Jeff - I think that you misunderstand Monod.
You seem to take the title of his book 'Chance and Necessity' to
define his views of evolution as being due to either chance or
'necessity'. [tychism and anancasm]. The term of 'necessity' seems
to me, to mean 'predetermined' i.e., 'the principle according to
which something must be so, by virtue or logic or natural law'. I use
the term 'predetermined' because it was a key topic on the thread of
'destinate interpretant and predestinate opinion'.
As for Monod, he was a key figure in the development of the
biological theories of self-organization - iwhich rejects
predestinate morphologies.
Edwina
On Tue 26/05/20 4:15 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
[email protected] sent:
Edwina, List,
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie,
'that life is predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence
of man is predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does
begin with chance'.
Note that I did not use the term "predetermined." Neither did Monod
in the passage I cited.
Is there some reason that you decided to reframe the assertions
Monod made and the questions I was raising in terms of the conception
of what is or isn't "predetermined"?
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 2:21 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate
Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Jeff, list
I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your
description of him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use
of him in my own work in semiotics.
1] You write:
JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting
forward: "The universe is not pregnant with life nor the
biosphere with man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the
unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by
chance." (180)
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can
see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and
rejects each as implausible. "
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie,
'that life is predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence
of man is predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does
begin with chance'. 1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is
rejecting predetermined morphologies, ie, the predetermined
actualities of life. Instead, he posits self-organized evolution
based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration [ie, agapistic
evolution].
...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized
rather than predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his
notion of evolutionary freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear
no resemblance to the substrates or products of the enzyme {Kauffamn;
, S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11]. He includes functional
self-regulation which produces novel molecules which, however, fit
into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than
deviant adaptation.
It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite
similar to Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and
anacasm but I disagree.
Edwina
On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
[email protected] sent:
Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List,
The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing
metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative theory of
semiotics.
Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are
hard to make out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He
does a lot of hand waving and gesturing towards various sorts of
positions as he tries to locate his view within the larger conceptual
landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the many gaps in what he
says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, logic
and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly.
Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is
interested in looking more closely his monograph:
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf
Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
"The universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with
man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity
of the universe, out of which he emerged only by chance." (180)
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can
see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and
rejects each as implausible.
Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad
conceptions that have a long history. As a person who regularly
teaches Plato and Aristotle, I tend to start there in my discussion
of the nest of questions that typically surface in discussions of
these large ideas. Setting aside all of the details that would be
needed to make sense of how Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses fit into
the larger historical story, my sense is that one central question
that Monod seems largely to be ignoring is the following: what kind
of explanation can be given for the laws of physics, chemistry and
biology? Why do the laws that appear to govern these natural systems
take the shape that they do at this point in the evolution of the
cosmos? Peirce's answer, of course, is that the laws of nature are
themselves evolving.
Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by
saying they came about as a matter of chance? No. Is the evolution of
these laws adequately explained by saying that they are the result of
mechanical and necessary processes? No. Is the evolution of these
natural laws adequately explained by saying they came about in
virtue of a combination of the operation of chance and natural
necessity? No, not according to Peirce. I agree with him on these
questions.
As far as I can tell, Monod is not asserting the third kind of
explanation. Rather, he does not offer much if any explanation of the
evolution of the laws of nature themselves. Rather, he thinks it is
enough to explain the evolution of the populations of the
individuals that comprise the systems that are governed by such laws.
He attempts to explain the evolution of physical, chemical and
biological systems by appealing to a combination of chance and
natural necessity.
How might we classify Monod's explanatory strategy? Here are five
types of positions that Peirce considers:
Possible relations between law and chance in explaining the cosmos.
A holds that every feature of all facts conforms to some law. A 's
being the persons who admit the least arbitrariness. Most everything
is governed by law. Nothing happens by chance. Does A also hold that
every feature of every law is governed by some further law of
B holds that the law fully determines every fact, but thinks that
some relations of facts are accidental.
C holds that uniformity within its jurisdiction is perfect, but
confines its application to certain elements of phenomena.
D holds that uniformities are never absolutely exact, so that the
variety of the universe is forever increasing. At the same time we
hold that even these departures from law are subject to a certain
law of probability, and that in the present state of the universe
they are far too small to be detected by our observations.
E's being those who admit the most arbitrariness (most everything
happens by chance. Nothing is governed by law. (Variety and
Uniformity, CP 6.90)
The position that Peirce is developing fits the mold of D. The
position that Monod is developing seems to fit somewhere between B
and C.
Does Peirce formulate explanations that are teleological in
character when he explains the evolution of law? Yes, I think he
does. Does Peirce appeal to teleological explanations in explaining
self-controlled processes of reasoning. Yes. Do I agree with Peirce
on these matters? Broadly speaking, yes. I tend to think that his
hypotheses concerning the evolution of the laws of nature and the
systems that are governed by these laws are more plausible than
those that fit the models of A-C and F.
