Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, List,

I really can't say that I understand what your complaint is. Your post
began with and highlighted the snippet pointed to
​. Here it is exactly as it appears in your post​
:


List,

I agree with Jerry.
Kirsti
>
>  IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH  A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR

BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?


You offered, btw, no reasons for your 'agreement'. You now say:

Kirsti: You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the
snippet you took up, it has been unintentional.


Looking again at what I just quoted, it certainly seems intentional to me.
But if it wasn't, so what? That wasn't at all the point of my post. You
continued:

​​KR:
A
​​
s a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable.


​I wasn't looking at this as list manager at all. In fact, when I post
something as 'list manager' or, ore characteristically, since it's my
principal role on peirce-l, viz., 'list moderator', I add to my signature,
("writing as list moderator" and sometimes when Ben and I have drafted a
post together, "writing as list moderator and co-manager with Ben Udell).

You continued:

Kirsti: However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel
good about the way you expressed your concern.

Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start. Addressing the
substance in the issue put forth as a main concern could facilitate
valuable discussions.

Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well joining in
the list.

So, in the context of my posting merely as a member of the forum, your
other comments (just quoted) seem at least untoward since, again, I make a
fairly sharp distinction between my role as moderator and that of simple
participant in forum discussions.

To reiterate: my post was merely to suggest that (a) one couldn't simply
say that one agreed with Jerry when he was indeed suggesting several (4)
options, and even as he seemed to be leaning strongly toward one or two in
particular and (b) that *if I *were to choose one of the four that it would
be Jerry's #1, *style*, that the 'introductory flourish' which Jerry
remarked was perhaps an expression of Peirce's style of thinking,
especially when he was delving into logical questions as fully and as
deeply as he could. I gave my reasons for my choice and even tried to
moderate them (pardon the pun) by suggesting that Peirce *may* have
 rhetorically overstated his case.

I must admit that this kind of exchange which you introduced seems to me
besides the point, is, in my opinion, a waste of my and the list's time. I,
for one, would rather be addressing Gary F's thoughtful comments having
briefly commented on Jerry's remarks. Although I may be mistaken, it would
appear that you have some 'beef' with the way I moderate (or co-manage?)
the list. But that is an entirely different matter which you might have, as
discussed here even rather recently, first addressed to me as list
moderator off-list.

Best,

Gary R (writing as list moderator)

​






[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 7:06 PM,  wrote:

> Gary R.
>
> You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the snippet
> you took up, it has been unintentional.
>
> As a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable.
>
> However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel good
> about the way you expressed your concern.
>
> Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start. Addressing the
> substance in the issue put forth as a main concern could facilitate
> valuable discussions.
>
> Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well joining in
> the list.
>
> Kirsti
>
>
> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 24.9.2017 23:25:
>
>> Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list,
>>
>> Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this
>> snippet from his message:  "IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH  A CASE OF CSP
>> STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?"
>>
>> But Jerry has here offered 4 _possibilities of interpreting_ the
>> opening comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I
>> would suggest that Peirce was the _most _thorough of thinkers, in
>> particular, of logicians. And so it is my sense that while he _may_
>> have somewhat overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as
>> Jerry put it), that it was indeed his _style_ to make such extremely
>> thorough, even 'minute' analyses (although, in fact, this might seem
>> an impossible task).
>>
>> I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most
>> valuable inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and
>> Terry Moore in initiating the SPIN project. And one might note that
>> there are other members of the list, such as Gary F and Jon Alan
>> Schmidt, who have contributed to SPIN.
>>
>> I'm looking forward to a lively 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[kirstima]

Gary R.

You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the 
snippet you took up, it has been unintentional.


As a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable.

However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel good 
about the way you expressed your concern.


Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start. Addressing 
the substance in the issue put forth as a main concern could facilitate 
valuable discussions.


Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well joining 
in the list.


Kirsti


Gary Richmond kirjoitti 24.9.2017 23:25:

Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list,

Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this
snippet from his message:  "IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH  A CASE OF CSP
STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?"

But Jerry has here offered 4 _possibilities of interpreting_ the
opening comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I
would suggest that Peirce was the _most _thorough of thinkers, in
particular, of logicians. And so it is my sense that while he _may_
have somewhat overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as
Jerry put it), that it was indeed his _style_ to make such extremely
thorough, even 'minute' analyses (although, in fact, this might seem
an impossible task).

I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most
valuable inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and
Terry Moore in initiating the SPIN project. And one might note that
there are other members of the list, such as Gary F and Jon Alan
Schmidt, who have contributed to SPIN.

