Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

[joseph simpson]

Jerry, List:

Version 2.0 of the Augmented Model-Exchange Isomorphism (AMEI 2.0) is
available at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332186969_Augmented_Model-Exchange_Isomorphism_v20

A new scope concept has been added to this version of the document.

Another technical report, "Applied Natural Language Relationships," is in
work and is scheduled to be available around the first of May, 2019.

It should be clear that some of the logical groupings in the AMEI do not
produce valid logical outcomes.  All 27 groups are addressed for
completeness.

Operational procedures, applied during system analysis, are discussed in
the "Applied Natural Language Relationships" report.  A quick look at a
simple 'logical fix' for an apparent logical problem is associated with the
natural language relationship, 'part-of.'  Some individuals assign a
logical group of irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive to the 'part-of'
natural language relationship.  Other individuals assign a logical group of
reflexive, asymmetric and transitive to the 'part-of' natural language
relationship.  Given an asymmetric and transitive relationship, it can be
shown that the only acceptable reflexive (logical) property is irreflexive.

The AMEI provides a complete framework to support the evaluation of these
types of logical issues.  In the case of system structural analysis, the
reflexive property is not important because it applies to only one object.
System structure depends on the relationship between two or more objects.
Therefore, either the irreflexive property or the reflexive property will
generate the same system structure.  In practice the irreflexive property
is used to determine the system structure.  If, once the system structure
is determined, the reflexive property becomes important in other
mathematical calculations, then the identity matrix may be added to the
binary matrix that represents the system structure.

The combination of prose, structured graphics, logic and mathematics
provides a rich collection of methods, operations and idioms to support the
effective practice of system analysis and data communication.

More methods will be addressed in the Applied Natural Language
Relationships paper.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe











On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 12:26 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> (List, This a both a correction of typos and an significant extension of
> the original post.  As I continue to work on the Bedrock paper and the
> plethora of implications for modern scientific re-interpretations of CSP
> deep encoding of the semiotics of the chemical sciences, I plan to post
> sporadically, other deductions from modern scientific bedrocks.)
>
> On Mar 2, 2019, at 7:07 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose 
> wrote:
>
> "But this is not what I mean, nor what is generally meant, by a collection
> of absolutely independent members. What I mean by that expression is that
> every member is distinguished from every other by possessing some one or
> another elementary and definite non-relative character which that other
> does not possess"   Thanks Gary. Thus are we.
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> From a logical point of view, this quote is absolutely critical to
> understanding the mathematical ground of CSP’s writings.
>
>  Although this concept is already present and / or inferred in many, many
> other places, particularly graph theoretic assertions, it is pleasing to
> see it is pleasing to see it clearly and unambiguously asserted.  Since CSP
> refreshed his views of the nature of logic and its relation to realism (the
> sciences) regularity over the decades, these sentences logical constrain
> interpretations of earlier works such that his assertions are related to
> the chemical table of elements, even if only by the thinnest threads.
>
> Though the entire body of CSP’s works, he had made numerous references to
> role of chemistry in his thinking and even calculated a table of elements
> from original data.  Most sadly, editors and interpreters either simply
> ignored the chemical roots of his philosophy or, as frequently was and is
> the case, ignored the chemical roots of his logic and often made misleading
> or even false assertions about meanings. For example, the concept of
> handedness, left and right handed molecules, is beyond any philosophical
> form of logic, either formal or informal that I am aware. Yet, the issue of
> handedness is a critical (if not the critical) constituent of CSP’s
> development and discussion of graph theory and its bedrock in organic
> chemistry. Natural handedness (left-handed amino-acids and right handed
> sugars) is essential to the logical interpretation of life, then and now.
>
> In an earlier paper, CSP compared the “doing” of mathematics with the
> “doing” of chemistry, at one point, nearly equating the two cognitive
> processes. This quote cited by Stephen refers to the mathematical nature of
> the relational logic among the 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Analysis of Signs (was Phaneroscopy and logic)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

While preparing what I posted in the "Phaneroscopy and logic" thread
earlier this evening, another related "Prolegomena" footnote caught my eye.

CSP:  ... a Graph-instance can perfectly well extend from one Province to
another, and even from one *Realm *(or space having one Mode of Tincture)
to another. Thus, the Spot, "-- is in the relation -- to --," may, if the
relation is that of an existent object to its purpose, have the first Peg
on Metal, the second on Color, and the third on Fur. (CP 4.558n)


I see two things here as noteworthy.

   1. We can scribe a Spot for the continuous predicate "-- is in the
   relation -- to --," where the name of the relation itself is treated as an
   additional *subject*.  This is consistent with my proposal below to
   scribe a Predicate Spot ("stands") as the only kind with multiple Pegs when
   we scribe *anything *that must be known to the Interpreter from
   Collateral Experience/Observation as a Subject Spot with one Peg.
   2. The three Pegs of such a Spot can be scribed on three *different *Realms
   with the three *different *Modes of Tincture, such that the subjects
   attached to them denote Objects with three *different *Modes of Being.
   This is similar to my proposal below to scribe each Subject Spot and the
   Line of Connection that attaches it to a Peg of the Predicate Spot using
   color and font to reflect the nature of its Dynamic Object and the
   corresponding continuous predicate.

