Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis (was Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion)
Robert, List: This post responds to your comments under #3, #4, and #5 below. I apologize for its resulting length. RM: And following here is Oi who is, or is in "the logical universe of discourse", a new universe that is described as "logical" by a not knew authority, don't related to the previous one and is not precised but I suppose it is included Again, the commens is a vast copulative proposition consisting of "all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter" of a particular sign token (EP 2:478, 1906). The immediate object of *any* proposition is the collection of all the immediate objects of the terms that it involves--i.e., whatever abstract qualities/relations and concrete things they *possibly could* denote as *subjects *of the proposition in accordance with their modes of presentation as descriptives and designatives (more on this below). "But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite" (NEM 3:885, 1908). That is what I mean by "the logical universe of discourse." RM: we learn that it has be "as established by collateral experience/observation that the utterer and interpreter have in common." hence I deduce that in every commun mind (A, B) there are only the personal experiences and observations of the utterer and the receiver. Yes, in the sense that every determination of a mind by a sign is a contribution to that mind's *experience*--"the total cognitive result of living" (CP 7.538, 1899), "that of a cognitive nature which the history of our lives has forced upon us" (CP 5.539, c. 1902-3), and "what the course of life has *compelled* me to think" (CP 8.330, 1904). "The person who interprets that sentence (or any other Sign whatsoever) must be determined by the Object of it through collateral observation quite independently of the action of the Sign. Otherwise he will not be determined to [the] thought of that object" (CP 8.178, EP 2:493, 1909). RM: I can't imagine two people who in their lives have never met the word "logical" and have no idea what logic is, could build such a universe every time they communicate. There is no need to "build" anything, since everything in the commens is *already *well understood by both parties "at the outset" (EP 2:478, 1906). Two people who had absolutely nothing in common would be unable to start communicating at all. RM: But now you're writing "The immediate object of the sign itself is how it identifies those objects--e.g., descriptive words and/or designative gestures--" which obliges me to return to my previous understanding since we have two immediate objects, the first is associated with the commens (or perhaps in the commens) and the second is associated with the sign and describes as a "how" that is to "identify" "these" objects, "these" denoting Od and Oi in their respective universes. The sign itself would show in some way these two objects that is to say that it is the sign that would designate the Od and the Oi. First, the immediate object of any sign is always *internal* to that sign--or as Peirce put it, "within the Sign" as the "hint" by which "[t]he Sign must indicate" its dynamical object (EP 2:480, 1908). It is the sign's "object as it is represented" (CP 8.333, 1904), "the Object as the Sign itself represents it" (CP 4.536, 1906), "the Object as the Sign represents it" (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908), "the Object as cognized in the Sign" (CP 8.183, EP 2:495, 1909), "the Object as represented in the sign" (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909), and "the form under which the Sign presents its Object" (ILT 284, 1910). In other words, the sign does not designate the Oi, it designates the Od *by means of* the Oi within it. Second, this is in fact the *primary *function of the immediate object-- *identifying *"the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign *cannot *express, which it can only *indicate *and leave the interpreter to find out by *collateral experience*" (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909). Put another way, for any sign, "acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience" (EP 2:480, 1908). Again, I prefer to use "collateral experience" when such familiarity must have been obtained in the *past *and "collateral observation" when it must be acquired at the *present*, as in the example that Peirce gives in the very next sentence--"For instance, I point my finger to what I mean, but I can't make my companion know what I mean, if he can't see it, or if seeing it, it does not, to his mind, separate itself from the surrounding objects in the field of vision" (ibid). Third, this is the basis for my distinction between "descriptive words and designative gestures." A descriptive, such as a word, is a term whose immediate object relies on the interpreter being acquainted with its meaning within the system of s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The sciences: mathematical and classificatory
John S, Robert, Jon A, List, Here are a few questions about the philosophical import of the mathematics of category theory. I'm hoping that you might have some ideas that would shed some light on the matter. 1. Category theory represents a class of objects as nodes and then connections are made in terms of directed arrows. It has the general aim of exploring structure-preserving morphisms within a mathematical system (e.g., a topology). Similarly, it can be used to explore maps between different systems of objects (e.g., between sets and groups). In these two respects, category theory bears a striking resemblance to the system of representations and resulting analysis developed by A.B Kempe in his A Memoir of the Theory of Mathematical Form. The upshot of both systems is that they enable the user to study the composition and decomposition of relations within and between virtually any mathematical system. Do you find the similarities between contemporary category theory and Kempe's system similarly striking? 2. Peirce was much impressed with the depth of the Kempe's insights into the formal features that are essential for inquiry in any area of mathematics. At this same time, he thought that Kempe's analyses fell short in a number of respects. One shortcoming was the result of treating objects as nodes that are connected by several arrows. This mirrors a central feature of Euler's graph theory. Peirce raises an objection that this does not provide the resources needed to analyze objects that are connected by three or more arrows in Kempe's systems. Peirce thought that the introduction of a branching relation that is inherently triadic in character might help to remedy this shortcoming. Do any of Peirce's objections apply both to Kempe's analysis of mathematical form and to contemporary category theory? 