Hope that helps.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:34 AM
To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and
Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...) Edwina, Jon,
Robert, Jeff, List, I am wondering about the difference between
Telos and Purpose: Is it so, that Telos is a Purpose, but not one of
the individual´s mind, but of a mind of a system on another
classificational level, or, speaking with Salthe, at another
subsumption level? Then the individual is acting according to this
telos or purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture, species, genus,
life as a whole, or universe as a whole, and the telos is inherited.
A super-telos of evolution is individuation, meaning, that
instructions for acting shall not only come from such
super-systems´ minds , but from the individual´s mind, meaning,
that telos is more and more substituted by purpose, and evolution
provides the means therefore, like brain,
thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity, etc.? Best,
Helmut Sonntag, 24. Mai 2020 um 15:10 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
Jeff, list
I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely
different views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them
compatible.
I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt
he supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely
biological evolution but also the development of thought and
knowledge. . I no longer have a copy of Monod's work in my library -
but - my recollection and quotes from old papers is that Monod most
certainly was not what one might term a 'neo-Darwinist', ie,
anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought - with
'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his
point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as
Peirce said, these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This
means that interactions - as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or
haphazard but chosen for their positive functionality
I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is
teleological; there is no predetermined agenda or identity; all that
we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving into ever more complex and varied
morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the purpose being the
development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin to an
ideal [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an
open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the
'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And
above all, the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible
with Monod's rejection of teleology and to permit both chance and
transformation. .."nature is objective and not projective' [1971;3]
and self-regulating.
Edwina
On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
[email protected] sent:
Robert, Jon, List,
It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of
metaphysical hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution
proceeds, in some sense, from random variations. From this common
starting point, the positions differ on a number of points, including
the following:
Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed
of potency for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the
dough of creation. By the time living organisms evolve in the history
of the cosmos, the seed has been sprouting as the laws of physics,
inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry have evolved. One
considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over those of
Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the
ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.
On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of
formulating hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical
validity while in the grips of a metaphysical theory. Instead,
common sense tells us that the normative requirements for the
conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct that is
self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it
would not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is
teleological in orientation because it is based on the idea that the
conduct of inquiry involves purposes and principles that may be
reviewed, criticized, and reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential
writings of Camus and Sartre, seems to agree with these common-sense
ideas concerning the purpose-driven character of the conduct of
inquiry.
Having said that, Monod seems to go further. Drawing on the kinds
of assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold
that the deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be
consciously selected by each individual in a radically free act of
choice. Otherwise, the purposes and principles are not authentic.
Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees
with these radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about
the origins of meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical
and moral principles has been evolving for many centuries. What is
more, this wisdom is possessed by the larger human community and not
by any one individual.
The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can
help us see some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory
logic rests on principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part,
I think that Peirce is on a more fruitful track when it comes to the
question of what should be taken as the data for a normative theory
of logic. The data should be arguments that the larger community
holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the test of time.
It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of
arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the
evaluation of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the
underlying purposes and principles are based on a radically free act
of choice by that individual.
As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting
the sorts of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to
offer for the sake of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or
a theory of logic as semiotics.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate
Opinion (was To put an end ...) Robert, Helmut, List: RM:
In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's
statements as an argument of authority. HR: Peirce is not
necessarily always right, is he? This comment and question both
indicate a misunderstanding of my intent. I am not suggesting that
there must be final causes in nature because Peirce says so, which
would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would suggesting
that there cannot be final causes in nature merely because Democritus
and Monod say so. I am simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly
(and repeatedly) affirms that there are final causes in nature, such
that denying the reality of final causes is straightforwardly
disagreeing with Peirce. I trust that no one disputes this. HR:
"For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a
definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it? No, why
suggest that? Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose of
an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation. The reality
of final causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and
atheism does not, by itself, entail the rejection of final causation.
RM: Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to
without a final cause there would be no evolution, arguing that
evolution itself is the realization of an end, which will no longer
be challenged by the science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which
would have provided evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I
suppose) would be an old-fashioned one who can be mocked. There is
nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is right and that
Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do), with in addition
a major scientific support ... HR: One may also assume, that
evolution is continuous adaption without an end. One may assume
that, but for Peirce such "continuous adaptation" would not be a
synonym for biological evolution. After all, by itself random
variation is insufficient; natural selection also must come into
play, and it is not the brute necessity of the "necessitarianism"
that Peirce routinely dismissed as untenable. Instead, fitness for a
particular environment is the telos of biological evolution--its ideal
end or final cause, a "would-be" that is never perfectly realized,
because if it were, then the process would cease. This philosophical
observation is perfectly consistent with not only the science of
Peirce's time, but also the science of today. HR: And
when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived to operate without
having been the purpose of any mind", had he forgotten then, that he
had claimed that the universe has a mind? No, because he did not
say that a final cause may be conceived to operate without any mind at
all, he said that it may be conceived to operate without having been
the purpose of any mind. Again, intentional agency is not required
for final causation, and Peirce's concept of mind (and thought) is
much broader than that. "It appears in the work of bees, of
crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no
more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes,
etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906). HR: The
big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically proven.
