RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

Interesting little anthology you've put together here, and it certainly
shows Peirce referring to parts of signs (also parts of objects and of
interpretants), and parts of an illative transformation. However I don't see
a clear case here of Peirce referring to a part of a relation. The closest
he comes is the one you put last, where he speaks of a part of a "spike" of
a relation, which is still not a part of a relation.

 

Generalizing from this sample, then, I think we can say that Peirce speaks
often enough of parts of a sign, but does not speak of parts of a relation.
If that's the case, I think it gives another reason why we should not say
that a sign is a (triadic) relation, but that a sign relation is triadic -
and its correlates should not be regarded as parts.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 22-Dec-17 13:33
To: jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com; Helmut Raulien 
Cc: Peirce List ; John F Sowa 
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Hello Gary F, John S, Helmut, Kirsti, List,

 

I take John to be asking a good question about whether or how the part/whole
distinction might or might not apply to the account of relations and
relationships as it is applied in the normative science of semiotics. Given
the context of our discussion, we can ask similar questions about how the
distinction should be applied in the formal logic of the EG.

 

In asking "what practical  difference would it make," I take John to be
asking the very same kind of thing that Peirce asked in his account of
relations and relationships when he moves from the first (i.e., familiarity)
and second (logical) grades of clarity, to a third pragmatic grade of
clarity (see The Logic of Relatives starting at CP 3.456 and also 6.318
below).

 

Starting with the texts, I see that Peirce applies the distinction in a
number of places to the account of relations and relationships.  Here are
several relevant passages (note:  words both underlined and in bold are my
emphasis):

 

1.  CP 2.316. Let us now proceed to compare the conclusions from the
abstract

definition of a Dicisign with the facts about propositions. The first
conclusion is that every proposition contains a Subject and a Predicate, the
former representing (or being) an Index of the Primary Object, or Correlate
of the relation represented, the latter representing (or being) an Icon of
the Dicisign in some respect. Before inquiring whether every proposition has
such parts, let us see whether the descriptions given of them are accurate,
when there are such parts. The proposition "Cain kills Abel" has two
subjects "Cain" and "Abel" and relates as much to the real Objects of one of
these as to that of the other. But it may be regarded as primarily relating
to the Dyad composed of Cain, as first, and of Abel, as second member. This
Pair is a single individual object having this relation to Cain and to Abel,
that its existence consists in the existence of Cain and in the existence of
Abel and in nothing more. The Pair, though its existence thus depends on
Cain's existence and on Abel's, is, nevertheless, just as truly existent as
they severally are. The Dyad is not precisely the Pair. The Dyad is a mental
Diagram consisting of two images of two objects, one existentially connected
with one member of the pair, the other with the other; the one having
attached to it, as representing it, a Symbol whose meaning is "First," and
the other a Symbol whose meaning is "Second." Thus, this diagram, the Dyad,
represents Indices of Cain and Abel, respectively; and thus the subject
conforms to our conclusion.  

 

2. CP 4.173 A part of a collection called its whole is a collection such
that whatever is u of the part is u of the whole, but something that is u of
the whole is not u of the part. (174) It is convenient to use this locution;
namely, instead of saying A is in the relation, r, to B, we may say A is an
r to B, or of B; or, if we wish to reverse the order of mentioning A and B,
we may say B is r'd by A. If a relation, r , is such that nothing is r to
two different things, and nothing is r'd by two different things, so that
some things in the universe are perhaps r to nothing while all the rest are
r, each to its own distinct correlate, and there are some things perhaps to
which nothing is r, but all the rest have each a single thing that is r to
it, then I call r a one-to-one relation. If there be a one-to-one relation,
r, such that every unit of one collection is r to a unit of a second
collection, while every unit of the second collection is r'd by a unit of
the first collection, those two collections are commonly said to be in a
one-to-one correspondence with one another. . . . 

