Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Nov 23, 2017, at 12:42 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
> 
>>> If Peirce had intended any further meaning, he would have
>>> mentioned it explicitly.
>> Really?
> 
> They're not conjectures.  They're observations based on studying
> Peirce's writings.  If you claim otherwise, show the evidence.
> 
> John


While anyone can study his writings, CSP’s level of genius, his level of 
knowledge of numerous languages, his level of scientific experiences and his 
seemingly innate capacity to make pink elephants appear to to pussy cats, (e.g. 
BS-ing), make it difficult for anyone to project his thoughts into rarefied 
logical, mathematical, scientific or philosophical atmospheres.

Many readers of this list are familiar with the CSP frequent whining about not 
having the resources to fully express his works.  Often, he complained about 
the lack of time in a lecture to develop his ideas fully.

But, more importantly, he made a concerted effort to find funding to publish 36 
volumes of his memoirs from the Carnegie foundation (1902). [EP2, page xxiv] 
Various drafts of the application were published. Even support from President 
Roosevelt was insufficient influence his vicious detractors.  

Such musings are neither unknown nor uncommon among CSP scholars.

Cheers

Jerry
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[gnox]

Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation marks. 
It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898. In the Lowell Lectures (and the 
Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in 
Lecture 3, for instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology 
because I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly 
evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on. 

 

As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it should be clear 
enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I can add anything to my 
last two posts that will clarify their usage in the terminology of EGs.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

 

Gary f.,

 

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his 
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???

 

Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have 
been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all about 
relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?

 

Not about just classification.

 

Kirsti

 

 

 

 

 

  g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:

> List, Mary,

> 

> Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with 

> either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth 

> comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 

> (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before 

> Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness, 

> Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more 

> specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained "by 

> means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the 

> unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll 

> include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:

> 

> Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity 

> attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I 

> call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached 

> to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs according 

> to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads, 

> triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete assertion, 

> like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb, 

> needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as

> 

> --obeys mamma

> you obey--

> 

> A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete 

> the assertion as

> 

> —OBEYS—

> or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—

> 

> A _triad_ needs just three subjects as

> 

> --gives--to--

> --obeys both--and--

> 

> The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what 

> Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate"

> in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic 

> trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292 

> or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here 

> represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy dot"

> in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"

> of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces 

> well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and 

> the interpreter of it."

> 

> The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT

> 155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to 

> the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold in 

> the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of 

> identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the 

> line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which 

> would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb, 

> though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," its 

> subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of the 

> "spots."

> 

> In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very 

> different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.

> Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of 

> the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having 

> such loose ends) are signs of a totally different kind. They are 

> demonstrative pronouns, indicating existing objects, not necessarily 

> material things, for they may be _events_, or even _qualities_, but 

> still objects, merely designated as _this_ or _that_. In the third 

> place the writing of verbs side by side, and the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

g...@gnusystems.ca  kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:
> List, Mary,
> Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
> either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
> comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
> (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46).

> Now such a _rheme_ being neither logically necessary nor logically
> impossible, as a [part of ?] a graph without being represented as a
> combination by any of the signs of the system, is called a _lexis_ and
> each replica of the lexis is called a _spot_. (_Lexis_ is the Greek
> for a single word and a lexis in this system corresponds to a single
> verb in speech. The plural of _lexis_ is preferably _lexeis_ rather
> than _lexises_.)

Thanks, Gary, for posting these important paragraphs.
Historically, CSP’s usage of the term “spot” emerged from the ground-breaking 
paper of Alfred Bray Kempe, 1886, which had a profound effect on CSP’s views on 
the relations between logic and mathematical logic and chemical logic. 
In a crude way, Kempe “Memoir the Theory of Mathematical Forms” and later 
papers, were key to the evolution of mathematical graph theory and hence, 
modern category theory.  
see Roberts, p. 21-25 for a lengthy discussion of massive influence of Kempe’s 
concept of spot on CSP’s thought.
One critical line
“… the lines or bonds connect certain of the spots “one to one” - in ORDER TO 
DIVIDE THE REPRESENTING UNITS UNDER CONSIDERATION INTO TWO SETS: ONE SET WHOSE 
UNITS (OR PLURALITIES OF UNITS) DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER AND THE OTHER SET WHOSE 
WHOSE UNITS (OR PLURALITIES OF UNITS) DO NOT.” (My emphasis in capital letters)

The lines, Kempe claims, are NOT used to represent  “ANY RELATIONSHIP IN THE 
NATURE OF CONNEXION, BUT SIMPLY TO DISTINGUISH CERTAIN PAIRS OF THINGS FROM 
OTHER”  This leads to the separation of verbs and blanks in the sense of 
medads, monads, dyads, triads, etc

CSP appears to have interpreted these concepts in terms of "the difference that 
makes a difference” between atoms and molecules. (3.421) 

Roberts (p. 25) contrasts the propositions:
"John gives John to John."
with the symmetric structure for Ammonia, NH3, with the Nitrogen in the middle, 
connected to all three Hydrogens.
(see Figure 5 and 6, p. 25)

It is critical to observe that the verb, “gives” in the proposition, is 
replaced in the ammonia diagram with the noun, Nitrogen. 

