 
Presence to the Mind of the Sign and the other to that of the Immediate Object. 
The Sign may have any Modality of Being, i.e., may belong to any one of the 
three Universes; its Immediate Object must be in some sense, in which the Sign 
need not be, Internal. 

 

OK, now I’ll try to catch up with later posts!

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 7-Dec-15 15:29
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

 

Jeff, List:

 

To answer your corrected questions ...

 

1.  Yes, icon/index/symbol is always based on the relation between sign and 
dynamical object.

2.  No, icon/index/symbol is not a classification of signs that includes the 
relation of sign to immediate object.

 

I am not going to be able to provide specific references regarding internal vs. 
external; to be honest, I am not sure whether that terminological distinction 
comes directly from Peirce's own writings or from the secondary literature.  
However, my understanding is that the trichotomy for the immediate 
object/interpretant itself is interchangeable with the trichotomy for its 
relation to the sign; it is precisely this lack of a separate relation that 
makes them immediate, rather than dynamical.  In fact, that letter to Lady 
Welby is exactly what I had in mind when I mentioned the "earlier" 
classification of the immediate interpretant as feelings/experiences/thoughts 
(vs. hypothetic/categorical/relative).

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 1:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  > wrote:

Hello Jon, List,

Quick responses and a further question.

J.S.:  No, icon/index/symbol actually corresponds to the relation between sign 
and dynamical OBJECT.  

 

J.D.:  Yes, my apologies for the error.  I meant to say:  is the icon is a 
class of signs that is always based on the relation between sign and dynamical 
object?  Or, is it 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jeff, some responses interleaved …

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 7-Dec-15 15:35



Gary F., Gary R., List,

 

Sorry for the errors in transcribing Nathan's table.  I put it into my notes, 
and then added a bunch of ideas myself, and then tried to subtract what I had 
added and managed to subtract the wrong terms.  Having said that, let me ask:  
where in the texts will I find this table?  My assumption is that the table 
isn't taken from any particular text, but that Nathan put it together based on 
suggestions Peirce makes in a number of places.

 

GF: Yes, I think so, but the primary source for Table 6.2 seems to be MS 478, 
i.e. “Sundry Logical Conceptions” in EP2. 

 

JD: If the latter is the case, then I think I get the general gist of what he 
is trying to do, but I'm not able to see how he arrived at the particularities 
of this list.  It is quite possible I'm missing something obvious, in which 
case I am hoping that someone will straighten me out.  Otherwise, if I'm 
missing something less obvious, then I'm still hoping to get pointed in the 
right direction.

 

My aim was to make sense of what Peirce says about more and less degenerate and 
genuine forms of the universal categories in the Lowell Lectures.  So far, I'm 
not able to tease out what Peirce is doing there with any confidence.  My hope 
was to turn to a secondary source, like Nathan's essay, for some guidance.  
Thus far, I'm not able to map what Nathan says onto Peirce's remarks about 
these more and less degenerate forms.  So, I'm still puzzled.

 

GF: I think Nathan’s essay is a good one, for the most part (though I don’t 
like some of the examples he gives for the ten classes of signs). But it’s not 
an essay intended for Peirceans, so he doesn’t bother to cite exact sources.

 

JD: The reason I was turning to the remarks about the different forms of the 
universal categories is that I thought it might give us insight into how Peirce 
is drawing from the phenomenology as he classifies the different sorts of signs 
and sign relations in NDTR.  At the start of the essay, Peirce says that 
triadic relations can be divided into 1) Triadic relations of comparison, 2) 
Triadic relations of performance, and 3) Triadic relations of thought.  This 
fits, I think, with points he makes about the laws of comparison in his account 
of genuine triadic relations in "The Logic of Mathematics."  As such, I'm just 
trying to draw on those remarks about the requirements for making comparisons 
for the sake of interpreting the first division between kinds of signs in NDTR. 
 The comments Peirce makes in this essay about the first division of signs 
won't seem very puzzling if taken in isolation.  When read in light of these 
other essays, however, I think there are puzzles a plenty.

 

GF: Perhaps, but I think it’s better to take each essay in its own terms first 
before trying to map them onto each other. That method makes it easier, in my 
opinion, to distinguish between mere terminological variations and deeper 
conceptual differences.

 

--Jeff

 

 

 

 

Jeffrey Downard

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy

Northern Arizona University

(o) 928 523-8354


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jeff, responses interleaved again …

 

Gary f.

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 8-Dec-15 14:10



Hello Jon S., Gary F., List,

 

Jon, given what you say in 1&2 below, then we do have a question.  Gary F. says 
that qualisigns are always icons, while you say that the icons are always based 
on the relation of the sign to the dynamical interpretant.

 

GF: There you go again, Jeff, writing “interpretant” when you mean “object”. 
Anyway, the icon is one of a trichotomy which is based on the relation of the 
sign to its object, and it is First in that trichotomy. That relation cannot be 
more complex than the sign in itself is, and that’s why any sign which is a 
qualisign (First in its own trichotomy) is necessarily an icon, which is First 
in the second trichotomy (based on the S-O relation).

 

What, then, should we say about the following kind of case that Peirce 
explicitly considers in his writings on perception.  In seeing a yellow chair 
with a green cushion, the awareness of the chair and pillow is a percept that 
serves as the immediate object.

 

GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that 
Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object. 
That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is precisely 
the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not apply. In 
fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to the percept. 
Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that entire long 
essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the perceptual judgment 
considered as a kind of natural proposition:

 

 

633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being 
perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair 
yellow. What the particular shade, hue, and purity of the yellow may be it does 
not consider. The percept, on the other hand, is so scrupulously specific that 
it makes this chair different from every other in the world; or rather, it 
would do so if it indulged in any comparisons. 

