date:20170329

[PEIRCE-L] Transcending Scientism - print version ready now.

2017-03-29 Thread Stephen Jarosek

List,

Towards the end of last year I posted here to advise that my eBook was
published. Some members contacted me to ask when the print version is
available. It's available now.

A more detailed synopsis of the book than that already provided:

1) Emphasis is on the PRACTICAL interpretation of the semiotics of CS
Peirce. What does Peircean semiotics imply for how we should live our lives?
Intended for general readership and as such, it omits detailed scholarly
discourse;
2) The FIRST CHAPTER is about the failure of the Darwinian paradigm,
attributable to its failure to address entropy. Peircean semiotics is in a
much better position to address entropy because of imitation. Imitation as a
variation on the pragmatic maxim, and how organisms define the things that
matter;
3) We touch on quantum semiotics - semiosis at the atomic-molecular
level, and how it relates to entanglement, and why DNA entanglement is
essential to understanding how life works. Unlike my earlier unsubstantiated
conjectures that I introduced in this forum, however, this time I provide
robust evidence to substantiate the DNA entanglement conjecture;
4) The SECOND CHAPTER is about exposing Dukkha. Dukkha is a term from
Buddhism, loosely translated as "suffering" or "imperfection." Exposing
dukkha is about exposing the breakdown in contemporary culture, and why we
need to "flee this burning house" (the burning house parable familiar to
Buddhists - to learn to see culture as it is, thus enabling one, in effect,
to transform to a different kind of "human organism"). Exposing dukkha...
how dukkha relates to the three categories, expressed in terms of habit,
association and motivation;
5) Throughout the book, we address broken science, and how a broken
materialist paradigm relates to broken culture. Of course this relates
directly to semiotics... how a broken science paradigm relates to pragmatism
and epistemology, by informing cultures about the things that matter;
6) Imitation - knowing how to be - the most essential pragmatism, and
how every organism defines the things that matter. The importance of
narrative and the company that we keep;
7) In its practical emphasis, the book relates also to politics and
religion;
8) Scientism as religion. There is nothing "objective" about materialist
science at all, as it will never overcome the subjectivity that is integral
to the pragmatic maxim.

If anyone is having difficulty obtaining the ebook online, contact me and
I'll forward a file version in either epub or pdf format, no charge.

The full title of the book: Transcending Scientism - Mending Broken
Culture's Broken Science

Print version:
https://www.amazon.com/Transcending-Scientism-Mending-Cultures-Science/dp/09
77526119

eBook version:
https://www.amazon.com/Transcending-Scientism-Mending-Cultures-Science-ebook
/dp/B01M14TCVR

sj


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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Jerry Rhee

*`when once it is written, every composition trundles about everywhere in
the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject and
of those who have nothing at all to do with it.. ~ *Phaedrus



*Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be
proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this
satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to
that of other men.* ~ Fixation of belief


Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to
> name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply expressed my considered
> opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from
> Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position.  I wish
> that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a
> debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we
> cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions.
>
> ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.
>
>
> Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic
> *function*) that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it *as *the
> Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*.  The Object
> and Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are the *other
> two* *correlates *in that triadic relation.  To me, this is absolutely
> fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it is by
> definition non-Peircean.
>
> ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on
> their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree
> that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that
> the three modal categories are 'universes'.
>
>
> Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns.
> Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and
> Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three
> modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that
> the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are
> all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your
> disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me.
>
> ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different terms.
>
>
> I agree!  My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but
> then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different
> terms, but then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's.
>
> ET:  With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think
> those 'habits' are doing?
>
>
> What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of
> habits of formation."  I do not see where Peirce ever associates the
> Representamen with habits.  Rather, he identifies a habit as a final
> logical *Interpretant*, precisely because it *does not* act as a
> Representamen to determine any *further* logical Interpretants (EP 2:418).
>
> ET:  As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a
> substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS
> the thing.
>
>
> Saying that bundles of habits *are *substances (as Peirce did) is not the
> same as saying that bundles of habits *form *substances (as you do).
> When they are Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and
> Interpretants are *all *bundles of habits in this sense.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.
>>
>> 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
>> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
>> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.
>> As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their
>> own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right  and I disagree that
>> each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the
>> three modal categories are 'universes'.
>>
>> You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer
>> to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the
>> different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is
>> going on?
>>
>> I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are
>> going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process!
>>
>> 2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to
>> 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are
>> doing? Do you deny that ther

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to
name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply expressed my considered
opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from
Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position.  I wish
that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a
debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we
cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions.

ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.

Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic *function*)
that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it *as *the
Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*.  The Object and
Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are the *other
two* *correlates *in that triadic relation.  To me, this is absolutely
fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it is by
definition non-Peircean.

ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on
their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree
that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that
the three modal categories are 'universes'.

Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns.
Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and
Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three
modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that
the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are
all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your
disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me.

ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different terms.

I agree!  My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but
then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different
terms, but then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's.

ET:  With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think
those 'habits' are doing?

What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of
habits of formation."  I do not see where Peirce ever associates the
Representamen with habits.  Rather, he identifies a habit as a final
logical *Interpretant*, precisely because it *does not* act as a
Representamen to determine any *further* logical Interpretants (EP 2:418).

ET:  As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a
substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS
the thing.

Saying that bundles of habits *are *substances (as Peirce did) is not the
same as saying that bundles of habits *form *substances (as you do).  When
they are Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and
Interpretants are *all *bundles of habits in this sense.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.
>
> 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.
> As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their
> own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right  and I disagree that
> each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the
> three modal categories are 'universes'.
>
> You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer
> to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the
> different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is
> going on?
>
> I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are
> going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process!
>
> 2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to
> 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are
> doing? Do you deny that there are 'habits'? I'm sure you don't, as Peirce
> uses the term! But to what purpose is that habit? You ignore this. What's
> going on in the world that is due to habit-taking? Why don't you explore
> this? Do you think that an atom has no continuity of type? That this
> continuity of type doesn't provide it with a continuity of behaviour? That
> this continuity of type doesn't differentiate it from another atom?  WHY do
> habits exist? You don't examine this.
>
> As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance.
> That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing.
>
> And, as he notes [1.22] "The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being
> he

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.

1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative
function/action in the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the
WHOLE Sign, the triad. As I've often said, none of the parts of this
triad exist 'per se' on their own. They are not each 'subjects' in
their own right  and I disagree that each is 'a constituent in their
own universe'. I don't consider that the three modal categories are
'universes'.

You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely
refer to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is
NAMING the different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the
dynamic PROCESS that is going on?

I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions
are going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process!

2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to
'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are
doing? Do you deny that there are 'habits'? I'm sure you don't, as
Peirce uses the term! But to what purpose is that habit? You ignore
this. What's going on in the world that is due to habit-taking? Why
don't you explore this? Do you think that an atom has no continuity
of type? That this continuity of type doesn't provide it with a
continuity of behaviour? That this continuity of type doesn't
differentiate it from another atom?  WHY do habits exist? You don't
examine this.

As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a
substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits
FORMS the thing. 

And, as he notes [1.22] "The embryonic being for Aristotle was the
being he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in
the course of its development took on form. Form is an element having
a different mode of beingMy view is that there are three modes of
being" 1.22. Here Peirce is referring to the FORM that matter takes
on, i.e., within the three categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness
and Thirdness. 

You seem to focus only on the words and don't examine what they mean
in actual actions and in the actual formation of matter.

Again- there's no point in arguing about this - as you will resort
to insults [telling me that I am 'non-Peircean']...and such
interactions are not a productive debate.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  3:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis
is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding
of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant
transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full
triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN
exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions -
within the full triadic interaction. 
 This is what I personally have a hard time recognizing as Peircean
semeiosis, which is certainly not mechanical or linear--i.e.,
dyadic--but I understand it to be a matter of triadic relations,
rather than relations between triadic processes.  Again, the Sign is
not a triadic function, it is one participant in an irreducibly
triadic relation.  The Sign (or Representamen), the Object (Dynamic
and Immediate), and the Interpretant (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final)
are not  themselves relations, they are all real subjects from a
logical and metaphysical standpoint.  Each of them, as well as their
relations to each other, can be a constituent of any of the three
Universes--a Possible (1ns), an Existent (2ns), or a Necessitant
(3ns).  The Sign itself is a qualisign/mark, sinsign/token, or
legisign/type.  The Sign's relation to its Object is what makes it an
icon, index, or symbol.  The Sign's relation to its Interpretant is
what makes it a rheme, dicent, or argument. 
 I find all of this to be fully consistent with a straightforward
reading of Peirce's extensive writings on semeiosis.  At the risk of
being labeled once more as "literal-bound," a quick search of the
Collected Papers turns up zero instances of "habit(s) of formation,"
"morphological generation," "triadic process," or "triadic function."
 While these are evidently "key factors" in Taborskyan semiosis, to me
this suggests rather strongly that  Peircean semeiosis has nothing to
do with any of them.  On the other hand, "triadic relation" appears
84 times.  What is unscientific or arrogant about simply stating what
the textual evidence clearly indicates to me?  You express just as
much certainty about the validity of your views as I do about mine.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-29 Thread CLARK GOBLE