 

3. CP 2.311 This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary Object,
the other being termed the Secondary Object. The Dicisign in so far as it is
the relate of the existential relation which is the Secondary Object of the
Dicisign, can evi

Aw: Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

I guess, that the union of units that unifies the unity is something different from a part-whole-affair, that is something that can sufficiently be depicted with a Venn-diagram. I think your saying of union of units fits better to real nature or phenomena than the part-whole-concept. So I guess it might be better not to talk with the term "part" anymore, but replace it with "unit"? Maybe "part" suggests, that there is a "whole", which is nothing more than its parts, but "unit" is a term still freeer of such a presupposition? 

Best,

Helmut

 

22. Dezember 2017 um 19:47 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
wrote:


List, Helmut:


On Dec 22, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 

I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are their parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, but maybe not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, 


 

My response is very simple rhetoric.

 

A relation is a unity in the sense of my earlier assertion, some months ago:

 

"The union of units unifies the unity."

 

I concurred with John’s assertion because a questioner may be familiar with the logic of the meaning the term “relation” in only one symbol system. (Monadic symbol users appear to prevail on this list.)

 

The definition of part-whole relations varies between disciplines - human relations, biological relations, chemical relations, physical relations, mathematical relations, etc.

 

The rhetoric of the meaning of the assertion:

 

"The union of units unifies the unity.”

 

depends on the capacity of the questioner to interpret the rhetoric in which I frame the meaning of “union” and the corresponding relational logic of  “units.”

 

More precisely, in preparing my answer to the questioner, I must decide to either include or exclude the concept of emergence between logical symbol systems. In other words, the rhetoric of music relations differs from the rhetoric of chemical relations even though both musical and chemical  relations can be illustrated with associations of the union of number units and compositions of parts to form wholes (unities.)

 

 

See CP 1:288-299 for relevant discussion of valencies relevant to symbols.  CSP fully recognized that the mathematization of science is a deep metaphysical challenge, not merely a rhetorical flourish asserting that the valencies loosely associated with the Laws of Physics suffice to explain all of science.  He held that the example of “handedness” as chiral molecules sufficed for this purpose.(EP2:159)

 

Cheers

Jerry 

 

 
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Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Helmut:
> On Dec 22, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but 
> there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are 
> their parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, 
> but maybe not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, 

My response is very simple rhetoric.

A relation is a unity in the sense of my earlier assertion, some months ago:

"The union of units unifies the unity."

I concurred with John’s assertion because a questioner may be familiar with the 
logic of the meaning the term “relation” in only one symbol system. (Monadic 
symbol users appear to prevail on this list.)

The definition of part-whole relations varies between disciplines - human 
relations, biological relations, chemical relations, physical relations, 
mathematical relations, etc.

The rhetoric of the meaning of the assertion:

"The union of units unifies the unity.”

depends on the capacity of the questioner to interpret the rhetoric in which I 
frame the meaning of “union” and the corresponding relational logic of  “units.”

More precisely, in preparing my answer to the questioner, I must decide to 
either include or exclude the concept of emergence between logical symbol 
systems. In other words, the rhetoric of music relations differs from the 
rhetoric of chemical relations even though both musical and chemical  relations 
can be illustrated with associations of the union of number units and 
compositions of parts to form wholes (unities.)


See CP 1:288-299 for relevant discussion of valencies relevant to symbols.  CSP 
fully recognized that the mathematization of science is a deep metaphysical 
challenge, not merely a rhetorical flourish asserting that the valencies 
loosely associated with the Laws of Physics suffice to explain all of science.  
He held that the example of “handedness” as chiral molecules sufficed for this 
purpose.(EP2:159)

Cheers
Jerry 



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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Gary F, John S, Helmut, Kirsti, List,


I take John to be asking a good question about whether or how the part/whole 
distinction might or might not apply to the account of relations and 
relationships as it is applied in the normative science of semiotics. Given the 
context of our discussion, we can ask similar questions about how the 
distinction should be applied in the formal logic of the EG.