I'm looking forward to a lively discussion of the 1903 Lowell Lectures
on peirce-l. I'll try to respond to Gary F's comments in the next few
days, but have just returned from what was to have been a vacation
trip on Martha's Vineyard but which soon became something of a battle
with Tropical Storm Jose.

Best,

Gary R

GARY RICHMOND
PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
COMMUNICATION STUDIES
LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
718 482-5690 [3]

On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 3:55 PM,  wrote:


List,

I agree with Jerry.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41:

List, Gary:

Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream.

It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance
(“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems (
linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to
communicate with others.

This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of
mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of
logical
stances are common and part of the everyday communications among
practitioners.

Beyond that, the following quote:

I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation
of
the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed
clear
and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that
it
would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute
examination
of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses
might
be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the
refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the
phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how
the
argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be
interpreted.

simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible
emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all
possible sin-signs could be given form?

"But after I had written it out,…"
Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript?

The phrase:
"the minute examination of all possible ways in which the
conclusion
and the premisses might be emended…"

remains a logically impossible task today.
I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because
the
symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be
put
into premises.
Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and
chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am
aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic
numbers.

Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and
let
each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves.

IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR
BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?

I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will
be
offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in
various
disciplines.

Cheers

Jerry

On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an
intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of
science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a
false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science
are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical
acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list,

Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this snippet
from his message: * "Is this opening flourish  a case of CSP style? or
hubris? or bragging? or sophistry?"*

But Jerry has here offered 4 *possibilities of interpreting* the opening
comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I would suggest
that Peirce was the *most *thorough of thinkers, in particular, of
logicians. And so it is my sense that while he *may* have somewhat
overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as Jerry put it), that
it was indeed his *style* to make such extremely thorough, even 'minute'
analyses (although, in fact, this might seem an impossible task).

I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most valuable
inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and Terry Moore in
initiating the SPIN project. And one might note that there are other
members of the list, such as Gary F and Jon Alan Schmidt, who have
contributed to SPIN.

I'm looking forward to a lively discussion of the 1903 Lowell Lectures on
peirce-l. I'll try to respond to Gary F's comments in the next few days,
but have just returned from what was to have been a vacation trip on
Martha's Vineyard but which soon became something of a battle with Tropical
Storm Jose.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 3:55 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
> I agree with Jerry.
>
> Kirsti
>
>
> Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41:
>
>> List, Gary:
>>
>> Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream.
>>
>> It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance
>> (“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems (
>> linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to
>> communicate with others.
>>
>> This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of
>> mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of logical
>> stances are common and part of the everyday communications among
>> practitioners.
>>
>> Beyond that, the following quote:
>>
>> I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of
>> the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed clear
>> and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that it
>> would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute examination
>> of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might
>> be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the
>> refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the
>> phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the
>> argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be
>> interpreted.
>>
>> simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible
>> emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all
>> possible sin-signs could be given form?
>>
>> "But after I had written it out,…"
>> Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript?
>>
>> The phrase:
>> "the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion
>> and the premisses might be emended…"
>>
>> remains a logically impossible task today.
>> I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because the
>> symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be put
>> into premises.
>> Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and
>> chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am
>> aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic
>> numbers.
>>
>> Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and let
>> each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves.
>>
>>  IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH  A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR
>> BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?
>>
>> I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will be
>> offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in various
>> disciplines.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>> On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>>>
>>> Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an
>>> intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of
>>> science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a
>>> false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science
>>> are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical
>>> acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly
>>> malignant” because of a peculiarity “which will prevent any
>>> refutation of it from receiving any attention.” In this respect
>>> it’s like a conspiracy theory, which is reinforced (for its
>>> believers) rather than refuted by pointing out the lack of evidence
>>> for it (the conspiracy has hidden the evidence!).
>>>
>>> Perhaps for this reason, Peirce 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[kirstima]

List,

I agree with Jerry.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41:

List, Gary:

Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream.

It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance
(“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems (
linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to
communicate with others.

This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of
mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of logical
stances are common and part of the everyday communications among
practitioners.

Beyond that, the following quote:

I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of
the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed clear
and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that it
would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute examination
of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might
be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the
refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the
phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the
argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be
interpreted.

simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible
emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all
possible sin-signs could be given form?

"But after I had written it out,…"
Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript?

