Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

Again, my definition is intended as a summary based on Peirce's various
descriptions of the immediate interpretant in his different writings.  That
said, I believe that it is compatible with the particular one that you
quoted (CP 8.315, EP 2:500, 1909 Apr 1).  The immediate interpretant is not
any *actual *effect of the sign (reaction), but rather a *possible* effect
of the sign (quality of impression) that a token is *fit* to produce by
virtue of embodying a type as "a definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537,
1906).

Regarding the division into possible/existent/necessitant, as you mentioned
it is not according to the nature or mode of being of the immediate
interpretant, but rather its mode of *presentation*.  The same is true of
the immediate object, and I believe that this is because both these
correlates are *internal* to the sign itself--the same reason why they have
no distinct dyadic relations with the sign.  With respect to the immediate
object, classification is based on how the sign identifies what it denotes;
and with respect to the immediate interpretant, it is based on how the sign
conveys what it signifies.

Peirce seems to have struggled with what to call the latter trichotomy of
classes, proposing hypothetic/categorical/relative "with great hesitation"
in his last complete taxonomy (EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 25).  As I have noted
before, these names pertain to three kinds of propositions, each having a
different number of lines of identity when scribed in existential graphs (R
481:10, LF 1:290, 1896)--zero for hypothetical (in alpha), one for
categorical, and two or more for relative.  Consistent with my post in
another thread about the immediate (communicational) interpretant being a
determination of the commens, which corresponds to the phemic sheet, I
suggest that this division reflects the *minimum* number of lines of
identity required to *present* an unattributed term (zero), a complete
proposition (one), and the premisses of an argument (two) in that system.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 2:13 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> How does your definition of the immediate interpretant compare to what
> Peirce says in the following passage:  "The Immediate Interpretant consists
> in the *Quality *of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to
> any actual reaction"? (CP 8.315)
>
> JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could* 
> signify
> within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant
> is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify on an individual
> occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself *necessarily
> would* signify under ideal circumstances.
>
> Notice the three features that are highlighted in Peirce's account. The
> immediate interpretant of a sign is:
>
>1. a Quality
>2. of the Impression
>3. that a sign is *fit* to produce
>
> Let me try to frame a question. This account of the immediate interpretant
> seems to accept the further division Peirce draws between the presentation
> of immediate interpretants as possibles, existents and necessitants. How
> does this division apply to your definition?
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Jeff - I think that you misunderstand Monod. 
You seem to take the title of his book 'Chance and Necessity' to
define his views of evolution as being due to either chance or
'necessity'. [tychism and anancasm].  The term of 'necessity' seems
to me, to mean 'predetermined' i.e., 'the principle according to
which something must be so, by virtue or logic or natural law'. I use
the term 'predetermined' because it was a key topic on the thread of
'destinate interpretant and predestinate opinion'. 
As for Monod, he was a key figure in the development of the
biological theories of self-organization - iwhich rejects
predestinate morphologies. 
Edwina
 On Tue 26/05/20  4:15 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, List, 
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie,
'that life is predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence
of man is predetermined...and after all, Peirce's  cosmology does
begin with chance'.
Note that I did not use the term "predetermined." Neither did Monod
in the passage I cited.  
Is there some reason that you decided to reframe the assertions
Monod made and the questions I was raising in terms of the conception
of what is or isn't "predetermined"? 
Yours, 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 2:21 PM
 To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate
Opinion (was To put an end ...) 

Jeff, list 
I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your
description of him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use
of him in my own work in semiotics.  
1] You write: 

 JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting
forward: "The  universe is not pregnant with life nor the
biosphere with man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the
unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by
chance." (180) 
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can
see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as  hypotheses and
rejects each as implausible. " 
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie,
'that life is predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence
of man is predetermined...and after all, Peirce's  cosmology does
begin with chance'. 1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is
rejecting predetermined morphologies, ie, the predetermined
actualities of life. Instead, he posits self-organized evolution
based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration   [ie, agapistic
evolution]. 