3. One of the striking features of category theory is that it enables the user to compare the structural features of wildly different types of mathematical systems. As such, systems that are infinite and continuous can be compared directly with systems that finite and discrete. Given Peirce's classification of these different kinds of mathematical systems, where does category theory itself fall? In particular, does the category of categories (i.e., the application of the theory to itself) belong to the part of mathematics that studies infinite and continuous systems, or does it belong to the study of systems that are finite and discrete, or does it fall somewhere in the middle? Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: John F. Sowa Sent: Friday, May 29, 2020 6:19:48 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The sciences: mathematical and classificatory Robert and Jon, I was browsing through and deleting some old email, and I came across the points quoted below. I also remember that Jon claimed that Peirce's word 'classificatory' for normative science made it sound trivial. But there are only three kinds of science: (1) mathematical, (2) classificatory. and (3) some combination of #1 and #2 in various proportions. Physics, after Galileo and Newton, became highly mathematical, but it has always depended on classification for its choice of hypotheses. Chemistry began as the classificatory science of alchemy, but it became more and more mathematical as it used physics to interpret and develop its study of the phenomena. And biology was almost purely classificatory until the late 20th century. As for phaneroscopy, Peirce derived his semeiotic by applying mathematics to the analysis of experiences in the phaneron. (See R602, Photometric Researches, and the sections of CP vol. 1 which the editors labeled 'Phenomenology'.) Pure mathematics (which includes mathematical logic) is the only science that is purely mathematical. But mathematics in practice depends on the classificatory sciences for the choice of various hypotheses to study. As for phaneroscopy, Peirce derived his semeiotic by applying mathematics to the analysis of experiences in the phaneron. (See R602, Photometric Researches, and the sections of CP vol. 1, which the editors labeled 'Phenomenology'.) That is why I used the term "formal semeiotic" for the methods Peirce used to derive his categories. And I agree that mathematical category theory is a powerful method for analyzing the structure. I believe that it makes a strong case for the label "formal". The next step after deriving formal semeiotic is to use it to classify the open-ended variety of phenomena labeled aesthetics, ethics, and rhetoric -- essentially every book on those subjects from Aristotle to the present. All the work on government and legal matters combines ethics and rhetoric with some logic (mostly limited to Aristotle's version). All that work is classificatory, and it's by no me
[PEIRCE-L] The sciences: mathematical and classificatory
Robert and Jon, I was browsing through and deleting some old email, and I came across the points quoted below. I also remember that Jon claimed that Peirce's word 'classificatory' for normative science made it sound trivial. But there are only three kinds of science: (1) mathematical, (2) classificatory. and (3) some combination of #1 and #2 in various proportions. Physics, after Galileo and Newton, became highly mathematical, but it has always depended on classification for its choice of hypotheses. Chemistry began as the classificatory science of alchemy, but it became more and more mathematical as it used physics to interpret and develop its study of the phenomena. And biology was almost purely classificatory until the late 20th century. As for phaneroscopy, Peirce derived his semeiotic by applying mathematics to the analysis of experiences in the phaneron. (See R602, Photometric Researches, and the sections of CP vol. 1 which the editors labeled 'Phenomenology'.) Pure mathematics (which includes mathematical logic) is the only science that is purely mathematical. But mathematics in practice depends on the classificatory sciences for the choice of various hypotheses to study. As for phaneroscopy, Peirce derived his semeiotic by applying mathematics to the analysis of experiences in the phaneron. (See R602, Photometric Researches, and the sections of CP vol. 1, which the editors labeled 'Phenomenology'.) That is why I used the term "formal semeiotic" for the methods Peirce used to derive his categories. And I agree that mathematical category theory is a powerful method for analyzing the structure. I believe that it makes a strong case for the label "formal". The next step after deriving formal semeiotic is to use it to classify the open-ended variety of phenomena labeled aesthetics, ethics, and rhetoric -- essentially every book on those subjects from Aristotle to the present. All the work on government and legal matters combines ethics and rhetoric with some logic (mostly limited to Aristotle's version). All that work is classificatory, and it's by no means trivial. John --- RM> Thank you very much John for these texts I did not ... I could have known the R602 since I had access to microfilmed manuscripts, but at the time, I was mainly interested in sign classifications and I did not think that this ms could contain such assertions . I particularly remember this sentence: "Phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of mathematics. The type of mathematics depends on the application, and there is no limit on the amount and depth of mathematics that may be needed" that I have had the opportunity to show to all those who will tell me that it does not have the ability to access the elementary definitions of category theory ... "Scientific research is a fighting sport".