The phrase:
"the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion
and the premisses might be emended…"

remains a logically impossible task today.
I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because the
symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be put
into premises.
Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and
chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am
aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic
numbers.

Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and let
each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves.

 IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH  A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR
BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?

I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will be
offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in various
disciplines.

Cheers

Jerry


On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an
intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of
science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a
false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science
are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical
acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly
malignant” because of a peculiarity “which will prevent any
refutation of it from receiving any attention.” In this respect
it’s like a conspiracy theory, which is reinforced (for its
believers) rather than refuted by pointing out the lack of evidence
for it (the conspiracy has hidden the evidence!).

Perhaps for this reason, Peirce has decided not to present a
“thorough and formal refutation” of the kind of fallacious
argument which would exemplify this “false notion of reasoning.”
He proposes instead “simply to describe the phenomena presented in
reasoning and then to point out to you how the argument under
examination must falsify these facts.” Now, “describing the
phenomena” in the simplest and most general terms is the task of
_phenomenology_, and Peirce’s way of doing that was to identify
the irreducible elements found in _any and every possible
phenomenon_ — including those “presented in reasoning.” In
this way we can show how the phenomena necessarily involved in
reasoning are related to other phenomena, and by this process
combining observation and generalization, we can establish some
“facts_”_ about reasoning. Then we can see “how the
[fallacious] argument under examination must falsify these facts.”
Peirce is proposing to refute a “confused” theory of logic by
confronting it with facts gleaned from phenomenology. This procedure
is consistent with Peirce’s placement of logic as dependent on
phenomenology, in his classification of the sciences which
accompanied these Lowell Lectures.

That’s how I see it, anyway.

Gary f.

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway

FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
SENT: 23-Sep-17 09:06

Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce’s
Lowell lectures of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments
and questions are invited as replies to this post. Here is the
source information given in EP2:242:
_[Partly published in CP 1.591– 610 (MS 448), 1.611– 15 and 8.
176 (MS 449). Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered
on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave
at the Lowell Institute in Boston under 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary:

Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream.

It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance (“hook”) is 
rather dependent on the number of symbols systems ( linguistic, musical, 
mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to communicate with others.  

This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of mathematical 
symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of logical stances are common 
and part of the everyday communications among practitioners.

Beyond that, the following quote:

I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of the 
fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed clear and 
convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that it would abuse 
your patience to ask you to follow the minute examination of all possible ways 
in which the conclusion and the premisses might be emended in hopes of finding 
a loophole of escape from the refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to 
describe the phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how 
the argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be 
interpreted.

simply lacks credibility.  How could one write out all possible emanations of 
all possible things?  Such that representations of all possible sin-signs could 
be given form?

"But after I had written it out,…"
Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript?

The phrase: 
"the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the 
premisses might be emended…"

remains a logically impossible task today.
I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because the symbol 
systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be put into premises.
Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and chemistry, 
closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am aware, impossible because 
of the irregularity of valences of atomic numbers.

Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and let each reader 
evaluate the possible meanings for themselves. 

 Is this opening flourish  a case of CSP style? or hubris? or bragging? or 
sophistry?

I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will be offered 
and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in various disciplines. 

Cheers

Jerry


> On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an intellectual 
> disease which is likely to spread through all of science if not nipped in the 
> bud. The source of the disease is “a false notion about reasoning,” and the 
> practitioners of science are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the 
> “logical acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly 
> malignant” because of a peculiarity “which will prevent any refutation of it 
> from receiving any attention.” In this respect it’s like a conspiracy theory, 
> which is reinforced (for its believers) rather than refuted by pointing out 
> the lack of evidence for it (the conspiracy has hidden the evidence!).
>  
> Perhaps for this reason, Peirce has decided not to present a “thorough and 
> formal refutation” of the kind of fallacious argument which would exemplify 
> this “false notion of reasoning.” He proposes instead “simply to describe the 
> phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the 
> argument under examination must falsify these facts.” Now, “describing the 
> phenomena” in the simplest and most general terms is the task of 
> phenomenology, and Peirce’s way of doing that was to identify the irreducible 
> elements found in any and every possible phenomenon — including those 
> “presented in reasoning.” In this way we can show how the phenomena 
> necessarily involved in reasoning are related to other phenomena, and by this 
> process combining observation and generalization, we can establish some 
> “facts” about reasoning. Then we can see “how the [fallacious] argument under 
> examination must falsify these facts.” Peirce is proposing to refute a 
> “confused” theory of logic by confronting it with facts gleaned from 
> phenomenology. This procedure is consistent with Peirce’s placement of logic 
> as dependent on phenomenology, in his classification of the sciences which 
> accompanied these Lowell Lectures.
>  
> That’s how I see it, anyway.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/  }{ Turning Signs gateway
>  
> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
> Sent: 23-Sep-17 09:06
> 
> Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce’s Lowell lectures 
> of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments and questions are invited 
> as replies to this post. Here is the source information given in EP2:242:
> [Partly published in CP 1.591– 610 (MS 448), 1.611– 15 and 8. 176 (MS 449). 
> Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered on 23 November 1903, 
> this 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[gnox]