...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized
rather than predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his
notion of evolutionary freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear
no resemblance to the substrates or products of  the enzyme {Kauffamn;
, S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11].  He includes functional
self-regulation which produces novel molecules which, however, fit
into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than
deviant adaptation.   
It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite
similar to Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and
anacasm but I disagree.  
Edwina 
 On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List, 
The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing
metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative  theory of
semiotics.  
Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are
hard to make out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He 
does a lot of hand waving and gesturing towards various sorts of
positions as he tries to locate his view within the larger conceptual
landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the  many gaps in what he
says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, logic
and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly. 
Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is
interested in looking more closely his monograph: 
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf

Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
"The  universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with
man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity
of the universe, out of which he emerged only by chance." (180) 
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can
see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as  hypotheses and
rejects each as implausible.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, List,


EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is 
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is 
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'.


Note that I did not use the term "predetermined." Neither did Monod in the 
passage I cited.


Is there some reason that you decided to reframe the assertions Monod made and 
the questions I was raising in terms of the conception of what is or isn't 
"predetermined"?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 2:21 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To 
put an end ...)


Jeff, list


I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your description of 
him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use of him in my own work in 
semiotics.


1] You write:

 JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
 "The universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at 
last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of 
which he emerged only by chance." (180)


It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce 
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as 
implausible. "


EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is 
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is 
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'. 
1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is rejecting predetermined 
morphologies, ie, the predetermined actualities of life. Instead, he posits 
self-organized evolution based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration  
[ie, agapistic evolution].

...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized rather than 
predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his notion of evolutionary 
freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear no resemblance to the substrates 
or products of the enzyme {Kauffamn; , S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11].  He 
includes functional self-regulation which produces novel molecules which, 
however, fit into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than 
deviant adaptation.


It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite similar to 
Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and anacasm but I disagree.


Edwina






On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List,


The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good 
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing metaphysical 
claims into the discussion of the normative theory of semiotics.


Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are hard to make 
out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He does a lot of hand waving 
and gesturing towards various sorts of positions as he tries to locate his view 
within the larger conceptual landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the many 
gaps in what he says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, 
logic and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly.


Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is interested in 
looking more closely his monograph:  
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf


Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward: "The 
universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at last 
knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which 
he emerged only by chance." (180)


It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce 
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as implausible.


Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad conceptions that have 
a long history. As a person who regularly teaches Plato and Aristotle, I tend 
to start there in my discussion of the nest of questions that typically surface 
in discussions of these large ideas. Setting aside all of the details that 
would be needed to make sense of how Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses fit into 
the larger historical story, my sense is that one central question that Monod 
seems largely to be ignoring is the following:  what kind of explanation can be 
given for the laws of physics, chemistry and biology? Why do the laws that 
appear to govern these natural systems take the shape that they do at this 
point in the evolution of the cosmos? Peirce's answer, of course, is that the 
laws of nature are themselves evolving.


Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by saying

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jeff, JAS list,



Forgive my interruption but were I to offer my opinion on your question
regards *Quality*,

my response would be ‘meh.. *any* immediate interpretant would do”;

