Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary, List,
I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on
the list) have at times been confused as to whether abduction
was in Firstness or Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is
applied to the "surprising fact" that causes us to question the
generals in Thirdness, so is *grounded* there, but the results
of abductive logic informs the possibilities to be considered
anew in the next sequence of inquiry, so informs what to
consider in Firstness. By this thought, abduction is really a
bridge between Thirdness and Firstness in a dynamic process.
In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should
be "most concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be
the most pragmatic responses to our inquiry. I think that is the
point you are making here. In that context, then, virtually any
"conditional proposition" worthy of pragmatic consideration
could/would be instantiated in some pragmatic reality. Even
unicorns fit under this umbrella, since we know of no natural
reason to discount a horse-like animal with a single frontal
horn. Under this formulation, any reasonable "conditional
proposition" could be seen as real.
While I like some of the nugget of this argument, I think it
ultimately begs the question. What caught my attention in the
CSP quote you surfaced seems to suggest more: a "most concerned"
criterion that seems to go farther than any "conditional proposition".
I get it that possibles, once instantiated or as a character
of what gets instantiated, can be deemed to exist (and are
obviously real). But I'm also not sure I am comfortable with a
notion that any possible is real simply because it is possible.
My sense is there is more here.
BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question?
Thanks!
  
Mike


On 10/18/2017 11:08 PM, Gary Richmond
  wrote:


  
Mike, List,


Thanks for your generous comments and
  support. It did take a bit of research to come up with the
  citations to support the argumentation of that post, so I'm
  glad you found it of interest.


I do think that this matter of the
  distinction Peirce makes between existence (2ns) and reality
  (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint of what I've termed
  the vector of involution, commencing at 3ns, which
  involves 2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of
  considerable importance and, so, ought not be swept under the
  carpet of a piece of logic which would equivocate existence
  and reality in a logico-grammatical sleight of hand
  ("quantified variables") which makes everything
  "exist" by the conceptual trick of having "is" stand for not
  only existence, but also reality. While the problem is
  difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not think that Quine's
  (and Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.


You quoted me, then asked:

  
  
  GR: As for the reality
of possibles, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the
last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical
inquiries.
  
  
  MB: Might you or others on the list
identify what "some" of those possibilities may be (with
citations).

I think yours is a very good question,
  that it is undoubtedly important to point out what "'some' of
  the possibilities may be." But I believe that the first
  question we ought try to answer is why Peirce says that "it is
  the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
  concerned to insist upon."
My preliminary thoughts on the matter:
  If pragmatism is the logic of abduction, as Peirce asserts in
  1903, then I would think that "some" of those possibilities
  will be particular abductions and hypotheses which might prove
  fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing, show
  themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce
  writes:



  Pragmaticism makes the ultimate
intellectual purport of what you please to consist in
conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and
therefore, the conditional propositions, with their
hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist,
being of the ultimate nature of meaning, must be capable of
b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, List,

Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of
research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation of that
post, so I'm glad you found it of interest.

I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between
existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint of what
I've termed the* vector of involution*, commencing at 3ns, which involves
2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of considerable importance
and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet of a piece of logic which
would equivocate existence and reality in a logico-grammatical sleight of
hand ("quantified variables") which makes *everything* "exist" by the
conceptual trick of having "is" stand for not only existence, but also
reality. While the problem is difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not
think that Quine's (and Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.

You quoted me, then asked:


GR: As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
into metaphysical inquiries.

MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations).

I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly important to
point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be." But I believe that the
first question we ought try to answer is why Peirce says that "it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon."

My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of
abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some" of
those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses which
might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing, show
themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce writes:

Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to
consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and
therefore, the conditional propositions, with their hypothetical
antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate
nature of meaning, must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing
whatever there be which is such as the proposition expresses, independently
of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in
any other symbol of any man or men. *But that amounts to saying that
possibility is sometimes of a real kind.* (Issues of Pragmatism, EP2:354,
emphasis added).