634. It may be objected that the terms of the judgment resemble the percept. 
Let us consider, first, the predicate, 'yellow' in the judgment that 'this 
chair appears yellow.' This predicate is not the sensation involved in the 
percept, because it is general. It does not even refer particularly to this 
percept but to a sort of composite photograph of all the yellows that have been 
seen. If it resembles the sensational element of the percept, this resemblance 
consists only in the fact that a new judgment will predicate it of the percept, 
just as this judgment does. It also awakens in the mind an imagination 
involving a sensational element. But taking all these facts together, we find 
that there is no relation between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and 
the sensational element of the percept, except forceful connections. 

635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a sign. 
But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which introspection 
can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that it should do so, 
since the qualities of these signs as objects have no relevancy to their 
significative character; for these signs merely play the part of demonstrative 
and relative pronouns, like “that,” or like the A, B, C, of which a lawyer or a 
mathematician avails himself in making complicated statements. In fact, the 
perceptual judgment which I have translated into “that chair is yellow” would 
be more accurately represented thus: “ is yellow,” a pointing index-finger 
taking the place of the subject. On the whole, it is plain enough that the 
perceptual judgment is not a copy, icon, or diagram of the percept, however 
rough. It may be reckoned as a higher grade of the operation of perception. 

 

On that basis, I don’t think we can extract from this passage any good 
information about what a qualisign is or how it works. What it does make clear 
is that the perceptual judgment is not iconic. So at this point I’m going to 
jump down to your concluding paragraph.

 

JD: The percept does not represent the chair.  Rather, it is a vague awareness 
that is largely characterized in following terms:  "it appears to me," "makes 
no professions of any kind," "It does not stand for anything," "I can’t dismiss 
is, as I would a fancy."

 

Peirce asks:  what logical bearing does the percept have upon knowledge and 
belief?  He says that it can be summed up in three precepts:

a. It contributes something positive.

b. It compels the perceiver to acknowledge it. 

c. It neither offers any reason for such acknowledgement nor makes any 
pretension to reasonableness. 

 

If the person perceiving the chair attends to the feeling of yellow, then this 
quality of feeling can stand as a qualisign so long as it bears the right kind 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary, List:

Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly
classified as a dicent sinsign?  And would the percept itself be a rhematic
indexical sinsign?  Or is the percept not yet a sign at all?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM,  wrote:

> GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that
> Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object.
> That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is
> precisely the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not
> apply. In fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to the
> percept. Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that
> entire long essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the
> perceptual *judgment* considered as a kind of natural proposition:
>
>
> 633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being
> perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair
> yellow. What the particular shade, hue, and purity of the yellow may be it
> does not consider. The percept, on the other hand, is so scrupulously
> specific that it makes this chair different from every other in the world;
> or rather, it would do so if it indulged in any comparisons.
>
> 634. It may be objected that the terms of the judgment resemble the
> percept. Let us consider, first, the predicate, 'yellow' in the judgment
> that 'this chair appears yellow.' This predicate is not the sensation
> involved in the percept, because it is general. It does not even refer
> particularly to this percept but to a sort of composite photograph of all
> the yellows that have been seen. If it *resembles* the sensational
> element of the percept, this resemblance consists only in the fact that a
> new judgment will predicate it of the percept, just as this judgment does.
> It also awakens in the mind an imagination involving a sensational element.
> But taking all these facts together, we find that there is no relation
> between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and the sensational
> element of the percept, except forceful connections.
>
> 635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a
> sign. But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which
> introspection can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that
> it should do so, since the qualities of these signs as objects have no
> relevancy to their significative character; for these signs merely play the
> part of demonstrative and relative pronouns, like “that,” or like the A, B,
> C, of which a lawyer or a mathematician avails himself in making
> complicated statements. In fact, the perceptual judgment which I have
> translated into “that chair is yellow” would be more accurately represented
> thus: “ is yellow,” a pointing index-finger taking the place of the
> subject. On the whole, it is plain enough that the perceptual judgment is
> not a copy, icon, or diagram of the percept, however rough. It may be
> reckoned as a higher grade of the operation of perception.
>
>
>
> On that basis, I don’t think we can extract from this passage any good
> information about what a qualisign is or how it works. What it does make
> clear is that the perceptual judgment is not iconic. So at this point I’m
> going to jump down to your concluding paragraph.
>
> GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see
> how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I
> think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction
> of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It
> has to be First in that trichotomy.
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jon A.S.,

 

IF (I say If!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the perceptual 
judgment, then I think rhematic indexical sinsign is probably how I would 
classify it. However, I think we can just as well (maybe better) consider the 
percept as the object of the sign (the perceptual judgment). If we consider the 
percept as a sign, then it must have an object of its own, and it’s hard to say 
how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept. 

 

Remember we’re talking logic/semiotic here, not the psychology of perception, 
which would probably locate the percept in the brain/mind and its object in the 
external world. But that analysis makes all kinds of metaphysical assumptions 
that phenomenology eschews. If we stick to phenomenology, we can say that the 
percept appears, i.e. it is a phenomenon, but it does not appear to mediate 
between some other phenomenon and a perceiver, as a sign does. It certainly 
doesn’t mean anything.

 

I think your questions are nice, in the sense used by Peirce when he wrote in 
NDTR (CP 2.265):

“It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all the 
circumstances of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom requisite to 
be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign precisely, one will 
easily come near enough to its character for any ordinary purpose of logic.”