The three subjects in Peirce's example are an existent object (Metal =
Actuality), its relation to its purpose (Color = Possibility), and that
purpose itself (Fur = Intention or Tendency).  Do these match up with their
counterparts in his division of Signs according to the nature of the
Dynamic Object?  The designation of an *existent *object is obviously a
Concretive (green/italic in my scheme), and Peirce evidently considered the
name of a *relation *to be an Abstractive (red/bold).  The latter is
something that I have been wondering about for a while; I went with
black/plain below because I was unable to settle on any one of the other
three.  But does a Sign for a *purpose *qualify as a Collective
(blue/underline)?  Cases like this might be one reason why Peirce described
"Collective" as "not quite so bad a name as it sounds to be until one
studies the matter" (EP 2:480; 1908).  Purposes do not seem to fit neatly
into *any *of the three classes as he defined them only days later.

CSP:  In respect to the Nature of their Dynamical Objects, Signs I found to
be either

1. Signs of Possibles. That is, Abstractives such as Color, Mass,
Whiteness, etc.

2. Signs of Occurrences. That is, Concretives such as Man, Charlemagne.

3. Signs of Collections. That is, Collectives such as Mankind, the Human
Race, etc. ...

I was of the opinion that if the Dynamical Object be a mere Possible the
Immediate Object could only be of the same nature, while if the Immediate
Object were a Tendency or Habit then the Dynamical Object must be of the
same nature. Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must
be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives.
(EP 2:489; 1908)


"Tendency or Habit" is employed here as a synonym for "Necessitant," and
Peirce elsewhere directly connected purposes with habits (e.g., EP 2:341;
1907).  Hence it seems clear that a purpose is a Necessitant, such that a
Seme *denoting *a purpose is indeed a Collective--or perhaps a Complexive,
an alternative that Peirce tried out in R 795 (but apparently nowhere
else).  However, it would presumably *not *be married to another Seme in a
Proposition by the continuous predicate "belongs to the class of."
Moreover, in English we typically express a purpose, tendency, or habit as
a *verb*, sometimes accompanied by a common noun--e.g., "the purpose of
your heart is pumping blood."  How should we translate this into Peirce's
example ("-- is in the relation -- to --") and then scribe the
corresponding EG?  Any specific suggestions would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 9:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> It occurs to me that a complex Seme can be analyzed into simple Semes
> joined by a continuous predicate.  For example, just as the copula "is"
> corresponds to the latter in a categorical Proposition, the preposition
> "of" plays that role in the Seme "the mortality of man," such that a more
> explicit translation is "the character of mortality possessed by anything
> belonging to the class of man."  This amounts to a hypostatic abstraction
> of the Proposition, "Anything belonging to the class of man possesses the
> character of mortality."
>
> Moreover, while further exploring the images of R 284 (1905) in the
> Digital Peirce Archive (
> https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pa

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

I should have checked the Pietarinen transcriptions before posting.

CSP:  The nature of the universe or universes of discourse (for several may
be referred to in a single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which
such precision is required, is denoted either by using modifications of the
heraldic tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink
upon the surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks. In the former
method it is usual to employ the different metals (or, argent, fur, and
plomb) to mark the different kinds of existence or actuality, the different
colours (azure, gules, vert, purpur) for the different kinds of
possibility,—possibility consisting of ignorance, of variety, of power, of
futurity; and the furs (sable, ermine, vair, potent), for the different
kinds of intention. (R 670:19-20[18-19]; 1911 June 12-13)


This confirms that according to Peirce, there are *exactly four* different
kinds of actuality, possibility, and intention; but he only names them in
the case of possibility, and does not elaborate on exactly what ignorance,
variety, power and futurity mean in this context.  I also just discovered
that Don Roberts, on page 93 of *The Existential Graphs of Charles S.
Peirce*, quotes the following explanation.

CSP:  Different states of things may all be Actual and yet not Actual
*together*; and the same is true of the Possible and the Destined. Two
graphs in the same *Province*, i.e. on the same continuously tinctured
surface will be asserted, not merely as True, but as True *together*.
Hence, since four tinctures are necessary to break the continuity between
any two parts of any ordinary surface, four metals, four colors, and four
furs will be required. (R 295:44; 1906)


It seems that the basis for providing *four *tinctures within each mode was
primarily *practical*, rather than *theoretical*.  On page 94, Roberts
offers his guess as to what Peirce might have intended each tincture to
represent, along with a suggested color as an alternative.