> On Mar 29, 2017, at 1:58 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> J.A.S., your post quoting “New Elements” makes much more sense that the other 
> Jon’s claim that “icons and indices are species under the genus” of symbol, 
> which I’m pretty sure Peirce would never say. The point that Peirce makes in 
> his “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” and elsewhere is that 
> symbols can involve indices, and indices can involve icons — indeed symbols 
> must involve both icons and indices in order to convey any information — but 
> icons do not involve indices nor do indices involve symbols, and this is what 
> makes them “degenerate” relative to the symbol. They are certainly not 
> species of the genus symbol. TRI again, Jon A.
>  
> As for which type of sign is logically “primordial,” I think the key to the 
> Peircean answer to that question is in his assertion that “a symbol alone is 
> indeterminate.” Now, any symbol which has a real object has been determined 
> by that object, to some extent, so clearly the “primordial” symbol is not one 
> of those. So the time before time is also prior to any information or 
> transformation. But that’s as far as I’m prepared to go into cosmology or the 
> universe of pre-reality.
> 

I wish I’d had the ability to put it that clearly Gary. Thanks for that. I’m 
marking this so I can quote you in future.

As you say, the primordial issue or cosmological issue is really the issue of 
moving for indeterminacy to determinacy. For practical symbols in semiotics you 
need indices and icons.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-29 Thread gnox

Jon (and Jon),

 

J.A.S., your post quoting “New Elements” makes much more sense that the other 
Jon’s claim that “icons and indices are species under the genus” of symbol, 
which I’m pretty sure Peirce would never say. The point that Peirce makes in 
his “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” and elsewhere is that 
symbols can involve indices, and indices can involve icons — indeed symbols 
must involve both icons and indices in order to convey any information — but 
icons do not involve indices nor do indices involve symbols, and this is what 
makes them “degenerate” relative to the symbol. They are certainly not species 
of the genus symbol. TRI again, Jon A.

 

As for which type of sign is logically “primordial,” I think the key to the 
Peircean answer to that question is in his assertion that “a symbol alone is 
indeterminate.” Now, any symbol which has a real object has been determined by 
that object, to some extent, so clearly the “primordial” symbol is not one of 
those. So the time before time is also prior to any information or 
transformation. But that’s as far as I’m prepared to go into cosmology or the 
universe of pre-reality.

 

Gary f.

 

} Perfect activity leaves no track behind it; perfect speech is like a 
jade-worker whose tool leaves no mark. [Tao Te Ching 27 (Waley)] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

 

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 28-Mar-17 17:42
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; jawb...@att.net
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

 

Jeff, Jon A., List:

 

Perhaps "New Elements" (1904) can shed some helpful light on the matters that 
have come up recently in this thread.

 

CSP:  A diagram is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a 
general predicate; and from the observation of this icon we are supposed to 
construct a new general predicate. (EP 2:303)

 

This seems consistent with the comment by John S. about a universal/general 
being the specification of a diagram.

 

CSP:  Of signs there are two different degenerate forms. But though I give them 
this disparaging name, they are of the greatest utility, and serve purposes 
that genuine signs could not. The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look 
upon it) is the icon ... The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an 
index ... We now come to the genuine sign, for which I propose the technical 
designation symbol ... (EP 2:306-307)

 

This affirms that only symbols are genuine signs, while icons and indices are 
degenerate.

 

CSP:  ... the significations of symbols have various grades of directness up to 
the limit of being themselves their own significations. An icon is significant 
with absolute directness of a character which it embodies; and every symbol 
refers more or less indirectly to an icon. An index is directly denotative of a 
real object with which it is in reaction. Every symbol refers more or less 
indirectly to a real object through an index. (EP 2:320)

 

This affirms that all symbols involve both icons and indices.

 

CSP:  If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the 
beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction and no 
quality, no matter, no consciousness, no space and no time, but just nothing at 
all. Not determinately nothing. For that which is determinately not A supposes 
the being of A in some mode. Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is 
indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, 
is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be 
understood. (EP 2:322)

 

As observed by the PEP editors in an endnote, "This statement brings to mind 
Peirce's favorite Evangelist: 'In the beginning was the Word' (John 1:1)."  It 
seems consistent with the comment by Jon A. about symbols being primordial 
relative to icons and indices--not to mention the entire universe, which Peirce 
described elsewhere as "a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose"; 
and "every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of 
Reactions and its Icons of Qualities" (EP 2:193-194).  So it also strikes me as 
another data point in favor of interpreting 3ns as primordial relative to 1ns 
and 2ns in Peirce's considered cosmology.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 3:51 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > wrote:

Jon A, List,

You say:

1. "one of the consequences of Triadic Relation Irreducibility (TRI)" is that 
symbols "are the genus of all signs, while icons and indices are species under 
that genus."