No theory is "scientifically proven" in the sense of being absolutely
definitive and infallible. Peirce's cosmological hypothesis is that
the entire universe is constantly evolving (3ns) at the present from
being utterly indeterminate (1ns) in the infinite past to being
utterly determinate (2ns) in the infinite future. These are not
actual states, they are ideal states that are approached but never
reached, like the asymptotes of a hyperbola. HR: Organisms who
have brains apply a third kind of causation, volitional or example
causation: They remember or anticipate something they want to get.
This is still final causation, but it is the specific kind that
manifests as an agent having a purpose. In my view, influenced by
what Menno Hulswit has written on the subject, formal causation
corresponds to 1ns, efficient causation to 2ns, and final causation
to 3ns. This is evident in the division of signs according to the
relation with the dynamical object--the latter is the formal cause of
an iconic sign, the efficient cause of an indexical sign, and the
final cause of a symbolic sign. We can also see it in the three
interpretants--the efficient cause of the dynamical (effective)
interpretant is the sign token itself, while its formal cause is the
immediate (explicit) interpretant and its final cause is the final
(destinate) interpretant. Consequently, every sign always
(logically) has an immediate interpretant (as a may-be) and a final
interpretant (as a would-be), but a token is only involved in the
continuous (temporal) process of semeiosis when the dynamical object
determines it to determine a dynamical (actual) interpretant. This
degenerate triadic relation, which is reducible to its constituent
dyadic relations, is governed by the genuine and irreducible triadic
relation between the dynamical object, the sign itself, and the final
interpretant. Semeiosis without such final causation (3ns) is not
genuine semeiosis at all, but rather degenerate semeiosis as strictly
efficient-causal action (2ns) due to "inveterate habits becoming
physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1.293, 1891). This is also insufficient
for evolution because it lacks the aspect of generalization, as
Peirce explains. CSP: Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not
make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist
in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more
to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined,
which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. (CP
5.433, EP 2:343, 1905) Those generals that "the existent comes
more and more to embody" by means of the "process of evolution" are
both destined and reasonable. But what did Peirce "just now"
describe as "destined" a few paragraphs earlier? CSP: Now, just
as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain
habits of conduct, the nature of which ... does not depend upon any
accidental circumstances, and in that sense may be said to be
destined; so, thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic,
tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the
nature of which will be the same in the end, however the perversity
of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement of the
ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually
assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he
seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of
"real," the state of things which will be believed in that ultimate
opinion is real. (CP 5.430, EP 2:342) Something is "destined"
in the relevant sense if its nature "does not depend upon any
accidental circumstances." The paradigmatic examples are
self-controlled "habits of conduct," which are beliefs as the final
interpretants of propositions, and the "ultimate opinion" after
infinite inquiry by an infinite community, whose dynamical object is
reality as a whole and whose final interpretant is the truth. This
is the telos of all semeiosis, its ideal end or final cause, the aim
of every sincere inquirer even though "the perversity of thought of
whole generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate
fixation." RM: I am very grateful to you for producing a
comparative analysis and I look forward to it with great interest.
There are some hints of it here and in my other post this
evening, but more is still to come. Thanks for your interest and
patience. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 2:55 PM robert marty wrote:
Jon Alan , List
In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use
CSP's statements as an argument of authority. Indeed, the quotation
CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a final cause there
would be no evolution, arguing that evolution itself is the
realization of an end, which will no longer be challenged by the
science of its time (in 1902, I presume) which would have provided
evidence of it. The old notion (Democrite I suppose) would be an
old-fashioned one who can be mocked.
There is nothing these and who think like me that Democrite is
right and that Jacques Monod is his continuator (he claims to do),
with in addition a major scientific support; and I guess it wouldn't
be sacrilege if someone sent the compliment back to CSP, 117 years
later. Moreover, his proclaimed fallible allowed us to yet would
oblige us to do so ...
CP 1.211 is still an opinion that concerns only, it seems to me,
the supporters of the final cause.
I am very grateful to you for producing a comparative analysis and
I look forward to it with great interest.
Best regards
Robert
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