In asking "what practical  difference would it make," I take John to be asking 
the very same kind of thing that Peirce asked in his account of relations and 
relationships when he moves from the first (i.e., familiarity) and second 
(logical) grades of clarity, to a third pragmatic grade of clarity (see The 
Logic of Relatives starting at CP 3.456 and also 6.318 below).


Starting with the texts, I see that Peirce applies the distinction in a number 
of places to the account of relations and relationships.  Here are several 
relevant passages (note:  words both underlined and in bold are my emphasis):


1.  CP 2.316. Let us now proceed to compare the conclusions from the abstract

definition of a Dicisign with the facts about propositions. The first 
conclusion is that every proposition contains a Subject and a Predicate, the 
former representing (or being) an Index of the Primary Object, or Correlate of 
the relation represented, the latter representing (or being) an Icon of the 
Dicisign in some respect. Before inquiring whether every proposition has such 
parts, let us see whether the descriptions given of them are accurate, when 
there are such parts. The proposition "Cain kills Abel" has two subjects "Cain" 
and "Abel" and relates as much to the real Objects of one of these as to that 
of the other. But it may be regarded as primarily relating to the Dyad composed 
of Cain, as first, and of Abel, as second member. This Pair is a single 
individual object having this relation to Cain and to Abel, that its existence 
consists in the existence of Cain and in the existence of Abel and in nothing 
more. The Pair, though its existence thus depends on Cain's existence and on 
Abel's, is, nevertheless, just as truly existent as they severally are. The 
Dyad is not precisely the Pair. The Dyad is a mental Diagram consisting of two 
images of two objects, one existentially connected with one member of the pair, 
the other with the other; the one having attached to it, as representing it, a 
Symbol whose meaning is "First," and the other a Symbol whose meaning is 
"Second." Thus, this diagram, the Dyad, represents Indices of Cain and Abel, 
respectively; and thus the subject conforms to our conclusion.


2. CP 4.173 A part of a collection called its whole is a collection such that 
whatever is u of the part is u of the whole, but something that is u of the 
whole is not u of the part. (174) It is convenient to use this locution; 
namely, instead of saying A is in the relation, r, to B, we may say A is an r 
to B, or of B; or, if we wish to reverse the order of mentioning A and B, we 
may say B is r'd by A. If a relation, r , is such that nothing is r to two 
different things, and nothing is r'd by two different things, so that some 
things in the universe are perhaps r to nothing while all the rest are r, each 
to its own distinct correlate, and there are some things perhaps to which 
nothing is r, but all the rest have each a single thing that is r to it, then I 
call r a one-to-one relation. If there be a one-to-one relation, r, such that 
every unit of one collection is r to a unit of a second collection, while every 
unit of the second collection is r'd by a unit of the first collection, those 
two collections are commonly said to be in a one-to-one correspondence with one 
another. . . .


3. CP 2.311 This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary Object, the 
other being termed the Secondary Object. The Dicisign in so far as it is the 
relate of the existential relation which is the Secondary Object of the 
Dicisign, can evidently not be the entire Dicisign. It is at once a part of the 
Object and a part of the Interpretant of the Dicisign. Since the Dicisign is 
represented in its Interpretant to be an Index of a complexus as such, it must 
be represented in that same Interpretant to be composed of two parts, 
corresponding respectively to its Object and to itself [the Dicisign]. That is 
to say, in order to understand the Dicisign, it must be regarded as composed of 
two such parts whether it be in itself so composed or not. It is difficult to 
see how this can be, unless it really have two such parts; but perhaps this may 
be possible. Let us consider these two represented parts separately. The part 
which is represented to represent the Primary Object, since the Dicisign is 
represented to be an Index of its Object, must be represented as an Index, or 
some representamen of an Index, of the Primary Object. The part which is 
represented to represent a part of the Dicisign is represented as at

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, John, List,

you wrote:

"
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

".