2. "Thus symbols...do not in the first instan

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 
 Helmut - yes, my apologies, you are quite right about the benefits
of using different terms. My problem was that I wasn't sure what YOU
meant by the term 'fact'.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  3:27 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, List, Most of your post I dont see contradicting what I
wrote, except that you are against "mapping the semantic movement of
one term to another term". But why not trying to translate, if it
helps interdisciplinarity? Philosophers and lay persons talk about
"truth", "facts", "things", "concepts", and so on, and disagree with
each other all the time, often because their analysis is dyadic. So
why not make Peircean thinking more available by translating some of
his terms into common speech? I guess the net gain will be higher
than to ask everybody to learn Peirces terms and their meanings
first, because maybe they wont. And for myself a sort of internalized
dictionary is good too, so I do not always have to switch between the
term sets, when I read or think about one time Peircean and the other
time non-Peircean concepts. Best, Helmut 29. März 2017 um 19:28
Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I
think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean
framework and I'm not sure that it has any function. 

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process
of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality
exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively
'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the
basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune
that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/
Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants. 

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions
as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an
Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an
Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'. 

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic
Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual
existence as 'that insect'. 

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits
of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the
insect and bird. 

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can
be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness]. 

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is
that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of
complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant
transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full
triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN
exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions -
within the full triadic interaction. 

There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another
set of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to
another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an
infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of
'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology. 

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his
Laws of Form. As he wrote: 

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a
space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts
off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle
in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can
begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear
almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical,
physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the
familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the
original act of severance". [1973:v]. 

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline
[1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A
Guess at the Riddle]. 

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can
see that influence throughout his remarkable book. 

Edwina 
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 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
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 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Wed 29/03/17 1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Edwina, Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with a
certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not
exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is
much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign. So it is only
correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not
m

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that
it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex
morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative
RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN.
None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own.
They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction.

This is what I personally have a hard time recognizing as *Peircean *semeiosis,
which is certainly not mechanical or linear--i.e., dyadic--but I understand
it to be a matter of *triadic relations*, rather than *relations between
triadic processes*.  Again, the Sign is not a triadic *function*, it is one
participant in an irreducibly triadic *relation*.  The Sign (or
Representamen), the Object (Dynamic and Immediate), and the Interpretant
(Immediate, Dynamic, and Final) are not *themselves *relations, they are
all real *subjects* from a logical and metaphysical standpoint.  Each of
them, as well as their relations *to each other*, can be a constituent of
any of the three Universes--a Possible (1ns), an Existent (2ns), or a
Necessitant (3ns).  The Sign itself is a qualisign/mark, sinsign/token, or
legisign/type.  The Sign's relation to its Object is what makes it an icon,
index, or symbol.  The Sign's relation to its Interpretant is what makes it
a rheme, dicent, or argument.

I find all of this to be fully consistent with a straightforward reading of
Peirce's extensive writings on semeiosis.  At the risk of being labeled
once more as "literal-bound," a quick search of the Collected Papers turns
up zero instances of "habit(s) of formation," "morphological generation,"
"triadic process," or "triadic function."  While these are evidently "key
factors" in *Taborskyan *semiosis, to me this suggests rather strongly
that *Peircean
*semeiosis has nothing to do with any of them.  On the other hand, "triadic
relation" appears 84 times.  What is unscientific or arrogant about simply
stating what the textual evidence clearly indicates to me?  You express
just as much certainty about the validity of your views as I do about mine.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think
> that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework
> and I'm not sure that it has any function.
>
> Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of
> semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists
> but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it
> functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad:
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune that into
> Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final
> Interpretants.
>
> So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as a
> Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate
> Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and
> Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'.
>
> But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of
> the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that
> insect'.
>
> And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of
> morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect
> and bird.
>
> AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be in
> a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness].
>
> As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it
> is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex
> morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative
> RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN.
> None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own.
> They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction.
>
> There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set
> of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another
> term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure
> enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' .
> One morphology to another morphology.
>
> Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his Laws
> of Form. As he wrote:
>
> "the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space
> is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an
> outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane.
> By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to
> recon

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, List,

Most of your post I dont see contradicting what I wrote, except that you are against "mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term". But why not trying to translate, if it helps interdisciplinarity? Philosophers and lay persons talk about "truth", "facts", "things", "concepts", and so on, and disagree with each other all the time, often because their analysis is dyadic. So why not make Peircean thinking more available by translating some of his terms into common speech? I guess the net gain will be higher than to ask everybody to learn Peirces terms and their meanings first, because maybe they wont. And for myself a sort of internalized dictionary is good too, so I do not always have to switch between the term sets, when I read or think about one time Peircean and the other time non-Peircean concepts.

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 19:28 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut, list - I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework and I'm not sure that it has any function.

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can fine-tune that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants.

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'.

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that insect'.

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect and bird.

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness].

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction.

There is no point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set of terms' used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology.

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his Laws of Form. As he wrote:

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance". [1973:v].

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline [1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A Guess at the Riddle].

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can see that influence throughout his remarkable book.