for they are all *predestinate* opinions.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 2:13 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
>
> How does your definition of the immediate interpretant compare to what
> Peirce says in the following passage:  "The Immediate Interpretant consists
> in the *Quality *of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to
> any actual reaction"? (CP 8.315)
>
>
> JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could* 
> signify
> within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant
> is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify on an individual
> occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself *necessarily
> would* signify under ideal circumstances.
>
>
> Notice the three features that are highlighted in Peirce's account. The
> immediate object of a sign is:
>
>
>
>1. a Quality
>2. of the Impression
>3. that a sign is *fit* to produce
>
>
> Let me try to frame a question. This account of the immediate interpretant
> seems to accept the further division Peirce draws between the presentation
> of immediate interpretants as possibles, existents and necessitants. How
> does this division apply to your definition?
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, May 26, 2020 9:57 AM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants
>
> Auke, List:
>
> JAS:  I continue to stand by my own definitions.
>
> AvB:  Own definitions? I only see citations.
>
>
> My own definitions are stated in the very next sentence, copied verbatim
> from a previous post.
>
> JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could*
> signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical
> interpretant is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify on an
> individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself 
> *necessarily
> would* signify under ideal circumstances.
>
>
> This is my summary based on Peirce's various descriptions of the three
> interpretants in his writings.  The quotations that I provided were
> intended to support my understanding of the immediate interpretant in
> particular.
>
> JAS:  I am really trying to understand *both* the system *and* the
> process.
>
> AvB:  is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph
> indicating your process view?
>
>
> Yes, any *actual* effect of a sign token is a *dynamical* interpretant--a
> feeling (emotional), an exertion (energetic), or a further sign token
> (logical).  The sign token itself is its efficient cause, the immediate
> interpretant is its formal cause, and the final interpretant is its final
> cause.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 4:13 AM  wrote:
>
>> Jon Alen,
>>
>> you wrote: I continue to stand by my own definitions.
>>
>> Own definitions? I only see citations.
>>
>> You wrote: I am really trying to understand *both *the system *and *the
>> process.
>>
>> My question: is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph
>> indicating your process view?
>>
>> Every sign *in actu* is a token of a type that belongs to a particular
>> system of signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a
>> dynamical interpretant--an *actual *effect on an interpreter as a
>> feeling (emotional interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or
>> a further sign (logical interpretant).  However, an interpreter who is
>> insufficiently acquainted with that system will be incapable of getting any
>> idea signified by the sign token, or might (as in my example) *misinterpret
>> *it as a token of a different sign type that belongs to a different
>> system.
>>
>> best,
>>
>> Auke
>>
>> Op 26 mei 2020 om 3:11 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
>>
>>
>> Auke, List:
>>
>> AvB:  The relevant part: "I have been accustomed to identify this
>> [immediate interpretant] with the effect the sign first produces or may
>> produce upon a mind".
>>
>> Peirce leaves two options open for the immediate interpretant here--it is 
>> *either
>> *the effect that the sign first (actually) produces upon a mind * or *the
>> effect that the sign may (possibly) produce upon a mind.  In order to
>> clarify this, I believe that the entire sentence is relevant, including a
>> clause that I am underlining here because it is omitted from the quotation
>> below.
>>
>> CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is, I think, very nearly, if not quite,
>> the same as your "Sense"; for I understand the former to be the total
>> unanalyzed effect that the Sign is calculated to prod

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Five Paths of Signs (Note)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

Thanks for the diagrams. A few comments at the moment:

1] Of course, we know that not all semiosic processes go through all
classes, and develop beliefs'. Much of our semiosic interactions are,
I think, Dicents and even though networked with 3ns as the ground
[ie, the rules of organization of this particular bird
morphology]….much of our semiosic interactions do not affect its
basic laws. 

2] it is interesting to see how important the RIL, or rhematic
indexical legisign is in the development of an interpretation. This
triad is a general law but functioning within a process of being
actually affected by its object "in such a manner as merely to draw
attention to that object' 2.259, ...and thus, it inserts Thirdness
into the process and then, moves the information into the DIL [Dicent
Indexical Legisign] which includes Thirdness but 'furnishes definite
information concerning that object. 2.260. 

I've always considered the RIL an important operative - because of
its connection to all three categories. Indeed, I see that only Path
1 ignores this RIL triad and opts instead for pure factuality until
it reaches the DIL [223]. 

3] But note, how Paths 4 and 5, even though they make use of this
RIL node, have a semiosic base which is heavily operative within
Firstness, within emotional content rather than factual and rapidly
moves this emotional into a 'final belief'. As you say- politics,
advertising etc - function within these paths. 

Fascinating. The opposition of the DIL [dicent indexical legisign;
223] ] to the RS [rhematic symbolic legisign; 133] is very clear -
and again - we see it in our political rhetoric and advertising.