 

Gary f.

 

} Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 9-Dec-15 13:22



Gary, List:

 

Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly classified 
as a dicent sinsign?  And would the percept itself be a rhematic indexical 
sinsign?  Or is the percept not yet a sign at all?

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM,  > wrote:

GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that 
Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object. 
That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is precisely 
the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not apply. In 
fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to the percept. 
Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that entire long 
essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the perceptual judgment 
considered as a kind of natural proposition:

 

633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being 
perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair 
yellow. What the particular shade, hue, and purity of the yellow may be it does 
not consider. The percept, on the other hand, is so scrupulously specific that 
it makes this chair different from every other in the world; or rather, it 
would do so if it indulged in any comparisons.

634. It may be objected that the terms of the judgment resemble the percept. 
Let us consider, first, the predicate, 'yellow' in the judgment that 'this 
chair appears yellow.' This predicate is not the sensation involved in the 
percept, because it is general. It does not even refer particularly to this 
percept but to a sort of composite photograph of all the yellows that have been 
seen. If it resembles the sensational element of the percept, this resemblance 
consists only in the fact that a new judgment will predicate it of the percept, 
just as this judgment does. It also awakens in the mind an imagination 
involving a sensational element. But taking all these facts together, we find 
that there is no relation between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and 
the sensational element of the percept, except forceful connections. 

635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a sign. 
But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which introspection 
can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that it should do so, 
since the qualities of these signs as objects have no relevancy to their 
significative character; for these signs merely play the part of demonstrative 
and relative pronouns, like “that,” or like the A, B, C, of which a lawyer or a 
mathematician avails himself in making complicated statements. In fact, the 
perceptual judgment which I have translated into “that chair is yellow” would 
be more accurately represented thus: “ is yellow,” a pointing index-finger 
taking the place of the subject. On the whole, it is plain enough that the 
perceptual judgment is not a copy, icon, or diagram of the percept, however 
rough. It may be reckoned as a higher grade of the operation 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fw: [peirce-society-list] Peirce Society Annual Meeting Program and Agenda

[Gary Richmond]

Jon Alan Schmidt asked: is publication of W9 still imminent?  Any update on
W11, which at one time was expected to be ready about a year after W9?

I'll look into this and see what I can find out.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Thanks, Gary F.  Continuing to muse out loud ... If the percept is not a
sign of some other object, but rather the (only?) object of the sign that
is the perceptual judgment, and "perceptual judgments are the first
premises of all our reasonings" (CP5.116), then how are our thoughts (i.e.,
subsequent signs) ever connected with objects other than percepts?

Jon S.

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 3:25 PM,  wrote:

> Jon A.S.,
>
>
>
> IF (I say *If*!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the
> perceptual judgment, then I think *rhematic indexical sinsign* is
> probably how I would classify it. However, I think we can just as well
> (maybe better) consider the percept as the *object* of the sign (the
> perceptual judgment). If we consider the *percept* as a sign, then it
> must have an object of its own, and it’s hard to say how any phenomenon
> could be the object of a percept.
>
>
>
> Remember we’re talking logic/semiotic here, not the *psychology* of
> perception, which would probably locate the percept in the brain/mind and
> its object in the external world. But that analysis makes all kinds of
> metaphysical assumptions that phenomenology eschews. If we stick to
> phenomenology, we can say that the percept *appears*, i.e. it is a
> *phenomenon*, but it does not appear to mediate between some *other*
> phenomenon and a perceiver, as a sign does. It certainly doesn’t *mean*
> anything.
>
>
>
> I think your questions are *nice*, in the sense used by Peirce when he
> wrote in NDTR (CP 2.265):
>
> “It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all
> the circumstances of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom
> requisite to be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign
> precisely, one will easily come near enough to its character for any
> ordinary purpose of logic.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 9-Dec-15 13:22
>
> Gary, List:
>
>
>
> Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly
> classified as a dicent sinsign?  And would the percept itself be a rhematic
> indexical sinsign?  Or is the percept not yet a sign at all?
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM,  wrote:
>
> GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that
> Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object.
> That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is
> precisely the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not
> apply. In fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to the
> percept. Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that
> entire long essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the
> perceptual *judgment* considered as a kind of natural proposition:
>
> 633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being
> perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair
> yellow. What the particular shade, hue, and purity of the yellow may be it
> does not consider. The percept, on the other hand, is so scrupulously
> specific that it makes this chair different from every other in the world;
> or rather, it would do so if it indulged in any comparisons.
>
> 634. It may be objected that the terms of the judgment resemble the
> percept. Let us consider, first, the predicate, 'yellow' in the judgment
> that 'this chair appears yellow.' This predicate is not the sensation
> involved in the percept, because it is general. It does not even refer
> particularly to this percept but to a sort of composite photograph of all
> the yellows that have been seen. If it *resembles* the sensational
> element of the percept, this resemblance consists only in the fact that a
> new judgment will predicate it of the percept, just as this judgment does.
> It also awakens in the mind an imagination involving a sensational element.
> But taking all these facts together, we find that there is no relation
> between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and the sensational
> element of the percept, except forceful connections.
>
> 635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a
> sign. But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which
> introspection can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that
> it should do so, since the qualities of these signs as objects have no
> relevancy to their significative character; for these signs merely play the
> part of demonstrative and relative pronouns, like “that,” or like the A, B,
> C, of which a lawyer or a mathematician 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fw: [peirce-society-list] Peirce Society Annual Meeting Program and Agenda

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary, List:

Thank you for distributing this.  Just curious, is publication of W9 still
imminent?  Any update on W11, which at one time was expected to be ready
about a year after W9?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 2:31 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> In any case, one practical consequence is that we have not finished W9
> yet, but finishing it is what we are doing now, in between other
> initiatives, and done it will be this year.
>

-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Gary F., List,

G.F:  Perhaps, but I think it’s better to take each essay in its own terms 
first before trying to map them onto each other. 