   - Metal (Actuality)
  - Argent (white) - "The actual or true in a general or ordinary
  sense."
  - Or (cream) - "The actual or true in some special sense."
  - Fer - not used
  - Plomb - not used
   - Color (Possibility)
  - Azure (blue) - "Dark blue: logical possibility. Light blue:
  subjective possibility."
  - Gules (red) - "Objective possibility."
  - Vert (green) - "What is in the interrogative mood."
  - Purpure (purple) - "Freedom or ability."
   - Fur (Intention)
  - Sable (gray) - "The metaphysically, or rationally, or secondarily
  necessitated."
  - Ermine (yellow) - "Purpose or intention."
  - Vair (brown) - "The commanded."
  - Potent (orange) - "The compelled."

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 6:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jeff, Gary F., List:
>
> The footnote quoted by Jeff about "the quaternion of metals" is from
> "Prolegomena" (1906), while the comment quoted by Gary F. about "different
> dimensions of the logical Universe" is from "Bedrock" (1908).  (This is not
> obvious in the electronic version of CP, where all of the footnotes--both
> Peirce's own and those provided by the editors--are jumbled together; I had
> to look at the original published version
>  of "Prolegomena" in
> order to disentangle them.)  Consequently, it seems quite tenuous to link
> the two concepts, such that "the quaternion of metals" somehow corresponds
> to "four dimensions--one real and three imaginary."
>
> In fact, Peirce wrote that *all four* Metal tinctures correspond to
> Actuality, while Color is used for Possibility and Fur is used for
> Intention (CP 4.554).  However, he did not spell out in "Prolegomena" *why
> *there are *exactly four* tinctures for each Mode of Being.  On the other
> hand, in "Bedrock" he referred to "the different tints representing
> different kinds of possibility" (CP 4.578).  Can we perhaps infer from this
> that there are *exactly four* different kinds of Possibility, as well as 
> *exactly
> four *different kinds of Actuality and *exactly four* different kinds of
> Intention?  If so, what are they?
>
> As for the "different dimensions of the logical Universe," Peirce
> explicitly attributed this concept to his former student, O. H. Mitchell;
> and in two alternative drafts of "Bedrock," he stated the following.
>
> CSP:  Yet since the Universe, which force[s] upon us all those enduring
> thoughts that we call truths, makes its power felt in three ways so utterly
> different that we may well liken them to a set of three mutually
> perpendicular directions from which any object may be viewed, we must
> distinguish, Firstly ... the *Universe of Real Capacities*; then,
> Secondly ... *the Universe of Actual Fact*; and Thirdly ... the *Universe
> of Tendencies *... I have suggested [in "Prolegomena"] that we resort to
> the heraldic tinctures; to wit, to *c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, Gary F., List:

The footnote quoted by Jeff about "the quaternion of metals" is from
"Prolegomena" (1906), while the comment quoted by Gary F. about "different
dimensions of the logical Universe" is from "Bedrock" (1908).  (This is not
obvious in the electronic version of CP, where all of the footnotes--both
Peirce's own and those provided by the editors--are jumbled together; I had
to look at the original published version
 of "Prolegomena" in
order to disentangle them.)  Consequently, it seems quite tenuous to link
the two concepts, such that "the quaternion of metals" somehow corresponds
to "four dimensions--one real and three imaginary."

In fact, Peirce wrote that *all four* Metal tinctures correspond to
Actuality, while Color is used for Possibility and Fur is used for
Intention (CP 4.554).  However, he did not spell out in "Prolegomena"
*why *there
are *exactly four* tinctures for each Mode of Being.  On the other hand, in
"Bedrock" he referred to "the different tints representing different kinds
of possibility" (CP 4.578).  Can we perhaps infer from this that there
are *exactly
four* different kinds of Possibility, as well as *exactly four *different
kinds of Actuality and *exactly four* different kinds of Intention?  If so,
what are they?

As for the "different dimensions of the logical Universe," Peirce
explicitly attributed this concept to his former student, O. H. Mitchell;
and in two alternative drafts of "Bedrock," he stated the following.

CSP:  Yet since the Universe, which force[s] upon us all those enduring
thoughts that we call truths, makes its power felt in three ways so utterly
different that we may well liken them to a set of three mutually
perpendicular directions from which any object may be viewed, we must
distinguish, Firstly ... the *Universe of Real Capacities*; then, Secondly
... *the Universe of Actual Fact*; and Thirdly ... the *Universe of
Tendencies *... I have suggested [in "Prolegomena"] that we resort to the
heraldic tinctures; to wit, to *color *for the Universe of Capacities,
to *metal
*for the Universe of actuality, and to *fur *for the universe of tendencies
... (R 300:72-75[37-40])


CSP:  As to the Mitchellian Dimensions of the Universe, it is easy to see
that their mutual relations,--imaged by perpendicularities in sets of
three,--are relations between different Modalities. (R 300:76[38])