This, I believe, is how inquiry progresses, how we approach "the truth of
certain matters," that 'truth," or, better, knowledge, sometimes bringing
about, for example, technologies which are of benefit to us. Perhaps it is
yet possible to imagine that we might evolve our humane consciousness, the
final frontier of evolution as Peirce saw it. But this has little--if
any--hope of happening if we cannot conceive powerful abductions,
hypotheses, *possibilities*. . . This, I would maintain, *is* the work of
individuals.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 9:33 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Gary, List,
>
> Excellent response. However, the snippet below caught my eye:
>
> As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
> upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
> into metaphysical inquiries.
>
> Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
> possibilities may be (with citations).
>
> Thanks, Mike
>
> On 10/18/2017 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
> upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
> into metaphysical inquiries.
>
>
> --
> __
>
> Michael K. Bergman
> Cognonto Corporation319.621.5225 
> <(319)%20621-5225>skype:michaelkbergmanhttp://cognonto.comhttp://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __
>
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary, List,
Excellent response. However, the snippet below caught my eye:


  As for
the reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  ". . .
it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is
most concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see
how the last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical
inquiries.
  
  

  
Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
  possibilities may be (with citations).
Thanks, Mike


On 10/18/2017 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond
  wrote:


  As for the
reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is
the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the
last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.
  
  


-- 
__

Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com
http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
__ 
  


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, John S, list,

Jon S wrote in reflecting on John S conclusion in a discussion of the
language and logic used to discuss "existence" and "reality":

Jon: By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed
late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to talk about actual
things that "react with the other like things in the environment" (CP
6.495).


 Exactly so. Existence is reactive (act/react), dual, 2ns, hic et nunc,
once for all, singular, determinate, etc. One sees this in such late
definitions as this which contrast existence and reality:

1901 | Individual | CP 3.613

…whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and
individuality are essentially the same thing…

and

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Existence […] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.

And so, as you remarked:

 Jon: This is precisely why he famously argued for the *Reality *of God,
rather than the *existence *of God.  Some of the difficulty here is likely
due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could then
be used to talk about both *actual *things and *real *relations.  The
latter indeed include generals and possibilities--even those that are
*real *despite never becoming *actual *(i.e., instantiated), and therefore
do not *exist.*


Besides the difficulty you commented on, viz., "that there is no verb form
of 'reality'," another problem is that according to Peirce existence is not
"properly" a term of logic, but of metaphysics.

1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

…the term *existence* is properly a term, not of logic, but of metaphysics;
and metaphysically understood, an object *exists*, if and only if, it
reacts with every other existing object of the same universe. But in the
definition of a logical proper name, *exist* is used in its logical sense,
and means merely to be a singular of a logical universe, or universe of
discourse.

This seems to me somewhat different from John S's logical analysis since,
in the quotation above, Peirce says that *exist* "used in its logical
sense. . . means merely to be a singular of a. . . universe of discourse."
This makes good sense to me.


As metaphysics has been introduced in the quotation directly above, I'd
also like to say a few words about it in considering, or better,
emphasizing *reality* (all the following quotations are from EP2, so
represent Peirce's late thinking on this topic).

"Metaphysics is the science of Reality. Reality consists in regularity.
Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or
in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness. Reasonable
reasonableness is Thirdness as Thirdness."

But "active laws" are, Peirce argues, symbols, which he goes on to say are
"the only things in the universe that have importance." (One recalls that
for Peirce *man* is a symbol, the *universe* itself is a symbol, the Greek
language is a symbol, the works of Shakespeare are a symbol, etc.) The
knowledge of such laws allow us to make predictions of what may happen* in
futuro*.

" Nobody can doubt that we know laws upon which we can base predictions to
which actual events still in the womb of the future will conform to a
marked extent, if not perfectly. To deny reality to such laws is to quibble
about words. Many philosophers say they are "mere symbols." Take away the
word mere, and this is true. They are symbols; and symbols being the only
things in the universe that have any importance, the word "mere" is a great
impertinence."


But while metaphysics may be a matter of 3ns, *reality*, in Peirce's view,
involves all three categories, and notably in the quotation below, 2ns,
compulsion, a matter of most assuredly of *hic et nunc*. But compulsion,
2ns, while existentially experienced, is not sufficient for a full
description of reality which requires regularity (habit).

"[R]eality is compulsive. But the compulsiveness is absolutely hic et nunc.
It is for an instant and it is gone. Let it be no more and it is absolutely
nothing. The [existential aspect of] reality only exists as an element of
the regularity. And the regularity is the symbol. Rea[lity, therefore, can
only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols."


Or stated somewhat differently:

" Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere
individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a
nullity. Chaos is pure nothing."


As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that  ". . . it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
into metaphysical inquiries.