J.D.  I appreciate the approach of taking each essay on its own terms 
first--especially when it comes to helping those who are relatively new to 
Peirce learn how to work carefully with the texts themselves--rather than to 
run off to their own ideas thought about in their own terms.  If that is your 
goal, then it might make sense to pick an early published essay such as 
"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" as the piece that will 
be used for such pedagogical purposes.  NDTR is a pretty tough essay to be 
reading in such a manner.

For those of us who have read through this and related pieces a number of 
times, and who have read spent more hours fretting over the details of what 
Peirce says than we might care to admit, I do think there are good reasons to 
put some of the key pieces together in other essays--even if it is only a few 
at a time.  Let me offer an example:  when it comes to reading NDTR, I think it 
helps to frame the discussion in terms of the methods that were laid out in the 
run up to "On a New List of the Categories," and then to follow Peirce's lead 
in the way he develops those ideas in that early set of essays in the Cognition 
series.

First and foremost, we need to draw on Peirce's account of reasoning, which has 
three basic levels to the discussion:  self-controlled arguments, propositions, 
and terms.  Unlike many philosophers, such as Kant and Russell, who say that we 
should start with the question of what is necessary to assert that a 
proposition is true, Peirce is asking us to focus first and foremost on the 
level of valid arguments.  The question of what is necessary for the different 
forms of argument to be valid controls the kinds of explanations that can be 
given about the nature of propositions--and the same point holds when it comes 
to terms as parts of propositions.  There are many advantages to this more 
holistic method that Peirce is using for the sake of developing a philosophical 
logic.

So, in asking, "What are the basic kinds of signs when we consider them in 
their mode of apprehension?," we should arrive at the conclusion by seeing what 
role signs having the character of qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns have in 
the various kinds of propositions that function as premisses or conclusions in 
abductive, inductive or deductive forms of argument.  Initially, we don't even 
need a theory of valid inference in order to work in such a manner.  Rather, we 
can rely on examples drawn from common experience.  Our logica utens is able to 
supply us with the most important kinds of observations that we need for the 
sake of improving on the the kind of logical grammar that has been developed 
thus far in Peirce's earlier writings on the nature of signs and sign relations.

Let me ask:  what is the role of the qualisign in an abductive inference?  The 
answer, I think, is that simple things such as the qualisigns that consist of 
the quality of a feeling of yellow or green (considered in isolation from the 
parts they might play in symbolic expressions) can't serve as premisses in such 
self-controlled arguments.  All self controlled arguments require propositions 
expressed in symbolic terms.  Do the inferences giving rise to perceptual 
judgments require that the premisses be stated in symbols?  The answer is no, I 
think.  When a young child who does not yet have symbolic expressions for 
"pillow," "chair," "yellow' and "green," looks at a green pillow on a yellow 
chair, the child sees the same thing that we see.  It is not as if the pillow 
on the chair initially are seen by the child quite darkly, or that it is a 
buzzing confusion of colors and shapes, and then, over time the colors are 
turned up and order is brought to the confusion once the concepts are 
understood in symbolic terms.  Rather, gaining the ability to use conventional 
symbols enables the child to focus his attention more clearly on various parts 
of the pillow and chair--and to communicate what his attention is focused on 
with greater clarity to others.

>From the early period in his work on the nature of representations, Peirce saw 
>a need to draw on the accounts of argument, propositions, and terms in the 
>philosophical theory of valid inference for the sake of generalizing on those 
>conceptions.  What is necessary for a sign to be used in the manner that is 
>necessary for making inferences to perceptual judgments?  Whatever answer we 
>give, Peirce insists that we treat the inference to the perceptual judgment as 
>a valid inference--even if it is not self-controlled.  Based on prior studies 
>of self controlled inference, we know that considerations of quantity are 
>really important in such inferences.  We make assertions about *this* 
>particular pillow, or about *some* chairs, or about *all* pillows resting 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S., Gary F.,

Peirce does say that the percept serves, in the first instance, as the 
immediate object, where the qualisign is brought into a relation to the 
percipuum--so that the percipuum is determined to be in relation to the same 
object as the qualisign.  Collecting a group of percepts together, they can 
also serve as the dynamical object in relation to the perceptual judgment, 
which is the dynamical interpretant.  This process, whatever it might amount 
to, should be conceived as inferential in character.  My aim is to see if we 
can learn a little more about the character of the qualisign by looking more 
closely at the kind of inference that can take us from a collection of percepts 
to a perceptual judgment.

The point Gary F. makes is well taken.  At the early phases of our inquiry into 
the character of different kinds of signs and sign relations--where we are 
trying to set up some nomenclature and make some divisions--accuracy and 
precision are not essential.  We can live with some vagueness in the way we are 
developing the conceptions.  I wonder:  what are the ordinary purposes of 
logic?  Whatever they are, I take these ordinary purposes to be something that 
is preparatory to doing things in a more exacting way.

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 2:41 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Thanks, Gary F.  Continuing to muse out loud ... If the percept is not a sign 
of some other object, but rather the (only?) object of the sign that is the 
perceptual judgment, and "perceptual judgments are the first premises of all 
our reasonings" (CP5.116), then how are our thoughts (i.e., subsequent signs) 
ever connected with objects other than percepts?