Chemically, this substitution makes NO SENSE because Hydrogen and Nitrogen are 
on equal ontological footing as members of the table of chemical elements.

Does the partial sentence:
> (_Lexis_ is the Greek
> for a single word and a lexis in this system corresponds to a single
> verb in speech.
shed any light on this attempted analogy? 

> On Nov 25, 2017, at 2:38 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have 
> been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all about 
> relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?

Kirsti’s question is well poised. 

In what sense to the three terms, spot, dot and blot, differ in their 
competences to generate relations among pairs of relatives?  And how do they 
relate to Kempe’s separation of two classes (sets) of kinds of objects?

Cheers
Jerry
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Secret Language of Plants

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Oh
dear, oh dear. I love the smell of newly cut grass. Does that mean -
it must mean - yes, yes, that I am some kind of hidden sadist; that I
love the 'smell of destruction'; that I am transported by the whiff of
.

But yes, every cell has memory, i.e., Thirdness - and can 'feel'
[Firstness] and react [Secondness]...

Edwina Taborsky
 On Sat 25/11/17  5:30 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 11/25/2017 8:21 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: 
 > Plants don’t have brains because the choices that they make  
 > from their Umwelts are simple, and in “slow motion”. 
 Yes, but every cell from bacteria on up has memory and can 
 signal neighboring cells via chemical excretions.  When a cell 
 is attacked, it can generate such chemicals even at the instant 
 before it disintegrates. 
 The next time you mow your lawn, remember that the smell of the 
 newly cut grass is a scream that says "THE LAWNMOWER MONSTER 
 IS ATTACKING!" -- or some paraphrase to that effect. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Secret Language of Plants

[John F Sowa]

On 11/25/2017 8:21 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
Plants don’t have brains because the choices that they make 
from their Umwelts are simple, and in “slow motion”.


Yes, but every cell from bacteria on up has memory and can
signal neighboring cells via chemical excretions.  When a cell
is attacked, it can generate such chemicals even at the instant
before it disintegrates.

The next time you mow your lawn, remember that the smell of the
newly cut grass is a scream that says "THE LAWNMOWER MONSTER
IS ATTACKING!" -- or some paraphrase to that effect.

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f.,

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his 
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???


Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would 
have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all 
about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?


Not about just classification.

Kirsti





g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:

List, Mary,

Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
(RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before
Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more
specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained "by
means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the
unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll
include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:

Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity
attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I
call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached
to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs according
to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,
triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete assertion,
like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,
needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as

--obeys mamma
you obey--

A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete
the assertion as

—OBEYS—
or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—

A _triad_ needs just three subjects as

--gives--to--
--obeys both--and--

The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what
Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate"
in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic
trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292
or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here
represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy dot"
in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"
of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces
well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and
the interpreter of it."

The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT
155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to
the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold in
the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of
identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the
line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which
would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb,
though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," its
subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of the
"spots."

In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very
different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.
Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of
the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having
such loose ends) are signs of a totally different kind. They are
demonstrative pronouns, indicating existing objects, not necessarily
material things, for they may be _events_, or even _qualities_, but
still objects, merely designated as _this_ or _that_. In the third
place the writing of verbs side by side, and the ovals enclosing
graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last is
continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great
difficulties of mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different
kind of sign. Signs of the first kind represent objects in their
firstness, and give the significations of the terms. Signs of the
second kind represent objects as existing,-- and therefore as
reacting,-- and also in their reactions. They contribute the
_assertive_ character to the graph. Signs of the third kind represent
objects as representative, that is in their Thirdness, and upon them
turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was
considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct
the system of graphs.

One last comment: the usage of the word "individual" in logic can be
confusing, but Peirce's definition of the term in _Baldwin's
Dictionary_ -- http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual [1]
--is helpful for understanding Peirce's usage.

Gary f.