I dont understand this. If anybody asks, if relations have parts, why can this not be an intrinsically motivated question? Why does the CSP spirit suggest, that this question must be extrinsically motivated, so that the asker does not just want to know the answer, because he/she finds it interesting, but has obscure motives, and wants to use the answer for something weird, something other than just gaining knowledge? Ok, you can always ask: Why do you want to gain knowledge? That is always a good question, I admit. But: If the knowledge gainer shares this knowledge, then I think it is clear to see, that she/he just wants to commit to the scientific progress, and is not Dr. No, or Frankenstein.

 


I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are their parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, but maybe not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, and I might have missed it).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 


22. Dezember 2017 um 17:55 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 

List, John:

Comments inserted within text:

> On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one “subject” or several.
>
> But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
>
> A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether
> you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example,
> consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
>
> If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
> and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
> But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
>
Well stated!
But, this is traditional mathematical usage because of the role of well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly display of numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a one-dimensional geometric line.

The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations that depend on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology). This is essential to the emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral centers. The alignment of the parts of the chiral molecule are in space. This proven by well-defined emanations necessary for the patterns of x-ray diffraction of the sinsign.

In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the symbols where A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for guanosine, the three symbols,

A > G

makes no logical sense.

In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the symbol system under inquiry.

(A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and syntax which is highly relevant to this discussion.)

> That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
> relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
> relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
> is only one of many ways of "having”.

A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given molecular formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of tartaric acid.
>
> One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
> infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that
> greater-than has infinitely many parts.

Agreed.
>
> The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
> (several statements with multiple symbols). But those
> axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

Agreed.
Abstractly, this is one component of the “alphabetic” sign system for chemical notation. The composition of the names of the parts (as names of atoms) generates a new name for the molecule that is the "difference that makes a difference” between atoms and molecules. The new name must give an exact accounting of the spatial organization of the parts, as with tartaric acid and virtually all other biochemicals.
>
> In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
> describe any relation, including the sign relation.
Agreed.
>
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

>From my perspective, I would suggest that John assertions are closely tied to the general problem of taxonomy / categorization / classification / order and organization which are intrinsic to the mathematization of natural sorts and kinds, as well as a host of other problems associated with the bare grammati

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:  

Comments inserted within text:

> On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but 
>> in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat 
>> arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one 
>> “subject” or several.
> 
> But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
> 
> A sign is a triadic relation.  But it's not clear whether
> you can or should say that a relation has parts.  For example,
> consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
> 
> If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
> and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
> But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
> 
Well stated!
But, this is traditional  mathematical usage because of the role of 
well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly display of 
numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a one-dimensional geometric line.

The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations that depend 
on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology).  This is essential to the 
emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral centers. The alignment of 
the parts of the chiral molecule are in space. This proven by well-defined 
emanations necessary for the patterns of x-ray diffraction of the  sinsign. 

In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the symbols where 
A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for guanosine, the three 
symbols, 

A  >  G  

makes no logical sense.

In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the symbol 
system under inquiry. 
 
(A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and syntax 
which is highly relevant to this discussion.)

> That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
> relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
> relationships.  And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
> is only one of many ways of "having”.

A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given molecular 
formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of tartaric  acid.  
> 
> One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
> infinite set of pairs.  But that does not imply that
> greater-than has infinitely many parts.

Agreed.
> 
> The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
> (several statements with multiple symbols).  But those
> axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

Agreed.
Abstractly, this is one component of the “alphabetic” sign system for chemical 
notation. The composition of the names of the parts (as names of atoms) 
generates a new name for the molecule  that is the "difference that makes a 
difference” between atoms and molecules. The new name must give an exact 
accounting of the spatial organization of the parts, as with tartaric acid and 
virtually all other biochemicals.
> 
> In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
> describe any relation, including the sign relation.
Agreed.
> 
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean?  Why are you asking
> that question?  What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

>From my perspective, I would suggest that John assertions are closely tied to 
>the general problem of  taxonomy / categorization / classification / order and 
>organization which are intrinsic to the mathematization of natural sorts and 
>kinds, as well as a host of other problems associated with the bare 
>grammatical usage of the term “part” in the context of philosophy and public 
>rhetoric.

