On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one “subject” or several.
But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts. A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example, consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'. If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols, and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2. But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation. That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part" is only one of many ways of "having". One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that greater-than has infinitely many parts. The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms (several statements with multiple symbols). But those axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation. In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to describe any relation, including the sign relation. If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?", I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking that question? What would you do with the answer?" John
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