Hence there are *only three* such dimensions, not four; and they
correspond *directly
*to the three Universes of Capacities, Actualities, and Tendencies--i.e.,
the three Modes of Tincture, not the four different tinctures *within *any
one of them.  It thus seems clear to me that in the "Prolegomena" footnote,
Peirce intended *only *the first sense of "quaternion," and *not *also the
third sense as Jeff conjectured.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 7:30 AM  wrote:

> Jeff, list,
>
> First, a correction: In the “Bedrock” (MS 300), Peirce makes *many*
> comments about the “Prolegomena” — indeed, the “Bedrock” was drafted to be
> the “next paper” which Peirce mentions at the very end of the “Prolegomena”
> — but of course the reverse is impossible, given the order of composition,
> which Peirce tells us explicitly at the beginning of the “Bedrock.” Anyway,
> the CP editors inserted another footnote into CP 4.553 which *they* took
> from MS 300, in which Peirce mentions “different dimensions of the logical
> Universe.” For that reason I would answer “Yes” to your question regarding
> quaternions, “would it also make sense to say that the representation of
> these modes in the gamma system can be interpreted in the third sense of
> the term as well, where we employ a mathematical system of numbers that are
> understood to be in four dimensions--one real and three imaginary?”
>
> But having said that much, I’m not prepared to go into further detail
> because I am not yet familiar enough with Peirce’s writings on quaternions.
> For the time being, then, I’ll have to leave the further exploration of
> that to you (and others who may be better prepared than I to do the
> exploring).
>
> I’ve been devoting my free time over the past two days to reading through
> Ahti Pietarinen’s full transcription of the talk Peirce gave at the
> National Academy of Science meeting in April 1906. I must thank Jon A.S.
> for posting the link to that ( here
> 
>  ), as I think it is at least as informative as the other texts I’ve been
> posting here, and anyone who’s been following this thread with interest
> should read it, in my opinion. After I’ve finished reading through it
> myself, I’ll try to pick out some highlights f

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

I prefer to stick with Peirce's terminology--every Sign is one correlate of
an irreducible triadic relation, along with its Object and its
Interpretant.  In this context, external vs internal has nothing to do with
"spatial composition"--according to his definitions, the Immediate Object
and Immediate Interpretant are both *internal to the Sign*; while the
Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant are all *external
to the Sign*.  Logical *extension* is what Peirce preferred to call
"breadth" and associated with the *Object*, while logical *intension *is
what he preferred to call "depth" and associated with the *Interpretant*.

However, again, it seems to me that your "third level composition" nicely
fits the ten divisions of Signs that Peirce posited in various manuscripts
from 1906 to 1908.

1.1.1. Sign (S)
2.1.1. Immediate Object (IO)
2.2.1. Dynamic Object (DO)
2.2.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object (S-DO)
3.1.1. Immediate Interpretant (II)
3.2.1. Dynamic Interpretant (DI)
3.2.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant (S-DI)
3.3.1. Final Interpretant (FI)
3.3.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Final Interpretant (S-FI)

3.3.3. Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object and the Final
Interpretant (DO-S-FI)


Note that the first level is Sign/Object/Interpretant, the second level is
Immediate/Dynamic/Final, and the third level is monadic/dyadic/triadic.
While certainly reflecting *different *aspects of Peirce's phenomenological
Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns, these levels clearly are *not *the "categorical
modes" or Universes of Possibles/Existents/Necessitants into which Signs
are divided *within *each trichotomy.  Instead, they are the basis for
*identifying
*those trichotomies in the first place, such that we can *subsequently *derive
the ten Sign classes of 1903 from three of them (1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.2) or
the 66 Sign classes of 1908 from all ten.  Such an approach is supported by
the following passages.

CSP:  A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable
of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same
Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273; 1903)

CSP:  I will just mention that among Firstnesses there is no distinction of
the genuine and the degenerate, while among Thirdnesses we find not only a
genuine but two distinct grades of degeneracy.
But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where
you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you
have two units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though
not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness
and Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness
and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing
as the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure
Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. (CP 1.529-530;
1903)


The Sign is a First (1ns of 1ns), so it has no degenerate correlate.  The
Object is a Second, so it has one degenerate correlate (Immediate, 1ns of
2ns) and one genuine correlate (Dynamic, 2ns of 2ns).  The Interpretant is
a Third, so it has two degenerate correlates (Immediate, 1ns of 3ns;
Dynamic, 2ns of 3ns) and one genuine correlate (Final Interpretant, 3ns of
3ns).  As *internal* to the Sign (1ns), the Immediate correlates have
no *distinct
*relations with it; but as *external *to the Sign (2ns and 3ns), the
Dynamic and Final correlates have *dyadic *relations with it; and the Final
Interpretant (3ns of 3ns) facilitates the overall *triadic *relation.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 12:02 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Supp.: I admit, what I wrote may be what do you call it, botching?
> Bungling? And I was not aware of Peirces 1908 work, and dont know what e.g.
> S-DO, and DO-S-FI means. Maybe also, intension and extension of a concept
> is only about type-signs... Anyway, making up things is more fun to me than
> closely reading Peirce. Bad, I know.
> *Corrected: 19th and 21st line.*
> Jon, Edwina, list,
> ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that
> the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it
> functional composition?
> In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to
> do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory
> also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial
> composition, and is another, third, topic.
> I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further
> analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts (again,

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - I think we'll have to agree-to-disagree on a lot!