As Peirce delves further into the character of metaphysics, as important as
he sees it to be as the last of the philosophic (cenoscopic) sciences, it
is, in his view, in 

[PEIRCE-L] THIRD EUROPEAN PRAGMATISM CONFERENCE

[Gary Richmond]

EUROPEAN PRAGMATISM ASSOCIATION 

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THIRD EUROPEAN PRAGMATISM CONFERENCE

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The third European Pragmatism Conference will take place at the University
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The submissions are expected to include a clear description of the panel’s
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The organizers invite presentation proposals exploring and applying
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inquiry, as well as special sciences. Pragmatism being the overall theme of
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45 minutes (including discussion) will be allotted for each individual
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abstracts are expected to include a clear description of the paper’s
contents and its contribution to its field of inquiry.

Please submit your panel proposal via our online electronic form
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Organizing committee (NPN):

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Programme committee (EPA)

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.1

[gnox]

List,

 

Just a couple of notes about the beginning of Lecture 2. Peirce's opening
remarks are crucial for understanding everything that follows.

 

First, the system of diagramming that Peirce is to develop here is designed
to for the study of mathematical or "necessary" reasoning; he sees no real
difference between those two adjectives, following his father's definition
of mathematics as the science which draws necessary conclusions. Mathematics
can do this because it is not a "positive science."

 

"A mathematical reasoning may be defined as a reasoning in which the
following of the conclusion does not depend on whether the premisses
represent sent experience, or represent the state of the real universe, or
upon what universe it may be that they apply to. This erects, as we shall
see, a definite party-wall between the reasoning of mathematics and much of
the reasoning of all the positive sciences, including philosophy. But, of
course, all the other sciences have recourse to the mathematician very
frequently, and none so constantly as logic."

-Charles S. Peirce. Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Writings (Kindle
Locations 1748-1751). This is from Lowell Lecture 5. 

 

Second, in this way of studying necessary reasoning, "our object is to
subdivide one step into as many as possible." This is Peirce's way of making
out what its " elementary steps are."

 

I kept the first excerpt short because I didn't want readers to slide over
these key points about the purpose of the whole enterprise. The next one
might be a little longer.

 

Gary f.

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: 17-Oct-17 07:12



Charles S. Peirce: second of the Lowell Lectures of 1903. Robin catalogue:
MS. 455, notebook, 1903, pp. 1-31: The first and third parts of an
introduction to the alpha and beta parts of the system of existential
graphs; MS. 456 is the second part: 1903, pp. 40-66. 

 

 

 

Let us take up the subject of necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning,
with a view to making out what its elementary steps are and how they are put
together. 

 

In order to do this it is necessary to replace the confused syntax of
ordinary language by a system in which the meaning of every form is exactly
defined, which is free from forms that cast a tinge of passion or of any
kind of subjective feeling on the facts, and which has no more forms than
are requisite in order to express every kind of fact or truth in such a way
as to enable us to carry the dissection of reasoning to its smallest steps. 

 

Let us devote this evening's hour to forming such a system of expression. 

 

Before beginning, let us distinctly recognize the purpose which this system
of expression is designed to fulfil. It is intended to enable us to separate
reasoning into its smallest steps so that each one may be examined by
itself. Observe, then, that it is not the purpose of this system of
expression to facilitate reasoning and to enable one to reach his
conclusions in the speediest manner. Were that our object, we should seek a
system of expression which should reduce many steps to one; while our object
is to subdivide one step into as many as possible. Our system is intended to
facilitate the study of reasoning but not to facilitate reasoning itself.
Its character is quite contrary to that purpose. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts }{ SPIN project

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Oct 18, 2017, at 11:06 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Kirsti,
>> Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
>> become actual. 
> 
> In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real',
> 'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
> dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

To analyze the issues (raised by John), I suggest that Quine’s dictum is a red 
herring

“To be is to be the value of a quantified variable” .
In that sentence, four words raise debatable issues:
“to be”, “value”, “quantified” and “variable”.

I suggest that John’s reliance on Quine’s sentence to relate metaphysical terms 
is highly problematic.
The sentence is merely a rhetoric trick to divert the reader’s attention from 
the distinction between logical propositions (inferred from the terms 
“quantified” and “variable” (also mathematica propositions!) and individual 
meanings of terms in constructing propositions in languages and metalanguages.  

Consider the word “Love” for example.  Or, almost any human feeling. 

Of course, Quine’s sentence also effectively excludes the logics of molecular 
biology and medicine. which require recursive compositions of terms to operate 
in multiple metalanguages. 

Cheers

Jerry


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough
attention to relations.