Jon S.

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 3:25 PM, > 
wrote:
Jon A.S.,

IF (I say If!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the perceptual 
judgment, then I think rhematic indexical sinsign is probably how I would 
classify it. However, I think we can just as well (maybe better) consider the 
percept as the object of the sign (the perceptual judgment). If we consider the 
percept as a sign, then it must have an object of its own, and it’s hard to say 
how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept.

Remember we’re talking logic/semiotic here, not the psychology of perception, 
which would probably locate the percept in the brain/mind and its object in the 
external world. But that analysis makes all kinds of metaphysical assumptions 
that phenomenology eschews. If we stick to phenomenology, we can say that the 
percept appears, i.e. it is a phenomenon, but it does not appear to mediate 
between some other phenomenon and a perceiver, as a sign does. It certainly 
doesn’t mean anything.

I think your questions are nice, in the sense used by Peirce when he wrote in 
NDTR (CP 2.265):
“It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all the 
circumstances of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom requisite to 
be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign precisely, one will 
easily come near enough to its character for any ordinary purpose of logic.”

Gary f.

} Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 9-Dec-15 13:22

Gary, List:

Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly classified 
as a dicent sinsign?  And would the percept itself be a rhematic indexical 
sinsign?  Or is the percept not yet a sign at all?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM, 
> wrote:

GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that 
Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object. 
That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is precisely 
the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not apply. In 
fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to the percept. 
Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that entire long 
essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the perceptual judgment 
considered as a kind of natural proposition:

633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being 
perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair 

[PEIRCE-L] Fw: [peirce-society-list] Peirce Society Annual Meeting Program and Agenda

[Gary Richmond]

From: shannon...@gmail.com  on behalf of Shannon Dea 

Sent: Tuesday, December 8, 2015 5:24 PM
To: peirce-soci...@westga.edu
Subject: [peirce-society-list] Peirce Society Annual Meeting Program and Agenda


Dear colleagues,

Please find below my signature the program and agenda for the Annual Meeting of 
the Charles S. Peirce Society, to be held Friday, January 8, 2016,  1:30-4:30 
p.m. at the Washington Marriott Wardman Park, Washington D.C., U.S.A.

Note as well that the Society is holding an additional session, Thursday, 
January 7, 2:00-5:00 p.m. with the following agenda:

Chair: Richard Atkins (Boston College)

Speakers:

Kenneth Boyd (Dalhousie University) and Diana Heney (Fordham University) 
“Rascals, Triflers, and Scientists: C. S. Pierce and the Centrality of 
Assertion”

Claudia Cristalli (Scuola Normale Superieure di Pisa, Italy) “Is Perception 
like Signal Detection? Peirce’s Philosophical and Scientific Inquiry on 
Perception and Its Analogies with a Modern Hypothesis on Cognition”

Robert Lane (University of West Georgia) “Peirce’s Theory of Truth: The Real 
Story”

For more information about the meeting of the Eastern APA, where both Peirce 
Society sessions will be held, see  
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.apaonline.org/resource/resmgr/Eastern2016/E2016_Meeting_Program.pdf.

I look forward to seeing many of you in St. Louis next month.

Best wishes,

Shannon Dea

Secretary-Treasurer, Charles Sanders Peirce Society
Director, Women's Studies
Faculty of Arts Teaching Fellow
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Waterloo
200 University Ave. W.
Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
(519) 888-4567 (ext. 32778)
FAX (519) 746-3097



Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society
1:30-4:30 p.m., Friday, January 8, 2016
Washington Marriott Wardman Park
Washington D.C., U.S.A.



Program of Scholarly Meeting

Chair: André De Tienne (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)


Presidential Address: Ivo Ibri (Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo)

Francesco Bellucci (Tallinn University of Technology), “Speculative Grammar: 
The Deduction of the Dicisign” (Winner of the 2015-16 Peirce Society Essay 
Contest)


Business Meeting Agenda

Chair: Ivo Ibri (Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo)

1. Approval of minutes of the 2015 meeting. (Ivo Ibri)
2. Report from the Executive Committee (Ivo Ibri)

3. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society (Cornelis 
de Waal)

4. Financial statement (Shannon Dea)

5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project (André De Tienne)

6. Report from the Nominating Committee and election of new officers

7. New business

8. Adjournment (André De Tienne)





Minutes of the 2015 Business Meeting

Charles Sanders Peirce Society

Thursday February 19, 2015
Hilton St. Louis At the Ballpark
St. Louis, Missouri, USA

Following the annual scholarly meeting, with papers by President Demetra 
Sfendoni-Mentzou and Essay Contest winner Aaron Wilson, President 
Sfendoni-Mentzou called the meeting to order.

1. Call for approval of the previous year’s minutes

Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou asked whether there were any objections to approving 
the minutes of the 2015 business meeting.  Hearing none, Bob Lane moved and 
David Pfeiffer seconded the approval of the minutes. Passed.
2. Report from the Executive Committee Meeting

Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou reported on the Society’s accomplishment in 2014:


·  International Centennial Congress held, with over 200 Peirce scholars 
from around the world.

·  Extremely well-attended open forum at International Centennial Congress 
on the future of Peirce scholarship – standing-room-only audience and a panel 
of distinguished international scholars.

·  Ad Hoc Constitution committee formed and recommendations submitted to 
Executive Committee.