However, I do consider that the triadic Sign is a function. f{x}=y,
where 'f' is the mediative Representamen, 'x' is the input data from
the DO and 'y' of course is the output Interpretant. I personally
consider that the Function is an excellent example of the triadic
semiosic process.

Again, I caution about confusing the mediative Representamen, also
called 'sign', with the full triadic Sign of O-R-I. The mediative
Representamen/sign does not 'exist' on its own; it's always part of
the semiosic triad.

I'm afraid that I don't understand your list of 'functional
parts'...where you have, for instance, the Immediate Object within
the categorical modes of 2.1.1.  I simply don't get this. The IO is a
part of the triad - and could be in any one of the three categories
[1ns, 2ns, 3ns] - and so, I don't get your point.

Edwina
 On Wed 03/04/19  9:47 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Jon, Edwina, list, ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S,
O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the
functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition? In this
aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do
with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory
also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial
composition, and is another, third, topic. I think it is interesting,
that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third
level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the
ten sign classes). My proposal is:   1.1.1. Sign 2.1.1. Immediate
object 2.2.1. Intended dynamic object 2.2.2. Extended dynamic object
3.1.1. Immediate interpretant 3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant
3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant 3.3.1. Intended final
interpretant 3.3.2. Extended final interpretant 3.3.3. True final
interpretant.   Intended DO plus intended FI make that what is called
"intension" in other concept theories. Extended DO plus extended FI
make what is called "extension". True FI is what is called "truth" in
metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in
further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of
the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is
carried out.   Functional composition is the composition of any sign
affair, regarding it is generalisation. Classification is not
generalisation, but the opposite: Specification. Generalisation and
specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be
mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal
talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.  
Best, Helmut  02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 wrote:   Helmut, List:   A Sign does not consist of three parts;
rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its
Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the
Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three
Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the
triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the
Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object,
Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six
correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes,
according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles,
Existents, or Necessitants.   If we were to arrange these ten
trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of
determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66
classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper
sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it
is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature,
since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond
DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these
trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its  relation with its Dynamic
Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that
order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.   Your "second
level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO
(2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level
composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO
(2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI
(3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third
level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we
reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming
convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic
Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic
Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign
(2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3),
Argument (3/3/3).   Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe,
Kansas,

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

 



 
Supp.: I admit, what I wrote may be what do you call it, botching? Bungling? And I was not aware of Peirces 1908 work, and dont know what e.g. S-DO, and DO-S-FI means. Maybe also, intension and extension of a concept is only about type-signs... Anyway, making up things is more fun to me than closely reading Peirce. Bad, I know.

Corrected: 19th and 21st line.




Jon, Edwina, list,

ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition?

In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial composition, and is another, third, topic.

I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the ten sign classes). My proposal is:

 

1.1.1. Sign

2.1.1. Immediate object

2.2.1. Intended dynamic object

2.2.2. Extended dynamic object

3.1.1. Immediate interpretant

3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant

3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant

3.3.1. Intended final interpretant

3.3.2. Extended final interpretant

3.3.3. True final interpretant.

 

Intended DO plus intended DI plus intended FI make that what is called "intension" in other concept theories.

Extended DO plus extended DI plus extended FI make what is called "extension".

True FI is what is called "truth" in metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is carried out.

 

Functional composition is the composition of any sign affair, regarding it is generalisation.

Classification is not generalisation, but the opposite: Specification.

Generalisation and specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.

 

Best,

Helmut

 


 02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 

Helmut, List:

 

A Sign does not consist of three parts; rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes, according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants.

 

If we were to arrange these ten trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66 classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature, since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its relation with its Dynamic Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.

 

Your "second level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO (2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO (2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI (3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign (2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3), Argument (3/3/3).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









 

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 3:10 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Edwina, list,

 

I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.

Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


Thank you for pointing out the source of the footnote I quoted.


For those interested in seeing how Peirce applies ideas drawn from the 
mathematics of quaternions to algebraic systems of logic, see section 3 in "The 
Simplest Mathematics". (CP 4.250-306). At 4.258, Peirce provides an 
interpretation of truth and falsity in a system of dichotomic logic. He offers 
a diagram in which the values of what is true and false are arranged along 
horizontal lines, with an origin in the middle. Peirce says that a value, x, 
which is in the upper right quadrant of truth can be considered to have a 
transformation by rotation into the lower left quadrant of falsity. Here is a 
modification of his diagram showing the rotation.