Edwina
 On Wed 18/10/17 12:06 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Kirsti and Gary R, 
 If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since 
 Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either 
 (a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely. 
 Kirsti, 
 > Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they 
 > become actual.  
 In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real', 
 'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's 
 dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." 
 (And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'.  I wrote
'Kirsti' 
 in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many
letters.) 
 > But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold.  
 In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation 
 for predicate calculus.  For "first intentions", he used quantified 
 variables to range over individuals.  For "second intentions", he 
 used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals.

 Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language

 can be represented by a relation in logic. 
 For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the 
 domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and 
 geometrical shapes. 
 For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent 
 generals of any kind.  Those generals include possibilities, among 
 which are sign types. 
 If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles

 aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions. 
 For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan.  As a general, 
 it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities. 
 But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill) 
 which does exist in the physical world. 
 However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the 
 relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan. 
 We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations 
 in the domain of second intentions. 
 Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503) 
 > [Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists 
 > are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that 
 > all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic 
 > realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." 
 > [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that 
 > time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so
opine. 
 In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about 
 what "many a logician" would consider: 
 > reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and
so 
 > is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with
the 
 > environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the
two 
 > meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same. 
 Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to
use 
 logic to represent both reality and existence.  But the domains
would 
 be different.  Logic about physical existence is first intentional; 
 it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about 
 reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character" 
 that does not react with the environment.  But both first
intentional 
 logic and second intentional logic use quantified variables. 
 Summary:  For actual things that interact with the environment, 
 Peirce used first-intentional logic.  For relations that represent 
 generals and possibilities, he used second intentional logic, 
 which may refer to anything that has a "cognitionary character" 
 in thought.  By Quine's dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to 
 talk about either domain. 
 John 

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[PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

JFS:  For actual things that interact with the environment, Peirce used
first-intentional logic.  For relations that represent generals and
possibilities, he used second intentional logic, which may refer to
anything that has a "cognitionary character" in thought.  By Quine's
dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to talk about either domain.


By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed late
in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to talk about actual things
that "react with the other like things in the environment" (CP 6.495).
This is precisely why he famously argued for the *Reality *of God, rather
than the *existence *of God.  Some of the difficulty here is likely due to
the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could then be used
to talk about both *actual *things and *real *relations.  The latter indeed
include generals and possibilities--even those that are *real *despite
never becoming *actual *(i.e., instantiated), and therefore do not *exist*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:06 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Kirsti and Gary R,
>
> If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since
> Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either
> (a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely.
>
> Kirsti,
>
>> Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
>> become actual.
>>
>
> In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real',
> 'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
> dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."
>
> (And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'.  I wrote 'Kirsti'
> in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many letters.)
>
> But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold.
>>
>
> In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation
> for predicate calculus.  For "first intentions", he used quantified
> variables to range over individuals.  For "second intentions", he
> used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals.
>
> Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language
> can be represented by a relation in logic.
>
> For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the
> domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and
> geometrical shapes.
>
> For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent
> generals of any kind.  Those generals include possibilities, among
> which are sign types.
>
> If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles
> aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions.
>
> For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan.  As a general,
> it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities.
> But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill)
> which does exist in the physical world.
>
> However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the
> relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan.
> We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations
> in the domain of second intentions.
>
> Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503)
>
>> [Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists
>> are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that
>> all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic
>> realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist."
>> [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that
>> time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine.
>>
>
> In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about
> what "many a logician" would consider:
>
>> reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so
>> is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the
>> environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two
>> meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same.
>>
>
> Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to use
> logic to represent both reality and existence.  But the domains would
> be different.  Logic about physical existence is first intentional;
> it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about
> reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character"
> that does not react with the environment.  But both first intentional
> logic and second intentional logic use quantified variables.
>
> Summary:  For actual things that interact with the environment,
> Peirce used first-intentional logic.  For relations that represent
> generals and possibilities, he used second intentional logic,
> which may refer to anything that has a "cognitionary character"
> in thought.  By Quine's dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to
> talk about either domain.
>
> John

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[John F Sowa]

Kirsti and Gary R,

If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since
Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either
(a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely.

Kirsti,

Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
become actual. 


In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real',
'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

(And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'.  I wrote 'Kirsti'
in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many letters.)

But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold. 


In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation
for predicate calculus.  For "first intentions", he used quantified
variables to range over individuals.  For "second intentions", he
used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals.

Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language
can be represented by a relation in logic.

For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the
domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and
geometrical shapes.

For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent
generals of any kind.  Those generals include possibilities, among
which are sign types.

If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles
aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions.

For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan.  As a general,
it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities.
But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill)
which does exist in the physical world.

However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the
relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan.
We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations
in the domain of second intentions.

Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503)

[Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists
are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that
all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic
realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist."
[But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that
time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine.


In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about
what "many a logician" would consider:

reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so
is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the
environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two
meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same.


Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to use
logic to represent both reality and existence.  But the domains would
be different.  Logic about physical existence is first intentional;
it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about
reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character"
that does not react with the environment.  But both first intentional
logic and second intentional logic use quantified variables.

Summary:  For actual things that interact with the environment,
Peirce used first-intentional logic.  For relations that represent
generals and possibilities, he used second intentional logic,
which may refer to anything that has a "cognitionary character"
in thought.  By Quine's dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to
talk about either domain.

John

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Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - yes, Again, Peirce refers to external and internal
frequently  - see for example, all through A guess at the riddle.  1.
354-

Yes, I can see the degenerate modes as submodes - except what is
interesting about them is that they include the other modes, which
thus makes them degenerate rather than genuine/pure.

I hope I've explained why I describe 3-1 and 3-2 differently from
you - though I acknowledge the validity of your points.

Edwina
 On Tue 17/10/17  9:31 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Supplement: "External, internal" are a bit likely to lead to
misunderstandings, I guess. I think, or rather guess, that, as
secondness is actuality and firstness possibility, this also applies
to the degenerate modes (I rather think of them as submodes). So,
that (3.1.) is possibility rather, and (3.2.) actuality.  Edwina,
list, my concepts of (2.1.), (2.2.), (3.1.), (3.2.), (3.3.) I mostly
have abducted from immediate object (2.1.), dynamic object (2.2.),
immediate (3.1.), dynamic (3.2.), final (3.3.) interpretant, and also
the parts of the consciousness: Sensation of altersense (2.1.), will
of altersense (2.2.), abstraction of medisense (3.1.), suggestion of
medisense (3.2.), association of medisense (3.3.). Looking at these,
I think that I agree with your (2.1.) and (2.2.), but that I see
(3.1.) and (3.2.) the other way around than you do, regarding their
local ex- and internality. Are there btw. any more examples of
degenerate modes by Peirce? Best, Helmut   17. Oktober 2017 um 21:59
Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
Helmut - I can see how you are arriving at this outline of the
categories - matter-form-interaction - and they DO fit into the three
modal categories.  My own view of the six modes possible within these
three categories analyzes how they function within time and space. 

1-1 [Pure Firstness]- is a mode of existence in Internal Local Space
and Present time: As internal, which is to say, in the non-actualized
or imaginary realm - - it provides a host of 'possible' experiences
but its existentiality as not-actual is without definition and
without form and thus, allows for a great deal of interpretation, via
its open possibilities. A feeling. 

2-2 [Pure Secondness] is a mode in External Local Space and Perfect
time: As external, it provides a discrete actual instantiation 

2-1 [Degenerate Secondness] is a borderline interface, in local
space..and on the border between the external and the internal. It's
an 'attractor'. I think it functions as a kind of initial condition
[its Firstness] , able to link with other relations [its indexical
Secondness]; It acts as a catalyst...with its properties of both
internal feeling and external closure. So, it iconically and
indexically  'interacts' with other sites and also, binds and links
with them. 

3-2 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an internal mode, and, as Thirdness,
operates in progressive or continuous time and non-local space. As
non-local, it  provides communal continuity, but, as internal, it
operates as a 'virtual information processor. It functions as an
exploratory ongoing flexible connection of indexical links to both
real and imaginary solutions; it 'browses' the entire informational
community without making a discrete decision. It's a vital, highly
important mode - because of its indexicality with its surroundings,
and the fact that, as internal - its decisions remain possible rather
than actual. This enables the organism to consider, without
actualizing,  multiple alternative solutions. It's a  vital
informational search engine. 

3-1 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an external mode, and, as Thirdness,
operates in progressive or continuous time and non-local space. It
provides communal continuity, but, as EXTERNAL, i.e., as actual
rather than imaginary or possible, it lacks the exploratory
capacities of 3-2; it provides a symmetry-inducing model, a communal
habit-form or abstract model, which guides and organizes the
development of instantiations. Akin to the genes of a species. 

3-3 [Pure Thirdness] is aspatial and atemporal - the universal
rationality of Pure Mind. It cannot be described for description
belongs to particularities. 

And now - I can imagine the reactions of shocked horror at my above
outline. ..and the assertions that 'it's not Peirce'. Well- I think
it is. 