Peirce begins his lecture series with a 'hook,' warning of an intellectual
disease which is likely to spread through all of science if not nipped in
the bud. The source of the disease is "a false notion about reasoning," and
the practitioners of science are vulnerable to it because many of them lack
the "logical acumen" which would detect its falsity. It is "particularly
malignant" because of a peculiarity "which will prevent any refutation of it
from receiving any attention." In this respect it's like a conspiracy
theory, which is reinforced (for its believers) rather than refuted by
pointing out the lack of evidence for it (the conspiracy has hidden the
evidence!).

 

Perhaps for this reason, Peirce has decided not to present a "thorough and
formal refutation" of the kind of fallacious argument which would exemplify
this "false notion of reasoning." He proposes instead "simply to describe
the phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the
argument under examination must falsify these facts." Now, "describing the
phenomena" in the simplest and most general terms is the task of
phenomenology, and Peirce's way of doing that was to identify the
irreducible elements found in any and every possible phenomenon - including
those "presented in reasoning." In this way we can show how the phenomena
necessarily involved in reasoning are related to other phenomena, and by
this process combining observation and generalization, we can establish some
"facts" about reasoning. Then we can see "how the [fallacious] argument
under examination must falsify these facts." Peirce is proposing to refute a
"confused" theory of logic by confronting it with facts gleaned from
phenomenology. This procedure is consistent with Peirce's placement of logic
as dependent on phenomenology, in his classification of the sciences which
accompanied these Lowell Lectures.

 

That's how I see it, anyway.

 

Gary f.

 

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs
gateway

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: 23-Sep-17 09:06



Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce's Lowell
lectures of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments and questions
are invited as replies to this post. Here is the source information given in
EP2:242:

[Partly published in CP 1.591- 610 (MS 448), 1.611- 15 and 8. 176 (MS 449).
Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered on 23 November 1903,
this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave at the Lowell Institute in
Boston under the general title "Some Topics of Logic bearing on Questions
now Vexed."] 

 

A malady, ladies and gentlemen, has broken out in science. Science is today
in splendid vigor, having thrown off its earlier infirmity of dogmatism, and
being in most respects in superlative trim. Its new disease is in its very
first stage and is confined as yet almost exclusively to certain members
that always have been weakly. The symptoms are local. The disorder, however,
is, in its nature, not local, but constitutional; and there is a distinct
danger of its appearing in parts that are now untouched. There is a certain
craze in the universities; by which I mean that certain ideas have become
rife in the universities by the force of vogue, and not by the force of
reasoning, whether good or bad. Such a phenomenon may be likened to fever.
Science has, at different times, passed through several such ailments,- some
of them pretty serious. They ran their course and health came back. The
present visitation is more serious, for the reason that it is no mere
feverish attack, not a mere fashion, but is in great measure the outcome of
a principle. Now every principle, once entertained, possesses vitality,
until it is notoriously refuted; and even after they have received their
death-blows, we have all had occasion to remark how long life may linger in
principles whose formulation has been sonorous. 

 

The principle in this case is a false notion about reasoning arising from a
confusion of thought; and unfortunately science, at this moment, is
ill-fortified against such an invasion, since scientific men of today are,
on the average, less armed than their forerunners were with that logical
acumen which is necessary to detect a somewhat subtle sophistry. I have kept
watch upon the progress of the symptoms for years; and my observations go to
show that they are becoming aggravated. I am unable to resist the belief
that the canker is bound to spread and to eat deeper. What renders it
particularly malignant is a peculiarity of this particular false notion of
reasoning which will prevent any refutation of it from receiving any
attention. Let this conception of ratiocination once get control, and
science must perforce become exceedingly enfeebled; and the only apparent
road to recovery will be through its gradually outgrowing the vicious
diathesis. Now this gradual resolution, after the vitality of science has
been