[cid:1aebdaf2-178f-4d5a-ad5a-a95117375331]


This type of rotation is precisely the kind of transformation that we find in 
the complex plane.


After developing the system of logic and providing some definitions of key 
relations, including the logic connectives along with the relations of 
quantity, aggregation and composition, he supplies an interpretation of how the 
values of the variables in such a system will be transformed under different 
functions. In order to explain how logical multiplication (functional and 
relative) works, he interprets the system in terms of a multiplication table of 
the quaternions.


In the next section, Peirce is using a set of chemical diagrams as a model for 
explaining how he intends to develop a trichotomic system of logic. In the 
runup to the discussion, he points out in the first paragraph of the section 
that he has already, in the previous discussion of logical multiplication, 
being employing a conception of multiplication that is "purely triadic".


One reason the account of operational multiplication is purely triadic, I take 
it, is that it is being interpreted in terms of a multidimensional system of 
quaternions. I would be interested to see how the account of relations that he 
develops on the chemical model in the 1902 explanation of the trichotomic 
system of algebraic logic compares to what he is doing in 1906 development of 
the existential graphs. In particular, I would like to better understand how 
the account of multiplication that is developed in sections 3 and 4 of "The 
Simplest Mathematics"--which is explained in terms of the composition of 
relations--compares to the account logical multiplication that is developed in 
the 1906 account of the gamma graphs in the "Apology" and "Bedrock" essays.


If anyone has thoughts about this comparison, I would be interested in hearing 
suggestions about how multiplication is being modeled in this modal 
system--topologically conceived.


Yours,


Jeff


P.S. For those who might like to see a gentle introduction to the complex plane 
(including a very accessible illustration of the Riemann surface) and the 
system of quaternions, I recommend the following videos which provide very 
helpful moving diagrams.


  1.   See the 12 videos in the series "Imaginary numbers are real:  " 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T647CGsuOVU
[http://img.youtube.com/vi/T647CGsuOVU/0.jpg]

Imaginary Numbers Are Real [Part 1: Introduction] - 
YouTube
www.youtube.com
For early access to new videos and other perks: 
https://www.patreon.com/welchlabs More information and resources: 
http://www.welchlabs.com Imaginary numbers ...

2. For an explanation and visual illustration of the quaternions, see:  
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4EgbgTm0Bg
[http://img.youtube.com/vi/d4EgbgTm0Bg/0.jpg]

What are quaternions, and how do you visualize them? A story of four 
dimensions. - YouTube
www.youtube.com
How to think about this 4d number system in our 3d space. Home page: 
https://www.3blue1brown.com Thanks to supporters: 
http://3b1b.co/quaternion-thanks Quant...






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2019 5:29:43 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic


Jeff, list,

First, a correction: In the “Bedrock” (MS 300), Peirce makes many comments 
about the “Prolegomena” — indeed, the “Bedrock” was drafted to be the “next 
paper” which Peirce mentions at the very end of the “Prolegomena” — but of 
course the reverse is impossible, given the order of composition, which Peirce 
tells us explicitly at the beginning of the “Bedrock.” Anyway, the CP editors 
inserted another footnote into CP 4.553 which they took from MS 300, in which 
Peirce mentions “different dimensions of the logical Universe.” For that reason 
I would answer “Yes” to your question regarding quaternions, “would it also 
make sense to say that 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Corrected: 19th and 21st line.




Jon, Edwina, list,

ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition?

In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial composition, and is another, third, topic.

I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the ten sign classes). My proposal is:

 

1.1.1. Sign

2.1.1. Immediate object

2.2.1. Intended dynamic object

2.2.2. Extended dynamic object

3.1.1. Immediate interpretant

3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant

3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant

3.3.1. Intended final interpretant

3.3.2. Extended final interpretant

3.3.3. True final interpretant.

 

Intended DO plus intended DI plus intended FI make that what is called "intension" in other concept theories.

Extended DO plus extended DI plus extended FI make what is called "extension".

True FI is what is called "truth" in metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is carried out.

 

Functional composition is the composition of any sign affair, regarding it is generalisation.

Classification is not generalisation, but the opposite: Specification.

Generalisation and specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.

 

Best,

Helmut

 


 02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 

Helmut, List:

 

A Sign does not consist of three parts; rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes, according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants.

 

If we were to arrange these ten trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66 classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature, since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its relation with its Dynamic Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.

 

Your "second level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO (2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO (2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI (3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign (2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3), Argument (3/3/3).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









 

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 3:10 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Edwina, list,

 

I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.

Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of signs are a classification of possible compositions.