Edwina 
 On Tue 17/10/17 3:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Edwina, list, I completely agree with your outline of what a thing
categorially is. My proposal about a thing is: Category 1 is
matter/material, cat. 2 is form, and cat. 3 is interaction. 2.1.
(firstness of secondness) is the form from the inside, the thing´s
perspective, and 2.2. (secondness of secondness) is the form from the
outside perspective. 3.1. is the interaction possibility, 3.2. the
actual interactions, and 3.3. the interactional habits. Where exactly
the border be

Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - yes, I see how you define your descriptions of the modal
categories, both the genuine and degenerate.

I describe them using the analysis by Peirce of just the modes,  -
and I don't assign them to the parts of the sign, although I
acknowledge and see the point and validity of your description. 

The concepts of internal and external are of course, analyzed all
through Peirce. [see A Guess at the Riddle]

I see your point about them all - and the difference between your
and my descriptions of 3-1 and 3-2 is indeed open to debate.

After all, Firstness is an internal mode and Secondness is an
external mode - and therefore, my placing 3-2 as internal and 3-1 as
external seems problematic.

I debated and research a long time over these two modes, and
described them that way - primarily because of the nature of their
respective activities not their internal/external location.

Firstness with its action of iconicity was, to me, incapable of
expansion, exploration; its strength was in repetition-of-the-same. 

Secondness, with its indexicality, was almost necessarily - seeking
out Otherness to 'touch' and be informed about [via
Thirdness/Reason].

Therefore, I put the weaker mode, which is 3-1, which I defined as
'weak anticipation' [Dubois] as external, and gave as an example,
genetic continuity of Type..Its action, as both continuity and
iconicity was to repeat-the-habit. See Peirce's 'resemblance' 1.367. 

The stronger mode, 3-2, [see Peirce's description of accidental
thirds 1.366]  I put as internal, considering that Thirdness in both
cases requires 'instantiation' in a particular entity. Its action -
an internal action since it was not yet a particular act of
Secondness - was to 'connect' with as many Otherness as possible..and
come up with novel solutions to environmental situations.
Information-gathering, without putting the results into
instantiations, is a vital action in the biological world - and I see
this mode as describing these actions.

Edwina
 On Tue 17/10/17  9:21 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, list, my concepts of (2.1.), (2.2.), (3.1.), (3.2.),
(3.3.) I mostly have abducted from immediate object (2.1.), dynamic
object (2.2.), immediate (3.1.), dynamic (3.2.), final (3.3.)
interpretant, and also the parts of the consciousness: Sensation of
altersense (2.1.), will of altersense (2.2.), abstraction of
medisense (3.1.), suggestion of medisense (3.2.), association of
medisense (3.3.). Looking at these, I think that I agree with your
(2.1.) and (2.2.), but that I see (3.1.) and (3.2.) the other way
around than you do, regarding their local ex- and internality. Are
there btw. any more examples of degenerate modes by Peirce? Best,
Helmut   17. Oktober 2017 um 21:59 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
Helmut - I can see how you are arriving at this outline of the
categories - matter-form-interaction - and they DO fit into the three
modal categories.  My own view of the six modes possible within these
three categories analyzes how they function within time and space. 

1-1 [Pure Firstness]- is a mode of existence in Internal Local Space
and Present time: As internal, which is to say, in the non-actualized
or imaginary realm - - it provides a host of 'possible' experiences
but its existentiality as not-actual is without definition and
without form and thus, allows for a great deal of interpretation, via
its open possibilities. A feeling. 

2-2 [Pure Secondness] is a mode in External Local Space and Perfect
time: As external, it provides a discrete actual instantiation 

2-1 [Degenerate Secondness] is a borderline interface, in local
space..and on the border between the external and the internal. It's
an 'attractor'. I think it functions as a kind of initial condition
[its Firstness] , able to link with other relations [its indexical
Secondness]; It acts as a catalyst...with its properties of both
internal feeling and external closure. So, it iconically and
indexically  'interacts' with other sites and also, binds and links
with them. 

3-2 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an internal mode, and, as Thirdness,
operates in progressive or continuous time and non-local space. As
non-local, it  provides communal continuity, but, as internal, it
operates as a 'virtual information processor. It functions as an
exploratory ongoing flexible connection of indexical links to both
real and imaginary solutions; it 'browses' the entire informational
community without making a discrete decision. It's a vital, highly
important mode - because of its indexicality with its surroundings,
and the fact that, as internal - its decisions remain possible rather
than actual. This enables the organism to consider, without
actualizing,  multiple alternative solutions. It's a  vital
informational search engine. 

3-1 [Degenerate Thirdness] is an external mode, and, as Thir