·  Monument Committee formed to consider erection of appropriate memorial 
monument at Peirce’s grave.
Sfendoni-Mentzou then verbally relayed the following minutes of the Executive 
Committee meeting earlier in the day:

Minutes of the Peirce Society Executive meeting

February. 19, 2015 St. Louis At the Ballpark Hilton, St. Louis, Missouri, 
2:30-4:30 p.m.

Present: Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (President), Ivo Ibri (Vice-President), 
Shannon Dea (Secretary-Treasurer), Richard Atkins (At-Large Executive member), 
Nathan Houser (Peirce Foundation President), André De Tienne (PEP Director).
Regrets: Ahti Pietarinen, Daniel Campos, Jérôme Vogel.
Recorder: Shannon Dea


1. Constitution Committee recommendations
Atkins summarized the Ad Hoc Constitution Committee’s recommendations for 
constitutional amendment, and some of the rationales for those recommendations. 
The two main goals of the amendments are continuity of leadership, and 
increased internationalization. Members discussed pros and cons of proposed 
amendments, and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fw: [peirce-society-list] Peirce Society Annual Meeting Program and Agenda

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary R, Jon A. S., list,

Go to the History page at the new P.E.P. website (activate your 
javascript if you usually keep it turned off), and scroll down to "5. 
Planning for future history."


http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/#history

Of course, the Peirce Edition Project is not exactly flush with funds. I 
remember when the P.E.P. had to engage in a year-long campaign to raise 
$30,000 in matching funds for an N.E.H. grant. Meanwhile at some 
universities, administrative coffers swell by $50,000,000 as a result of 
recent events. Somehow I don't feel /all is well/ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDAmPIq29ro


Best, Ben

On 12/9/2015 5:03 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon Alan Schmidt asked: is publication of W9 still imminent?  Any 
update on W11, which at one time was expected to be ready about a year 
after W9?


I'll look into this and see what I can find out.

Best,

Gary R


Gary Richmond*
*
*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*




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[PEIRCE-L] Double articulations in linguistics, biology, physics, and semiotics

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

(*1*) When I proposed the notion of the isomorphism between cell language
(or cellese for short) and the human language (or humanese) in 1997 [1, 2,
3], one of the most striking features of both languages that caught my
attention was the phenomenon of double articulations, i.e., letters forming
words (2nd articulation) and words forming sentences (1st articulation).
In both languages,  the second articulation (i.e., covalent bond in
cellese) is much more difficult to alter than the first articulation (i.e.,
non-covalent bonds)..  Interestingly, this is also true in quantum
mechanics (see  cosmese, or the *cosmic language*, in *Table 1*)

(*2*)  The phenomena of double articulations in *humanese*, *cellese*, and
*cosmese* (i.e., t*he means of communication  between the Universe and its
components, including Homo sapiens, and between its components*) are
defined in the upper portion of Table 1.

(*3*) The phenomenon of double articulation is semiotics (or logic) is not
as clear as in the other cases, primarily because Peircean semiotics, as I
understand it, is based on two kinds of signs -- 9 types and 10 classes --
 without the third kind that is needed to complete the double
articulations.  For convenience, I designated this third kind with the
symbol X in *Table 1.  * It is possible that  Peirce's writings mention
something similar to or identical with X but  I am ignorant of it.


*Table 1*.  The postulate that the principle of double articulation
underlies  all organizations in the

Universe.


Organization


*Humanese*

*Cellese*

*Cosmese*



*First Articulation*

Words

|
|
V

Sentences


1D Structures

|
|
V

3 D Structures

Baryons

|
|
V

Molecules


*Second Articulation*

Letters

|
|
V

Words



Molecules

|
|
V
1 D Structures

Quarks

|
|
V
 Baryons

*Force*


* ‘Semantic’***

*‘Cell force’**

*Strong and Electroweak forces*




*Field of  Study*

*Linguistics*


*Biology*

*Physics/Chemistry*


*Semiotics:*


*  9 Sign Types ---> 10 Sign Classes >  X *

*   ('Elementary signs')  ('Composite signs')('Complex
signs')   *











*ITR(Irreducible Triadic Relation)*




*f
  g*
* Cosmese  ---> Cellese
>  Humanese*


*   |
^   |
 |
 |
 |   ||*

*h*



*f** =  biogenesis*

*g** =  semiogenesis (?)*

*h** =  information flow*

*Defined as the new kind of force in nature that is postulated to be
responsible for organizing the physicochemical processes inside the cell so
as to maintain life despite the destructive power of thermal motions, just
as the strong force maintain the structure of the atomic nuclei despite the
electrostatic repulsions among protons [5].

**Used here for the first time and defined as the 'force' that holds
together the elements of a language (i.e., letters, words, sentences) so
that they can signify or be meaningful, just as the strong force holds
together nucleons (protons and neutrons) within atomic nuclei despite the
electrostatic repulsion among protons.

(*4*)  It is interesting to note that *Semiotics* does not fit in nicely
with the three special sciences of *linguistics*,* biology *and* physics* that
occupy the three *columns* side by side in the upper portion of *Table 1*
but instead resides in one of the *rows* in the table, indicating that
semiotics is ORTHOGONAL to (or cannot be replaced by) special sciences.

(*5*)  Finally, the question naturally arises as to the possible relation
among the four fields of inquiries -- *humanese*, *cellese*, *cosmese*, and
*semiotics*.  One possibility is is depicted in the lower portion of *Table
1*, suggesting  that the principle of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation),
 the heart of Peircean semiotics, may provide the needed overarching
theoretical framework for integrating and organizing these distinct
disciplines.

All the best.