 

In categorial composition, subcategory numbers can only stay the same or go down, the result in the second level is six, and in the third level ten:

1, 2, 3 are composed of 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., that is six.

Further analysis would make 1.1.1; 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2; 3.1.1, 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, Edwina, list,

ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition?

In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial composition, and is another, third, topic.

I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the ten sign classes). My proposal is:

 

1.1.1. Sign

2.1.1. Immediate object

2.2.1. Intended dynamic object

2.2.2. Extended dynamic object

3.1.1. Immediate interpretant

3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant

3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant

3.3.1. Intended final interpretant

3.3.2. Extended final interpretant

3.3.3. True final interpretant.

 

Intended DO plus intended FI make that what is called "intension" in other concept theories.

Extended DO plus extended FI make what is called "extension".

True FI is what is called "truth" in metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is carried out.

 

Functional composition is the composition of any sign affair, regarding it is generalisation.

Classification is not generalisation, but the opposite: Specification.

Generalisation and specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.

 

Best,

Helmut

 


 02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 

Helmut, List:

 

A Sign does not consist of three parts; rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes, according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants.

 

If we were to arrange these ten trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66 classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature, since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its relation with its Dynamic Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.

 

Your "second level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO (2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO (2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI (3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign (2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3), Argument (3/3/3).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









 

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 3:10 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Edwina, list,

 

I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.

Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of signs are a classification of possible compositions.

 

In categorial composition, subcategory numbers can only stay the same or go down, the result in the second level is six, and in the third level ten:

1, 2, 3 are composed of 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., that is six.

Further analysis would make 1.1.1; 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2; 3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3., that is ten.

 

In categorial classi

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[gnox]

Jeff, list,

First, a correction: In the “Bedrock” (MS 300), Peirce makes many comments 
about the “Prolegomena” — indeed, the “Bedrock” was drafted to be the “next 
paper” which Peirce mentions at the very end of the “Prolegomena” — but of 
course the reverse is impossible, given the order of composition, which Peirce 
tells us explicitly at the beginning of the “Bedrock.” Anyway, the CP editors 
inserted another footnote into CP 4.553 which they took from MS 300, in which 
Peirce mentions “different dimensions of the logical Universe.” For that reason 
I would answer “Yes” to your question regarding quaternions, “would it also 
make sense to say that the representation of these modes in the gamma system 
can be interpreted in the third sense of the term as well, where we employ a 
mathematical system of numbers that are understood to be in four 
dimensions--one real and three imaginary?”

But having said that much, I’m not prepared to go into further detail because I 
am not yet familiar enough with Peirce’s writings on quaternions. For the time 
being, then, I’ll have to leave the further exploration of that to you (and 
others who may be better prepared than I to do the exploring).

I’ve been devoting my free time over the past two days to reading through Ahti 
Pietarinen’s full transcription of the talk Peirce gave at the National Academy 
of Science meeting in April 1906. I must thank Jon A.S. for posting the link to 
that ( here 

  ), as I think it is at least as informative as the other texts I’ve been 
posting here, and anyone who’s been following this thread with interest should 
read it, in my opinion. After I’ve finished reading through it myself, I’ll try 
to pick out some highlights from it and tie up some “loose ends” of the thought 
process Peirce was going through in drafting all of these documents. After that 
I’ll be ready to dig deeper into the matter of quaternions (with your help of 
course).

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 2-Apr-19 20:16
To: 'Peirce List' ; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

 

Gary F, List,

 

The texts to which you are drawing our attention are fascinating. Let me ask a 
question that we should be able answer in a yes or no way, even if we don't see 
all of the implications of the competing answers.

 

In "Prolegomena to an Apology to for Pragmaticism," Peirce makes some comments 
about "The Bedrock beneath Pragmaticism." The remarks are found in the CP in 
footnote 1 to 4.553 (on page 443 of Vol. 4). He says:  "It is chiefly for the 
sake of these convenient and familiar modes of representation of Petrosancta, 
that a modification of heraldic tinctures has been adopted. Vair and Potent 
here receive less decorative and pictorial Symbols. Fer and Plomb are selected 
to fill out the quaternion of metals on account of their monosyllabic names."

 

When he refers to the "quaternion" of the metals, it is clear that he means to 
use the term in the first of the sense that he articulates in the Century 
Dictionary, which is something that belongs to a group of four. In making the 
point, would it also make sense to say that the representation of these modes 
in the gamma system can be interpreted in the third sense of the term as well, 
where we employ a mathematical system of numbers that are understood to be in 
four dimensions--one real and three imaginary? In a number of places, both in 
the earlier writings on the symbolic systems of logic and the later writings on 
the existential graphs, Peirce applies the mathematical system of the 
quaternions for sake of thinking about the values of the variables where the 
values are (1) continuous in their variation (and not merely binary T or F), 
and (2) related as part of a system having more than three dimensions. As such, 
I think that the answer may be "yes", that we might interpret the relations 
between the tinctures that are used to designate the boundaries around 
different sheets as related in manner that is analogous to a four dimensional 
system of quaternions.