Cheers

Jerry


> 
> John
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

John, my response inserted [GF:] —

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 22-Dec-17 10:39



On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM,   g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and 

> predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these 

> “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of 

> whether it has one “subject” or several.

 

But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.

 

GF: It gives a conditional answer: IF you consider a proposition to be a sign, 
and you refer to a subject or a predicate as a part of a given proposition, 
then I know what you mean by “part”, and I say that such a “part” is a product 
of an analysis which is not logically necessary.

 

JFS: A sign is a triadic relation.  

GF: No. If we follow Peirce’s terminology strictly, a sign is one correlate of 
a triadic relation. (We’ve been through this before, and predictably some list 
members will object to that terminology, but I consider the issue settled by 
Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations” (EP2:290, CP 2.242), 
not to mention the rest of the Syllabus and the entirety of the Lowell 
Lectures, which are consistent in this respect. We can say that a sign relation 
is triadic, but we can’t say that a sign is a triadic relation — not if we’re 
sticking to Peirce’s terminology, which I think causes less confusion than the 
alternative. 

 

I agree with you in this respect: I would not say that the other correlates of 
the triadic relation (i.e. the object and interpretant) are “parts” of the 
relation. A correlate is not a part. So I would agree with everything you say 
below, but I don’t object to references to signs as having parts. Peirce 
himself does this occasionally, for instance in “New Elements” where he says 
“the common stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter, called to mind by 
the words, is a part of the sign” (EP2:310).

 

Gary f.

 

But it's not clear whether you can or should say that a relation has parts.  
For example, consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.

 

If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols, and it expresses a 
relationship between 7 and 2.

But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.

 

That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the relation named 
greater-than can "have" infinitely many relationships.  And as Aristotle 
observed, "have as part"

is only one of many ways of "having".

 

One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an infinite set of pairs. 
 But that does not imply that greater-than has infinitely many parts.

 

The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms (several statements with 
multiple symbols).  But those axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

 

In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to describe any relation, 
including the sign relation.

 

If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?", I would say "What do you mean?  
Why are you asking that question?  What would you do with the answer?"

 

John


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Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Kirsti,

is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of points).

Best,

Helmut

 

 22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
course, are deeply related. But how?

To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.

Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.

I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
question, is such an experiment.

Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.

EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
logical thinking.

Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> Gary, Kirsti, List,
> I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
> spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
> geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
> they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
> g...@gnusystems.ca
> wrote:
>
> Kirsti, list,
>
> Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
> points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
> month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
> according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
> _point_ before Euclid.
>
> Gary f.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
> Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
>
> Listers,
>
> Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
> geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
> as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
> instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
> Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.
>
> Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning?
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
> posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a
> message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .
>
> Links:
> --
> [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/
> [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm


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Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:


> On Dec 19, 2017, at 10:10 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
> 
> Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
> But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
> I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
> for making a stronger claim:
> 
>> For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with a 
>> discussion of chirality and the laws of motion (Right—handed and Left-handed 
>>  screws)
>> 
>> “There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by mechanical 
>> action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the corpuscular 
>> philosophy.”
> 
> By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics
> was that all the major problems had been solved.  But the first
> decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency.
> 
> If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest
> journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow
> the corpuscular philosophy."
> 
> John

Your response deserves a longer reply.

But, for the moment, one brief comment.
Here is a recent  reference from the the Royal Society journal:

Review article: Spontaneous mirror symmetry breaking and origin of biological 
homochirality
Josep M. Ribó, David Hochberg, Joaquim Crusats, Zoubir El-Hachemi and Albert 
Moyano
J. R. Soc. Interface 14:20170699; doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0699 (published 
December 13, 2017)
http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699 


It discusses the central role of the development of chirality in emergence of 
life.
CSP concerns were well founded and remain a profound research problem to this 
day. 