Edwina
 On Tue 26/05/20 10:58 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
 Abstract:
 This text is a methodological complement for a "dynamic" use of the
lattice of the ten classes of signs.
 https://www.academia.edu/43167632/The_Five_Paths_of_Signs_Note_ [1] 

 Thanks for comments,Best regards,Robert 


Links:
--
[1] https://www.academia.edu/43167632/The_Five_Paths_of_Signs_Note_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon, List,


How does your definition of the immediate interpretant compare to what Peirce 
says in the following passage:  "The Immediate Interpretant consists in the 
Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual 
reaction"? (CP 8.315)


JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could signify 
within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant is 
whatever a sign token actually does signify on an individual occasion, and the 
final interpretant is whatever a sign itself necessarily would signify under 
ideal circumstances.


Notice the three features that are highlighted in Peirce's account. The 
immediate object of a sign is:


  1.  a Quality
  2.  of the Impression
  3.  that a sign is fit to produce

Let me try to frame a question. This account of the immediate interpretant 
seems to accept the further division Peirce draws between the presentation of 
immediate interpretants as possibles, existents and necessitants. How does this 
division apply to your definition?

Yours,

Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2020 9:57 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

Auke, List:

JAS:  I continue to stand by my own definitions.

AvB:  Own definitions? I only see citations.

My own definitions are stated in the very next sentence, copied verbatim from a 
previous post.

JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could signify 
within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant is 
whatever a sign token actually does signify on an individual occasion, and the 
final interpretant is whatever a sign itself necessarily would signify under 
ideal circumstances.

This is my summary based on Peirce's various descriptions of the three 
interpretants in his writings.  The quotations that I provided were intended to 
support my understanding of the immediate interpretant in particular.

JAS:  I am really trying to understand both the system and the process.

AvB:  is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph indicating 
your process view?

Yes, any actual effect of a sign token is a dynamical interpretant--a feeling 
(emotional), an exertion (energetic), or a further sign token (logical).  The 
sign token itself is its efficient cause, the immediate interpretant is its 
formal cause, and the final interpretant is its final cause.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 4:13 AM 
mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl>> wrote:

Jon Alen,

you wrote: I continue to stand by my own definitions.

Own definitions? I only see citations.

You wrote: I am really trying to understand both the system and the process.

My question: is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph 
indicating your process view?

Every sign in actu is a token of a type that belongs to a particular system of 
signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a dynamical 
interpretant--an actual effect on an interpreter as a feeling (emotional 
interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or a further sign (logical 
interpretant).  However, an interpreter who is insufficiently acquainted with 
that system will be incapable of getting any idea signified by the sign token, 
or might (as in my example) misinterpret it as a token of a different sign type 
that belongs to a different system.

best,

Auke

Op 26 mei 2020 om 3:11 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>:


Auke, List:

AvB:  The relevant part: "I have been accustomed to identify this [immediate 
interpretant] with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a 
mind".

Peirce leaves two options open for the immediate interpretant here--it is 
either the effect that the sign first (actually) produces upon a mind or the 
effect that the sign may (possibly) produce upon a mind.  In order to clarify 
this, I believe that the entire sentence is relevant, including a clause that I 
am underlining here because it is omitted from the quotation below.

CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is, I think, very nearly, if not quite, the 
same as your "Sense"; for I understand the former to be the total unanalyzed 
effect that the Sign is calculated to produce, or naturally might be expected 
to produce; and I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the 
sign first produces or may produce upon a mind, without any reflection upon it. 
(SS 110, 1909 Mar 14, underline added)

The effect that the sign is calculated to produce or naturally might be 
expected to produce or may produce is not necessarily the effect that the sign 
actually does produce--except perhaps in the initial moment of apprehension, 
before any reflection upon it whatsoever.  Later in the same paragraph, Peirce 
states, "I might describe my

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

JAS:  I continue to stand by my own definitions.

AvB:  Own definitions? I only see citations.


My own definitions are stated in the very next sentence, copied verbatim
from a previous post.

JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could*
signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical
interpretant is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify on an
individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign
itself *necessarily
would* signify under ideal circumstances.


This is my summary based on Peirce's various descriptions of the three
interpretants in his writings.  The quotations that I provided were
intended to support my understanding of the immediate interpretant in
particular.

JAS:  I am really trying to understand *both* the system *and* the process.

AvB:  is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph
indicating your process view?


Yes, any *actual* effect of a sign token is a *dynamical* interpretant--a
feeling (emotional), an exertion (energetic), or a further sign token
(logical).  The sign token itself is its efficient cause, the immediate
interpretant is its formal cause, and the final interpretant is its final
cause.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 4:13 AM  wrote:

> Jon Alen,
>
> you wrote: I continue to stand by my own definitions.
>
> Own definitions? I only see citations.
>
> You wrote: I am really trying to understand *both *the system *and *the
> process.
>
> My question: is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph
> indicating your process view?
>
> Every sign *in actu* is a token of a type that belongs to a particular
> system of signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a
> dynamical interpretant--an *actual *effect on an interpreter as a feeling
> (emotional interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or a
> further sign (logical interpretant).  However, an interpreter who is
> insufficiently acquainted with that system will be incapable of getting any
> idea signified by the sign token, or might (as in my example) *misinterpret
> *it as a token of a different sign type that belongs to a different
> system.
>
> best,
>
> Auke
>
> Op 26 mei 2020 om 3:11 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
>
>
> Auke, List:
>
> AvB:  The relevant part: "I have been accustomed to identify this
> [immediate interpretant] with the effect the sign first produces or may
> produce upon a mind".
>
> Peirce leaves two options open for the immediate interpretant here--it is 
> *either
> *the effect that the sign first (actually) produces upon a mind *or *the
> effect that the sign may (possibly) produce upon a mind.  In order to
> clarify this, I believe that the entire sentence is relevant, including a
> clause that I am underlining here because it is omitted from the quotation
> below.
>
> CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is, I think, very nearly, if not quite,
> the same as your "Sense"; for I understand the former to be the total
> unanalyzed effect that the Sign is calculated to produce*, or naturally
> might be expected to produce*; and I have been accustomed to identify
> this with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind,
> without any reflection upon it. (SS 110, 1909 Mar 14, underline added)
>
> The effect that the sign is *calculated *to produce or naturally might be 
> *expected
> *to produce or *may *produce is not necessarily the effect that the sign 
> *actually
> does* produce--except perhaps in the initial moment of apprehension,
> before any reflection upon it whatsoever.  Later in the same paragraph,
> Peirce states, "I might describe my Immediate Interpretation, as so much of
> a Sign that would enable a person to say whether or not the Sign was
> applicable to anything concerning which that person had sufficient
> acquaintance" (ibid).  In a letter to William James written on the very
> same day, he says that the immediate interpretant is the "Interpretant, as
> expressed ... what the [sign] expresses, *all *that it immediately
> expresses" (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14); and a couple of weeks later,
> he says that it "consists in the *Quality *of the Impression that a sign
> is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction" (CP 8.315, EP 2:500, 1909
> Apr 1).
>
> Taking all this into account, as well as Peirce's 1906 definition as
> quoted below and his statement to Lady Welby in another draft letter that
> the immediate interpretant is "the Interpretant represented or signified in
> the Sign" (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24-28), I continue to stand by my
> own definitions.  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly
> could* signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the
> dynamical interpretant is whatever a sign token *actually does* signify
> on an individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign
> itself *necessarily would* signify under ideal circumstances.
>
> AvB:  Here yo

[PEIRCE-L] The podium "enriched" of the universal categories of Peirce.

[robert marty]

This is an "enriched" version of the podium that complete  the one that
appears in the draft of my  article  awaiting publication: The podium of
the universal categories of C.S.Peirce


https://www.academia.edu/43168564/Podium_enriched

Thanks for comments,
Best Regards,
Robert
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] The Five Paths of Signs (Note)

[robert marty]

Abstract:
This text is a methodological complement for a "dynamic" use of the lattice
of the ten classes of signs.

https://www.academia.edu/43167632/The_Five_Paths_of_Signs_Note_

Thanks for comments,
Best regards,
Robert
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[a . breemen]

Jon Alen,

you wrote: I continue to stand by my own definitions. 

