List:
While preparing what I posted in the "Phaneroscopy and logic" thread
earlier this evening, another related "Prolegomena" footnote caught my eye.
CSP: ... a Graph-instance can perfectly well extend from one Province to
another, and even from one *Realm *(or space having one Mode of Tincture)
to another. Thus, the Spot, "-- is in the relation -- to --," may, if the
relation is that of an existent object to its purpose, have the first Peg
on Metal, the second on Color, and the third on Fur. (CP 4.558n)
I see two things here as noteworthy.
1. We can scribe a Spot for the continuous predicate "-- is in the
relation -- to --," where the name of the relation itself is treated as an
additional *subject*. This is consistent with my proposal below to
scribe a Predicate Spot ("stands") as the only kind with multiple Pegs when
we scribe *anything *that must be known to the Interpreter from
Collateral Experience/Observation as a Subject Spot with one Peg.
2. The three Pegs of such a Spot can be scribed on three *different *Realms
with the three *different *Modes of Tincture, such that the subjects
attached to them denote Objects with three *different *Modes of Being.
This is similar to my proposal below to scribe each Subject Spot and the
Line of Connection that attaches it to a Peg of the Predicate Spot using
color and font to reflect the nature of its Dynamic Object and the
corresponding continuous predicate.
The three subjects in Peirce's example are an existent object (Metal =
Actuality), its relation to its purpose (Color = Possibility), and that
purpose itself (Fur = Intention or Tendency). Do these match up with their
counterparts in his division of Signs according to the nature of the
Dynamic Object? The designation of an *existent *object is obviously a
Concretive (green/italic in my scheme), and Peirce evidently considered the
name of a *relation *to be an Abstractive (red/bold). The latter is
something that I have been wondering about for a while; I went with
black/plain below because I was unable to settle on any one of the other
three. But does a Sign for a *purpose *qualify as a Collective
(blue/underline)? Cases like this might be one reason why Peirce described
"Collective" as "not quite so bad a name as it sounds to be until one
studies the matter" (EP 2:480; 1908). Purposes do not seem to fit neatly
into *any *of the three classes as he defined them only days later.
CSP: In respect to the Nature of their Dynamical Objects, Signs I found to
be either
1. Signs of Possibles. That is, Abstractives such as Color, Mass,
Whiteness, etc.
2. Signs of Occurrences. That is, Concretives such as Man, Charlemagne.
3. Signs of Collections. That is, Collectives such as Mankind, the Human
Race, etc. ...
I was of the opinion that if the Dynamical Object be a mere Possible the
Immediate Object could only be of the same nature, while if the Immediate
Object were a Tendency or Habit then the Dynamical Object must be of the
same nature. Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must
be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives.
(EP 2:489; 1908)
"Tendency or Habit" is employed here as a synonym for "Necessitant," and
Peirce elsewhere directly connected purposes with habits (e.g., EP 2:341;
1907). Hence it seems clear that a purpose is a Necessitant, such that a
Seme *denoting *a purpose is indeed a Collective--or perhaps a Complexive,
an alternative that Peirce tried out in R 795 (but apparently nowhere
else). However, it would presumably *not *be married to another Seme in a
Proposition by the continuous predicate "belongs to the class of."
Moreover, in English we typically express a purpose, tendency, or habit as
a *verb*, sometimes accompanied by a common noun--e.g., "the purpose of
your heart is pumping blood." How should we translate this into Peirce's
example ("-- is in the relation -- to --") and then scribe the
corresponding EG? Any specific suggestions would be greatly appreciated.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 9:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
> List:
>
> It occurs to me that a complex Seme can be analyzed into simple Semes
> joined by a continuous predicate. For example, just as the copula "is"
> corresponds to the latter in a categorical Proposition, the preposition
> "of" plays that role in the Seme "the mortality of man," such that a more
> explicit translation is "the character of mortality possessed by anything
> belonging to the class of man." This amounts to a hypostatic abstraction
> of the Proposition, "Anything belonging to the class of man possesses the
> character of mortality."
>
> Moreover, while further exploring the images of R 284 (1905) in the
> Digital Peirce Archive (
> https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php), I came across
> these additional interesting remarks.