Edwina

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On Wed 29/03/17 1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina,

Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with a certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign.

So it is only correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not meant as identity, but as being a subset of something, like when we say: "A human is a mammal".

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 14:33 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation. This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from Object to Representamen to Interpretant. This view

[PEIRCE-L] THE NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM New Date: Friday, April 7, 2017 5:30-7:30 p.m.

2017-03-29 Thread Gary Richmond

*THE NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM*

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*5:30-7:30 p.m.*



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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 
 Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I
think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean
framework and I'm not sure that it has any function.

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process
of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality
exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively
'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the
basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune
that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/
Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants.

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions
as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an
Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an
Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'.

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic
Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual
existence as 'that insect'. 

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits
of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the
insect and bird.

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can
be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness].

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is
that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of
complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant
transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full
triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN
exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions -
within the full triadic interaction.

There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another
set of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to
another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an
infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of
'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology. 

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his
Laws of Form. As he wrote: 

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a
space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts
off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle
in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can
begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear
almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical,
physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the
familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the
original act of severance". [1973:v].

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline
[1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A
Guess at the Riddle].

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can
see that influence throughout his remarkable book.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with
a certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not
exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is
much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign. So it is only
correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not
meant as identity, but as being a subset of something, like when we
say: "A human is a mammal". Best, Helmut 29. März 2017 um 14:33
Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is
dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation.
This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean
semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from
Object to Representamen to Interpretant. This view negates the
dynamic power of the Peircean framework. 

Instead, a Dynamic Object - which is only a Dynamic Object because
it is currently functioning within a semiosic process where it IS the
Dynamic Object..well, this same Dynamic Object could be at the same
time operating in another semiosic process...where it is functioning
as the Dynamic Interpretant. And both processes are developing that
mediation process of the Representamen. 

If you think of it, Peirce used this dynamic functionalism right
from the start; that is - in his cosmology, [1.412] where he outlines
the beginning of the universe as a Process of the emergence of
instantiations of matter, and then, the development of habits of
formation of this matter; and the outline of how these particular
'bits' interact with each other;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina,

So it is only correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not meant as identity, but as being a subset of something, like when we say: "A human is a mammal".

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 14:33 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Instead, a Dynamic Object - which is only a Dynamic Object because it is currently functioning within a semiosic process where it IS the Dynamic Object..well, this same Dynamic Object could be at the same time operating in another semiosic process...where it is functioning as the Dynamic Interpretant. And both processes are developing that mediation process of the Representamen.

If you think of it, Peirce used this dynamic functionalism right from the start; that is - in his cosmology, [1.412] where he outlines the beginning of the universe as a Process of the emergence of instantiations of matter, and then, the development of habits of formation of this matter; and the outline of how these particular 'bits' interact with each other; how Thirdness functions to stabilize these processes...and so on. How Firstness functions to introduce novelty and diversity.

All other outlines of semiotics and semiology, i.e., non-Peircean, ignore this complex dynamism of the Peircean framework. They operate almost completely within the linguistic or within the human conceptual framework and focus on that linear movement from 'this' to 'that'. As such, they are used to suggest 'hidden meanings' and 'the unconscious'. But they have nothing to do with the actual morphology of matter as an action of Mind and can't be used within the biological and physic-chemical realms. The Peircean framework is basic, in my view, to these realms...and I admit that I'm not much interested in using Peirce within the linguistic or human conceptual analysis.

Edwina

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On Wed 29/03/17 3:35 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina,

I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical object is a dynamical object.

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 01:57 Uhr

Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since 'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.

The Dynamic Object is, when it is named as such, is already in a semiosic interaction with another Object. So- it could be one molecule in interaction with another molecule. Of an insect in interaction with a flower. The interaction sets up, within each of them [each Dynamic Object] an Immediate Object. This is transformed by the habits-of-mediation in each of them [the Representamen]and both 'produce' an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant.

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one larger molecule. Both are transformed.

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are transformed.

Edwina

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On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Jon, Edwina, List,

I think, the dynamical object must be external from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other signs and be idiosyncratic.

I guess, that the dyn. object is an external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign.

Which kind of interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it provides:

A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or been in the past,

a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object which is a material thing,

an immediate interpretant forms a d.o. which is a concept.

About the fourth kind of dynamical objects, metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-29 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Tom:

Exactly right, good point.