Own definitions? I only see citations. 


You wrote: I am really trying to understand both the system and the process. 

My question: is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph 
indicating your process view?

Every sign in actu is a token of a type that belongs to a particular system of 
signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a dynamical 
interpretant--an actual effect on an interpreter as a feeling (emotional 
interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or a further sign (logical 
interpretant).  However, an interpreter who is insufficiently acquainted with 
that system will be incapable of getting any idea signified by the sign token, 
or might (as in my example) misinterpret it as a token of a different sign type 
that belongs to a different system.


best,

Auke

Op 26 mei 2020 om 3:11 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :


Auke, List:

AvB:  The relevant part: "I have been accustomed to identify this [immediate 
interpretant] with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a 
mind".

Peirce leaves two options open for the immediate interpretant here--it is 
either the effect that the sign first (actually) produces upon a mind or the 
effect that the sign may (possibly) produce upon a mind.  In order to clarify 
this, I believe that the entire sentence is relevant, including a clause that I 
am underlining here because it is omitted from the quotation below.

CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is, I think, very nearly, if not quite, the 
same as your "Sense"; for I understand the former to be the total unanalyzed 
effect that the Sign is calculated to produce, or naturally might be expected 
to produce; and I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the 
sign first produces or may produce upon a mind, without any reflection upon it. 
(SS 110, 1909 Mar 14, underline added)

The effect that the sign is calculated to produce or naturally might be 
expected to produce or may produce is not necessarily the effect that the sign 
actually does produce--except perhaps in the initial moment of apprehension, 
before any reflection upon it whatsoever.  Later in the same paragraph, Peirce 
states, "I might describe my Immediate Interpretation, as so much of a Sign 
that would enable a person to say whether or not the Sign was applicable to 
anything concerning which that person had sufficient acquaintance" (ibid).  In 
a letter to William James written on the very same day, he says that the 
immediate interpretant is the "Interpretant, as expressed ... what the [sign] 
expresses, all that it immediately expresses" (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 
14); and a couple of weeks later, he says that it "consists in the Quality of 
the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction" (CP 
8.315, EP 2:500, 1909 Apr 1).

Taking all this into account, as well as Peirce's 1906 definition as quoted 
below and his statement to Lady Welby in another draft letter that the 
immediate interpretant is "the Interpretant represented or signified in the 
Sign" (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24-28), I continue to stand by my own 
definitions.  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could 
signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical 
interpretant is whatever a sign token actually does signify on an individual 
occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself necessarily 
would signify under ideal circumstances.

AvB:  Here you nicely illustrate our different viewpoints.
You write: every sign is part of some system of signs
I write: every sign in actu is part of a process of semiosis
as a result you try to understand the system, I the process of interpretation.

I am really trying to understand both the system and the process.  Every sign 
in actu is a token of a type that belongs to a particular system of signs and 
is determined by its dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant--an 
actual effect on an interpreter as a feeling (emotional interpretant), an 
exertion (energetic interpretant), or a further sign (logical interpretant).  
However, an interpreter who is insufficiently acquainted with that system will 
be incapable of getting any idea signified by the sign token, or might (as in 
my example) misinterpret it as a token of a different sign type that belongs to 
a different system.

JAS:  One difference that I have with Peirce is that I consider the written and 
spoken versions of the same language to be two distinct systems of signs.

AvB:  The bridge is furnished by the very same symbol called forth by either of 
the signs, i.e. the spoken and written forms of horse.

Thanks for this clarifying remark.  Indeed, I consider "horse" as written and 
"horse" as spoken to be two different types of the same sign.  From that 
standpoint, I agree that they belong to the same system of signs, so I suppose 
that going forwa