>
> CSP: It is, however, important to state that the relations of identity
> and of coexistence are but degenerate Secundan, and that these two are the
> only *simple* dyadic relations which are symmetrical, that is, which
> imply each its own converse. All other symmetrical relations are
> compounded and involve asymmetric elements ... In existential graphs,--that
> is, in the usual, "Beta," form of the system,--there are equally these two
> modes of connection, the lines signifying identity and the absence of lines
> coexistence. But, of course, no relations other than these can be
> expressed except by giving relative significations to spots; and if a spot
> signifies an asymmetric relation, it is necessary to distinguish connection
> with one part of it as meaning something different from connection with
> another side. Of course, if a great variety of colors or other qualities
> of lines were recognized, although their two ends were alike, a
> corresponding variety of asymmetric relations could be built up, since, for
> example, a friend of a cousin is not necessarily a cousin of a friend. (R
> 284:88,94-96[83,89-91])
>
>
> The standard interpretation of EGs treats a Line of Identity as an
> indefinite subject to which discrete predicates may be attributed by
> attaching Spots. Here Peirce instead described a Line of Identity as
> *itself *a "mode of connection," presumably *between *subjects,
> consistent with his later concept of a continuous predicate; specifically,
> "is identical to." He then acknowledged that a Spot for "an asymmetric
> relation" requires each of its connections (i.e., Pegs) to be distinguished
> by its location, but also noted that "colors or other qualities of lines"
> could serve a similar purpose. These comments suggest an alternative way
> of scribing and interpreting EGs, as follows; see attached for updated
> examples.
>
> - Represent each discrete dyadic or higher predicate with a Predicate
> Spot ("stands") whose number of Pegs matches the number of subjects,
> including the relation itself.
> - Represent each monadic predicate, including the relation itself,
> with a Subject Spot that is attached to a single Line of Connection.
> - Use color and font to reflect the nature of the Dynamic Object of
> each Subject Spot--red and bold for an Abstractive, green and italic for a
> Concretive, blue and underlined for a Collective, or black and plain for a
> Relation.
> - Use the same color for the attached Line of Connection, which
> represents the corresponding continuous predicate--"possesses the character
> of" for an Abstractive, "is identical to" for a Concretive, "belongs to the
> class of" for a Collective, or "(stands) in the relation of" for a
> Relation.
> - Arrange the Subject Spots around a Predicate Spot by attaching the
> subject nominative on the left side, the relation itself above, the direct
> object on the right side, and any others below (cf. R 670:8[7]; 1911 June
> 9); i.e., read the Graph *clockwise* in accordance with the principle
> that syntax ought to be consistent with "the flow of causation" (cf. R
> 664:11-13; 1910 Nov 27).
> - Translate each Peg of the Predicate Spot--except the one for the
> relation itself--and each Point where a Line of Connection changes color,
> branches, or crosses a Cut as an indefinite subject ("something").
>
> I should add that I am by no means claiming that we *must *implement this
> new approach, or even that anyone *ought *to do so; only that it is
> *valid*, reflecting a different analysis of a Proposition--the one that
> throws everything possible into the subject. As such, it appears to
> confirm that a Seme can be a monad (one-Peg Subject Spot) and a continuous
> predicate is at least a dyad (Line of Connection); but does it reveal
> anything about the valency of a leading principle? In EGs, the latter
> corresponds to a *transformation rule*, which brings to mind part of what
> Gary F. quoted in the "Phaneroscopy and logic" thread earlier today.
>
> CSP: Suppose then a Triad to be in the Phaneron. It connects three
> objects, *A*, *B*, *C*, however indefinite *A*, *B*, and *C* may be.
> There must, then, be one of the three, at least, say *C*, which
> establishes a relation between the other two, *A* and *B*. (EP 2:364;
> 1905)
>
>
> Can we say that *A* is the initial Graph, *B* is the subsequent Graph,
> and *C* is the convention that permits the change from *A* to *B*? If
> so, does this confirm that a leading principle is at least a triad? When I
> wrote the post below, that felt like its most speculative and least secure
> assertion, so I am open to being *shown *(not merely *told*) that I am on
> the wrong track here. In fact, that goes for just about anything that I
> propose on-List, including all of the above and below; "since in scientific
> inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds, *Nothing hazard,
> nothing gain*" (EP 2:410; 1907).
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
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