SENT: 23-Nov-17 16:38

Continuing from Lowell 2.13,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13620
[2]

You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that
_something exists_, a fact that graphist and 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[gnox]

List, Mary,

 

Lowell 2.14 introduces the spot (which must not be confused with either the
dot or the blot!), and in this connection is worth comparing with MS 439,
the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In
this lecture given five years before Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of
his "categories" (Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to
formal logic (more specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then
explained "by means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for
the unmathematical" (or so he claimed - RLT 151). In this post I'll include
two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:

 

 

Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity attached to
it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I call a verb. The
places at which lines of identity can be attached to the verb I call its
blank subjects. I distinguish verbs according to the numbers of their
subject blanks, as medads, monads, dyads, triads, etc. A medad, or
impersonal verb, is a complete assertion, like "It rains," "you are a good
girl." A monad, or neuter verb, needs only one subject to make it a complete
assertion, as 

-obeys mamma 
you obey-

A dyad, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete the
assertion as 

-obeys- 
or -is identical with-

A triad needs just three subjects as 

-gives-to- 
-obeys both-and-

 

 

The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what
Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate" in the
Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic trichotomy
rheme/dicisign/argument as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292 or CP 2.250.) The
"subject blank" or "line of identity" here represents the individual
"subject of force," as does the "heavy dot" in Lowell 2, where the sheet of
assertion represents "the aggregate" of those "subjects of the complexus of
experience-forces well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes
the graph, and the interpreter of it."

 

The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT 155-6)
relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to the Peircean
"categories" - and I think these relations also hold in the Lowell
presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the line of identity is classed
among "verbs" here, although the ends of the line (the "dots" of Lowell 2)
represent "individual objects" which would be the "subjects" of the "verbs"
in the graph. As a verb, though, all the line of identity can mean is "is
identical with," its subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the
"hooks" of the "spots."

 

 

In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very
different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety. Among
these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of the line of
identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having such loose ends)
are signs of a totally different kind. They are demonstrative pronouns,
indicating existing objects, not necessarily material things, for they may
be events, or even qualities, but still objects, merely designated as this
or that. In the third place the writing of verbs side by side, and the ovals
enclosing graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last is
continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great difficulties of
mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different kind of sign. Signs of
the first kind represent objects in their firstness, and give the
significations of the terms. Signs of the second kind represent objects as
existing,- and therefore as reacting,- and also in their reactions. They
contribute the assertive character to the graph. Signs of the third kind
represent objects as representative, that is in their Thirdness, and upon
them turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was
considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct the
system of graphs. 

 

 

One last comment: the usage of the word "individual" in logic can be
confusing, but Peirce's definition of the term in Baldwin's Dictionary -
http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual -is helpful for
understanding Peirce's usage.

 

Gary f.

 


Sent: 23-Nov-17 16:38



Continuing from Lowell 2.13,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-low
ell-lecture-ii/display/13620

 

You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that something
exists, a fact that graphist and interpreter took for granted at the outset.
I will show you that the sign will be useful as long as we agree that
although different points on the sheet may denote the same individual, yet
different individuals cannot be denoted by the same point on the sheet. 

 

If we take any proposition, say 

A sinner kills a saint

and if we erase portions of it, so as to leave it a blank form of
proposition, the blanks being such that if 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Secret Language of Plants

[Stephen Jarosek]

EDWINA: “And it IS an aspect of 'Mind'. As Peirce said - "Thought is not 
necessarily connected with a brain.”

Ultimately, the question of what role a brain plays relates to thermodynamics. 
Plants don’t have brains because the choices that they make from their Umwelts 
are simple, and in “slow motion”. They receive a distributed, limited form of 
energy from the sun and nutrients from the soil, and so they cannot afford to 
squander their energy in the same way that brained organisms can… it’s why 
plants don’t have legs, why they don’t get up and move around. The “brain” of 
the plant is therefore distributed throughout its body, in its leaves, 
branches, roots and stem… that’s how I would interpret it.

Carnivorous plants, however, such as the Venus flytrap, receive excess energy & 
nutrients from the insects that they digest, and therefore are able to divert 
that energy to “hunting” for supplementary food sources. And by the time that 
some hypothetical plant might develop sufficiently to get up and move around, 
it would cross an energy-access threshold whereby it would no longer need its 
leaves… it then becomes an animal and, by necessity, one that requires a brain. 
Brains are required for more complex conceptualizations,  in order to 
accommodate energy-intensive choice-making from complex environments.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Saturday, November 25, 2017 12:42 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Charles Pyle
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Secret Language of Plants

 

Thanks for the article. Biosemiotics is very involved with this reality - of 
plant communication.

And it IS an aspect of 'Mind'. As Peirce said - "Thought is not necessarily 
connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and 

throughout the purely physical world'. 4.551.

And 'Mind' is most certainly operative in the biological realm.

Edwina Taborsky

 

On Fri 24/11/17 5:08 PM , Charles Pyle charlesp...@comcast.net sent:

 

Striking evidence that plants warn each other of environmental dangers is 
reviving a once ridiculed field.

 

https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-secret-language-of-plants-20131216/

 


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