Sung


Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net


Referecnes:
  [1] S. Ji (1997). Isomorphism between cell and human languages: molecular
biological, bioinformatics and linguistic implications. *BioSystems* *44*:
17-39.  PDF at http://www.conformon.net under Publications > Refereed
Journal Articles.

  [2] S. Ji (1999). The Linguistics of DNA: Words, Sentences, Grammar,
Phonetics, and

 Semantics.  *Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci*. *870: *411-41. PDF at
http://www.conformon.net under Publications > Refereed Journal Articles.

  [3] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro-
and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Peircers,

I am wondering if there are more than one kinds of *signs*, just as there
are more than one kinds of *particles* in physics, chemistry, and biology.
As I will detail in another post to follow, there is some theoretical
reasons to believe that the principle of "*double articulation*" discovered
by linguists as underlying most, if not all,  human languages applies to
the organization of particles in *biology* (e.g., molecules ---> 1 D
polymers ---> 3 D polymers), *physics* (e.g., quarks ---> baryons --->
molecules), and *semiotics* (e.g., 9 sign types > 10 sign classes --->
 'complex signs' (?)).  Applying this idea to the current debate concerning
the nature of "percept", I can offer the following thoughts:

(*1*) "Percept" is a sign, since we are thinking about it and we think in
signs.

(*2*) As a sign, "Percept" may have three levels of meaning -- (i) as one
of the 9 types of signs (e.g., qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index,
etc.), (ii) as one of the 10 classes of signs (e.g., rhematic iconic
qualisign, even 'argument symbolic legisign" ?), and (iii) as one of the
many theories that can be formulated using sophisticated/advanced/ complex
combinations of more basic kinds of signs (e.g, immediate object, dynamic
object, immediate interpretant, dynamic interpretant, final interpretant,
dicent indexical sinsign, rhematic indexical legising, etc.).

(*3*)  To resolve some of the challenging problems arising in the Peircean
semiotics, it may be not only helpful but also necessary to borrow
concepts, laws, and principles established in neighboring sciences outside
of the traditional semiotics such as modern physics, chemistry, biology,
neurosciences, linguistics, and information sciences.

All the best.

Sung





On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 6:00 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Gary F, Jeff, Jon S,
>
> Given Gary's comments in this last post, I think it would be worthwhile to
> quote the passage that is pertinent to some of what Jeff has been
> discussing, and which I discussed with Jeff in our previous discussion.
> From Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers:
>
>>
>> 539. The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the
>> last analysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with
>> Pragmaticism, which holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought
>> proper is Conduct. Nothing is more indispensable to a sound epistemology
>> than a crystal-clear discrimination between the Object and the Interpretant
>> of knowledge; very much as nothing is more indispensable to sound notions
>> of geography than a crystal-clear discrimination between north latitude and
>> south latitude; and the one discrimination is not more rudimentary than the
>> other. That we are conscious of our Percepts is a theory that seems to me
>> to be beyond dispute; but it is not a fact of Immediate Perception. A fact
>> of Immediate Perception is not a Percept, nor any part of a Percept; a
>> Percept is a Seme, while a fact of Immediate Perception or rather the
>> Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is the Immediate Interpretant, is a
>> Pheme that is the direct Dynamical Interpretant of the Percept, and of
>> which the Percept is the Dynamical Object, and is with some considerable
>> difficulty (as the history of psychology shows), distinguished from the
>> Immediate Object, though the distinction is highly significant.†1 But not
>> to interrupt our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the
>> Immediate Object of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought
>> makes up for that lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late
>> Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a
>> Perceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive thought as
>> determining the original Immediate Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I
>> must be understood as talking not psychology, but the logic of mental
>> operations. Subsequent Interpretants furnish new Semes of Universes
>> resulting from various adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe. They are,
>> however, all of them, Interpretants of Percepts.
>
>
> Notice that the percept, in one case, is identified by Peirce as a Seme
> and that does in fact make it a sign. Of course, it is also discussed as
> immediate object, and dynamical object, so one needs to be careful as to
> how one interprets this passage when trying to figure out what is going on
> with the percept, and how it is understood differently depending upon what
> its role is in the triadic relation. In any case, it would appear that the
> percept, according to Peirce, can be a sign and classified as a seme
> (a.k.a., rheme), and can have its own immediate object, and have
> interpretants.
>
> For my part, I would suppose that there can be phenomena which we directly
> experience (directly perceive), which can nevertheless serves as signs of
> other perceptual phenomena. I directly perceive smoke. The smoke, while
> 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations & Their Relatives

[Jon Awbrey]

Peirce List:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17890
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17894
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17902
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17907
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17911
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17916
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17955
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17956
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17958

Helmut, List,

I put a better formatted version of my last email in this blog post:

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/12/08/relations-their-relatives-16

I thought it might serve a purpose over the long haul to merge this discussion
of elementary relations and/or individual relations with an earlier thread on
relations and their relatives.  The immediate task is to get clear about the
critical relationship between relations as sets and elementary relations as
elements of those sets.  What's at stake is understanding the extensional
aspect of relations.  Beyond its theoretical importance, the extensional
aspect of relations is the interface where relations make contact with
empirical phenomena and ground logical theories in observational data.

Well, it's later than I thought, so I'll have to break here.