Jon

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> For what it's worth, I think you're right on.
>
> I would just add that a "diagram" in Peirce's sense (i.e. distinguished
> from both images and metaphors) not only would require relations between
> the parts (indices) but also those relationships should be such that we can
> derive new relationships from them within the diagram.  "Diagrams" of
> things like sales year to year are more like images than diagrams in
> Peirce's sense.
>
> Tom
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 8:08 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Tom:
>>
>> A simple list of color *names *does not seem to qualify as a diagram in
>> Peirce's terminology, because it does not embody any relations among its
>> parts.  A depiction of the visible spectrum is probably a better example,
>> whether it is a simple color wheel or the discrete (but dense) version that
>> you can pull up on your computer monitor to display two million different
>> shades.
>>
>> I would suggest that the object of such a diagram is a range of
>> qualities; i.e., real possibilities.  Which particular diagram is suitable
>> depends mainly on the purpose for which someone is using it.  To teach
>> primary and secondary colors to a child, the color wheel with only six
>> varieties is adequate.  Early video games and personal computers made do
>> with a palette of just 16 colors.  An artist might not want to be limited
>> to any finite collection of hues, and thus will freely smear together
>> different paints until the result is just right.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 9:24 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:
>>
>>> Jon,
>>>
>>> I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
>>> possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
>>> seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
>>> categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
>>> white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
>>> can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
>>> wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
>>> with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
>>> these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.
>>>
>>> The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean
>>> "object" in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these
>>> diagrams ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this
>>> thing-in-itself, i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right,
>>> i.e. the reality.  Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the
>>> side of evolving diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't
>>> these particular diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we
>>> really need to know the thing "color" directly or an absolute,
>>> one-size-fits-all universal diagram?
>>>
>>> Tom
>>>
>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-29 Thread Tom Gollier

Jon,

For what it's worth, I think you're right on.

I would just add that a "diagram" in Peirce's sense (i.e. distinguished
from both images and metaphors) not only would require relations between
the parts (indices) but also those relationships should be such that we can
derive new relationships from them within the diagram.  "Diagrams" of
things like sales year to year are more like images than diagrams in
Peirce's sense.

Tom

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 8:08 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Tom:
>
> A simple list of color *names *does not seem to qualify as a diagram in
> Peirce's terminology, because it does not embody any relations among its
> parts.  A depiction of the visible spectrum is probably a better example,
> whether it is a simple color wheel or the discrete (but dense) version that
> you can pull up on your computer monitor to display two million different
> shades.
>
> I would suggest that the object of such a diagram is a range of qualities;
> i.e., real possibilities.  Which particular diagram is suitable depends
> mainly on the purpose for which someone is using it.  To teach primary and
> secondary colors to a child, the color wheel with only six varieties is
> adequate.  Early video games and personal computers made do with a palette
> of just 16 colors.  An artist might not want to be limited to any finite
> collection of hues, and thus will freely smear together different paints
> until the result is just right.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 9:24 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
>> possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
>> seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
>> categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
>> white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
>> can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
>> wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
>> with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
>> these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.
>>
>> The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean
>> "object" in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these
>> diagrams ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this
>> thing-in-itself, i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right,
>> i.e. the reality.  Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the
>> side of evolving diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't
>> these particular diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we
>> really need to know the thing "color" directly or an absolute,
>> one-size-fits-all universal diagram?
>>
>> Tom
>>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Diagramming Inquiry (was Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity)

2017-03-29 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Hi Jon, List,


In response to your remarks about points and lines on the horizon.


Let's focus on the case of perspective geometry and leave projective geometry 
to the side for the time being. I recommend thinking of the points on the 
horizon I have drawn in several figures that use the idea of railroad tracks 
running off to distant points as examples of what all of the possible parallel 
lines would look like that run through every part of the space. All of those 
possible parallel lines form a line on the horizon.


That is what I am trying to illustrate with the diagrams having larger set of 
parallel lines going to the same two points. Every possible point on the 
horizon has an unlimited number of possible parallels line that could run 
through it from every possible part of the larger two dimensional space. That 
is what one is able to see quite readily when one alters the diagrams by 
processes of continuous transformation.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2017 6:43 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Diagramming Inquiry (was Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity)

Jeff, List:

JBD:  As in projective geometry, the points on the horizon form lines.

I am not very familiar with projective geometry, and that is probably why I am 
having a hard time understanding how points on the horizon can form lines, 
hyperbolic or otherwise.  Is it a change in perspective that facilitates this 
transformation?  Is it a limitation of your two-dimensional diagram that you 
have to show multiple points along each line?

JBD:  Inquiry starts with surprising phenomena that are a source of doubt. As 
such, the points on the far left where the lines originate are meant to pick 
out the sources of those doubts, It is likely that they will need to be 
represented in a way that better captures the vagueness that is part and parcel 
of such doubts (as a kind of grey area on the line, and not a definite point).

In that case, should each group of parallel lines of inquiry perhaps originate 
from the same vague region of the line on the left, rather than discrete 
points?  Maybe the lines of inquiry themselves should also be fuzzy at first.  
Or is the idea that distinct lines of inquiry that ultimately converge are 
initially prompted by different sources of doubt?