--JFS> Your summary of the issues is very good, and I strongly agree with the need for examples. In a search for examples, I went back to _Photometric Researches_, which I believe is essential for understanding the development of Peirce's philosophy. It's not an accident that it was published in 1878, the same year in which "How to make our ideas clear" was published in _Popular Science Monthly_. (Peirce met the editor of that magazine when they were both in Sicily, observing the solar eclipse.) The title of Chapter 1 is "The sensation of light." See http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf . On page 2, he wrote "Light considered purely as something in the external world may be called _noumenal light_. Light considered as an appearance, and as a function of the sensation, such that it is measured by the convention just mentioned, may be termed _phenomenal light_. Photometry generally concerns phenomenal light..." Just reading a few pages (my PRexperts, for example) is enough to show how deeply Peirce's phaneroscopy is grounded in his scientific and engineering research. It's also important to compare that research with R602, which was written after his 1903 classification of the sciences. See http://jfsowa.com/peirce/r602.htm : p 12> But preliminary to normative science, which is essentially classificatory, stop to take that well in, I beg you, gentle reader, there should be a nomological science, which shall make out all the different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how they can be varied and combined. This science I hesitate to call phenomenology after Hegal, for fear of marring his peculiar conception of it; and therefore, though I think it is essentially the same thing under a somewhat different aspect, I will name phaneroscopy. p 13> It is the science of the different elementary constituents of all ideas. Its material [m13] is, of course, universal experience, experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract, as well as of the concrete and real. Yet to suppose that
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Theory and Analysis of Semeiosis (was Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion)
Supplement: I did not want to question your view, perhaps both views/models are justified, one is objective, and one subjective. Would it be interesting to draw Venn diagrams and EGs about the triads possible/existent/necessitant, 1ns/2ns/3ns, immediate/dynamic/final, and others? Best, Helmut 28. Mai 2020 um 22:26 Uhr "Helmut Raulien" wrote: Jon, List, The possibility of the immediate object (similar with the immediate interpretant) you describe is a relation between the sign and the world, mathematically correct, I assume: The subset of all tuples of sign-elements and world-elements (s,w), for which is valid "s may denote w". But Peirce also says, that the immediate object is the object as conveyed by the sign. But does a sign really transmit such a huge subset? Or are there two meanings of "possibility": On one hand it just is like opening a window to yet unknown visions for the future, just an offer of connectivity, and on the other hand "possibility" is all that is possible? I mean, does a sign always harness the whole phaneron, stirring the whole phaneron-machine, making it click, or is it a quite isolated thing trying to get access to it? Best, Helmut 28. Mai 2020 um 03:35 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" Robert, List: As promised, I will attempt to offer my own semeiotic analysis of my post from last week (included below) for comparison with your parable (also included below). For the sake of clarity, I will first review how I employ the terminology, seeking to be as faithful as possible to Peirce's own usage while recognizing that there are some differences. For the sake of (relative) brevity, I will omit supporting quotes and citations. As the sender, I am the utterer, and every recipient who reads the post is an interpreter. The post itself is a sign token, the embodiment of a sign type, which is a definitely significant form. It consists almost entirely of questions, each of which is likewise a token of a type. Two of the nine questions have one word in italics for emphasis as a sign tone, which is an indefinite significant character. Every question expresses a proposition, and the dynamical object of every proposition--what it actually does denote--is the entire universe of reality. Its immediate object is the logical universe of discourse--the collection of everything that the terms involved in it possibly could denote to an interpreter who possesses the necessary familiarity with them by virtue of collateral experience in the past and/or collateral observation at the present. Those items are described by each term's immediate interpretant, which is simply its definition--whatever it possibly could signify to an interpreter who is sufficiently acquainted with the system of sign types to which it belongs; in this case, written English. An event of semeiosis happens when a dynamical object determines a sign token to determine an individual interpreter to a dynamical interpretant--what the sign token actually does signify to that interpreter on that occasion, which is its effect as a feeling (emotional interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or a further sign token (logical interpretant). This can be (and often is) different for different interpreters under different circumstances, although treating each of them as a discrete occurrence is an artifact of analysis, because real semeiosis is truly continuous. The final interpretant is what the sign itself necessarily would signify to any interpreter under ideal circumstances--the habit toward which all the different dynamical interpretants determined by different tokens of different types of the same sign would converge over the course of infinite inquiry by an infinite community. In summary, the sign token is the efficient cause of the dynamical interpretant, the immediate interpretant is its formal cause, and the final interpretant is its final cause. In a very different sense, the dynamical (dynamoid) object determines the immediate object, which determines the sign, which determines the final (destinate) interpretant, which determines the dynamical (effective) interpretant, which determines the immediate (explicit) interpretant. This is not a temporal sequence of strictly dyadic efficient-causal relations, but rather a logical scheme for identifying which 28 sign classes are really possible out of the 729 that are mathematically possible, based on the universe to which each correlate in turn belongs. There are three such universes, which are distinguished by three modalities of being that correspond to Peirce's three phenomenological categories and consist respectively of possibles (1ns), existents (2ns), or necessitants (3ns). The governing rule for sign classification is that a possible can only determine a possible, a necessitant can only be determined by a necessitant, and an existent can determine either a possible or an existent while being determined b