The issue of chirality effectively blocks the mathematization of natural sorts 
and kinds using physical laws alone.
Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy” is a mystery to me.
Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?

At a minimum, CSP was arguing against a universal law of mechanics. 
Or, was he merely arguing against the putatively universality of the 
newly-defined laws of thermodynamics (entropy?)

Whatever he was arguing for or against, the chiral tetrahedral carbon atom, as 
a well-defined natural geometrical object that was irreducible to a triad, 
posed a major conundrum for him (and all others) who seek to construct a 
universe in simpler terms.

Cheer

Jerry


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[John F Sowa]

On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, 
but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is 
somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it 
has one “subject” or several.


But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.

A sign is a triadic relation.  But it's not clear whether
you can or should say that a relation has parts.  For example,
consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.

If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.

That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
relationships.  And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
is only one of many ways of "having".

One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
infinite set of pairs.  But that does not imply that
greater-than has infinitely many parts.

The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
(several statements with multiple symbols).  But those
axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
describe any relation, including the sign relation.

If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
I would say "What do you mean?  Why are you asking
that question?  What would you do with the answer?"

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Kirsti, John, list,

 

My source for the usage of SEMEION was Liddell and Scott (which can be searched 
online). As John says, the primary meaning is “mark”. My answer to the question 
of whether a sign has parts was, I thought, implied by the Peirce quote in the 
blog post I linked to, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/: “upon a 
continuous line there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is 
only room for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you mark a point on the 
line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if the line has a beginning 
and end, then it has those two points (discontinuities) already. 

 

I was suggesting an analogy to a sign: for instance, you can say that a 
dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the 
analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the 
choice of whether it has one “subject” or several. The more “complete” a sign 
is, the more the element of continuity (or Thirdness) is predominant in it, and 
thus the more room there is in it for possibilities of parts, i.e. the more 
opportunity for analyzing it into “partial signs.” Sorry for being so 
elliptical in my post, but that was my point (if you’ll pardon the expression). 
I have a very unPeircean fondness for conciseness.

 

By the way, the manuscript of Lowell 4 has a very detailed and previously 
unpublished explanation of (hypostatic) abstractions such as “dormitive 
virtue”, so that may be of use for continuing your recent discussion of 
abstraction, when we reach that point in the next lecture.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 22-Dec-17 01:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Kirsti and Gary F,

 

K

> Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has 

> no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the 

> earlier STIGME .

 

GF

> By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον 

> for point before Euclid. [And from web site] According to the Liddell 

> and Scott lexicon, the word σημεῖον (the usual Greek word for sign and 

> root of semeiotic) was also used by Aristotle for a mathematical 

> point, or a point in time. In this sense it was synonymous with στιγμή 

> (stigma).

 

I checked Liddell & Scott, Chantraine's dictionnaire étymologique, and Heath's 
translation and commentary on Euclid.

 

The base word is the verb 'stigo', which means to mark something; for example, 
as a sign of ownership.  From that, the word 'stigma'

(ending in alpha instead of eta) meant the mark caused by a pointed instrument. 
 The word 'stigme' originally meant a spot in a bird's plumage; then it came to 
mean any spot, a small mark, or an instant.

 

Aristotle explicitly said that a  point was a marker on a line, not a part of 
the line.  Heath said that Euclid generally followed Aristotle.  But in vol. 1, 
p. 156, he said that 'semeion' was probably "considered more suitable than 
'stigme' (a puncture) which might claim to have more reality than a point."

 

In summary, all three words (stigma, stigme, and semeion) could refer to a 
mark, but semeion is more abstract and general than the others.

 

K

> Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

 

The word 'semeion' could be used to refer to any kind of mark.

Euclid used it for just one particular kind.  For that use in geometry, the 
thing it refers to has no parts.

 

K

> the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries. 

 

I believe that it was good idea to have two distinct words:

'signum' for sign, and 'punctum' for point.

 

John


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