Regards,

Jon

On 12/8/2015 11:42 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, list,
thank you, Jon. Your example is less complicated than mine was. So the
elementary relation does not determine the general relation or general relative
term. So, both, elementary and general relation do not have a token-type-
connection with each other, I think. So it is confusing to me, that both are
called "relation". In mathematics, I think, an actual subset of a cartesian
product is a relation. This seems like secondness to me. The term "smaller than"
is a relative term, I guess. This seems like firstness or thirdness to me,
depending on whether it is the reason for (ground of, quality of) an actual
subset, or the interpretation of this actual subset.
Best,
Helmut


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fw: [peirce-society-list] Peirce Society Annual Meeting Program and Agenda

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Ben:

Thanks for the link, but it provides no additional information beyond what
was stated in the minutes--W9 "is slated for completion later in
2015," and nothing about the timetable for W11.  I am aware that Irving
Anellis, who was preparing copious annotations for the latter, passed away
suddenly a couple of years ago; has anyone taken over that daunting task?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 8:25 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon A. S., list,
>
> Go to the History page at the new P.E.P. website (activate your javascript
> if you usually keep it turned off), and scroll down to "5. Planning for
> future history."
>
> http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/#history
>
> Of course, the Peirce Edition Project is not exactly flush with funds. I
> remember when the P.E.P. had to engage in a year-long campaign to raise
> $30,000 in matching funds for an N.E.H. grant. Meanwhile at some
> universities, administrative coffers swell by $50,000,000 as a result of
> recent events. Somehow I don't feel *all is well*
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDAmPIq29ro
>
> Best, Ben
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fw: [peirce-society-list] Peirce Society Annual Meeting Program and Agenda

[Benjamin Udell]

In fact, also read "4. The early twenty-first century"

http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/#history

On 12/9/2015 9:25 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Gary R, Jon A. S., list,

Go to the History page at the new P.E.P. website (activate your 
javascript if you usually keep it turned off), and scroll down to "5. 
Planning for future history."


http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/#history

Of course, the Peirce Edition Project is not exactly flush with funds. 
I remember when the P.E.P. had to engage in a year-long campaign to 
raise $30,000 in matching funds for an N.E.H. grant. Meanwhile at some 
universities, administrative coffers swell by $50,000,000 as a result 
of recent events. Somehow I don't feel /all is well/ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDAmPIq29ro


Best, Ben

On 12/9/2015 5:03 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon Alan Schmidt asked: is publication of W9 still imminent?  Any 
update on W11, which at one time was expected to be ready about a 
year after W9?


I'll look into this and see what I can find out.

Best,

Gary R


Gary Richmond*
*
*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Jon A, Gary F, Jeff, lists,

You asked

" . . . (i) would a perceptual judgment be properly classified as a dicent
sinsign?
And (ii) would the percept itself be a rhematic indexical sinsign?  Or
(iii) is the
percept not yet a sign at all?"


Let me try to answer these questions based on the ITR (Irreducible Triadic
Relation) diagram of semiosis:


f   g
Object >  Sign  >  Interpretant
   |  ^
   |  |
   |___|
  h

Figure 1.  The ITR diagram of semiosis.  f = sign production; g = sign
interpretation; h = information flow


(i) Processes f and g combined may be related to PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENT.  IF
so, it is a part of a triadic sign, likely a dicent sinsign as you suggest,
but not a complete sign.

(ii) Process f may be related to the PERCEPT.  If so, the percept is also
not a complete sign.

(iii) Same as (ii).

At least for me, the above diagrammatic method of analyzing the various
terms is helpful.  I hope that others on these lists will find it so too..


All the best.



Sung







On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 1:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary, List:
>
> Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly
> classified as a dicent sinsign?  And would the percept itself be a rhematic
> indexical sinsign?  Or is the percept not yet a sign at all?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM,  wrote:
>
>> GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe
>> that Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate
>> object. That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept
>> is precisely the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does
>> not apply. In fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to
>> the percept. Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that
>> entire long essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the
>> perceptual *judgment* considered as a kind of natural proposition:
>>
>>
>> 633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being
>> perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair
>> yellow. What the particular shade, hue, and purity of the yellow may be it
>> does not consider. The percept, on the other hand, is so scrupulously
>> specific that it makes this chair different from every other in the world;
>> or rather, it would do so if it indulged in any comparisons.
>>
>> 634. It may be objected that the terms of the judgment resemble the
>> percept. Let us consider, first, the predicate, 'yellow' in the judgment
>> that 'this chair appears yellow.' This predicate is not the sensation
>> involved in the percept, because it is general. It does not even refer
>> particularly to this percept but to a sort of composite photograph of all
>> the yellows that have been seen. If it *resembles* the sensational
>> element of the percept, this resemblance consists only in the fact that a
>> new judgment will predicate it of the percept, just as this judgment does.
>> It also awakens in the mind an imagination involving a sensational element.
>> But taking all these facts together, we find that there is no relation
>> between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and the sensational
>> element of the percept, except forceful connections.
>>
>> 635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a
>> sign. But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which
>> introspection can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that
>> it should do so, since the qualities of these signs as objects have no
>> relevancy to their significative character; for these signs merely play the
>> part of demonstrative and relative pronouns, like “that,” or like the A, B,
>> C, of which a lawyer or a mathematician avails himself in making
>> complicated statements. In fact, the perceptual judgment which I have
>> translated into “that chair is yellow” would be more accurately represented
>> thus: “ is yellow,” a pointing index-finger taking the place of the
>> subject. On the whole, it is plain enough that the perceptual judgment is
>> not a copy, icon, or diagram of the percept, however rough. It may be
>> reckoned as a higher grade of the operation of perception.
>>
>>
>>
>> On that basis, I don’t think we can extract from this passage any good
>> information about what a qualisign is or how it works. What it does make
>> clear is that the perceptual judgment is not iconic. So at this point I’m
>> going to jump down to your concluding paragraph.
>>
>> GF: There is no