 

The reason I point this out is that it has a direct bearing on the way we might 
interpret the improvement offered on the gamma graphs where the relation 
between the recto and verso is taken to represent a relation between 
existential facts and possibilities of different kinds (depending on the tint 
of the outer boundary on the verso side)--where a cut in a page is conceived to 
go down through subsequent pages in a book that represents other kinds of 
possibilities depending upon the tint of the recto and verso of each of those 
pages.

 

In the system of the quaternions, the relations between the dimensions is 
different in a number of respects from that which is represented in an algebra 
of multiple dimensions where all of the dimen

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance

[Gary Richmond]

Auke,

I am so sorry to read that you broke your arm! May it completely heal--and
quickly.

Thanks for the link to your paper which I will look at later today.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 6:00 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:

> Gary, list,
>
>
>
> I just broke my arm, so I’ll keep it short.
>
> For Stampers ladder see:
>
>
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6e1e/b1d74909a117c71d89e8c697c382c7ab7137.pdf
>
>
>
> With regard to your interesting remark about my typology. Imagine a trikon
> with at the corner the woman. You take me to mean to score on the edge in
> the corners. While the power of my use of trikons is that they allow of
> more and less. At some point from the central point in the direction of the
> relevant corner a score can be made. This feat makes getting the others
> vision in negotiation possible. I tried to hint at that in the Tom Short
> part. It is all about relative differences.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> auke
>
>
>
>
>
> *Van:* Gary Richmond 
> *Verzonden:* woensdag 3 april 2019 6:38
> *Aan:* Peirce-L 
> *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce .. and its importance
>
>
>
> Auke, list,
>
>
>
> Thanks for your response.
>
>
>
> First, as regards Stamper's ladder, I don't know if there exists a diagram
> which would show the modifications and augmentations which you've suggested
> have been made to the ladder since he devised it, but I think it might be
> helpful for the list to look at the basic diagram:
>
>
>
> [image: image.png]
>
>
>
> Perhaps this (or some other diagram which you might supply) could serve as
> the basis for forum members getting a handle on those enhancements that you
> outlined in an earlier message, especially should we get further into this
> topic.
>
>
>
> Although I have probably said enough about the current disagreements
> regarding views of semeiotics, and while I would like for us to get back to
> substantive matters, I feel I need to say a word about this:
>
>
>
> AvB: 1. One was intensely scrutinizing the text (Jon, John). 2. The other
> reads it at an arm’s length (Tom Short, with the first involved, he did a
> great job in his books on understanding Peirce, and remained critical), 3.
> with the third the book on her lap, while see looked around (Edwina, Dan).
>
>
>
> I had earlier drafted a segment of this post which took up each of the
> individuals mentioned above as I thought your outline over-simplified the
> complexity of the interests of each of the scholars named. But I decided
> that it was probably best that I only say for now that the thinkers you
> mentioned above cannot, in my opinion, be so neatly pigeon-holed. As I see
> it, their interests extend *at least* over the three approaches to Peirce
> scholarship which you have chosen to characterize. In my view none of them
> can be so compartmentalized. And further, does anyone here (or elsewhere)
> have the expertise, or for that matter, the right to categorize these
> individual's approaches or interests in this way? I would only say that
> there is no doubt in my mind--and I think I know enough of their scholarly
> work to say this--that they are all extremely intelligent and
> extraordinarily complex thinkers; and that is the *only way* I would care
> to characterize them publicly.
>
>
>
> Thank you for the more detailed explication of your earlier example. It
> completely clarifies it as "an expression of “inconsistencies aris[ing]
> at the level of axioms” at the social level and that that it is usually
> possible to "accept lower-level facts without creating any conflict.” I
> continue to find this analysis of interoperability at the social level of
> considerable interest and would be eager to learn more.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 4:33 AM Auke van Breemen 
> wrote:
>
> Gary, List,
>
>
>
> Regarding Stampers Ladder you wrote: my interests have changed
> considerably in the baker's dozen of years since I wrote that paper and …
>
>
>
> RE: The ‘might’ in ‘you might be interested’ wasn’t meant as  ‘you
> should’, but as a polite alternative to  ‘may’.
>
> My aim was not to get you reading Stamper, but to show that from practical
> need somebody extended the amount of layers in such a way that somebody
> interested in nagging about the technical terms of semiotics and their
> relations, could recognize this as fitting with the Peircean scheme and
> decided to try to put the idea further in such a way that all sign aspects
> are covered.
>
>
>
> This example seemed especially fit since, lately, I see some quit
> fundamentalist attitude on this list regarding the interpretation of
> Peircean semiotics. If you look at the foundation of those attempt, it
>