JBD:  In a way, the collection of meeting points at the infinitely distant 
horizon that form the hyperbolic curves are a kind of origin from which the 
continuity of the larger space gets its ultimate shape.

This is nitpicking, but obviously Peirce would not accept a collection of 
points as constituting a continuum.  Again, maybe I am just not understanding 
how projective geometry works.  Normally we think of only one horizon, but your 
diagram has two curves that are separate.  I understand that this represents 
how the end is different from the origin, but it is not very intuitive for most 
people (myself included).

JBD:  In effect, our understanding of the aims and principles of reasonable 
inquiry grows as our beliefs and theories grow.

That makes sense, but it still seems contrary to the idea that the lines of 
inquiry converge.  My thought was that the number and variety of beliefs and 
theories being considered shrinks over time, until the final opinion consists 
of "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

JBD:  As such, the converging lines of inquiry are supposed to represent the 
manner in which, over the course of time, inquiry makes incremental 
improvements in the proportions ...

Right, so my thought is that maybe the circles should represent the measurement 
of total falsity in the collection of all believed propositions, which would 
cause it to get smaller rather than larger, until it disappears at the end of 
inquiry.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 11:15 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, List,

Thanks for your questions about the sketch of a diagram I've offered as part of 
an interpretation of Peirce's remarks about conceiving of the starting and 
ending points of inquiry in terms of a conception of the absolute drawn from 
projective geometry.

Here are some initial responses to the first four questions you've asked. I 
will need to think a bit more about the 5th question before responding in 
greater detail.

 Having said that, let me offer these initial responses to your thought 
provoking questions.

1. With respect to the sketch of a diagram, I refer to the starting and ending 
points of inquiry, but then represent them as hyperbol

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-29 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Tom:

A simple list of color *names *does not seem to qualify as a diagram in
Peirce's terminology, because it does not embody any relations among its
parts.  A depiction of the visible spectrum is probably a better example,
whether it is a simple color wheel or the discrete (but dense) version that
you can pull up on your computer monitor to display two million different
shades.

I would suggest that the object of such a diagram is a range of qualities;
i.e., real possibilities.  Which particular diagram is suitable depends
mainly on the purpose for which someone is using it.  To teach primary and
secondary colors to a child, the color wheel with only six varieties is
adequate.  Early video games and personal computers made do with a palette
of just 16 colors.  An artist might not want to be limited to any finite
collection of hues, and thus will freely smear together different paints
until the result is just right.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 9:24 AM, Tom Gollier  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
> possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
> seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
> categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
> white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
> can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
> wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
> with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
> these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.
>
> The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean "object"
> in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these diagrams
> ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this thing-in-itself,
> i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right, i.e. the reality.
> Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the side of evolving
> diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't these particular
> diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we really need to
> know the thing "color" directly or an absolute, one-size-fits-all universal
> diagram?
>
> Tom
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-29 Thread Tom Gollier

Jon,

I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
seem all that problematic to me.  Such a diagram might be rudimentary
categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
white — or it might be extended categories of colors — such as my computer
can display.  Or, the diagram might be infinitely divisible into sequential
wavelengths within a certain range. Or, it might be the artist's palette
with different colors and various combinations smeared together. All of
these allow us to identify, distinguish, and/or produce colors.

The trouble comes with your question about the object. If we mean "object"
in the sense of what is this thing "color" which all these diagrams
ostensibly refer, the question becomes either what is this thing-in-itself,
i.e. the reality, or which of these diagrams is right, i.e. the reality.
Peirce, via the scientific community, seems to be on the side of evolving
diagrams, but personally, I wonder why we bother. Aren't these particular
diagrams useful, real and general enough, for us?  Do we really need to
know the thing "color" directly or an absolute, one-size-fits-all universal
diagram?

Tom

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 8:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Tom, List:
>
> It is no intrusion at all, I welcome your input!
>
> I think that both "red" and "color" are universals, or rather generals as
> Peirce typically preferred to call them.  Each names a continuum of
> possible instantiations, and the one for red is part of the one for color,
> consistent with his definition of a continuum as "that which has parts, all
> of which have parts of the same kind."  Both 1ns and 3ns are general, but
> in different ways; Peirce called them "negative" and "positive" generality,
> respectively.
>
> I would appreciate it if you could elaborate on your suggestion that a
> concept is "a diagram of possibilities."  What is the object of such a
> diagram?  What are its parts?  What are the significant relations among
> them that the diagram embodies?  How does such a diagram mediate between
> red things and the consequences of being red, such as primarily reflecting
> broad-spectrum light at a wavelength between 620 and 750 nm?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-29 Thread Jon Awbrey


List,

I will be occupied with other business for a while,
with no more than bits and snatches of time on line,
so I will continue this discussion later next month.

I added a few links to the blog version of my last post
on behalf of the extensional view of sign relations that
one needs to make contact with real-world empirical and
computational applications.

Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 12
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/28/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-12/

Semeiotic:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semeiotic

Sign Relation:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Sign_relation

Semiotic Information:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information

I may change the word “primordial” to “primitive” or something else
if it continues to convey the wrong idea, as I meant it more in the
sense of logical primitives or mathematical irreducibles than any
kind of physical or temporal genesis.

Regards,

Jon

--

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academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is
dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation.
This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean
semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from
Object to Representamen to Interpretant. This view negates the
dynamic power of the Peircean framework.

Instead, a Dynamic Object - which is only a Dynamic Object because
it is currently functioning within a semiosic process where it IS the
Dynamic Object..well, this same Dynamic Object could be at the same
time operating in another semiosic process...where it is functioning
as the Dynamic Interpretant. And both processes are developing that
mediation process of the Representamen.

If you think of it, Peirce used this dynamic functionalism right
from the start; that is - in his cosmology, [1.412] where he outlines
the beginning of the universe as a Process of the emergence of
instantiations of matter, and then, the development of habits of
formation of this matter; and the outline of how these particular
'bits' interact with each other; how Thirdness functions to stabilize
these processes...and so on. How Firstness functions to introduce
novelty and diversity.

All other outlines of semiotics and semiology, i.e., non-Peircean,
ignore this complex dynamism of the Peircean framework. They operate
almost completely within the linguistic or within the human
conceptual framework and focus on that linear movement from 'this' to
'that'. As such, they are used to suggest 'hidden meanings' and 'the
unconscious'. But they have nothing to do with the actual morphology
of matter as an action of Mind and can't be used within the
biological and physic-chemical realms. The Peircean framework is
basic, in my view, to these realms...and I admit that I'm not much
interested in using Peirce within the linguistic or human conceptual
analysis.  

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  3:35 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt
mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical
object is a dynamical object. Best, Helmut 29. März 2017 um
01:57 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky"  

Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is
external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since
'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic
set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant. 

The Dynamic Object is, when it is named as such, is already in a
semiosic interaction with another Object. So- it could be one
molecule in interaction with another molecule. Of an insect in
interaction with a flower. The interaction sets up, within each of
them [each Dynamic Object] an Immediate Object. This is transformed
by the habits-of-mediation in each of them [the Representamen]and
both 'produce' an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant. 

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one
larger molecule. Both are transformed. 

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The
flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are
transformed.  

Edwina
 --
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
 largest alternative telecommunications provider.
 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Jon, Edwina, List, I think, the dynamical object must be external from
the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken,
aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be
external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other
signs and be idiosyncratic. I guess, that the dyn. object is an
external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an
interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign. Which kind of
interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it
provides:   A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to
the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or
been in the past, a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object
which is a material thing, an immediate interpretant forms a d.o.
which is a concept.   About the fourth kind of dynamical objects,
metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that
there are different theories. The supersign, as any sign, has all
three kinds of interpretant, but only one of them provides the
dynamical object for the subsign, is my guess. Best, Helmut 28.
März 2017 um 21:45 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just
for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that
you speak for all and 'anyone else'.  I h

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina,

I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical object is a dynamical object.

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 01:57 Uhr

Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one larger molecule. Both are transformed.

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are transformed.

Edwina

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On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Jon, Edwina, List,

I guess, that the dyn. object is an external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign.

Which kind of interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it provides:

A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or been in the past,

a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object which is a material thing,

an immediate interpretant forms a d.o. which is a concept.

About the fourth kind of dynamical objects, metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that there are different theories.

The supersign, as any sign, has all three kinds of interpretant, but only one of them provides the dynamical object for the subsign, is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

28. März 2017 um 21:45 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that you speak for all and 'anyone else'. I have backed up my views of Peirce repeatedly and won't do it again.

Edwina
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On Tue 28/03/17 3:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:

I knew that I could count on you! As usual, you offer no evidence to back up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them seriously--and neither does anyone else.

Cheers,

Jon S.

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my view, absorb the full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able to appreciate the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis. And I don't think that you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what Peirce wrote.

Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS the correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to insert a phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this isblah blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you aren't. And I totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and mechanical outline.

Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no senseetc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never have the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views - and may, or may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce.

And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se' but within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of formation. Do you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se' -out in the external world, all on their own? What are you - a Platonist? The Representamen, as I've said before, is not a separate entity. In my view, you misunderstand the 'correlates'; the fact that the Representamen is the 'first correlate' doesn't mean that it is singularly agential but that it, as holding the habits of formation, is the primal force in transforming t

[PEIRCE-L] Transcending Scientism - print version ready now.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

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[PEIRCE-L] THE NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM New Date: Friday, April 7, 2017 5:30-7:30 p.m.

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Diagramming Inquiry (was Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity)

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